





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
HISTORY
OF THE
CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

BY
THE COMTE DE PARIS.

PUBLISHED BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE AUTHOR.

VOLUME I.

PHILADELPHIA:
PORTER & COATES.




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THIS VOLUME COMPRISES VOLUMES I. AND II. OF THE FRENCH
EDITION, WITHOUT ABRIDGMENT.



PREFACE TO THE FRENCH EDITION.

MUCH was said in France about the American civil war while it lasted. But the documents necessary to a full understanding of it as a whole, and to follow it in its details, were then wanting. Since that time public attention has been diverted by the events which have occurred in Europe. Nevertheless, this war in the New World may be useful to study, even after those of which our continent was the theatre in 1866 and 1870. At a time when labor and contemplation are the duty of all, no page of contemporaneous military history should be neglected.

Having been kindly received in the armies of the young republic, which remembers the support given by France to the first defenders of its independence, and has not failed to place the name of Bourbon among those who are to perpetuate its memory on its soil, it has been the wish of the author to present his grateful testimony to his late companions in arms. In writing his personal recollections, he has been led to describe a war some incidents of which have come within his own personal observation. Notwithstanding his legitimate preferences for the cause he served, he has endeavored to preserve, throughout his narrative, the strictest impartiality. He has examined, with equal care, the documents that have emanated from both parties; and if his work be a reflex of the vicissitudes in the midst of which it was prosecuted, he believes that it possesses, at least, the merit of precision and sincerity.

PARIS, September, 1875.

GENTLEMEN: The necessities of an early publication of the translation of my History of the Civil War in America having prevented me from revising that translation before the present issue, I must leave upon Mr. Tasistro the responsibility of his work; but his ability is a sufficient guarantee that this work has been accomplished with care and accuracy. It has therefore been agreed between my publishers, Messrs. Lévy, and myself to grant to the translation, since it is to be published by yourselves, the exclusive copyright in England, according to the forms prescribed by international treaties, and, in America, the right of giving out your edition as the only one authorized by myself.

My History has been written rather for the instruction of the European public than for Transatlantic readers, to whom every incident of the war is already familiar. I trust that my account of these great events will, at least, not provoke a too bitter controversy; for if I have been obliged to judge and to censure, I have done so without any personal or partial feeling against any one, with a sincere respect for truth and a keen sense of the responsibility which I assumed. I hope, moreover, that your readers will acknowledge that I have tried to make Europe understand the magnitude of the strife which divided the New World, the extent of the sacrifices borne by the American people, and the heroism displayed by both sides on the bloody fields of battle. I should be proud to have my share in raising the monument which is to perpetuate the memory of that heroism and the glory of the American soldier, without distinction between the blue and the gray coats.

Believe me, gentlemen,

Yours truly,

I. P. d'ORLEANS,

Comte de Paris.

MESSRS. J. H. COATES & Co.

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

WHEN I was called by the publisher to the task of editing this work, I was at first doubtful as to the extent and limit of my labors. The English version of Mr. L. F. Tasistro, an experienced translator, had already been made, and was placed in my hands. After a very careful revision of it, particularly as to military details and technicalities, with which my former life had rendered me more familiar, I found myself really limited to seeing the volume properly through the press, with scarcely a comment. The very few editorial notes are upon points of fact or statistics.

It would have been unbecoming in me to argue upon controverted questions, national, political, or military, upon which, after careful investigation and mature deliberation, the author has expressed himself decidedly.

Least of all have I considered it within my province to say a word as to his estimates of individuals and their relations to the government.

He has himself said that his history was written for European readers, who desire to know only his impressions and conclusions. But the book will be largely read in this country by people more capable of judging its facts and its philosophy.

This I may be permitted to say : He has produced a book displaying careful research, cool judgment, and a manifest purpose to be just to all. It is vigorous in style, scholarly without a touch of pedantry ; his battle-pictures are effective from their great simplicity ; the battle fights itself under the reader's eyes. So varied and skilful is the handling of the narrative that the

interest does not flag for a moment, even when he deals with dry statistics. In a large and philosophic view of American institutions he has rivalled De Tocqueville. Although his service was short in this country, he gained a full knowledge of the machinery and working of our government, and was a witness of the marvellous creation of a colossal army out of nothing.

He has thus been enabled to use intelligently the large materials he has collected, and to present the first portion of what must be regarded as an admirable history of the greatest war, as to numbers, extent of territory, and importance of issue, the world has ever seen.

Not one word has been altered or omitted from the original; the only change is in form. To bring it more readily within the scope of all who desire to read it, the first two French volumes have been compressed into one of the American edition, and a similar arrangement will be adopted for the following volumes.

The maps necessary to a clear understanding of the text have been exactly reproduced; only the general maps of large sections of country have been omitted, as they may be supplied by any good American atlas within the reader's reach.

The French metrical system of measurement has been retained in the translation, because it is already greatly used in this country and taught in our schools, and because, although on a scale the transfer is easy from miles to kilometres, etc., it is difficult to make the transfer in decimals throughout the text.

For convenience the reader is reminded that a *metre* = 39.38 American inches; a *centimetre*, the one hundredth of a metre, = .3938 of an inch; *kilometre* = .62 of a mile. It may further be observed that as the map scales are simply fractions of any unit, as 60,000 to 1, etc., distances may be laid off at once in our measures by assuming our unit.

HENRY COPPÉE.

FOUNTAIN HILL, SOUTH BETHLEHEM, Nov. 9, 1875.

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THE
CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

BOOK I.—THE AMERICAN ARMY.

CHAPTER I.

THE VOLUNTEERS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

AT the beginning of the year 1861 one of those acts of violence which ambitious men are often able to disguise under names the more attractive in proportion as their motives are most culpable, occurred to rend the republic of the United States, and enkindled civil war.

A *coup d'état* was attempted against the Constitution of that republic by the powerful oligarchy which ruled in the South and had long controlled in the councils of the nation. On the day when the common law, which guarantees alike to the poor and the outcast respect for their individual rights, and to the majority the full enjoyment of political power, is violated by any portion of the community, if the outrage be not severely repressed, despotism is established in the land.

Beaten in the presidential elections of 1860, the Southern States sought to regain by intimidation or force the influence they had exercised until then in the interest of slavery; and while shouting aloud the words "Independence and liberty," they trampled the solemn contract under foot as soon as the national ballot had declared against their policy. But success, that great apologist of predestinarians, failed them, and victory favored the cause of right and loyalty. Then it was seen what treasures of energy the free and constant practice of liberty hoards up for a people fortunate enough to possess it and sufficiently wise to guard it.

America had already solved one of the most difficult problems of our age by developing free institutions in the midst of a democratic society ; but no great internal crisis had yet arisen to try their solidity. Many people had asserted that the first storm would wrench this fragile plant from a soil that could not afford it sustenance. The storm-wind of civil war arose, and, contrary to these predictions, the vigorous tree of American institutions, spreading its shadow over the country where it had taken such deep root, saved it from impending destruction. In this crisis, the American people learned to appreciate their Constitution even more than they had done in the past ; and they proved to the world that the statue of Liberty is not a worthless idol, deaf in the hour of danger, but the holy symbol of a powerful divinity which may be invoked in seasons of adversity.

Therefore, although war always presents a cruel aspect, we may, at least, examine the one that has lately rent America without experiencing that profound and unmitigated sadness which the triumphs of violence and injustice inspire. It is interesting to observe how that victory, so long disputed, the results of which are patent to every observer, although the causes are difficult to unravel from a distance, was achieved. In this study, as important to the soldier as to the statesman, we should doubtless take into consideration the difference of institutions, customs, and many peculiar circumstances ; but on the other hand, we should not reject without examination precious examples and dearly bought experiences, under the pretext that what has succeeded in America cannot be applied to Europe.

The work we have undertaken is essentially a military history. We shall not, therefore, attempt to describe the constitutional struggles and the political events which brought on the war, a narrative of which we present in these pages. But at a time when the misfortunes of our own country impart a peculiar importance to all questions of military organization, we have thought this narrative would appear incomplete if we did not begin by placing before the reader a somewhat detailed account of the resources of the two adversaries, how they made use of them, the services rendered to both parties by a corps of regular army officers, well trained and brought up under the influence of excellent traditions,

and finally the improvisation of the large armies which sustained that long war. This preliminary exposition will show how those armies, finding themselves on both sides in an analogous condition, were able to organize and gradually acquire a military character, without being exposed to the disasters which both would have experienced if from the commencement they had had to fight with veteran and disciplined troops.

We must, therefore, in the first place, show in a rapid sketch what the American army was previous to 1861. Although the Americans were not a military people, they had had occasion to exhibit certain warlike qualities. During their short history they already had precedents for the organization of their national forces, and a small knot of brave and devoted men had preserved from oblivion the traditions acquired in campaigns instructive if not brilliant.

Without dwelling at length on the wars in which the American soldier figured prior to 1861, it is necessary that we should say a few words on the subject. The reader will the better understand the remarkable movement which called large armies into existence at the first rumor of civil war, when he has seen how volunteer corps were formed at other epochs in the history of the young republic. After having followed the small regular army to the far West and to Mexico, the part it played in the great military organization of the Federals and the Confederates will be understood.

It was against our soldiers in the Seven Years' War that the American volunteers, then composing the militia of an English colony, made their *début* in arms. This fact may be recalled to mind not only without bitterness, since, Heaven be praised! the flag of the United States, since it has been afloat, has never been found opposed to that of France on the field of battle, but also as a remembrance constituting an additional tie between them and us. For, during the unequal struggle which decided the ownership of the new continent, those militia-men received some useful lessons while contending with the handful of heroic men who defended our empire beyond the seas in spite of a forgetful country.

The soldiers of the war of independence were formed in that

school. Montcalm, even more than Wolfe, was the instructor of those adversaries who very soon undertook to avenge him. It was while endeavoring to supplant the French on the borders of the Ohio, by long and frequently disastrous expeditions, that the founder of the American nation gave the first indications of that indefatigable energy which in the end triumphed over every obstacle. It was the example of the defenders of Fort Carillon, in holding an English army in check from behind a miserable breastwork, which inspired at a later period the combatants of Bunker Hill. It was the surrender of Washington at Fort Necessity, and the disaster of Braddock at Fort Duquesne, which taught the future conquerors of Saratoga how, in those wild countries, to embarrass the march of an enemy, to cut off his supplies, to neutralize his advantages, until, at last, he was either captured or annihilated.

So that, although at first despised in the aristocratic ranks of the regular English army, the *provincial militia*, as they were then called, soon learned how to make themselves appreciated, and to compel respect from their enemies. In that war, so different from those waged in Europe, in those conflicts carried on in the midst of a wild and wooded country, they already displayed all the qualities which have since characterized the American—shrewdness, strength, valor, and personal intelligence.

These qualities were again displayed when, fifteen years later, they took up arms once more, under the name of *volunteers* or *national militia*, in order to shake off the oppressive yoke of the mother-country; but they had no longer the intelligent officers of the English army to direct them, nor the old regular forces to support them at the critical moment. Their *rôle* of auxiliaries had but poorly prepared them to sustain alone the great struggle which patriotism imposed upon them. Beside Washington no colonial officer had ever figured in a high rank. Consequently, the French who came with Lafayette to place their experience at the service of the young American army brought to the latter most valuable assistance. But their best ally, their greatest strength, was that perseverance which enabled them to turn a defeat to advantage instead of succumbing under it. This was demonstrated when the arrival of Rochambeau furnished them the opportunity to undertake that splendid and decisive cam-

paign which transferred the war from the borders of the Hudson into Virginia, and ended it by one blow in the trenches of Yorktown.

The late events which have steeped the United States in blood impart a peculiar interest to the study of the war of American independence. The theatre is the same, the character of the country has changed but little since then, and on both sides the actors are the descendants of the soldiers of Washington. In that first attempt of the young American nation to organize its military power we shall find precedents for what was done in 1861, and in the meagre armies of the last century the model of those which, in our own day, have participated in the civil war.

But we must, first of all, point out certain important differences which mark both wars, and the circumstances under which they were undertaken; in fact, it is in consequence of not having taken notice of these differences that many people have found their predictions falsified by the results of the late struggle. Because the thirteen colonies had exhausted the efforts of England, they believed that the Confederate States would eventually wear out the strength of the North. Fortunately, the comparison between the generous movement of 1775 and the resort to arms by the slave-owners in 1861 is as false in a military as in a political point of view.

On the day when the colonies shook off the authority of the mother-country, all the strategic points of their territory were occupied by the English. It was necessary, therefore, to conquer everything: they had nothing to lose, and could not have considered themselves as beaten, even though the enemy was still in the heart of the country. In 1861, on the contrary, the Confederates, masters of all the territory which they sought to alienate from the lawful jurisdiction of the new President, had need of all that vast country, partly for the maintenance of the institution of slavery, and partly for the support of their numerous armies. When that country was invaded, they felt themselves vanquished. What was possible in the war of independence, where the number of combatants was limited, was so no longer. Washington and Gates, Howe and Cornwallis, had, ordinarily, not more than ten or fifteen, and very rarely twenty, thousand

men under their command. These little armies could live upon the country which they occupied. It was not always without difficulty, it is true; and the soldiers of Washington suffered cruelly during the winter they passed at Valley Forge. The English army, passing through a relatively rich country from Philadelphia to New York, was obliged to carry its provisions along with it; and Cornwallis lost all his baggage in North Carolina, even while he was making a conquering march through it. But neither of these had to depend upon that vast system of victualling which relies upon a fixed and certain base of operations, and without which large armies cannot be supported in America. They subsisted, marched, and sojourned for months by the side of an enemy who was master of the country.

If we wished to draw a comparison between the two wars, it would be the armies of the North, and not those of the South, that we should have to compare with the volunteers who freed America. The Confederate conscripts—impetuously brave, accustomed to obedience, and blindly following their chiefs, but individually without perseverance or tenacity—were men of different spirit, different habits, and different temperament; their character had been moulded by the aristocratic institutions founded upon slavery. The Federal volunteer, on the contrary, with his peculiarities and his defects, is the direct heir of those *Continental*s, as they were called, who, difficult to manage, badly organized, and almost always beaten notwithstanding their personal courage, ended, nevertheless, by defeating the English legions. He has, moreover, other claims to be considered their inheritor, for he can recall to mind the fact that it was the Northern States, then simple colonies, which sustained nearly all the brunt of the war of independence, the rewards of which they shared with their associates of the South. Out of the two hundred and thirty-two thousand men whom that war saw mustered under the Federal flag, Massachusetts alone, always the most patriotic and the most warlike, furnished sixty-eight thousand; Connecticut, with less population, thirty-two thousand; Pennsylvania, twenty-six thousand; New York, almost entirely occupied by the English, eighteen thousand; to sum up, the States which were faithful to the Union in 1861 had given one hundred and seventy-five thou-

sand men to fight against England—that is to say, more than three-fourths of the total number. Among those which, at a later period, espoused the Confederate cause, valiant Virginia was the only one which at that time contributed a respectable contingent, while South Carolina, so haughty since, could not raise more than six thousand men during the whole war against England. It will thus be seen that the States which defended the Union in 1861 are those that had made the greatest sacrifices to establish it, while those that raised the standard of rebellion against it are also those that had the least right to call themselves its founders.

We cannot be astonished, therefore, at finding among the soldiers who were the first to carry the star-spangled banner to the battle-field the traits which have always characterized the Federal volunteer. These traits have been displayed from the beginning of the struggle with the mother-country. As soon as mustered, they would meet the onset of the English veterans from behind the rudest defences. They defended themselves with extraordinary energy at Bunker Hill, as the improvised soldiers of General Jackson did at a later period, in 1815, at New Orleans, and as, upon a wider field of action, the army of the Potomac did at Gettysburg. They were indefatigable workers: with pick and axe in hand, at the sieges of Boston and Yorktown, like those volunteers who, in the course of four years, covered America with fortifications and trenches, but, at the same time, easily disconcerted when they felt or fancied themselves surprised by a flank movement, as at Brandywine and Germantown; difficult to lead to the attack of a strong position, and forgetful of the principle, that there is less danger in rushing upon an enemy than in receiving his fire without stirring. They would then quickly become disorganized, and, more wonderful still, would recover their organization with equal promptness. From their first engagements with the English down to the war which arrayed them against each other, the American volunteers, finding a valuable auxiliary in their country, covered with forests and interspersed with swamps, seldom allowed a panic to degenerate into a rout, and had the great merit of scarcely ever believing themselves vanquished after a defeat.

It required, nevertheless, all the organizing mind of Washington, all his devotedness, all his tact and patience, to be able, almost without resources and in the midst of a thousand intrigues, to maintain unity among elements so difficult to unite, and to mould them to the hard exigencies of the military profession.

The provincial militia which had taken part in the Seven Years' War was formed on the model of those of the English counties. At the beginning of the struggle with England, each colony added to her militia some regiments of volunteers enlisted for a short period, and thus raised a small independent, private army. United by Congress under the authority of Washington, they nevertheless maintained for some time their distinct organization; and when the first flush of enthusiasm and self-denial was once over, one may imagine the obstacles which such a system opposed to the zeal of the general-in-chief. He, who never courted popularity by flattering his countrymen, knew how to enforce a severe discipline. "It is necessary," he said to them, "that a most perfect despotism should exist in an army." The testimony of that great citizen deserves to be pondered by those who, in the name of liberty, seek to introduce a spirit of criticism and independence in the army, which always engenders insubordination. Besides, his despotism was strictly confined to his military character, and tempered by the regard which he inspired among all his inferiors; it was only, however, by means of seasonable severities and necessary concessions that he was able to maintain that organization in his army which enabled him thoroughly to accomplish his task.

The militia, recruited from the lowest dregs of society, as in England, were a perpetual source of anxiety to him. On the field of battle they more than once occasioned disastrous panics; in camp they frequently fomented a spirit of revolt. The volunteer regiments, formed at a moment of patriotic impulse, were composed of far better material; but they were only enlisted for a few months, and during the early stages of the war the negotiations set on foot to prolong their term of service were constantly paralyzing military operations.

The national army was at last organized in 1776. It has served as the type of all the levies of volunteers which have been

made since, down to those called for by Mr. Lincoln. This army was placed under the immediate orders of Congress, which shared with the States the costs of pay and equipment. The contingent of each State was fixed at a certain number of battalions, the officers of which were appointed by the local authorities; and if the voluntary enlistments did not suffice, the total number required was completed by drafting exclusively among the militia. The latter, in reality, was only composed of enlisted volunteers. It is true that in cases of extreme urgency, the number of men required for the militia could be raised by general draft, as in England. But this experiment had once been tried in Virginia, and had caused so much trouble that it was found necessary to abandon it. Congress, while mindful that the brigades should be formed of battalions from the same State, reserved to itself the organization of the army, the confirmation of inferior grades and the appointment of the general staff. This army was at first composed of eighty-eight battalions of seven hundred and fifty men each; its organization and the commissions issued were to last as long as the war continued; but as it was impossible to procure enlistments for such an indefinite period of service, the term had at first to be limited to one year. As the distress of the country contributed to the general embarrassment, the difficulties which it had been sought to avoid very soon reappeared. In order to encourage re-enlistments, the pay was raised, money-bounties were offered on being mustered into service, and land-bounties on being mustered out. Washington pointed out in vain the inconveniences of a system which mingled speculation with the noble and rugged profession of arms. But men were wanted; and the States, dreading the unpopularity of the draft, instead of listening to his advice, outbid the offers made by Congress. The result was that the allurements of the new bounties induced the volunteers to seek opportunities to re-enlist by shortening their time of service. They eventually entered into an engagement to serve "for three years, *or* during the war." The three years expired on the first of January, 1781, and the war seemed far from being ended. The Pennsylvania soldiers insisted that they had only enlisted for three years, the words "*or* during the war" meaning simply, according to their interpretation, that

if the war was ended before, their time of service would be abridged. The officers, on the contrary, construed these words as implying an engagement to remain under the flag for at least three years, and longer if the war continued for a longer period of time. This question of grammar almost caused the shedding of blood; it was deemed expedient to yield to the demands of the volunteers, and their interpretation was finally adopted. But the harm done to discipline was great and lasting.

Nor did unjust rivalries and petty jealousies spare the most illustrious soldiers of the war of independence; but these belong to all times and to all countries, and the Americans did not wait long to indemnify those who had been their victims by a spontaneous reaction in public opinion. In fact, notwithstanding the defects of their organization, the American soldiers were animated by that ardent and sincere zeal which carries great men and great nations to the accomplishment of their designs; and it was owing to their possession of this quality that they finally compelled victory to perch upon their banners.

The greater the magnitude of the national effort, the more irresistible became the reaction which followed. After so many sacrifices made for the common good, the spirit of local independence again resumed its empire. The remembrance of the English regulars, the need of economy, and the general exhaustion, caused a universal demand to be made for the disbanding of the national army. Freed from the danger which had brought them together, the old colonies hastened to get rid of all the burdens most necessary to their new existence; they wasted their energies in quarrels which nearly lost them the regard of their most zealous partisans in Europe, and, being still more jealous of the central power, they left it no authority—no means of action. It was the golden age of "States' Rights," the defence of which, at a later day, served as a pretext for the insurrection of 1861. Under this fatal influence the army of the United States gradually disappeared, the entire defence of the extensive frontiers of Canada and the Indian tribes was entrusted to the militia of each State, and in 1784 the national army found itself reduced to the absurd total of eighty men and officers.

When true patriots rescued America from the fatal course she

was pursuing, and her nationality had been definitely established by that admirable document called the Federal Constitution, it was deemed necessary to confer some authority upon the reconstituted central power. Yet, between this period, which may be called its first resurrection, and the day when it was definitely organized, the regular army experienced a great many vicissitudes. In fact, when Washington found himself invested, in 1789, with the new title of President and commander of all the military forces of the republic, they amounted only to six hundred men. His authority over the militia was confined to a small number of special cases, and their formation depended exclusively upon each State. Knowing from experience the inconvenience of an improvised army, he thought of endowing his country with military institutions, and of preparing a few *cadres*,* which would enable him to transform with considerable rapidity such citizens as might be called, by unforeseen danger, to rally around the flag, into effective soldiers. But he could not conquer the prejudices of a people, just enfranchised, against a standing army—prejudices of which Jefferson was the exponent in his own cabinet. Consequently, from 1789 till 1815 the regular army—that which was raised and organized directly by the Federal power without the intervention of the States—remained in a provisional condition. When war was imminent, it was immediately swelled by adding to it, for want of established *cadres*, regiments entirely new, in which all the grades were conferred at random; and when peaceful tendencies were again in the ascendant, both officers and men were hastily discharged.

In 1790 this army comprised only one regiment of infantry and one battalion of artillery—twelve hundred and sixteen men in all. A second regiment, formed in the following year, increased the number to two thousand one hundred and twenty-eight men. In 1793 it was suddenly raised to six thousand men,

* The word *cadre*, which the author frequently uses to designate the framework of a regiment, cannot be satisfactorily rendered into English by any equivalent term. The *cadres* are regimental skeletons or frames, which, in European armies, form the centres of new regiments, into which are incorporated all the raw recruits. Therefore, in all cases where the word *cadre* is used in the original, the French word has been retained, since it conveys the idea more distinctly than any English equivalent.—Ed.

to be again reduced in 1796 to two thousand eight hundred men. Each time an act of Congress had authorized the recruiting of men and the formation of corps, now and then specifying the duration of their existence, and creating the necessary grades for the occasion. But it frequently happened that, by this process, officers were procured more readily than soldiers. Thus, in 1798, apprehending a war with France, Congress ordered a levy of thirteen thousand regular troops. But two years after, it was found that, while the corps of officers was complete, only three thousand four hundred men had been enlisted; and in 1802 this ephemeral army was reduced to the total of three thousand men. It will be seen that it scarcely deserved the name of a regular army. Consequently, the more America relied upon her volunteers for defence, the more she needed a permanent school to form a corps of educated officers, possessing traditions and a military spirit, and capable of supplying the wants of an improvised and inexperienced army. Washington had felt this need, and desired to found a Federal school, upon a sufficiently comprehensive basis, in order that it might render this important service to the nation. But his project, destined to be adopted at a later period, was twice rejected, in 1793 and in 1796. It was deemed sufficient to establish a species of disguised school at West Point (*une espèce d'école déguisée*) altogether inadequate to the wants of the country, comprising a dépôt of artillery and engineers, with two professors and about forty cadets. It was only in 1812 that the project of Washington was taken up again, and that the West Point academy, of which he was the posthumous founder, became in reality, the nursery of the regular army. At that period America learned at last, to her own cost, how much these indecisions and alternations had militated against the development of good military institutions.

We have desired to show by these details that the raising of improvised armies, of which the year 1861 has given such a gigantic example, has been at all times the custom of America, and that the measures then adopted upon a large scale have been resorted to since the early times of the republic whenever it has been threatened by unforeseen danger. It is easy to understand the inexperience of the whole nation when she took up arms

against the secessionists; and in observing the weak part played by the military element in her public life, far from being astonished that she did not succeed sooner, one should, on the contrary, admire her for having accomplished so much and created so much without any preparation. We might quote many instances of this contrast, so honorable to her energy, between the organized resources that she possessed and the results she attained. Thus the department of war, which in 1865 had control of more than a million of men, was, at the beginning of the present century, amalgamated with that of the navy, and was composed of one secretary and eight clerks.

The six thousand men voted by Congress in 1808, when war with England seemed imminent, had never been brought together. Therefore, when, in 1812, after twenty years' peace, that war broke out at last, the traditions of the war of independence had been nearly obliterated. There was no enthusiasm to supply their place: this could not be kindled in behalf of a war in which the national existence was not at stake. We shall not pause to narrate the particulars of that war, for it has left no important traditions behind, and only developed a small number of distinguished men. It presents but few instructive examples of the mode of fighting in the New World, and with the exception of the brilliant affair of New Orleans, it scarcely displayed aught save the ordinary defects of American volunteers, without bringing their best qualities into relief. The campaigns in Canada, if such a term may be applied to a series of disjointed operations as insignificant in their results as in the means employed, are utterly destitute of interest. The regular army was hardly in existence. The volunteers, few in number, levied in haste, and generally for the term of a single expedition, confined to the frontier of their own State, could scarcely be considered as part of the army. The militia, more insubordinate still than under Washington, found constitutional reasons for refusing, even in the midst of active operations, to go beyond the frontier to support their comrades in the field. The most bloody affair, perhaps—that of Niagara—was a night skirmish, in which each of the contending parties, believing itself beaten, abandoned the field of battle before the break of day; while the rout of Bladensburg

threw a melancholy light upon the demoralization of those improvised troops. The name of the young general Scott, lately the illustrious senior of the American army, is alone deserving of being mentioned in the same breath with that of Perry—that sailor who, by dint of audacity, was enabled to secure the naval supremacy of the lakes.

Those, however, who followed that war throughout all its chequered fortunes, might already have noticed one fact—a fact which has often been confirmed since—that on the soil of America the defensive is easy, but the offensive difficult, to maintain. Absorbed by their struggle with France, the British, instead of attacking, were obliged to wait for the Americans in Canada; this necessity constituted their strength. In 1814, peace with France, by restoring to them all freedom of action, seemed to have given them a guaranty of indisputable superiority. The reverse took place; for feeling themselves the stronger, they resumed the offensive, and the Americans, being attacked in their turn, soon recovered all the advantages they had lost by invading the territory of the enemy. In fact, after having been successful at Bladensburg without effort, having burnt one portion of Washington, and occupied the rest, the British could not sustain themselves in that position; and in vacating the capital of the enemy without a fight, they were obliged to acknowledge how fruitless was the victory which had delivered it to them. At last, the war ended to the advantage of the Americans on the borders of Lake Champlain and at New Orleans, where the British were vanquished by a handful of white men and negroes mixed together and armed in haste, to whom Jackson had imparted his own indomitable energy.

These two fortunate affairs could not make America forget the events that had preceded them, and had proved a serious lesson to her. Therefore this war was not altogether useless to her, for it made her feel the necessity of reorganizing her military institutions upon a new basis. From the very beginning, public opinion, that all-powerful judge among free peoples, which possesses perhaps the caprices, but not the fatal infatuations, of despots, had promptly recovered from all its prejudices. It was then that the project of a military school, bequeathed by Wash-

ington, was adopted. The President asked for ten thousand men for the regular army; he was authorized to raise twenty-five thousand. This actual force, however, was never fully raised, and the new recruits, without established *cadres*, proved to be quite as inexperienced as any volunteers or militia.

But when peace was declared in 1815, instead of disbanding them to the last man, as had been customary, ten thousand men were retained under the flag. They formed the effective total of the Federal troops on the peace footing, which it was finally determined to organize in a more definite manner. It is, therefore, from that year that the existence, in America, of a regular army may be dated, comprising corps of all arms, systematically recruited, having a fixed system of promotion, and opening a legitimate career to officers, certain, henceforth, of retaining their respective grades.

CHAPTER II.

THE REGULAR ARMY.

A REGULAR standing army, with its discipline and successive grades, placed in the midst of a society so fluctuating and so jealous of everything which does not emanate directly from the elective power, must have occupied a singular and difficult position. It did not succumb before the numerous attacks of which it was the object, but that position gave it an original character, and developed in the highest degree an *esprit de corps* among its members.

We must enter into some details concerning its organization, which had changed but little since its creation, and which served as a model to that of the volunteer army, whose campaigns we shall have to narrate.

The West Point Academy has exercised a powerful influence upon the character of the American army. Situated on the wooded banks of the Hudson, upon a picturesque site, where interesting historical associations cluster around an important military post, the cradle of the family of *regulars* is in striking contrast with all its surroundings. At the foot of that peaceful retreat, where military traditions are religiously cherished, the great river which waters New York presents a moving panorama of active industry. By a remarkable exception in that country of perpetual changes, the academy, from its foundation to the period of which we speak, has preserved its early regulations and statutes, and the pupils still wear the gray coat with narrow black lace on the facings which was adopted for the use of the first engineer-cadets in 1802. The system of admission is also in contrast with the equalizing customs of the country. It is founded entirely upon favor, and it is only since the war that a

proposition has been made, hitherto without success, to open the places to competition. This anomaly, however, is susceptible of explanation; for the profession of arms was but little courted, and besides, the American people do not consider government offices as public property, for a share in the distribution of which every one has a right to bid, undergoing an examination as to fitness. The system of filling up vacancies in the academy adopted by its founders was devised with a view of making that institution as perfect a representation as possible of the confederation of States of which it was the common bond. Ten pupils are appointed every year at large by the President. Moreover, each of the electoral districts which send members to the House of Representatives designates every four years, through the agency of that member, one pupil, who is admitted after an examination which is purely nominal.* As the course of studies embraces a period of four years, each district finds itself thus represented by one pupil, unless the latter should receive a sufficient number of demerits to cause his dismissal. These selections have frequently been the result of good luck rather than of good judgment. As an illustration of these fortunate chances we may quote the case of the young general Kilpatrick, one of the most brilliant cavalry officers in the late war, who was indebted to his precocious eloquence for his admission to West Point. In 1856, when only eighteen years of age, he was extremely anxious to embrace the profession of arms. The right to nominate a pupil to West Point was about to fall upon the Representative of his district, and, on the other hand, in consequence of the expiration of his term of office, the person who occupied that position was on the eve of entering upon a new canvass for the suffrages of his fellow-citizens. The candidate for the military academy conceived the idea of laying the political candidate under personal obligations by undertaking the advocacy of his interests. He went from village to village, haranguing the electors, extolling the merits of the individual from whom he expected, in return, to obtain his admission to the academy, and the people were im-

* The subjects of examination are very rudimentary—reading, writing, and arithmetic through decimal fractions; English Grammar, American Geography, and History; but the examination is strict, and many are rejected annually.—ED.

pressed by his speeches and his youth. The member was re-elected, and Kilpatrick entered West Point.

But if the terms of admission do not guarantee the worth of the candidate who is admitted, in the school itself the studies are rigorous and prolonged, and the discipline is very severe. All those who have not obtained a certain number of marks are excluded at the annual examinations, and by this means a portion only of the pupils succeed at the expiration of four years in obtaining admission into the army with the rank of second lieutenant. The last two years are devoted alike, by all the pupils, to special studies, and to obtaining a knowledge of engineering and artillery practice; it is a necessary condition of the profession which awaits them on leaving the academy; indeed, the greater part of them, before entering a regiment of the line, undergo a probation of some years in the artillery corps,* which is very large compared with the total effective force of the army, in consequence of the fortifications which it is necessary to maintain all along the immense frontier. The rest, constantly isolated at distant points among Indians, are obliged, in order to attain efficiency, to acquire a knowledge of every branch of the military profession. This general instruction is, moreover, in harmony with the national spirit, which readily believes in its capacity to do everything, and in which the initiative of individual efforts, strongly developed, rectifies the abuses of that system of specialties which is too often fatal to independence of character. A solitary example will show that, in bestowing this varied instruction, which enables officers to pass from one branch of the service to another, the West Point system does not, on that account, lower the standard of its studies. Only a few years ago all the professors had officers of the army for assistants, who, each in turn, forsook the active and solitary life of the Western prairies, to become, for the term of four years, the scientific instructors of those pupils who had replaced them on the benches of the academy, and who were soon to become their comrades in the ranks of the army. The pupils, instead of paying for the privileges of such excellent ed-

* There is an artillery school at Fortress Monroe, and some officers of infantry and cavalry have attended it at their own request, but it is chiefly designed for officers of artillery.—ED.

ucation, receive, on the contrary, a considerable salary. Consequently, the Federal government is somewhat entitled to their loyalty, and had the right to prefer charges of ingratitude against those who, in 1861, placed at the service of its enemies the knowledge they had thus acquired under the auspices of the Federal flag.

Thanks to their long and serious studies, which kept them aloof from their fellow-citizens, always in a hurry to act and to enjoy—thanks to the bonds of fellowship which the associations of youth implant in the heart of man, and especially to those attacks of which both the academy and the army had been the subject—the West Pointers very soon formed an almost aristocratic and exclusive body, all the members of which mutually sustained each other. At the period of which we are speaking, those who remained under the flag were animated by a genuine passion for the profession of arms; for such a feeling alone could have induced men of capacity and energy to lead a rugged and unremunerating life, without even finding the reward of their labors in public sympathy. Those who, tired out by the slowness of promotion, and attracted by more brilliant prospects, quitted the service after a few years (and they were numerous, especially among the young men of the North), did not forget their early education on that account; it was, therefore, among these that the Federal cause recruited its most brilliant defenders. These changes in the pursuits of life did not break the bonds which united all West Pointers together. If this *coterie*—for it was one—could, with all its defects and partialities, maintain itself and cause itself to be respected in the midst of a society so fluctuating, it is because it was governed by the noblest sentiments of honor and military duty. Preserving the most valuable traditions by the side of successive administrations essentially changeable in their character, it was found ready, notwithstanding many desertions, to organize the scattered forces of the nation on the day when the Southern leaders gave the signal of civil war.

That great task accomplished, the *coterie* disappeared, even in the midst of the triumph to which it had so powerfully contributed. After such a struggle, it will not be asked of the general who has commanded in twenty battles whether he is or is not a

West Pointer. The public, which had regarded the regular officer as a being apart from the rest of mankind, and almost dangerous, has seen him at work, knows his patriotism, and has given him its confidence. And the latter, forgetting the derisive nickname of *mustang* (Indian name for wild horse), which he was wont to apply to inexperienced volunteers before the advent of the common trial, now respects them, and seeks his associates among them. The great drama in which they have played their respective parts side by side, in breaking down the old barriers and blotting out past distinctions, has created a new fraternity among them.

The West Point Academy, since its origin, has always supplied the army with the greatest portion of its officers; but the President has never been restricted in his appointment of officers to selections among the graduates of that institution. As commander-in-chief, he is not bound by any law, either as regards admission or promotion. When the number and the various grades have once been defined and settled by Congress, he can distribute them as he thinks proper. But his power is subjected to the will of the Senate—that great political body which plays the principal rôle in the Federal constitution, and whose province it is to confirm every nomination, which otherwise becomes null and void by the tacit operation of the law, at the close of the legislative session in which it was presented for consideration. The Senate has always made ample use of this prerogative. From the general to the second lieutenant, each candidate has his claims discussed before this assembly, which, if need be, becomes the interpreter of public sentiment against too glaring acts of favoritism, but which, under the influence of party spirit, is also sometimes led into error in the exercise of these delicate functions.

The executive power, however, took care to impose upon itself a rule, and to fortify the hierarchical spirit by introducing the principle of promotion by seniority. This system of promotion was established through the promulgation of certain ordinances, styled *Articles of War*, which comprise, at the same time, instructions for the officers, and a series of military regulations which, although liable to be revoked by the President, have, nevertheless, come to be considered as a true code of laws for the army.

Promotion by seniority is a wise rule of action in a republic where the administrative power so frequently changes hands, and where the *personnel* of the government is almost entirely renewed on the occasion of each change; for although the President is allowed perfect freedom of choice in the formation of new regiments, it secures true independence to the officers. Up to the rank of captain this promotion takes place in the regiment; to that of colonel, in the arm. Seniority of rank has nothing to do with the appointment of general officers.

The President had, nevertheless, numerous occasions for the exercise of his patronage outside of all hierarchical regulations; indeed, the standing nucleus of the army was so weak that at every sign of war it was necessary to increase it in haste. The value of traditions was as yet so little appreciated in the various branches of the service that more than once, for instance, considerations of economy have caused the sudden discharge of all the cavalry. And too often, when new *cadres* had to be formed, the President, forgetful that young soldiers require experienced leaders, only reserved a few places for the officers taken from the other corps of the army; the rest were divided among old volunteers, officers who had resigned their respective commissions and were desirous to resume the epaulette, and especially political favorites. Those who attained superior grades assumed at once their seniority of rank in that entire branch of the service, and preserved it when the corps to the formation of which they were indebted for their rapid elevation was disbanded. This system, however, occasionally gave the army some excellent soldiers, who, although not graduates of West Point, did not the less display great military talents. Finally, a custom, singular enough in a republic, borrowed from the British army, that of *brevet rank*, or honorary promotion, enabled the President to confer, in the way of rewards, titles which were wholly independent of the rules of seniority. These, however, only conferred superiority of rank in regard to what was strictly honorary, giving no increase of pay, and serving in no way to assist promotion. The recipient of the brevet continued to perform the functions of the inferior grade; and one might thus see a simple captain in command of a company wearing the insignia of a lieutenant-colonel. This system, so much at

variance with the spirit of military subordination, was largely in vogue, because, through its operation, the self-love and vanity of many people could be gratified without loosening the purse-strings of the nation. At the close of the civil war, in one regiment alone, counting forty-five officers, twenty-one of them received brevets.

By a natural reaction against the spirit of social equality peculiar to the country, an almost impassable barrier had been raised in the regular army between soldiers and officers. It required some splendid achievement to enable the non-commissioned officer, ennobled by the epaulettes, to take a seat among his former chiefs, and it was only in 1861 that a commission was appointed for the examination and regular admission of a certain number of non-commissioned officers to the rank of officers. The material of which the rank and file was composed did, in fact, justify that exclusiveness; for it fully deserved the name of mercenary, subsequently so unjustly applied to the volunteers of 1861. These troops were recruited among emigrants who had not been able to secure better means of existence; for that mode of life which required entire submission to the discipline of the barracks, even in the midst of the desert, held out but few inducements to the Americans themselves, who never sought to adopt it unless driven to it by sheer necessity.

The regular officer, in short, isolated at some distant post, like a sea-captain on board his vessel, always exposed to the perfidy of the Indian, and obliged to be constantly on his guard, maintained his authority by means of the strictest discipline. Corporal punishments were frequent and severe. When, in 1861, the remnants of the regular army returned to the large cities of the Union from the far West, they brought with them those inflexible regulations, the application of which contrasted so singularly with the customs of the country, and which must have cooled down the enthusiasm of more than one citizen about to enlist.

In the fall of 1861 the inhabitants of Washington, passing near the batteries of artillery encamped on their public grounds, saw with astonishment soldiers who had been guilty of some violation of discipline, some of them tied to the carriage of a gun, some

half suspended by their thumbs, others compelled to walk with a gag in their mouths or with their heads thrust through a staved-in barrel—emblems of their insolence or their drunkenness.*

A high rate of compensation could alone draw volunteer recruits into this army. In 1860 this rate of compensation was as high as eleven dollars, or nearly sixty francs, per month, without any deduction for food or raiment. The disproportion between the salaries of different grades was less than amongst us; for in America it is not thought that a faithful performance of duty in public offices can be secured by allowing the lower ranks of employés to vegetate under the pressure of insufficient pay, while a few superior officers only enjoy high salaries. A lieutenant receives under various forms an annual salary of fifty-five hundred francs; a colonel, twenty thousand francs; and a major-general, twenty-five thousand francs. They could undoubtedly, therefore—all of them—economize to some extent, especially when they had to pass half their lives in the wilderness. At all events, it was but little compared with what their former comrades of West Point earned in the various pursuits of industry and commerce.

There is, moreover, a radical difference between the system of public salaries in the United States and our own. Unless an officer can procure a pension through the instrumentality of honorable wounds, it is all over with him on the day he is discharged from active service. In return for his time and trouble he is liberally paid so long as the contract in virtue of which he was mustered into service is in existence; but this contract between the President and himself is always liable to be revoked by either of the contracting parties, and if one has always the right to tender his resignation, the other is equally entitled to dismiss him whenever he pleases—there is no retiring list, and, consequently, no limit as to age.† The hope of obtaining from the State, by

* Such punishments were in defiance of the army regulations and the Articles of War, and must be attributed to the excitement and confusion of the period referred to.—ED.

† The author was probably not aware of the very liberal provisions that have been made, since the war, for the retirement and support of officers who have

the exercise of patience, on the day when he shall no longer be able to render any service to it, some slender means of existence, does not retain, as it does elsewhere, officers who have grown old or infirm in the service under the flag. If the American officer tenders his resignation or is mustered out, without any previous notice, with the regiment to which he belonged, he launches at once into other pursuits until the formation of some new regiment, when he is almost certain, if worthy of it, to regain his former position. He who has remained faithful to the profession of arms has laid up something against the day of his possible discharge, when he may console himself by saying that it is never too late in life to strive after fortune. Since that time, this system has been entirely changed by a law on retiring allowances and military pensions. This law seems to have been a necessary one, but it is as yet too early to appreciate its effects. Time alone will show whether legislation, in this case, was a happy inspiration.

Before concluding this chapter it remains for us to speak of the organization of the different corps which composed the regular army; for although their effective strength has been subjected to strange vicissitudes, the organization itself has experienced but few changes.

The cavalry was disbanded after the war of 1812; and not until 1833 was it revived, in the First Dragoons. The Second Dragoons was created in 1836; the Third in 1846, as also the *mounted* riflemen, who, notwithstanding their appellation, served as foot-soldiers in the war with Mexico. The Third Dragoons having been disbanded at the close of that war, Congress ordered, in 1855, the formation of two new regiments, bearing the name of 1st and 2d Cavalry. These five regiments, under their different designations, were to represent various arms in the service: the two last regiments, composing the light cavalry, the mounted riflemen, were to be simply infantry on horseback. At the very outset of the war of secession, it was evident that the long-range weapons rendered all such distinctions useless in a contest in

become disabled or who have attained a certain specified age in the military or naval service.—ED.

which the dragoon should be the true type of all cavalrymen; and consequently all five regiments were united, August 3, 1861, under the sole designation of cavalry; a sixth regiment was added to them under the same law.

The number of infantry regiments varied frequently. During the war with Mexico it reached seventeen; then it was again reduced, but never below eight.

The artillery, on the contrary, consisting of four regiments, preserved that organization until 1861, but the number of companies of which they were composed varied according to the exigencies of the service.

The places created by the formation of new regiments were not all given to officers of the army; a certain number of these commissions were always held in reserve for the protégés of the President and of the Secretary of War, and especially of those Congressmen whose votes had contributed to secure this increase of the army, but, it must be admitted, this patronage was judiciously bestowed, and among the new officers were generally to be found many former volunteers who had already seen service. We shall mention one instance of the kind which reflects credit on the discernment of Mr. Jefferson Davis, under whose administration of the War Department the 1st and 2d Cavalry were organized. The field officers of these two regiments were taken from the army in active service, as also one half of the whole number of captains and lieutenants; the remainder were chosen from civil life. Out of these one hundred officers, forty-one became, a few years later, generals in the Northern or in the Southern armies, and six of them held commands-in-chief.

All the regiments were organized in the same manner, each being provided with ten captains, whose command took the name of company, even in the cavalry and the artillery, where it corresponded with the terms squadron and battery. The regiments of infantry, instead of comprising three battalions, were formed, in reality, of but a single one; but each had a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, and a major, the division of the regiments among the frontier stations and along the coast rendering this large number of superior officers necessary. Their effective total of one thousand to twelve hundred men was seldom attained, recruiting

being always difficult. A wise ordinance of President Monroe requiring that every reduction of the army should bear equally upon all organized regiments, those only could be discharged whose strength was found to be diminished by more than one-half, in order to preserve complete *cadres* ready to receive recruits in case of necessity. Unfortunately, however, while the observance of this rule was being enforced, the authorities, in the exercise of an imprudent economy, neglected to fill the vacancies of officers in the regiments thus reduced; so that in the end the *cadres* were found to be as insignificant as the total effective force.

The proportion of artillery up to 1861, and its immunity from any important reductions, can be explained on the ground of the valuable services constantly required of it. It has always had the charge of occupying, maintaining, and arming the fortified posts which have served, and still serve, as finger-posts to the march of civilization across the prairies of the West.

The somewhat numerous body of officers of the engineer corps enjoyed the same immunity, but, generally speaking, it never had but about one hundred soldiers under its command, who were at the same time sappers and pontoniers. As to the general staff, such a branch of the military service has never existed in America. The small regular army having only been brought together once during the first forty-six years of its existence, the want of such a corps was but little felt. During the Mexican expedition the army suffered greatly on account of this blank, but in the corps of engineers it found young and excellent officers who, by their zeal and intelligence, supplied the want of a general staff. It was only, therefore, in 1861, when it was no longer a question of handling twenty thousand regular troops, but one hundred thousand volunteers, that all the inconveniences arising from the absence of such an important machinery were sensibly felt.

The functions of the general staff were divided among different corps. Officers detached from their regiments, and volunteers invested with temporary rank, performed the duties of aides-de-camp to the generals under the name of personal aides. All the topographical, geodetical, and hydrographical works were entrusted to the corps of topographical engineers, to whom we are

indebted for the handsome publications of the *Coast Survey*, and who, in 1862, were merged into the engineer corps, just as our geographical engineers were formerly merged into the general staff. The other functions of the latter corps, particularly those concerning the *personnel* of armies in the field, were entrusted to special officers of administration.

Any details regarding the administration of military affairs, although greatly abridged, may appear long and tedious. Still they are necessary; for we must know the interior mechanism of an army in order fully to understand its movements, and its organization is a mirror wherein its spirit is reflected. That of the regular army, like one of those diminutive models every part of which is equally enlarged and amplified by some ingenious process, was exactly copied at the time when the hundreds of thousands of volunteers, whose campaigns we shall have to narrate, were mustered into service. In this narrative we shall have to use technical English terms in order to designate military functions, the exact equivalents of which do not exist among us, and the precise meaning of which it is, therefore, necessary that we should establish.

The administration of the American war department is divided into two technical parts. On one hand the body of troops, cavalry, artillery, and infantry, divided into regiments, depend, without intermedium, on the department bureaux, having neither distinctive chief nor separate management; on the other hand, there are corps composed exclusively of officers, each of them under the special direction of a general officer or colonel, almost invariably placed in that position by right of seniority, who takes a large share in all the decisions which affect them, and who is the only medium between them and the department. The latter corps are, in the first place, the engineers and topographical engineers, separated until 1862, and united since that period; and then the various branches of the service, much more independent of each other, which, with us, constitute the military administration. Under the name of departments they perform their functions both in the army and in the War Department, where their hierarchical chiefs have each a separate bureau, which nearly corresponds to our administrative divisions (*directions*).

In these varied functions the corps above mentioned partake of the character of our supervising department (*intendance*), with this important difference, however, that most of them are composed of officers in active service. Taken from the army, with the exception of paymasters and surgeons, who have simply an assimilated military rank, they do not leave their army grade on entering upon the discharge of departmental duties, and may, by means of a simple exchange, resume their places in the ranks of combatants. They have therefore the same prospects as the latter, and may, like them, come out of their respective army corps with a general's epaulette. The late war has shown by many examples the advantages of such a system of promotion. Thus, one of the generals who achieved most distinction on the field of battle, Hancock, a simple captain-quartermaster, commanded with success an army corps, and was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army for his services. Hence it is that rivalries and jealousies are very rare between officers of the line and those of the staff corps, and the frequency of rotation among them, by initiating each in turn into the details of every branch of the service, imparts to them an amount of information that is found invaluable in the isolated life of the frontiers, which entails upon them such manifold duties. Here, again, the Americans have done well in not pushing the system of special services to excess.

The adjutant-general's department, composed of officers from the rank of captain to that of colonel, was, in 1861, commanded by a general of brigade, who combined the functions of superintendent of the *personnel* of the department with those of chief of staff to the army. The assistant adjutant-generals, his subordinates, are divided into two classes. Some doing duty in the bureaus, or detached on special service, perform administrative functions; the others, for the most part, perform the duties of our chiefs and sub-chiefs of staff to the several generals in command.

The inspector-general's department, although independent of the adjutant-general's, is, in reality, but a supplementary branch of it; and being composed solely of a few superior officers, it has only the character of a commission to inspect the troops of the line.

The quartermaster and subsistence departments resemble in most respects our supervising department (*intendance*).

The former, organized since 1812, besides the duty of providing part of the supplies for the army, performs certain functions which, with us, appertain to the departments of engineers, transportation, and disbursement of public moneys, and is the most important of all the department bureaus. During the late war it disbursed forty-three per cent. of the total amount required for military expenses.

The subsistence department, having charge of the victualling of troops, the purchase of provisions at scattered markets, the preparation, preservation, and distribution of rations among the regiments, is composed of officers styled commissaries; at the beginning of the war a colonel was at the head of this department.

The ordnance department exercises the administrative functions which with us belong, for the most part, to the artillery. It has not only charge of the arsenals, of the manufacture of arms and military equipments, of cannon and artillery material, of muskets and ammunition of every kind, of side-arms, saddles, and harness accoutrements, but also of their distribution in each corps. We find this department in 1861 under the direction of a brigadier-general.

The departments of the adjutant-general, quartermaster, subsistence, and ordnance are represented on the staff of each army, army corps, active or territorial division, brigade, and regiment, by officers who, while subject to the authority of the chiefs of those corps, continue nevertheless to maintain direct relations with their respective departments.

Finally, the surgeons and paymasters form two civil corps, the members of which, as we have said before, being simply assimilated in rank to military grades, cannot be transferred from one corps to another. They follow in their own a regular order of promotion, and each class is placed respectively under the command of a surgeon-general and a paymaster-general.*

* See note A, in the Appendix of this volume.

CHAPTER III.

THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION IN MEXICO.

THE organization of the American army was not developed in the midst of absolute peace. The Mexican war and an almost continuous warfare with the Indian tribes justified its existence in the eyes of a jealous public, kept it always in working order, and permitted it to acquire a useful experience. They developed its qualities, while the nature of the country where the American army had to fight, and the enemies it encountered, exercised a powerful influence upon its character and its mode of waging war. The Mexican campaign constitutes the most brilliant epoch in its history previous to the great struggle of 1861. That campaign was the means of forming nearly all the military chiefs who, on one side or the other, have been noted in the combats we shall have to describe. It inspired the stories of the *bivouac* fifteen years later, when the captain and the lieutenant of 1847, now in command of volunteer armies or army corps, found themselves opposed to the companions of their early experiences in arms. The war of 1812 had not been a glorious one. That of Mexico, on the contrary, was a series of successes scarcely interrupted by a few insignificant checks. It offered the soldier all the interest of regular warfare, with its pitched battles, the names of which can be mentioned and their trophies shown, and at the same time all the attractions that adventurous spirits find in fighting in a country but half civilized. It was, in short, a decisive trial of the military institutions of America; if the regular soldiers had already been inured to the privations and fatigues that awaited them in Mexico, if the mongrel race they had to encounter there was not superior in courage to the Indians of the prairies, they had never before been brought together as one army, nor fought otherwise than as partisans. The Mexican war was

essentially their work; they were in a majority in the army of General Scott, who made the decisive campaign; the volunteers were only their auxiliaries; and even where the latter happened to be more numerous than the former, the regular officers retained, nevertheless, the exclusive control of all operations.

Those volunteers did not much resemble the class in the same service who, in 1861, truly represented the nation in arms, for no enthusiasm had stimulated their enlistment. The war which was undertaken against Mexico was iniquitous. The men of the South who then governed the Union, President Polk and his agent Mr. Slidell—the same we have subsequently seen in Europe pleading in behalf of the Confederate cause in the name of the right of nationalities—alarmed at the increasing influence of the free States, had sought to counterbalance it in the councils of the republic by the creation of new slave States. To accomplish this it was deemed necessary to dismember Mexico and to introduce slavery into the territories that would be taken from her. It was for the purpose of carrying out this political scheme that war was declared, just as at other periods filibusters were encouraged to carry trouble into Cuba or into Central America. The North repudiated this odious policy; consequently, it was only represented by a contingent of less than twenty thousand volunteers, and even the majority of these only entered the service to sustain the national honor, when Scott, detained at Puebla for want of troops, found himself seriously compromised. About forty thousand volunteers from the South, a force which was then considered very large, were successively mustered into service: the hope of extending the domain of slavery had fired their ardor. Among those most in earnest might already be noticed Colonel Jefferson Davis at the head of a regiment of Mississippi volunteers. Ambitious, impetuous, and eloquent, this old West Pointer was trying to achieve at the same time popularity with his party, and the military reputation which, when the crisis came, was to place him in possession of the War Department. He accomplished that double object; and at a later period, when the great rebellion, of which he was the soul, broke out, he received the honors of the first Confederate successes; but when defeat followed, his former accomplices accused him of having accelerated

the common ruin by imperiously trammelling generals abler than himself.

But, generally speaking, let us remark again, these Southern volunteers did not resemble those who would have taken up arms in support of a truly national cause. They were, for the most part, adventurers recruited from among that idle, restless, and adventurous population which the Southern leaders had made the pioneers of their institutions and had alternately thrust upon the Antilles and the far West. They were not without military qualifications: always with rifle in hand, by turns soldiers, colonists, or traders, they had already fought as improvised citizens of Texas at the time when the North and the South were contending for the supremacy of influence in that ephemeral republic. They had already measured strength with the Mexican soldier, and at San Jacinto they had learned to outwit his vigilance and to excel his skill in horsemanship. The Americans, therefore, did not even wait for the declaration of war to launch out into the most hazardous expeditions. Between the populated districts of Mexico and the boundaries of Anglo-Saxon civilization, there was then a vast extent of country, almost untenanted, and inhabited only by roving Indians and a few settlers of Spanish origin. At certain periods this desert was ploughed by large armed caravans, which carried on a trade of more than ten millions annually, by following two routes, equally difficult and dangerous. One, starting from the rich mining districts of Chihuahua, pursued its course by way of El Paso, Santa Fé, and the Rocky Mountains to Fort Leavenworth, on the borders of the Missouri; the other, leaving Monterey, crossed the Rio Grande and Texas, and finally reached the settlements of Arkansas and Louisiana. Although nominally under the jurisdiction of Mexico, this country, of which all adventurers had glimpses in their golden dreams, was in reality the *land of God*, as the Arabs express it. The first object of the war was to wrest this territory from the feeble hands that were unable to turn it to account. So that, while we find the army which Scott led into Mexico proceeding with great regularity, and only fighting to compel the enemy to come to terms, the troops under Taylor, which attacked Mexico by way of the Rio Grande, were a colonizing army. To distinguish them from the Army

of Invasion commanded by General Scott, they were called the Army of Occupation, and they took possession of a country already considered as conquered.

This country seemed to be protected by its own immensity ; but the Americans, who have been too often accused of tardiness, soon overcame this obstacle. Their columns swept rapidly over the territory, while a few insignificant bands rushed upon it with a degree of audacity which demands our attention for a moment.

At the outset of the war General Kearny starts from Fort Leavenworth with twenty-seven hundred men, for the purpose of conquering New Mexico, the State of Chihuahua, and California—countries the surface of which is three or four times as large as that of France. This column, however, consists only of three squadrons of regular cavalry, the rest being made up of volunteers recruited in haste, two regiments of Missouri cavalry, one battalion of Mormons, and some artillery. A considerable train of provisions and ammunition accompanies them, for they have to cross a desert of four hundred leagues in order to reach the capital of New Mexico, Santa Fé, which is situated between two branches of the Cordilleras, upon an elevated plateau parched by drought, and where there is only to be met a narrow strip of grass on the margin of the little river, called even at this point the Rio Grande. At the entrance of this plateau the Mexicans occupy a defile of less than twelve metres in width. The Americans enter it with all their train, well knowing that in the event of their being driven back into the desert which stretches behind them, they must perish to a man ; but their audacity disconcerts the Mexicans, who disappear at their approach, and fifty days after quitting the borders of the Missouri, Kearny and his little band enter the capital without striking a blow.

But this conquest was only the first stage in the undertaking ; it has scarcely been secured when Kearny, with a simple escort of one hundred dragoons and two mountain-howitzers, launches out into a new desert of four hundred leagues in extent to join hands with Colonel Fremont on the shores of the Pacific, and share with him the conquest of California. Fremont, a skilful and intrepid explorer, had preceded him a year before, prosecut-

ing his scientific researches at the head of a band of Indians, some white hunters, and a few adventurous companions like himself, over whom, thanks to his energy, he exercised an absolute control.

They wandered for a considerable time among those immense solitudes, driven by chance or necessity, studying the elements of the future prosperity of those settlers of whom they were the fore-runners, and from time to time making their sudden appearance among the Mexican settlements of California, where they were justly regarded as suspicious visitors. One day they were fired upon, and thus they learned that war had broken out on the Rio Grande. Fremont determined to revenge himself by conquering the province from which the inhabitants had sought to expel him. His boldness and sagacity assured him an easy victory over the ignorant assurance of the Mexicans. His ardor is communicated to all his companions, and he finds powerful allies among the American settlers, who, by crossing the Rocky Mountains, had already, for some years past, penetrated into California. A few days sufficed him to put the Mexican authorities to flight, to proclaim the independence of California, and annex it to the United States. In the mean time, one of those counter-revolutions so common in Mexico broke out in the southern part of the State, at the very moment when Kearny, who had been travelling with his escort for the last two months without receiving any news from the outside world, was approaching the first California settlements. After exploring, in the midst of unheard-of hardships, the routes to be followed by the caravans, to which he opened new outlets, he was in hopes of finding some rest under the protection of the government founded by Fremont. Instead of this, at the end of his last terrible march of twenty-five leagues across a waterless desert, he encountered, December 6, 1846, a party of hostile cavalry, who disputed his passage. The Mexicans were not superior in number to the Americans; but as they carried no baggage and were supplied with fresh horses, they had a great advantage over an adversary who had travelled eight hundred leagues without receiving a single remount. One half of Kearny's soldiers were on foot escorting the guns, fifty of them were mounted on mules which had been unharnessed from the wagons in proportion as the train became lightened of its load, while

twelve dragoons only had retained their horses. These, with the officers, constituted the light cavalry. The latter, notwithstanding their small number, charged the enemy as soon as he came in sight, leaving the rest of the troop behind, who tried in vain to urge their wornout mules forward. At first the Mexicans made a show of resistance, then fled; subsequently, perceiving by the irregularity of their motions, that their adversaries, like the Curiatii, had allowed themselves to become separated, they wheeled round abruptly, and their long lances unhorsed their too confident adversaries one after the other. Kearny himself received several wounds. Fortunately for him, the heavy cavalry had time to come up; and notwithstanding the somewhat unmartial appearance of the animals, its approach was sufficient to disperse the Mexicans. If the Americans had been beaten in the battle of San Pascual, they would inevitably have perished of hunger and destitution. Although victorious, they were obliged to repel for two days longer the attacks of their adversaries. Fortunately for them, the naval division of Commodore Stockton was waiting for them at San Diego, and a detachment of marines and soldiers, sent by the latter, brought them on the 11th of December the succor they had so greatly needed. After fifteen days' rest at San Diego, Kearny's small troop, reinforced by more than four hundred and fifty men, resumed their march under the supreme command of Stockton. On the 8th of January, 1847, at the river San Gabriel, the Americans dispersed the hostile forces assembled against them, and beat them again the next day before Los Angeles. After a violent quarrel with Stockton, who claimed the chief command, Kearny, continuing his march, was joined by a battalion of Mormons, which had arrived from the North, and at last occupied Upper California in concert with Lieutenant-Colonel Fremont.

During this expedition, which secured to its general the title of governor of the new State, the two regiments of cavalry that Kearny had left at Santa Fé did not remain inactive. One, commanded by Colonel Sterling Price, whom we shall find later in the Confederate army, was making strenuous efforts to crush the insurrection of the Mexican settlers. The other, under the command of Colonel Doniphan, traversed, in the heart of winter, the rugged mountains inhabited by the Navajos Indians, the only

pastoral people on all the continent; and, after concluding a treaty of friendship with them, this little band had taken a southern direction toward the distant city of Chihuahua, in the hope of joining Taylor's army, which had crossed the Rio Grande, and had just invaded the province of Monterey.

Doniphan had only eight hundred mounted Missourians, who were subsequently reinforced by about one hundred artillerymen, with four pieces of cannon. He was moreover obliged to accept the company of a caravan of American traders, who, after reaching Santa Fé by crossing the desert, were only waiting for an opportunity to introduce American goods into Mexico under the protection of the national flag, in spite of custom-house officers, Indians, and brigands. These warlike traders, with their train of three hundred and fifteen wagons, indemnified the troops for whatever trouble they might have caused them, by organizing among their mule-drivers two companies, which rendered essential service to the camp-guard.

The little band has scarcely set out when it finds itself assailed by all the dangers which beset the traveller in those inhospitable regions; in the *Jornada del Muerto*, a vast dried-up plateau of thirty-five leagues in length, it finds neither a drop of water nor a tree; scarcely a few thorny plants, which, blazing like straw, cannot impart any heat to the soldiers benumbed with cold; their cinders, quickly cooled off, alone indicate, in the midst of that vast solitude, the track of the detachments which it has been found necessary to separate from the main body in order to facilitate the march. Owing to the want of water, the Americans find it impossible to make a halt until they at last reach the boundary of the desert which has been so appropriately denominated the *Dead man's halt*.

But a slight skirmish soon makes them forget their hardships, and delivers to them the defile of *El Paso del Norte*, an important strategic point; it is the southern gate of New Mexico, the only one which opens upon the rich lands of Central Mexico. The Rio Grande, passing through this wild gorge, falls, in a succession of cascades, from the high table-lands into the rich valley, where it serves as the frontier of Texas. From this point the column advances slowly, for it is necessary to feed the animals and to

reconnoitre a route almost unknown. It has left the fertile borders of the Rio Grande, and the new deserts it has to cross have dangers and sufferings in store of a totally different kind from those it has hitherto encountered. These deserts consist of vast plains of burning sand that rise with the least puff of wind and give way under the footsteps of the soldier exhausted by the heat. The last stage in those dreadful solitudes proved nearly fatal to the Americans ; it was of twenty-five leagues and without water ; the wagons sank into the sand up to the axle-tree ; the drooping animals being no longer able to move them, they were abandoned, and the cares for the morrow were forgotten in the all-absorbing anxiety to reach the nearest water-sources, when a friendly rain-storm suddenly burst forth, and by restoring strength to the beasts of burden, saved the train and the entire force.

But this danger was scarcely over when the little army was threatened by another. After the sterile desert comes the prairie with its tall dry grasses. The march has been fatiguing, for the whole day has been wasted in running after large herds of cattle, which, guarded by Mexican *vaqueros*, have finally disappeared in the distant horizon. They have hardly reached the margin of a lake, near which both men and beasts are endeavoring to procure some refreshing rest, when the most formidable foe to emigrants, the prairie fire, announces its approach. Lighted by the revengeful hand of some *vaquero*, or caused, it may be, by burning cinders neglected at the morning halt, the conflagration appears suddenly above the heights which border the lake, sweeps down rapidly, and quickly envelops its waters in flames and smoke. The camp is broken up in haste ; every living thing flies helter-skelter before the terrible element which outstrips the swiftest foot in velocity with an implacable uniformity of motion. The ammunition wagons, covered with sparks which the wind has driven before it, are dragged into the lake (fortunately not very deep), where the drivers sprinkle water over them ; the officers lead their horses into the water and then make them trample the grass with their wetted hoofs. All in vain ; the flames continue to advance. At last a desperate remedy is resorted to ; after cutting down the tall grasses which surround them with their sabres and taking refuge within the space thus cleared, the troopers kindle

another fire all around them. The circle thus formed soon gains in proportions; on one side this new fire advances slowly toward the great conflagration of the prairie, and stops its progress by interposing an impassable barrier, destroying the food it was about to devour. On the other side, driven by the wind, the fire spreads rapidly in advance of the American column, which follows it step by step over the burnt grasses until the fiery tempest which had threatened to consume them is left far behind. Finding themselves at last freed from the embraces of the most cruel of all deaths, men and beasts then sink upon the still smoking and parched-up ground, caring for nothing but to procure a little of that repose which is so delightful after a great danger.

Watch must be kept, however, for the vicinity of an enemy superior in number, although not yet visible, is made manifest by those multitudinous signs which a prairie life teaches one never to overlook. The *vaqueros* who have caused all the herds of cattle to disappear from those vast grazing-grounds, and the unknown hand that has kindled the prairie fire so as to carry the conflagration into the American camp, have, no doubt, obeyed the orders of this enemy. The decisive hour has arrived, and the little band prepares for battle. All the wagons of the army, both light and heavy, are formed into four parallel lines at intervals of fifty feet. The artillery is placed in the centre of each intervening space; the mounted men occupy the right and left wings, while the light companies deploy and scout upon the road. Instead of marching in a single column, easy to be broken, the train forms thus a compact mass, behind which the combatants, concealing their number, can entrench themselves in case of attack, and whence it is yet easy for them to emerge to form upon any point of that moving square. At night all the wagons, ranged in a circle and strongly tied together, are formed into a *corral*, a kind of temporary fortification within which the draught-animals are confined. In the event of a fight, as soon as the troops are engaged outside of the train, the corral is formed, and its defence is entrusted to the traders and the mule-drivers.

At last, after a long journey, without water, February 28, 1847, they reach the borders of Rio Sacramento, when, in the place of an encampment where it had hoped to find rest, the little

American army beholds four lines of redoubts erected upon precipitous heights and occupied by four or five thousand Mexicans. True to their customs, the Mexicans were thus compelling the Americans to fight after a fatiguing march; but if it be considered clever tactics to force an adversary to assume the offensive under such circumstances, the party thus acting should at least have made sure of being able to withstand the ardor which the sight of the refreshing stream infused into those whom it was intended to drive from its approaches.

The inhabitants of the neighboring *haciendas* had gathered in groups on the heights which border the Sacramento, some merely to look at those foreigners who had come from such a long distance; others to aid in crushing them as soon as victory had declared against them. They followed with astonishment the movements of the American column, which, enveloped by its long lines of wagons, had abandoned its original direction in order to describe a large circuit upon its right. When the Mexicans understood the intentions of the Americans, the first line of redoubts had been turned and the second vigorously charged. They had yet time, however, to change front and advance *en masse* to the defence of this second line. The Americans were exposed to a slanting fire; but the Mexicans having placed their guns on the summit of the hill, in the belief that the higher the position the stronger it must be, their plunging shots killed but one man among the assailants. The latter, however, were checked for a moment by a deep ravine. The first battalion of Doniphan, protected by two howitzers that had arrived at a gallop to come into battery fifty paces from the Mexican works, attempted to carry them without dismounting, and was firing in vain upon their defenders. But the second battalion, having dismounted, dislodged the enemy, who abandoned all his entrenchments and allowed himself to be driven from post to post until his retreat became a perfect rout. The Missouri volunteers had fought equally well on foot and on horseback; but the success was chiefly due to the officer who had so boldly brought up his two howitzers. The Mexicans left behind them three hundred wounded and ten pieces of cannon, and on the following day the victors entered Chihuahua.

But in this town Doniphan received news which rendered his

position singularly perilous. General Wool, who had left Texas with a considerable force for the purpose of joining him, had failed to make his appearance. A mountain too steep for his train, the existence of which he had not known, had obliged him to abandon the direction of Chihuahua, and he had retraced his steps towards the encampments of Taylor on the lower Rio Grande. That general, weakened by the departure of his best troops for Vera Cruz, and himself greatly exposed, had detained him at Saltillo. Wool thus found himself at more than one hundred and fifty leagues from Doniphan, and utterly unable to effect a junction with him.

Isolated in a town of twenty-six thousand inhabitants, in the heart of a hostile country, having received neither succor nor a dollar since the commencement of the campaign, those eight hundred men, whose term of enlistment had only two months more to run, had some cause to fear that they might find themselves in some Mexican prison when their time of service expired. To beat a retreat would have been to acknowledge their weakness, and to draw upon themselves an adversary whose forces increased at the slightest indication of success. They settled down in the city with a degree of assurance which disconcerted their enemies, avowed or concealed. The traders unloaded their wagons and opened a fair. Strict police regulations, an entirely new thing in Chihuahua, were maintained by the Americans. Men and animals thus rested themselves for two months, and prepared for the new hardships they would have some time to encounter.

At last, one day some bold troopers who had succeeded in reaching the headquarters of General Wool brought back an order to re-join the army of occupation at Saltillo. The column took up once more the line of march, leaving behind it the town of Chihuahua, where they had lived in peace and plenty, together with its listless population, which looked upon their departure with the same emotions with which it had witnessed their arrival, considering them as powerful travellers whose visit, if not too long, presented a curious spectacle, with opportunities of profit. After another march of one hundred and fifty leagues, they encamped near their comrades at Saltillo and Monterey; but their term of enlistment having expired, they proceeded towards the Rio

Grande ; and, unmolested by any enemy, they went to embark in the vicinity of Matamoras for New Orleans

On their return to Missouri they were discharged, having travelled more than two thousand leagues during their one year's service. Like those torrents which rush down from the Rocky Mountains in the neighborhood of Santa Fé, some running into the Pacific Ocean and others into the Gulf of Mexico, so did the small band which had started from Fort Leavenworth become divided in the capital of New Mexico ; and while Kearny was making his entry into San Francisco, Doniphan, after traversing all the north of Mexico, had reached the shores of the great Gulf with his troops. When he rejoined Taylor at Saltillo, the army of occupation had already fought several important battles in the vicinity of the Rio Grande and at Monterey. But although the troops of Taylor were more numerous than those whose adventurous march we have just been following, the study of their campaign does not afford the same interest in a military point of view.

In that campaign, however, the Americans received a few lessons which they subsequently turned to account. Thus, for instance, at the outset, a squadron of regular cavalry allowed itself to be drawn into a *corral*, or hacienda stable-yard, where the half wild horses of the country are confined and tamed, and the whole party was captured like a herd of cattle which a blind terror delivers to the lasso of the *vaquero*.

Their first important operations came also very near terminating in a disaster. The line which connected their cantonments on the Rio Grande with their *dépôts* at Point Isabel, near the mouth of that river, ran along the left bank, in sight of the enemy's posts situated on the opposite bank. The Mexican general Arista determined to pierce it by a sudden attack. The Americans, warned in time by a fortunate chance, fell back upon their *dépôts* thus menaced. When they attempted afterward to go to extricate the little garrison that had been left in their cantonments, they found Arista barring their passage at Palo Alto (May 8, 1846). Although this general had so entirely lost all presence of mind that his countrymen accused him of treason, the Americans would have been compelled to beat a retreat before the superior number

and position of the enemy, but for the steadfastness of their old battalions of regular troops. These did not allow themselves to be shaken by the impetuous charge of the Mexican lancers. At the risk of seeing their *caissons* blown up, the artillery, always well served, rush into the prairie, which has been on fire since the beginning of the engagement. Masked by the thick smoke, which the wind blows into the Mexican ranks, it takes a position so as to enfilade their lines, and thus obliges the enemy to beat a hasty retreat. The Mexican rear-guard, making a stand at *Resaca de la Palma*, tries in vain to cover the passage of the Rio Grande. The American artillery is the first to attack it; the regular dragoons charge and disperse it; and finally the infantry drives it into the stream in the midst of the greatest disorder. The Mexican army, completely disorganized, sought refuge in the interior, where it suffered the most terrible privations before it could reach the quiet and wealthy districts where it could reorganize. Nevertheless, a few months later (August, 1846) the important city of Monterey, which they had left behind with a feeble garrison, was able to repel for two whole days, while inflicting heavy losses upon the assailants, all the attacks of those regular troops, accustomed to victory in an open field, whatever might be the numerical force of the Mexicans. The armistice which the commander, Ampudia, obtained, for the purpose of evacuating the city, when he found himself threatened with famine, was an homage paid to the courage of his soldiers.

Both parties had been too sanguine of easy victory. Owing to this excess of confidence, the Mexicans were beaten, and the Americans were not in a condition to follow up their success. It was necessary to prepare for a new campaign. The Americans organized a naval expedition; the Mexicans made a revolution.

Not being able to clear a way across the immense tract of country which separates Saltillo, where Taylor was encamped with the army of occupation, from the city of Mexico, where the treaty of cession which the Americans wanted to wrest from their adversary had to be sought, they determined to attack the enemy at the most vulnerable point on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico.

Some troops had been collected at New Orleans for this purpose, but it was deemed necessary to take away from Taylor his

best soldiers to form the principal nucleus of the new expedition. These preparations occupied a portion of the winter, and at the beginning of 1847, nearly all the regular troops that Taylor had under his command were proceeding toward Matamoras, where they were to join the fleet, which had left New Orleans, and embark with General Scott for Vera Cruz.

In the mean time, the Mexicans, under the pretext of a political revolution called *federalist*, had called into power a soldier, the most able to cope with the invaders. When, ten years before, at San Jacinto, a trick of fortune delivered President Santa Anna into the hands of the warlike American settlers in Texas, instead of shooting him, they had set him free, thinking, as they said, that they could not bestow a more fatal gift upon their enemies. In fact, his restless ambition, capricious and fertile in expedients, did not permit him in time of peace either to submit to a regular government, or to become himself the founder of one; but in time of war, his failings as much as his talents secured him a powerful influence over his countrymen. He alone could organize a resistance and create unlooked-for resources to sustain it. He gave evidence of his foresight by taking advantage of the moment when a portion of his adversaries had already abandoned their positions beyond the Rio Grande and were sailing in the Gulf of Mexico, to attack those that had remained with Taylor before the naval expedition, the object of which a fortunate accident had revealed to him, should call him back to the defence of Vera Cruz. He had re-created an army; and the battle which he fought with Taylor at Buena Vista (on the 23d of February, 1847) was certainly the best contested of the entire war. The American army had lost even more in quality than in quantity through the reinforcements that had been sent to Scott; with the exception of the artillery and some cavalry, it consisted only of volunteers who had not seen one year's service. It is therefore of interest to us to see them at work on the only occasion when, in the whole course of that war, they were left to themselves.

It is impossible to find in the official accounts of that battle the least evidence of any concerted movement; the action once commenced, each officer acts upon his own impulses. The general-in-chief, not depending upon the execution of his orders, goes

in person, on the evening of the first day's battle, to visit his *dépôts*, several leagues in the rear of the army. Returned to the field of battle, he braves the enemy's fire without thinking of directing the movements of his various corps, which have become engaged at hap-hazard. The Mexicans, on this occasion, being well handled, vigorously assume the offensive. Some of the American regiments repel the first shock, while others, on the contrary, instantly disperse, deaf to every appeal to hold their ground. The entire line, thus outflanked at several points, wavers; isolated groups of soldiers are trying to secure the best positions for holding in check the Mexican cavalry, which is driving before it all whom it has thrown into confusion. The artillery, abandoned by those whose duty it was to support it, continues to fight heroically, thereby delaying the success of the Mexicans. But the latter, trusting to their numbers (they were twenty-two thousand against six thousand*), captured several guns, notwithstanding the efforts of the regular officers, and of Colonel Jefferson Davis, who was seriously wounded at the head of his regiment. This handful of men would have been annihilated but for the timely arrival of Captain Braxton Bragg, who, crossing the field of battle from one side to the other with his battery, saved them from utter destruction. Jefferson Davis never forgot this service, and ever after showed great favor to Bragg, for which he was severely blamed when this officer had attained the highest ranks in the Confederate army. Among the other officers who distinguished themselves on that memorable occasion, mention has been made of the names of Sherman, Thomas, Reynolds, and French, all of whom became celebrated afterward in the Federal ranks.

In the mean time, the artillery on one side, two regiments of cavalry and three battalions of infantry on the other, continued alone to make resistance, and the Mexicans, notwithstanding their losses, might, by a final effort, have secured the victory. Their mounted men, bestriding horses caparisoned in all that gorgeousness of colors which is so attractive to southern people, and brandishing their lances with long streamers, were advancing in ser-

* The disparity was even greater. The American army did not number quite five thousand men.—Ed.

ried columns and in the best of order, despite the roughness of the ground. But as they neared that portion of the American line of infantry which was still making resistance, their motions were seen to slacken; the grape-shot had begun to reach them. They came to a full stop, and a few volleys of musketry sufficed to make them wheel about in quick time. The American mounted volunteers on their part, under the command of a rough but brave Kentuckian, Humphrey Marshall, behaved handsomely. At first they occupied, as sharpshooters and on foot, a crest inaccessible to horses; then, at the moment of the great disorder, they fell back gradually without allowing themselves to be broken. Reduced finally to four hundred men, they waited, without flinching and in line of battle, the attack of a brigade of the enemy, which they received at sixty paces with a volley fired from their saddles. Then, seeing the Mexicans waver and halt, they flung their carbines over their shoulders, and charging the enemy with their sabres, put them to flight after a bloody conflict, in which many of their men, and one of their colonels, were left upon the ground.

Disorganized by the very effort which had seemed to render success certain, the Mexican army gave up the struggle; but it was only on the following day, when they were preparing for a new effort to sustain the unequal contest, that, finding no longer any enemy in front, the Americans, as it has often happened to them since, learned that they had gained the victory.

Having failed on this side, Santa Anna unhesitatingly turned towards Vera Cruz, where his presence was needed, and where we shall again shortly find him. He left the army of occupation in quiet possession of the country it had conquered, but too far remote from the new theatre of war to exercise any influence over the events of which we have yet to speak.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ARMY OF INVASION IN MEXICO.

ON the 9th day of March, 1847, thanks to the skill of the American navy, twelve thousand men were landed on the beach of Vera Cruz without striking a blow. The operations of this little army, which, although never amounting to more than fourteen thousand men, was nevertheless able to open for itself a triumphant passage to the city of Mexico, deserve all our attention. It passed through a country which is now familiar to those who have become interested in the labors of our own soldiers in the same localities ; and the obstacles which it encountered, the skilful and successful manner in which it was handled, while they earned for it well-deserved glory, also proved to be the best of schools.

Santa Anna had preceded it to Vera Cruz, his real capital, which had so often seen him retire like a hermit to his vast hacienda, or appear suddenly among the barracks to issue some *pronunciamiento*. The recollection of that night in 1838, when he was surprised and wounded by a handful of our bold sailors, had not discouraged him. But while giving directions for the defence of the place where he intended to cause the success of our arms to be forgotten, he took care not to shut himself up within its walls in the presence of the Americans. He dreaded with just cause the superiority of their discipline, of their military spirit, of their *matériel*, and, above all, of their perseverance. In spite of one of those terrible *northers* so common and so dangerous in the harbor of Vera Cruz, which interrupted all communication with the fleet, and which by demolishing the hills of moving sand levelled the first works of the engineer, the siege progressed rapidly. The city surrendered three days after the trenches were opened, and after one day's bombardment, which only disabled sixty-four Americans.

But all the advantages accruing from this rapid success were lost in consequence of the difficulty of transportation, which is the great problem of war in regions destitute of resources, and which becomes still more difficult when, the base of operations being purely maritime, the supplies are slow in reaching their destination. The horses and draught mules had perished in the gale, and three weeks elapsed before the army could take up its line of march. Fortunately for it, the Mexicans did not know how to take advantage of this delay. If they had confined themselves to the defence of cities and forts like Puebla and Perote, and to harassing the Americans with their numerous cavalry, the latter, not being then provided with the means for transporting their siege guns, would have found a resistance in those localities which they could not have overcome. But despite the teachings of the Spanish war, the Mexicans forgot Saragossa, to imitate Ocaña and Rio Seco. They had not the incentives of popular passions and national hatred to lead them to resort to that terrible street-fighting in which the Spanish race excels. The Americans had avoided all occasions of stirring up their animosities, by not meddling with their intestine quarrels. Scott, who had no more idea of their regeneration than Santa Anna himself, had taken sides with none of the parties which divided them; he was most anxious not to overthrow the government he had come to fight; for he wanted to be able to treat with it on the day after the victory. Besides, it was not the sacrifice of some distant portions of the territory which could rouse a population accustomed to see half these provinces in arms against each other. Therefore, during that campaign the cities themselves offered no resistance to the little foreign army. The inhabitants, crowded upon the balconies to see the American soldiers pass, wondering at their haggard looks, their tattered garments, and disappointed in their expectations of a brilliant pageant, asked each other how such men could have vanquished the national troops, but left to those troops the care of fighting them.

Santa Anna committed an error of frequent occurrence in those half-civilized countries, where generals with scarcely any military experience command troops that have but the outward appearance of our organized armies. Always anxious to fight pitched battles,

they impose a discipline upon their soldiers which embarrasses without sustaining them ; they encumber themselves with *matériel* which they know not how to use, and thus lose all their natural advantages. When he took up his position at Cerro Gordo—a position skilfully chosen and strongly entrenched, for the purpose of preventing the Americans from reaching the table-lands by the Jalapa road—he sustained, on the 18th of April, 1847, a crushing defeat. Of his twelve thousand men, three thousand were taken prisoners, and the remainder took to flight, leaving behind them four thousand muskets and forty-three guns. He had again committed the mistake which, at the beginning of the war of Mexican independence, had proved so fatal to Hidalgo. But at Cerro Gordo one did not see, as at Calderon Bridge, entire populations of Indians almost unarmed given up to useless and inevitable slaughter. The courageous defence of the Mexicans was, on the contrary, a useful lesson to the Americans. In fact, Scott had charged the enemy in front and in flank at the same time. The first of these two attacks cost the Americans dear, and was productive of no results ; while the other, boldly led, succeeded in taking the army of Santa Anna in rear and throwing it into irretrievable confusion. These flank movements, often tried afterward, always proved successful before an enemy who weakened his wings for the sake of extending his lines.

The success of this flank movement had, besides, been carefully planned. They had scarcely emerged from their open trenches among the moving sands and fever-breeding swamps which surround Vera Cruz, when the American soldiers took up once more the shovel and pick, for three days, to cut a passage through a rock, which allowed the artillery to take up a position within range of the Mexican works at Cerro Gordo, and to support the assault which carried them. It was owing to this patient labor that the defences erected in front of the enemy's army were avoided, and that, at the critical moment, the latter found its retreat cut off.

Scott's troops showed their valor, not only by resolutely charging positions bristling with guns, but especially in pursuing the enemy after his defeat with a degree of vigor which prevented him from rallying again. This pursuit, difficult when the ques-

tion of supplies embarrasses every movement, would have been impossible with new troops, who are always exhausted at the end of a conflict by the very effort which has secured the victory.

Perote and Puebla fell into the hands of the Americans without a struggle. It was very fortunate for them that they had so crippled the Mexican army that their entrance into those towns could not be opposed; for their number had been greatly reduced, and they were beginning to experience those vexations which render a campaign in the New World so troublesome. A month of inactivity in the fatal climate of tropical lands, followed by long and fatiguing marches, the scorching days and cold nights of the table-lands, had developed many diseases in that little army, which only numbered forty-five hundred men when it entered Puebla. The large train, from which it could not separate itself, had been equally diminished. Admirably adapted for long expeditions in the vast prairies of the far West, it was poorly organized for the purpose of following an army over the rugged soil of Mexico. The wagons were too heavy, the teams, already much reduced in numbers during the sea voyage, were falling in their traces, and the mules of the country were restive in harness. The few remaining vehicles were encumbered with the sick that could not be left behind. There also occurred in this army, composed as it was of men of such various nationalities, too many desertions. Finally, the four thousand volunteers who followed Scott as far as Jalapa had only a few weeks longer to serve; for at the time of their enlistment they did not count on so long a war. Although this corps constituted more than one-third of his army, the American general would not take them along with him in his march upon Mexico, as it would have rendered it impossible for them to leave him when their term of enlistment should expire. That high-toned commander, a scrupulous observer of the requirements of law, like the people whom he represented, made it a point to fulfil the obligations which the State had assumed in regard to them, and at the end of April he sent them back to Vera Cruz, before the yellow fever scourged the coast.

The Federal government had committed a grave error, and had greatly deceived itself regarding the facility of reaching Mexico;

for that strange capital is surrounded by a kind of mirage which dazzles all those whose cupidity it excites. But when free governments, acting under the influence of popular impressions, commit such errors, to which absolute powers are not less liable, they generally find in public opinion itself the means of rectifying them. Congress, in fact, in its session of 1846, had failed to vote the formation of ten new regiments of regulars which had been proposed at the last moment; and the President was not authorized to raise them until the time when they should already have been landed at Vera Cruz to reinforce Scott, who was condemned to inactivity on the table-lands of Puebla. But this want of foresight was soon followed by action. The smallest detachments of the regular army were called in from every part of the country to constitute *cadres* for the new regiments, which, thanks to the rapidity of enlistments, swelled to more than ten thousand men during the year; and as the question now was to sustain the national honor, the North furnished volunteers with as much eagerness as the South.

Finally, after a tedious inactivity of three months and a half, the American army found itself increased to the total of fourteen thousand five hundred men. This was not enough, however, to maintain communications with the sea while the principal column was marching upon Mexico. Scott resorted to a bold expedient: all the garrisons, except those of Vera Cruz and Perote, were gathered together in Puebla, where six hundred able-bodied men and six hundred convalescents were shut up with twenty-five hundred sick confided to their care.

The American general, having given up his base of operations, took up his line of march with ten thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight men, and every available means of transportation. The total amount of regular troops in this force was eighteen regiments, a number altogether unusual, some of which had been reduced, it is true, to less than five hundred men during the campaign; they comprised twelve regiments of the line, one of *voltigeurs*, one of dismounted rifles, and four regiments of foot artillery, taken from the various Federal fortresses, which performed infantry duty. The regulars formed three divisions, to which was added one division of volunteers, each comprising two

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brigades and one regular field battery. The cavalry, in consequence of the difficulty of maritime transportation, was reduced to five hundred horses, a most insignificant number compared with that of the Mexicans. The American heavy wagons having failed for the transportation of provisions and ammunition, a convoy of the sumpter animals of the country was substituted.

The circumstances which obliged the Americans to abandon their communications with Puebla rendered it necessary for them to keep their lines as close during their march as the difficulties of the roads and the necessity of collecting provisions permitted. The divisions were kept apart at intervals of three leagues, so as to be able mutually to support each other. The park with the large *impedimenta* followed first. The dragoons, well officered, scouted the roads sufficiently, notwithstanding the smallness of their numbers. It was in this order that the Americans crossed the table-lands and the high chain of mountains which separate Puebla from the interior basin of Mexico. The heavy rains of that year had swelled the torrents and damaged all the roads. The American soldier does not possess the art of procuring food in a poor or exhausted country. The administrative department, accustomed to campaigns in which the troops carried everything with them, did not know how to make a country contribute to the necessary wants of the army, while lightening as much as possible the burdens of war. Provisions were scarce. Invisible but stubborn guerillas surrounded the Americans like an elusive mist; and they advanced rapidly to escape from their clutches. It was especially around the large supply-train, the preservation of which was a matter of vital importance, that it became necessary to be doubly vigilant. Consequently, when the mules, strung along like a chaplet of beads, pricked up their ears, and shaking the little bells attached to their parti-colored trappings, entered one of those defiles favorable to ambushades, the alarms were frequent; the least impediment, the shouts of the Mexican *arrieros*, of doubtful fidelity, the very echo of the animals' feet striking against the rocks, seemed to the officers charged with this heavy responsibility the signal of some treachery.

The Americans, however, arrived without fight or accident in the valley of Mexico, where Santa Anna, with an army which

four months' respite had enabled him to reorganize, offered them another chance in the game he had once lost at Cerro Gordo—double or quits. This time, profiting by experience, he fully intended to take advantage of those solid buildings which the Spaniards had scattered around Mexico. The position of Scott's army was a difficult one. In sacrificing his communications, he had deprived the enemy of one of his principal resources—the attack of isolated detachments—but at the sight of the preparations for defence made by the latter, he must have acknowledged that he had not brought one man too many with him, in order to avoid a disaster the gravity of which no line of posts established *en echelon* on the route could have lessened. His troops, full of confidence in him, had not been in the least alarmed at a step which would have disconcerted less experienced soldiers.

It was necessary at all hazards for them to conquer this formidable adversary in the positions he had chosen. They fortunately passed through this ordeal so trying to the *morale* of the soldier, and success justified the daring of their chief. They may probably have been sustained by the example of that adventurous genius who was the first to subjugate Mexico; for the Americans, who are far from wanting in imagination when the greatness of the nation is in question, were no doubt incited by the remembrance of Cortes and the hope of equalling his exploits.

Nature has done everything to render the approaches to Mexico difficult:—On one part, lakes and marshes intersected by narrow causeways, which the redoubts erected by Santa Anna fully commanded. On the other, along the mountain sides which surround this interior basin, a ground singularly uneven, traversed by immense petrified streams of ancient lava, in which enormous blocks with sharp angles are piled up in heaps. These streams of lava, called *pedregales*, were impracticable for cavalry and artillery; the infantry even could not keep their ranks; and the small but compact villages of Contreras, San Antonio, and Churubusco formed a line on that same ground difficult to carry. Nearer the capital rose the rock of Chapultepec (the “hill of locusts”), crowned with strong Spanish fortifications of the seventeenth century which command all its approaches. Finally, the city itself,

owing to an unusual rainy season, was then surrounded by ground deeply gullied.

A series of combats which occupied three days, from the 18th to the 20th of August, and which conjointly constituted an important battle, as much on account of the price it cost as for its results, delivered up to the Americans the first line of defences.

The decisive blow was delayed for two weeks by an armistice, of which the Mexicans alone derived the benefit. But the two bloody days of the 7th and 13th of September caused the fall of Chapultepec, and secured to the Americans, with that final victory, possession of the great city of Mexico.

These two operations deserve to be commented upon in detail, for they reflected as much honor upon the commander who conducted them as upon the army that executed them. The limits of this historical sketch, however, do not allow us to do more here than point out the principal features of the struggle, and the military qualities to which the Americans were indebted for their success against an enemy superior in numerical strength and master of strong defensive positions.

They knew how to work, march, and fight at the same time. With pick in hand, they opened for themselves a passage across the *pedregal* to avoid some of the strongest positions of the enemy. Sometimes in his very presence, at other times concealing their movements, and often even dispensing with the support of their artillery, it was always by some flanking manœuvre that they prepared for their successes; and if it happened more than once that in the midst of some movement executed under the fire of the enemy, or in the darkness of the night, their battalions, little used to act in concert, were thrown into confusion, the zeal and intelligence of the officers always repaired these accidents in time. It was by their courage, in short, and their stubbornness, that the American troops achieved victory when it became necessary to attack positions in front which could no longer be turned.

He had hardly set foot upon the direct road from Vera Cruz to Mexico, which runs between the lakes Tezcuco and Chalco, when Scott perceived that he could not open himself a passage on that side. Renewing on a larger scale the manœuvre of Cerro Gordo, he determined to attempt an attack by way of the south

after having turned Lake Chalco. Between this lake and the adjacent mountains, it was found necessary to cut a road several leagues in length, enabling the artillery to come within range of Contreras, and securing at the same time the communications of the army with the *dépôts* that had been left east of Lake Chalco.

This turning movement, thus commenced at the entrance into the basin of Mexico, was continued until the taking of the capital. It always proved successful in the face of an enemy unable to make any sudden movement without falling into the greatest disorder. When arrived in front of Contreras and San Antonio, the Americans meet with a more vigorous resistance than they had anticipated. Their first attack is repulsed; their artillery, too weak to have any effect upon houses solidly roofed, is crushed by the superior calibre of the Mexican guns. They at once make a new flank movement. One division proceeds under cover of the night to place itself in the very rear of the position of Contreras, and the defenders of the place only become aware of this bold manœuvre when they find themselves attacked and surrounded on every side. This *point d'appui* once carried, the Americans concentrate their efforts successively upon each of the positions which formed the too extended line of the enemy. This is entirely broken, and the Mexicans only retain the massive walls of the convent of San Pablo de Churubusco, with the adjoining *tête de pont*, which, being in the rear of that line, could not be turned with it. This time it was found necessary to attack the position in front, which the regular troops vigorously carried, not without sustaining serious losses, thus showing that if they knew how to manœuvre under an able commander, the latter could also rely upon them at that critical moment in all battles when the personal courage of the soldier decides the victory.

The successes which after the expiration of the armistice opened the gates of Mexico to the Americans were obtained in the same manner. Always manœuvring by their left, after having passed from the eastern to the southern part of the city, they extended their lines from south to west, and when they appeared before its walls they were exactly facing Vera Cruz. In order to capture the castle of Chapultepec, they sought to surround that formid-

able position by forcing the extremity of the line of which it was the key. But the success of this movement was purchased at a great sacrifice. At the extreme left, three hundred dragoons, under the command of Major Sumner, undergo the most difficult ordeal that can be conceived for cavalry, and keep that of the enemy in check by remaining immovable under a murderous fire. In the mean while, the regular foot-soldiers make an assault upon the works which form the Mexican line. Although they succeed in piercing the centre, the most important entrenchments which support its two extremities resist all their efforts. A single regiment loses eleven of its fourteen officers before Molino del Rey. But, as it happened at Contreras, this check is soon turned into a victory. Seeing their line broken, and perceiving farther off on the plain Sumner, who is with his few dragoons and a battery of artillery driving the Mexican lancers before him, the defenders of Molino del Rey and of Casa de Mata, fearing to be hemmed in, abandon their positions in great haste. The American army lost in that battle (September 7, 1847) one-fourth of its effective force.

Nevertheless, on the following day, they must go to work to demolish the fortifications evacuated by the enemy, and to erect batteries in front of Chapultepec: they must place there the siege-guns brought from Vera Cruz or captured at Contreras, whose fire is to batter down the thick walls of the castle. Despite the murderous fire of the besieged, all the preparatory works are speedily completed, and Chapultepec is bombarded during two days. At last, on the 13th of September, the American troops scale the steep acclivities and surmount the various obstacles of every sort by which the ancient residence of the viceroys of New Spain is surrounded. The garrison, which numbers among its best combatants the pupils of the military school, makes a brave defence, but, exhausted and decimated, it can no longer resist the concentrated effort of the Americans, who make themselves masters of the whole castle.

The war was virtually ended. A clever feint which drew the attention of the Mexicans to one of the gates of the capital, while the army completed its great flank movements at the west, enabled the latter to take possession of another entrance to the city, and thus spared its adversaries an effusion of blood thereafter useless.

There were very few men on that side, and not a single gun, to take advantage of the obstacles that Nature has placed there. Only a few muskets were fired to cover the retreat of Santa Anna. Notwithstanding his defeats, he could go out of the capital he had so ably defended with head erect, nor had he yet given up the game. His sudden attack upon Puebla is an evidence of his daring and of the resources of his genius, and it was only after the conflict at Huamantla that, forsaken by his most trusty companions, he was compelled to submit to the decrees of fate.

In the battles fought around the capital, the American army took thirty-seven hundred prisoners, thirteen of whom were generals and three ex-presidents; and among its trophies were found seventy-five cannons. The army itself lost in those conflicts twenty-seven hundred and three men, or the fourth part of all its effective force; so that, notwithstanding the genial climate of those high table-lands, the sound constitution of the soldier, injured to military life, and the precautions which saved them from much sickness, their number was reduced to about six thousand men when they occupied Mexico.

But this small body of troops, composed of the *élite* of the American forces, had acquired, together with the consciousness of its prowess, an experience in the art of war which proved beneficial to all the regular army, and which was not lost in the great struggle of 1861. It was among the young generation who learned their trade so well under Scott, that both Federals and Confederates sought the leaders to whom they confided the control of their respective armies. Thus, to mention some names we shall find again presently in every page of this narrative, it was at the siege of Vera Cruz that Lee, McClellan, and Beauregard, all three officers of engineers, made together their *début* in arms. Lee, who, through his ability as a staff officer, soon afterward gained the entire confidence of General Scott, directed at Cerro Gordo and Contreras the construction of the roads which secured the victorious movements of the army. After his name, which was destined to a much greater celebrity, those of Sumner and of Kearny, both serving in the small corps of dragoons which had such a hard task to perform throughout that campaign, were the most frequently mentioned by their commanders. Sumner,

formed to lead a charge of cavalry straight to the point of attack, courageous, stubborn, and as inflexible in matters of discipline as he was unsparing toward himself, had been surnamed by his soldiers "the Bull of the Woods." Always keeping clear of politics and faithful to his flag, we find him in 1857 dispersing the legislature of Kansas in the name of the then pro-slavery government of Washington, with as much ardor as he displayed in defending the national cause in the army of the Potomac in 1862. Kearny, chivalrously brave and passionately fond of the military profession, always discontented with his superior officers, except when ordered to attack the enemy, had accompanied our army to Algeria in 1840, in the Médéah expedition, and had subsequently returned to Europe to follow that army in the campaign of Italy. At the battle of Contreras, rushing with one hundred horse in pursuit of the fleeing Mexicans, he followed them as far as the gates of the city, where he lost an arm. Of all the officers of his squadron, one only, not less brave than himself, but more favored by fortune than the rest—Lieutenant Ewell—returned without a wound; and by another strange fatality, fifteen years later almost to a day, Kearny and himself were found each in a command of a division in the two contending armies on the battle-field of Chantilly, where the former was killed while vainly endeavoring to remedy the mistakes of his general; whilst the latter, always more fortunate, only lost a leg in that bloody conflict. In order to show how useful the Mexican campaign was in training generals for the civil war, it will suffice to say that among those officers who had the honor of receiving special mention in the despatches of General Scott, sixteen became generals in the Federal army, and fourteen in that of the Confederates.

The American army remained some time longer in Mexico; it even received a reinforcement of twelve or fifteen thousand men, and these reserves, drilled and instructed under the assiduous care of Scott, soon rivalled in ardor and soldierly bearing the troops who had passed through all the trials of the campaign.

The conqueror of Mexico was as much admired as he was envied. Some personages of distinction in the country, already in search of a foreign monarch, offered him the imperial crown of the Aztecs; and it is even asserted that this idea was for a

time popular in Mexico, where the name of Scott represented at once strength and moderation. But he was not the man to barter away the title of citizen in a free country for the false glitter of such an offer; for he well knew that the satisfaction which an honest man can find in public life depends not on the greatness of his personal position, but on the character and ripe political judgment of the people whose destinies he shares.

Respected by those he had vanquished, worshipped by his soldiers and officers, his relations with the generals of divisions soon became embittered by jealousy. Politics interfered; he was recalled, and had to return to the United States alone, in advance of the troops he had so well commanded. But with a truly free people injustice is seldom of long duration. The Americans, far from adopting the miserable prejudices of those who were then in power, felt that they had cause to be proud of their general. He had infused new life into the regular army; he had given it traditions, and, above all, he had inspired it with confidence in itself. Consequently, knowing how to conquer love as well as to enforce obedience, he was regarded from that time as the father of the family of officers reared in his school.

CHAPTER V.

THE AMERICAN ARMY AMONG THE INDIANS.

THE Mexican war was the only brilliant epoch in the annals of the American army from its actual formation in 1815 down to the breaking out of the civil war in 1861. But the remainder of that long period was not a time of peace and rest for it, inasmuch as it was occupied by incessant conflicts with the descendants of the ancient possessors of America.

When this army was charged with the protection of the frontiers of the newly-settled States, the Indians living east of the Mississippi had not yet been driven into the far West, nor politically absorbed by the white race. But the latter was already crowding upon them, stifling them within narrow limits, and in proportion as its settlements extended, it successively despoiled them of their domains, and removed them, partly with their consent and partly by force, to some district yet too far distant to excite the cupidity of the whites, where a new place of exile was assigned them under the name of *Indian Reservation*. The aboriginal race, which often submitted to these sad migrations with the indifference of fatalism, would also at times resist the conquerors who imposed them with all the energy of despair. When the struggle between the pioneer abusing his superior intelligence, and the savage trying to find in the expedients of cunning some help for his weakness, became embittered, the little American army, summoned to the assistance of the settlers or the Federal agents, found itself engaged in a murderous, toilsome, and obscure war. Sometimes it had to take part in skirmishes which were important only on account of the magnitude of the losses it sustained in them. Thus, in 1814, a conflict took place on the yet unfrequented borders of the Tallapoosa, in which the American cavalry lost over two hundred men, and the Creek tribe, van-

quished after a desperate struggle, left more than one thousand warriors on the battle-field.

The tribe which offered the longest resistance was that of the Seminoles, once a powerful nation, always haughty and warlike, gradually driven by the whites into the low lands which form the peninsula of Florida, in the south-eastern portion of the United States. There, under a tropical sun and amidst impenetrable thickets, two enemies, both alike invisible and unrelenting—the fever and the Indian—awaited the American soldier, who, bending under the weight of his arms and his provisions, had exhausted all his strength in contending against the obstacles of Nature. The Florida war, often rekindled after deceitful attempts at pacification, was long and cruel. The Indians, exasperated by repeated instances of bad faith on the part of the whites, gave no quarter. Reduced in number by the unequal contest, they sought shelter among the inaccessible recesses of the Everglades—vast woody swamps where the cypress, the magnolia, and the palmetto preserve an eternal verdure—and at the approach of the whites they would disappear with their light canoes in a labyrinth of channels of which they alone knew the secret. The Americans, taking advantage of their divisions and the exhaustion of all their resources, went at last to find them in this last refuge. It was a trying campaign for the soldier. Water and the forest interposed a double obstacle to his progress. The ground gave way under his feet, and he was alternately obliged to creep slowly across the swamps, or to get into some fragile canoe and open himself a passage between the trees, each of which might conceal a foe. He had nothing to guide him but the track left on the muddy bottom by the Indian in his flight towards his secret place of refuge. This refuge generally consisted of an elevated piece of ground called a hummock, covered with thick vegetation, in the midst of which the indigenous families were sheltered in a rude village. This islet was usually surrounded by open lagoons, and the moment the whites emerged from the forest they were exposed to a well-sustained fire from a concealed enemy, who was determined to die rather than give up his possessions. Finally, however, tracked from islet to islet, abandoned or betrayed by their allies, deprived of arms and ammunition, the most deter-

mined among the Seminoles, after a truly heroic resistance, had to submit, or were made prisoners by stratagems little creditable to their conquerors. Decimated by sickness, hunger, and, above all, by the fatal abuse of *fire-water*, the sad remnants of this proud race embarked for New Orleans, and thence proceeded to the prairies of Arkansas, where that civilization which they only knew as an inveterate foe was soon again to find them.

This struggle had lasted thirteen years, and although the American army always endeavored to mitigate the evils of that cruel policy of which it was the instrument, the remembrance of the valiant resistance of those poor savages, of the losses they inflicted upon that army, and, above all, of their miserable end, remained as a gloomy recollection among military traditions.

Three years later, when the smoke of the log hut, that rustic citadel of the frontier settler, rising in the place of the camp-fires above the forests of Florida, had scarcely proclaimed the return of peace, a new career was opened to the Federal army on the distant shores of the Pacific.

The annexation of Texas after an ephemeral independence, that of New Mexico and of Upper California, hastened by the campaign of Scott, which rendered that ingenious transition useless, were sanctioned by the treaty signed at Guadalupe Hidalgo. Half the continent was embraced within the new frontiers of the Union. Mountains and deserts, forests, rivers, and prairies, all the space of land comprised between the last settlements of the basin of the Mississippi and the almost uninhabited coasts of California, where the gold-fever was not yet raging, became part of the domain of the American people. In thus extending the boundaries of the field open to their ambitious activity, the latter pledged themselves, in the eyes of the world, to conquer that territory in the interest of civilization; their little army, through its intelligence and perseverance, was to be one of the principal instruments in that enterprise. Such conquests constitute the noblest mission of the soldier. Abounding in useful lessons, thanks to the varied labors and the individual responsibility they impose upon every man, they form an excellent school for an army. Colonization, which, under the powerful influence of true and rational liberty, progresses rapidly in America, asks no power, civil or military, to

direct it or to think for it. But the squatter, who will not separate the rifle from the axe, sometimes carries the love of independence to excess, and in the struggle of the new civilization against Nature and against the imperfect society of the Indians, the intervention of a superior power, strong and impartial, often becomes necessary. This was the part the American officers were called upon to play.

They alone represented the Federal government, which was at once the ruler and sole proprietor of those vast tracts of country ; they entered into a contest with the still virgin nature, very different from those conflicts in which they had been engaged with the Indians, for it had the happy privilege of leaving no captives in its train ; but the victory had to be purchased at the price of patient efforts that can only be expected from military devotion. Their splendid geodetical labors were intermingled with some of the strangest adventures. We have shown how one of the most distinguished among them, Colonel Fremont, while simply engaged in exploring the Rocky Mountains, had conquered, on his passage, a province as large as France. Although a quarrel with General Kearny, induced by party spirit, deprived the army of his valuable services, his example was followed. Demarkations of frontier lines, hydrographical surveys of coasts and rivers, geological inquiries, researches in natural history, were at once undertaken by those indefatigable pioneers of science. Their reports, published by the War Department, notwithstanding their length, form the most complete and interesting collection of historical records of colonization in America. The solitary life they led induced many who had not even received an official appointment to join in these pursuits. It is true that at times some untoward accident interfered with their peculiar tastes ; a geologist would be stationed in a plain where he could not find a single stone ; a botanist in a sterile desert ; but nearly all of them found some opportunity to help the march of progress in the study of the new countries which had been acquired.

They had, however, other duties to perform besides these peaceful labors. The Indians of the West, although not cornered, like the Seminoles, and obliged to fight or to surrender, did not give way without resistance before the never-ebbing tide

of the white race. The extent of their territory, which enabled them to refuse or to accept a combat, and always to select the moment and the place favorable for the attack, rendered it much more difficult to conquer them. By a wise precaution against local outbreaks, all relations with the Indians were confided to the President, who styled himself their great father at Washington; and the lands which they occupied, not belonging to any State, were under the immediate jurisdiction of his government. The management of these relations was divided among Indian agents in the civil employ of the government, who had charge of all fiscal matters, the distribution of lands, and the collection of taxes; while the army, as the guardian of public order, made use both of diplomacy and the force of arms to maintain it.

It had a difficult part to perform, for it was placed between the new civilization—represented by the *squatter*, who pretends to exercise the right of prior occupancy over all the lands where he finds only red-skins; by the dealer in ardent spirits, who carries his fatal poison to the very *wigwam*—and the Indian tribe, which requires vast uncultivated spaces for its existence, and a degree of independence incompatible with an improved state of society. Although the Americans have been accused of systematically destroying the Indian race, their army, on the contrary, has frequently assumed the defence of these unfortunate people against the destructive contact with the white man. It has endeavored to smooth the way for their adoption of civilized customs, without, however, seeking to perpetuate the rude organization of the system of tribes, which it rather sought to destroy, as opposed to every kind of progress, by favoring those who renounced their wandering modes of life. The Indian tribe, in fact, resembles greatly the Arab tribes, but more particularly those tribes—nomadic as in the times of Abraham—which inhabit the deserts of Africa and of Syria, than those we have found in the Tell of Algeria, possessing already a limited territory, portions of which they cultivate. The latter, although they represent a more advanced condition of society, or rather on account of that fact, are much more antagonistic to modern civilization; their system, in short, is founded on a religion exclusive and political, and on territorial regulations which admit community of property. The

religion of the Indian, like that of the Bedouin, is, on the contrary, so simple and so vague, that it does not repel as an enemy the religion we bring to him; while the property of both—consisting only in tents, arms, and horses in the New World, of herds of cattle in the Old—is essentially individual. The tribe-system, therefore, is only a weak political tie—a simple extension of the family. In their intercourse with these primitive people, the Americans have always taken care that their progress should not result in consolidating the organization of the tribes, but have rather tried to merge its elements into the great modern society which is rapidly spreading all over the continent. Therefore, under the influence of the examples of civilization, a great number of Indians have abandoned the nomadic ways of life, and, casting aside the traditions of the past, have ceased their hostility to the whites when they have become tillers of the soil. American policy has devised various means to win their attachment, either through interest or fear. After taxing them at first, the Federal government changed its mode of proceeding, and bought their lands, giving them annuities in exchange. It thus made them submissive pensioners, while it narrowed the limits of the tribe's hunting-grounds, which were a barrier against colonization; and in order that this domain might not become, in the hands of the tribes, a real collective property, it imposed upon them the alternative, as soon as the tide of civilization began to approach, either to emigrate *en masse*, or to divide their lands among themselves, by securing a lot to every Indian who desired to become a tiller of the soil. In thus destroying the social organization of the tribes, the government, however, still respected their political system, with a view of imposing upon them a collective responsibility for all the crimes which might be committed by their members—the only effective guarantee of the police of the desert. This process of primitive justice was abandoned as soon as the division and individual cultivation of the lands had rendered the change of customs permanent, and the political system of the tribe gradually gave place to an ordinary municipality, while its members became citizens of the United States.

No prejudice of color interposed any obstacle to this work of absorption, which is still carried on to this day, and the State of

New York itself has several villages of civilized Indians who, although preserving the type and the traditions of their race, are in every respect the equals of the old settlers around them. Thirty years ago a regiment of Federal cavalry was raised entirely among the Creeks, and Indians of pure blood have left the West Point Academy with the rank of officers in the regular army. More than this, in the South, where they are treated as the equals of the whites, where the Confederate Congress admitted their delegates to its deliberations, they had become, in their turn, the owners of slaves and fanatic partisans of the enslavement of the black race.

The American army had, therefore, a double task to perform. On the one hand, it had to maintain the national authority over the Indian tribes, to see that the treaties concluded with them were faithfully executed, and to impress them with the wholesome conviction that from one end of the continent to the other all the whites would take up arms, if necessary, to avenge any outrage committed on a single individual belonging to their class; and, in order to accomplish this, the army had occasionally to resort to force, and sometimes to negotiations, in which the sword gave them, in the eyes of those savages, great advantages over the civil agents. On the other hand, it was frequently obliged to interfere against the white adventurers, either to protect the ancient owners of the soil from their violence, or to restore order in the midst of a new community where the most antagonistic elements were at work; or, finally, to enforce respect for the superior authority of the Federal government, which was easily disregarded amid the vehement quarrels of those distant regions.

Consequently, the army was always, if not in war, at least in watchful anxiety. Having to watch the Apaches and the Comanches, who infested the passes of the Rocky Mountains on the side of New Mexico, the Sioux on the Upper Missouri, the *Néz Percés* and the *Cœur d'Aléne*—warlike tribes from the shores of Oregon—it was scattered over an immense territory, and had, besides, to hold itself always in readiness to repel a sudden attack or to punish the first act of hostility committed against any new settlement. This rough and adventurous life gave to the American officer the habit of command, of responsibility, and of individual

enterprise—qualities which go to form the warrior. Most of them became passionately attached to it, for the life of the desert has for the soldier, as well as for the traveller, an attraction which those who have once tasted it never cease to regret.

The story of Kearny and of Doniphan has already shown us some of the difficulties that surround an expedition in those distant regions. Those two chieftains, however, had a settled (*sédentaire*) enemy to contend with in the Mexicans, whose territory offered certain resources to the invader. But these resources were altogether lacking when the Americans had to fight nomadic tribes. Launching into the wilderness, the troops required to be well supplied with provisions, so as to be able to follow them a long distance after the first encounter, and also to be sufficiently strong not to fear a check, almost always irreparable.

The supply-train, that ball-and-chain which every civilized army has to drag along, carried all that it could need during the expedition; for among a hunting people like the Indians there could not be found even such feeble resources as our *razzias* procured among the Arab shepherds. The train consisted of heavy emigrant wagons, each carrying a load of more than eight hundred kilogrammes weight, and drawn by mules admirably trained. The team, controlled by a single rein, obeyed the voice of the teamster. The country is everywhere open, and the ground sufficiently even to admit of the passage of those heavy vehicles. Among the isolated masses of rock in the Rocky Mountains there are no abrupt defiles to mark the separation of the watersheds of the two oceans, and it is only at certain points on the Pacific slope that steep mountains and dense forests have compelled the Americans to imitate the *conductas* of mules they had seen in Mexico, and to substitute beasts of burden for their wagons.

The longer and the more toilsome the expedition, the more it became necessary to enlarge the train; and its very magnitude, by obstructing the march of the soldiers, multiplied the evils attending the campaign. Difficulties of this nature came near causing the loss of the largest body of troops that ever ventured to cross the Rocky Mountains, although commanded by an experienced officer—Sidney Johnston, who would undoubtedly have played a dis-

tinguished part in the Confederate armies, if he had not met with a premature death at the outset of the war on the battle-field of Shiloh. This little army, sent by President Buchanan in 1857 to reinstate the Federal authority among the Mormons, which they had disregarded, numbered twenty-five hundred combatants; but being obliged to carry eighteen months' provisions, it had more than four thousand wagons in its train. With such a train its march was delayed by the least obstacle. At the crossing of every deep river, all the wagons had to be unloaded and set afloat, so as to be drawn to the opposite shore by ropes; then the provisions had to be carried by hand over the bridges constructed for the use of the infantry, like rafts, of trunks of trees tied together. After a march of two months, the Americans reached the upper passes of the Rocky Mountains in the middle of November, when they were overtaken by an early winter. Hemmed in by a snowdrift, the animals perished of cold and hunger. Each day lessened their number by hundreds, and the shivering soldiers set fire to the wagons which were abandoned with their precious supplies. For fifteen days this little band, strewn with the *débris* of its train the frozen mantle of the desert, continued its terrible march with more perseverance than prudence. But it could only accomplish fourteen leagues, at the end of which it had to stop from exhaustion, and was compelled to establish its winter quarters in the gloomy region where it found itself blockaded. The greatest part of the provisions having been lost, all had to live upon mule flesh. Finally, this last resource having failed, Captain Marcy—who afterwards became a general in the Federal army—undertook the perilous task of going to solicit a fresh supply of provisions and conveyances among the settlements of New Mexico. He lost nearly all his companions on the route, and only accomplished the mission, on the success of which the salvation of the army depended, after unheard-of sufferings. Thanks to him, the fresh supplies arrived in time, and Johnston was able to reach Great Salt Lake City in the spring.

When hostilities broke out with any of the Indian tribes, it was necessary, in the midst of these difficulties, to go in search of a vigilant enemy, who, born in the wilderness, was not encumbered with supply-trains. Always on horseback, the Indians

were indebted to their animals for that rapidity of movement which constituted their strength in attack and their safety in flight, and which, even when they had not yet adopted the use of the rifle, compensated more than once for the inferiority of their arrows as compared with the firearms of the Americans. It was at the moment when the white race came to dispute the possession of the new continent, that a just Providence placed in their hands this precious and powerful auxiliary. When the European landed in their midst, he brought them, at the same time, implacable and endless war, and the means of waging it. He gave them the horse, without which they could not even have lived in peace on the plains to which they were about to be driven. The horse became the indispensable companion of their new existence. Living solely by hunting, they made themselves absolute masters of the art of surprises and ambuscades. Fearing neither to risk their lives in the most dangerous enterprises, nor to seek refuge in flight when their attack had failed, rather than wait for an irreparable defeat by keeping their ground, their bands alternately increased and disappeared in the twinkling of an eye, like one of those light fogs which rise from the prairie wet with dew, and which are condensed and dissolved by turns under the influence of an early morning sun.

It has often happened to a column to march for weeks without seeing an enemy, who, however, has been following it step by step, ready to spring upon it at the least sign of weakness. Woe, then, to him who, through an imprudent confidence, strays too far from his comrades! he never again makes his appearance. After a day's march, which the want of water has prolonged, when the camp-fires, smouldering in their ashes, are dying out, and silence and darkness prevail everywhere, a strange cry is sometimes heard, which is responded to by other cries in opposite directions. While the men are waking up and making inquiries, a confused noise comes from the corral where the artillery horses and the train mules are picketed. Some Indians, creeping in unnoticed, have adroitly cut their fastenings, and, taking advantage of the confusion they have created, have dashed off on their own horses to stampede the drove of frightened animals and direct their course. These rush off at once like a whirlwind, tram-

pling down every obstacle in their way ; and, still guided by their savage leaders, soon disappear, leaving the whites stupefied and powerless as boatmen without oars on a stormy sea. The word *stampede*, used to designate a panic among horses, was applied during the civil war to those commotions which too often led undisciplined troops into a disorderly flight.

But these surprises were of rare occurrence with officers accustomed to the tactics of the wilderness. They opposed vigilance to cunning, tenacity to agility, and, finally, friendly Indians to hostile Indians. These native allies accompanied the column in the capacity of guides, and frequently as scouts, fighting in a half-civilized fashion—handling their rifles skilfully, but furtively taking off the scalp of the vanquished when they could do so without being seen by their allies. In short, while they would discover, with the instinct of a hunting-dog, the *cache* (hiding-place) where the hostile tribe had deposited their winter provisions, the American cavalry rivalled them in dexterity, and succeeded at times, by a bold stroke, in capturing, in their turn, droves of half-wild horses which the Indian chiefs always kept in reserve to remount their warriors. In one of the last expeditions that went out before the civil war, in 1858, a party which left Fort Vancouver on the Pacific coast, after dispersing the Pelouse tribe, captured their horses in this manner. The Indians, knowing the untamable nature of those animals, and full of confidence in their own skill, relied upon being able to steal them again from their new masters by means of a stampede, and to make use of them in a few days to resume hostilities ; so that when, on the following day, surveying the American camp from a distance with a spy-glass, taken from an officer who had been killed the preceding year, they saw the ground covered with the carcasses of their seven hundred and seventy horses, they felt so discouraged that they acknowledged themselves conquered. The commander of the expedition, divining their intention, had called a council of war, and the latter—not without much regret, for men who have lived long in the desert cannot be cruel to animals—had ordered the poor beasts to be shot.

Notwithstanding all these surprises, the Indian and the white man almost always ended by measuring strength in an open and

decisive battle. For if the former accepted war, it was because he felt sure of victory; and as soon as he saw his stratagems baffled by his enemy, the same confidence impelled him to attempt an attack by main force; then, in almost every instance, the cool courage of the white man, his discipline, and the superiority of his arms made his success certain, although he seldom obtained it until after a long and bloody struggle.

The various arms of the service had each a share in the hardships and dangers of these incessant wars; through them they preserved their activity and their military traditions, and acquired a new experience.

The task of the foot-soldier was the hardest. The fine rivers which furrow the prairie are separated by intervals of from ten to twelve leagues, which had to be travelled in a single stage, by forcing a passage through the tall grasses, without a tree to shelter the soldier for an instant from the burning heat of the sun, or a drop of water to slake his thirst. On the morrow, before being able to resume his march, he had to cut the necessary materials for the construction of floating bridges along the steep banks of the river; or, if the expedition was lightly equipped, to cross a deep river by riding double behind the mounted men. To the burning heat of a summer, which no sea-breezes temper, were added the prairie-fire, the sudden storms of wind and rain so terrible on the Plains, where there is nothing to allay their violence; then the cold and the snow followed in quick succession, bringing new sufferings to the troops they overtook, like those of Johnston. Such a life formed marchers trained to long stages; but campaigning in a desert, where they carried everything with them, and unable to separate themselves for more than two or three days from their train, they were accustomed to a certain abundance of food and regular supplies. Consequently, when, in 1861, war was to be waged in a country not altogether destitute of resources, the officers who had been brought up in that school did not dream of turning those resources to account, so as to render themselves independent of the supply-trains, until Sherman had abandoned this system.

In regard to the cavalry, this Indian war was an excellent preparation for the part it was soon called upon to play. These

American dragoons, who for so many years had lived scattered among the Indians, were not indeed elegant horsemen, nor even good manœuvrers on field parade, and did not understand war as our soldiers do, who, whether in line or as foragers, only depend upon the point of their sabres or the swiftness of their horses. But the necessities of a special war had taught them to vindicate their name, by performing the complicated duties for which, in the seventeenth century, the first regiments of mounted infantry were formed. In order to reach the Indians in their last retreats, and deal rapid chastisement to the minor tribes, they frequently undertook short campaigns without taking any supply-trains with them. Carrying their ammunition, biscuits, coffee, etc., on their animals, they were followed only by a few led horses laden with a reserve of provisions. The marches were long and the rations small. When the enemy was at last reached, he was almost invariably attacked with firearms, for he did not allow himself to come within reach of sidearms, any more than the wild bird allows himself to be taken by the sportsman with the hand. The use of the rifle, moreover, gave the Americans great advantage over their adversaries, who, for the most part, had nothing but bows and arrows or very poor muskets. They omitted no opportunity to use that weapon; and whether for the purpose of striking the enemy in his too precipitate flight, or to keep him at bay, they fired without leaving the saddle, for amid the immensity of the prairies man does not like to separate himself from his horse; if, however, it became necessary to attack an Indian camp or to defend a corral, if the enemy occupied a position too difficult of access, the dragoons, leaving their horses in charge of one-fourth of their number, formed and fought like infantry.

Therefore, despite their awkward appearance and their long legs dangling by the sides of their little horses, despite their large wooden stirrups which they had brought from Mexico, and the weapons of every kind attached to their saddles, those bronze-faced men, with their sky-blue cloaks with fur collars, had the easy and resolute air which betokens the well-trained soldier. From the manner in which they led their horses, it was easy to perceive that more than one day's journey performed on foot by

the side of a limping animal had taught them to be merciful. Let us say that they would have proved themselves ungrateful if they had failed to appreciate the good qualities of those faithful companions of their toils. All those who have gone through a campaign in the New World have often had occasion to admire the sagacity of the American horse and his sure footing in the middle of the darkest nights. Able, though small, to carry a great weight; gentle and intelligent, enduring fatigue, rain, cold, neglect, and want of food, he seemed in every way adapted for that rough life of the prairie which man could not face without his aid. In the evening, after a long day's march, his only meal would be the wild plants of the prairie in the midst of which the *bivouac* had been made. But in the morning, instead of being saddled at sunrise, he was allowed to browse the herbage made tender by the heavy dews of the desert during the first two hours of the day; and for every three days' march he was generally granted one of rest. In short, when, after serving at this rate for many months, carrying both his master and his baggage, he re-entered the rude stable of the frontier post, he found means to regain strength and to forget his privations by munching ears of corn, the grains of which he picked out for himself.

The artillery had also a large share in the common hardships. The mere changes of garrison between the distant posts, the defences of which it had charge, were equivalent at times to regular campaigns. It, moreover, made part of every important expedition, for the sound of cannon reverberating in the wilderness produces a profound impression upon the Indian. The prairie, though passable for wagons, does not, however, much resemble a turnpike; the long marches over that rough ground, the crossing of rivers, the necessity of cutting a passage with the axe through the forests that are occasionally met with, kept both men and teams constantly at work. Sometimes they were obliged to keep up with the pace of the cavalry, for the light expeditions undertaken by the latter were frequently accompanied by from two to four guns. It is true that the artillery interfered but seldom, and only when the conflict was sufficiently equal to give it time to reach the field of battle, and when it was necessary to throw some shells into the midst of the mounted Indians, to make

up for the numerical inferiority of the whites. But while waiting for this opportunity the gunners would take up the musket or the carbine, and, fighting either on foot or on horseback, share all the dangers of their companions. Finally, the artillery officers found themselves frequently invested, either by choice or the chances of seniority, with the command of important expeditions; and they gave ample proof of having lost none of the traditions of the Mexican war, where we have seen them play such a brilliant part.

We have already mentioned the great scientific labors of the officers of the engineer and topographical engineer corps. In the war-expeditions they occupied the post of honor, for they performed the functions of staff-officers and had charge of clearing the route for the army, and of directing its march.

The administrative branches of the service had an important task to perform in those campaigns where it was necessary to prepare everything in advance that the army could require. The reader will understand this when he recalls the fact of Johnston's army being followed by a train of four thousand wagons. It is not astonishing, therefore, that when it became necessary to provide for a million of volunteers, there should have been found among the various corps, quartermasters and commissaries of subsistence possessed of the required experience for directing every part of such a vast administration.

It was in the midst of this active and instructive life that the news of the disruption of the Union reached the American army. The perfidious foresight of the late Secretary of War, Mr. Floyd, had removed almost the whole of this army far from the States which his accomplices in the South were preparing to rise against the Federal authority. The soldiers had been honored with the belief that they would remain faithful to their flag. Under a multitude of pretexts the Federal forts and arsenals had been dismantled by the very men whose first duty was to watch over the general interests of the nation, and the garrisons which had been withdrawn from them long before, to be scattered over Texas, found themselves under the command of an officer, who seemed to have received no other orders than to betray them.

But thus removed from the haunts of civilization, the regular

officers had remained utter strangers to the turbulent quarrels which it engenders, and had paid but little attention to the movement which divided their country into two hostile camps. Consequently, no class of men suffered more keenly, when the citizens armed themselves against each other, than that military family whose members were united by so many ties. All those belonging to the North, notwithstanding the great diversity of opinions on the questions of the day, prepared to respond to the appeal of their government. Among those who adhered to the Southern States on account of their birth or connections, there were some who, like the veteran Scott, remained faithful to their oath, believing that the insurrection, far from releasing them from it, obliged them to defend the threatened life of their country. The greatest portion of them, however, controlled by the influence of party spirit and imbued with the fatal doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the States, which had come to be a kind of dogma among them, abandoned the Federal flag *en masse* to go and organize the infant forces of the rebellion. Many among them did not adopt this course, so much at variance with the common notions of military honor, without regret. These regrets, well known to their old comrades, contributed to mitigate the horrors of war, by removing from it all bitterness and passion; and their recollection actuated General Grant when, four years later, he extended a friendly hand to his conquered adversary.

There were some, however, who by their conduct aggravated the always painful spectacle of military defection. General Twiggs, who commanded the troops in Texas, was seen conniving at the success of the rebellion while still wearing the Federal uniform, and delivering into the hands of the rebels the *dépôts* of provisions and ammunition of his own soldiers, in order to take away from the latter every means of resistance. Abandoned by a portion of their officers, destitute of resources, finding only enemies among the ungrateful population they had protected during so many years, these brave soldiers were further obliged to resist the flattering representations of those who promised them a brilliant future in the ranks of the insurgents. One of their old chiefs, Van Dorn, had the sad hardihood to reappear among them, to support these propositions with the influence which his rare

military qualities had given him. He made no converts; and the remnants of his regiment, obliged to enter into an agreement for evacuating the place with the enemies who surrounded them on every side, returned to the cities of the North, where they met the comrades so long separated from them, who were flocking to the defence of the national cause.

New dangers had in fact sought out, in the bosom of civilization, these men thus once more brought together by the same sentiment of duty. The national cause needed all their devotion, for the evil which had sown such seeds of treason in an army must have been deeply rooted, and those sad examples of desertion were but a symptom of the blindness and self-deception which precipitated the South into civil war.

BOOK II.—SECESSION.

CHAPTER I.

SLAVERY.

BEFORE exhibiting the American Republic divided into two hostile factions, and describing the organization of the forces that were about to fight on its soil to secure the supremacy either of the slave institutions of the South or the free society of the North, it is proper that we should answer the questions which every reader must ask: How could such a war break out? What radical causes could thus divide a great nation throughout the whole extent of her territory, disrupt her armies, and put arms in the hands of citizens whom so many ties, so many interests, and so many common memories should keep united?

They were brethren; they had lived together and had been reared in the same school; they resembled each other in all the prominent traits of their character; they had the same political institutions, the same military traditions. Their leaders had served under the same flag, and had sat in the same council-chambers.

There did not exist any real difference of origin between the North and the South. All those that the South alleged to exist when, despairing of her ability to extort aid from Europe by threatening to deprive her of cotton, she sought to arouse the sympathies of the latter, were purely imaginary. She merely

pretended to genealogical affinities to serve her own purpose, when, pointing to her old colony of New Orleans, she called herself half French ; and when, turning to the English aristocracy, she evoked the memory of the Cavaliers driven out by Cromwell, in order to array that aristocracy against the Yankees, whom she represented as a gathering of Germans and Irishmen. In point of fact, the Anglo-Saxon race ruled equally in the South and in the North. It rapidly absorbed the races that had preceded it, as well as those which supplied it with a contingent of emigrants. In taking part in its work, those races also adopted its customs and its character.

In the first city of the South, New Orleans, there did indeed exist a nucleus of population which by its language and associations clung to the country that had basely sold it. But that islet, already half submerged under the rising tide of another race, did not constitute a nationality. As to the Irish emigrant, far from resisting this tide, he rather followed it ; for although differing widely from the Anglo-Saxon, he goes in search of a new country only where the latter is already firmly established. He resembles those plants, difficult of acclimation, which only thrive upon a soil already prepared by other and more vigorous vegetation. By another contradiction to his primitive habits, becoming in America a denizen of cities rather than a tiller of the soil, the barriers which slavery had raised against the settling of husbandmen did not exist for him. Consequently, the Irish element had spread equally over the South and over the North. With that pliability of mind peculiar to the race, Irishmen adopted all the prejudices of those among whom they lived ; and when the war broke out, they were seen to enlist in the cities of the South, where they were very numerous, with as much eagerness as their brethren living in the North displayed in defence of the Federal flag.

No commercial interest separated the South from the aggregate interests of the Northern States. Large rivers formed a single basin of all the centre of the continent, and all its products converged into the main artery of the Mississippi, of which the Southern States held the lower course. Exclusively occupied with the culture of cotton and sugar-cane, they asked from the West-

ern States meat and flour, which they could not produce in sufficient quantities for their own consumption. The North supplied them with the necessary capital for all their industrial enterprises. It is true that the South sought in these very circumstances a pretext for a new grief, by pretending to be the victim of speculation on the part of those who brought her, together with their wealth, the means of fertilizing her soil; and when the day of secession came, all the debts contracted by the merchants and planters of the South toward Northern creditors, amounting, it is said, to one billion of dollars, were repudiated, after the Confederate government had tried in vain to confiscate them to its own benefit. But this complaint, which is that of all countries in arrears against their more prosperous neighbors, cannot affect any serious mind. The complaints of Southern planters against the Northern States in regard to the protective tariffs, which favored the manufactures of the latter, were more plausible; but, in point of fact, they had no better foundation. If the commercial question had had anything to do with the political struggle which brought on the civil war, the Western States would have had as much cause as those of the South to separate themselves from the manufacturing districts of New York, Pennsylvania, and New England, whose foundries and mills dread English competition, and they would have joined the South in defence of the system of free trade. The landholders of the West, in fact, also derived their wealth from the cultivation of the soil, the products of which were yearly exported in increasing quantities. In spite of the scarcity of labor, the absence of land taxes, together with the cheapness and fertility of the land, afforded an outlet for their wheat to all the markets of the world. Commercial protection, therefore, which raised the price of all European commodities for the benefit of their associates of the North-eastern States, was only a burden to them; and if, while complaining of this protection, they made common cause with those States, it is because they fully understood the sole motive of the war, and did not in any way deceive themselves as to the only social difference which divided America into two hostile factions—North and South.

This difference was not occasioned either by diversity of origin or by antagonistic commercial interests. It had a much deeper

foundation. It was a ditch dug between slavery and free labor, which was becoming wider every day. It was slavery, prosperous in one half of the republic and abolished in the other, which had created in it two hostile communities. It had greatly modified the customs of the one where it was in the ascendant, while leaving the outward forms of government intact. It was, indeed, not the pretext nor the occasion, but the sole cause of that antagonism, the inevitable consequence of which was the civil war.

Therefore, in order to demonstrate the differences of character which the war revealed between the combatants, we must show the constant and fatal influence which the servile institution exercised over the habits, the ideas, and the tastes of those who lived in contact with it. Proteus-like, the question of slavery assumes every variety of form; it insinuates itself everywhere, and always reappears most formidable where one least expects to encounter it. Notwithstanding all that has been said on the subject, our people, who fortunately have not had to wrestle with it, are not aware how much this subtle poison instils itself into the very marrow of society. It was, in fact, in the name of the rights of the oppressed race that they condemned slavery. It was the sentiment of justice in behalf of this race which inspired religious England when, in response to the appeals of Buxton and Wilberforce, she proclaimed emancipation; and which actuated our great National Assembly when it abolished slavery for the first time in our colonies, and those who again prepared for its suppression after the extraordinary act by which the First Consul re-established it upon French soil. It was the picture of the unmerited sufferings of our fellow-beings which stirred up the whole of Europe at the perusal of that romance, so simple and yet so eloquent, called *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.

But the effects of the servile institution upon the dominant race present a spectacle not less sad and instructive to the historian and philosopher; for a fatal demoralization is the just punishment that slavery inflicts upon those who expect to find nothing in it but profit and power.

In order to demonstrate more clearly to what extent this demoralization is the inevitable consequence of slavery, and how, by an inexorable logic, the simple fact of the enslavement of the

black corrupts, among the whites, the ideas and morals which are the very foundation of society, we will pass over the long martyrdom of bad treatment daily inflicted by brutal masters upon their slaves. It is among those who before the war were called good slave-owners that we must inquire into the pretended moral perfection of slavery, in order to understand all its flagrant immorality. This slave-owner possesses the same principles as ourselves, but he is obliged to obey the laws of necessity. He knows what protection and respect are due to the family tie; but as the negro population in the United States, employed in the cultivation of the cotton and sugar, does not multiply fast enough to supply the exigencies of this kind of labor, he goes into the markets of Virginia to procure a contingent of young laborers. After having thus torn them from their relatives, their affections, and the land of their birth, he will certainly not break up the new ties that are forming under his own eyes; but this is owing to the fact that, as an economical manager, he finds in their fecundity a direct source of revenue. He does not desire to humiliate, to cause suffering by unnecessary castigations, but the negro who fails to perform his duties must be punished, and these duties are obedience and labor. The negro must forget that he is a man—to remember only that he is a slave, and to work without choice of occupation, without remuneration, without hope of a better future. In short, his owner will take care of him, will not impose any labor above his strength, and will administer to his material wants in a satisfactory manner, precisely as he will do for the animals that are working by his side under one common lash. But, in order that he may enjoy this pretended good fortune, he has to be reduced to the moral level of his fellow-slaves, and have the light of intelligence within him extinguished for ever; for if he carries that divine spark in his bosom, he will be unhappy, for he will feel that he is a slave. And when the good master, satisfied with his own virtues, points to his slaves, saying, "They are happy; they have no care for the morrow; they are lodged, fed, and clothed, and would not accept their freedom," it is the bitterest of self-accusations, for it is the same as if he said, "I have so completely stifled in them every feeling that God has implanted in the heart of man, that the word freedom, which we

might hear pronounced by every creature that has breath, if we understood all the languages of Nature, has no longer any meaning for them." It might so happen, in extreme cases, that even in the midst of his surroundings, his conscience rebels against this degradation of his fellow-beings, but then he will blame the customs which sanction this systematic degradation, and the severe and peculiar laws, enacted in almost all the Southern States, which render it nearly impossible for him to grant individual emancipation, and which even subject him to severe penalties if he should teach his own negroes to read and write. Shall he protest against this hateful law which confines the intelligence of the slave within the narrow dungeon of perpetual ignorance? He cannot do so, because the moral degradation of the latter is the only guarantee for his physical submission: if he were to witness too frequently the liberation of his fellow-beings from bondage as an act of favor, he would wish for it in his turn; and if he received the least education, he would rise in his own estimation, the abyss which separates him from his master would appear less difficult to cross, and he would emerge satisfied from the brutal condition in which it is necessary to keep him in order to make him the docile instrument of a lucrative traffic.

But, again, the servile institution, in violating the supreme law of humanity, which links indissolubly together those two words, labor and progress, and in making labor itself a means for brutalizing man, not only degraded the slave, but it also engendered depravity in the master; for the despotism of a whole race, like the absolute power of a single individual, or an oligarchy, always ends by disturbing the reason and the moral sense of those who have once inhaled its intoxicating fragrance. Nothing was more calculated to develop this kind of depravity than the high qualities, and the virtues even, which existed in the community founded upon such a despotism. It is precisely because that community was enlightened and religious, because it had produced men, in every other respect, of irreproachable character, because it had given birth to heroic soldiers who had followed a Lee and a Jackson to the battle-field, that it was the more revolting to see slavery, with its odious consequences, prosper in its midst. That this community should have exhibited such a shocking contrast

to the world without being itself conscious of the fact, the moral sense must have been perverted in the child, surrounded from its birth by flattering slaves; in the man, absolute master of the labor of his fellow-beings; in the woman, accustomed to relieve the distress around her, in obedience, not to the dictates of duty, but to a mere instinct of humanity and pity; in everybody, in short, through the exaggerations of declamatory appeals intended to stifle the voice of upright consciences. What a deeply sorrowful spectacle for any one who wishes to study human nature to see every sense of righteousness and equity so far perverted in a whole population by the force of habit, that the greatest portion of the ministers of all denominations were not ashamed to sully Christianity by a cowardly approval of slavery; and men who bought and sold their fellow-beings took up arms for the express purpose of defending this odious privilege, in the name of liberty and property !*

This falsehood having become the basis of society, its influence increased and gathered strength from prosperity. The founders of the American nation regarded slavery as a social sore, and trusted to the enlightenment and patriotism of their successors to heal it; but as this institution was productive of considerable profit, it was soon viewed in a different light. The Middle States (Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee) were ready to abolish it, in imitation of their neighbors of the North, when the suppression of the slave trade gave a new impulse to slave production among them, by protecting it against the competition of negro-traders, who formerly brought cargoes of slaves from Guinea under the name of *ebony*. They soon developed this new branch of industry; and the planters of the South, being always able to procure fresh and hardy laborers in their own markets, found it economical to spare their slaves no longer, but to subject them to excessive labor which wore them out in a few years. This abundance of hands giving an extraordinary impulse to the cultivation of the sugar-cane and the cotton-plant, slavery, which the authors of the American Constitution had not even dared to mention by name, was thenceforth honored, recognized, and considered as the corner-stone of the social edifice.

* See in the Appendix to this volume, Note B.

But the upholders of slavery did not stop here; after having declared it to be profitable and necessary, they proceeded to proclaim its moral excellence. A new school, of which Calhoun was the principal apostle, the teachings of which were accepted by all the statesmen of the South, assumed the mission of holding up the social system founded upon slavery as the highest state of perfection that modern civilization had reached. It was to this system that America was destined to belong, and its adherents anticipated for it the empire of the world. There was a time when these frightful dreams cast a sinister light upon the future of the new continent, for it seemed as if their realization was within the scope of possibility.

In fact, the slave-power could only exist by enlarging its domain and absorbing everything around it. Reckless and violent in its modes of proceeding, compelling the Union to become the docile instrument of its policy, it had conquered immense territories in the interest of servitude, sometimes in the wilderness, more frequently in Mexico or among the Northern settlements, and it already extended its hand towards Cuba and the isthmus of Nicaragua—positions selected with the instinct of control. If the North had carried patience and forbearance much further, the day when the decisive crisis arrived, this power might possibly have been able to impose its fatal yoke upon all America.

In proportion as slavery thus increased in prosperity and power, its influence became more and more preponderant in the community which had adopted it. Like a parasitical plant which, drawing to itself all the sap of the most vigorous tree, covers it gradually with a foreign verdure and poisonous fruits, so slavery was impairing the morals of the South, and the spirit of her institutions. The forms of liberty existed, the press seemed to be free, the deliberations of legislative bodies were tumultuous, and every man boasted of his independence. But the spirit of true liberty, tolerancæ towards the minority, and respect for individual opinion, had departed, and those deceitful appearances concealed the despotism of an inexorable master, slavery—a master before whom the most powerful of slaveholders was himself but a slave, as abject as the meanest of his laborers. No one had a right to question its legitimacy, and like the *Eumenides*, which the ancients

feared to offend by naming them, so wherever the slave power was in the ascendant, people did not even dare to mention its name, for fear of touching upon too dangerous a subject. It was on this condition only that such an institution could maintain itself in a prosperous and intelligent community. It would have perished on the very day when the people should be at liberty to discuss it. Therefore, notwithstanding their boasted love of freedom, the people of the South did not hesitate to commit any violence in order to crush out, in its incipency, any attempt to discuss the subject. Any one who had ventured to cast the slightest reflection upon the slavery system could not have continued to live in the South; it was sufficient to point the finger at any stranger and call him an abolitionist to consign him at once to the fury of the populace. One of the best citizens of the United States, Mr. Sumner, who had pleaded in behalf of emancipation with equal courage and eloquence on the floor of the Senate, was struck down with a loaded cane in the very midst of that assembly,* by one of his Southern colleagues, and left half dead; and not only did this crime go unpunished, the tribunals of Washington being then occupied by slaveholders, but the assassin received a cane of honor from the ladies of the South as a reward for his exploit. In short, the mere fact that a simple Kansas farmer named John Brown, who had been ruined and persecuted by the slaveholders, sought to wreak his revenge upon them in Virginia, and had gathered together a dozen of fugitive slaves at Harper's Ferry, was sufficient to arouse a terrible sensation in the South. It was thought that a civil war had broken out, preparations were made for a great uprising, and it was found necessary to send regular troops from Washington to seize this man, who expiated upon the gallows the crime of having frightened the proud Virginians.

It was not enough, however, thus to protect slavery on its own domain; the acknowledgment of its supremacy had to be enforced in all the neighboring States in order to protect it from all outward attacks. The North, through an imprudent exercise of the spirit of conciliation, had allowed the Constitution to be violated

* The act was perpetrated in the Senate chamber, where Mr. Sumner was seated at his desk, but the Senate was not in session at the time.—Ed.

by shameful compromises. The barriers of the free States had been lowered that the fugitive slave might be restored to the planter. The national policy was entirely subservient to the interests of the slave-power. Its demands, in short, became the more pressing and excessive that it felt itself on the point of losing the control of that policy. It could permit neither the territorial extension of the North nor the criticisms of a free press beyond its boundaries. Therefore, it was fully determined not to give up its supremacy in the councils of the Union without a struggle. Its newspapers and orators inflamed the public mind, and prepared it for the coming conflict; prophetic romances, so-called, shadowed forth the triumphs it would achieve; and, at the first appeal of the secession leaders, the whole Southern community, seized with a raging fever, severed without the least regret all the ties which the day before had bound it to those whom it thought to insult by styling them abolitionists.

The differences which slavery had engendered between the South and the North were not confined to this political antagonism; they affected the very constitution of society. Under its influence there had sprung up in the South classes more and more widely separated from each other—a division which greatly facilitated at first its military organization.

Work, being considered an act of servitude, could not be resorted to without disgrace. This rule, enforced by public opinion, kept out of the Southern territories that immense tide of emigrants from Europe and the Eastern States which spreads over the vast prairies of the West, to form a population of landholders working their own farms—a population whose industry, energy, and intelligence constitute the strength and respectability of the *free-soil States*. The whole system of Southern agriculture had been affected by this exclusion, and America thus presented in its two sections a nearly exact picture of the Latin territory at the two extreme epochs of Roman history; at the North, the land parcelled out, cultivated by the citizen himself, who was at once proprietor, husbandman, and soldier in case of need; at the South, the *latifundia*, or large domains, peopled by slaves and divided among a few masters.

The social system of the South was founded upon large do-

mains, the inconveniences of which are especially felt in a region of country yet half wild, but which were the inevitable result of the servile institution. It alone, in fact, admitted of turning to advantage the expensive, insufficient, and uncertain labor of the slave.

This labor is costly, for the profits accruing from it must not only cover the maintenance of the slave during his lifetime, but also the interest on, and the redemption in a few years of, the capital invested in his purchase; and the amount of these costs being always in excess of the yearly wages paid to the best white laborer, the employment of free labor is, all things considered, the most economical.

It is insufficient, because, the intelligence of the slave being systematically suppressed, his work is always clumsy, and the same care cannot be expected from him as from the laborer who is master of himself.

It is uncertain, because the harvest season requires a great number of hands which the proprietor is unable to hire in a free market; and he is therefore obliged to maintain upon his plantation throughout the year the number of slaves he may then require, without being able, by any amount of foresight, to make an exact calculation in advance; having, moreover, to take all the chances of sickness and stoppage of work, among his best laborers.

Under such circumstances the cultivation of the land could only be undertaken on a large scale and with considerable capital. On the large plantations, the absence of those resources afforded by free competition could be supplied by having special slaves taught different trades, and the variety of labor required by such operations always admitted of the employment of a large portion of the slaves—sometimes upon one kind of work, sometimes upon another; in short, the capital invested was divided among a sufficient number of negroes to enable the proprietor, by means of a sinking fund and an insurance system well managed, to meet the accidents which are the ruin of small slaveholders.

Owing to this peculiar condition of landed property, the Southern States were almost exclusively occupied by three classes.

At the foot of the social ladder was the negro, bowed down upon the soil he alone had to cultivate, forming a population of

about four million souls—that is to say, one-third of the inhabitants of the South.

At the top, the masters, too numerous to constitute an aristocracy, yet forming, nevertheless, a real caste. They owned the land and the slaves who cultivated it; and each of them living in the midst of an entirely servile population whose labor was under their control, they disdained every other kind of occupation. Consequently, being more intelligent than educated, brave but irascible, proud but overbearing, eloquent but intolerant, they devoted themselves to public affairs—the exclusive direction of which belonged to them—with all the ardor of their temperament.

The third class—that of poor whites, the most important on account of its numbers—occupied a position below the second, and far above the first, without, however, forming an intermediate link between them, for it was deeply imbued with all the prejudices of color. This was the *plebs romana*, the crowds of clients who parade with ostentation the title of citizen, and only exercise its privileges in blind subserviency to the great slaveholders, who were the real masters of the country. If slavery had not existed in their midst, they would have been tillers of the soil, and might have become farmers and small proprietors. But the more their poverty draws them nearer to the inferior class of slaves, the more anxious are they to keep apart from them, and they spurn field-labor in order to set off more ostentatiously their quality of free men. This unclassified population, wretched and restless, supplied Southern policy with the fighting vanguard which preceded the planter's invasion of the West with his slaves. At the beginning of the war the North believed that this class would join her in condemnation of the servile institution, whose ruinous competition it ought to have detested. But the North was mistaken in thinking that reason would overcome its prejudices. It showed, on the contrary, that it was ardently devoted to the maintenance of slavery. Its pride was even more at stake than that of the great slaveholders; for, while the latter were always sure of remaining in a position far above the freed negroes, the former feared lest their emancipation should disgrace the middle white classes by raising the blacks to their level.

This division of classes facilitated the organization of the forces of the South. Each of them had its part in the drama laid out, and the transition from a state of peace to one of war was effected with so little trouble, that the very ease with which it was accomplished proved to be a dangerous temptation, which contributed to drag the South into the fatal path where it was destined to find defeat and ruin.

The negroes naturally remained attached to the soil, and by continuing their forced labors, they saved the agricultural interests of the South from those serious troubles which the preparations for war inflicted upon those of the North, and thereby sustained the cause of those who riveted their chains. While at the North every soldier who donned the uniform left some employment useful to society, in the South the truly productive population never ceased for a moment to contribute to the common wants.

The common white people, who, doomed to idleness on account of their social position, had never contributed to the national wealth in a manner proportionate to their number, willingly exchanged the leisure of their poverty for the occupations of military life. They constituted the principal element of the Southern armies. Useless and dangerous in a well-regulated community, they were fully prepared for this new rôle. Habituated to the privations of a precarious existence, accustomed from infancy to handling arms, which they considered a sign of nobility, zealous in defending the privileges and the superiority of their race, they could not fail to become formidable soldiers if placed under able leaders.

They found these leaders among the superior class of slaveholders, from whom they were already accustomed to receive directions. Therefore, although grades of every description were made elective, the new soldiers, faithful to their habits, almost invariably selected members of this superior class to command them; and if any slaveholders, during the first outbursts of enthusiasm, set them the example by shouldering the musket, none of them ever remained in the ranks. It followed that the fatal system of electing officers was not productive of the same evil

effects in the South as in the North, and was continued much longer.

We have not, as yet, spoken of the population of the cities, because it had not felt so directly the effects of the servile institution as those living in the country, and because, moreover, it was too small to exercise much influence. Much inferior to the slaveholders, but superior to the common whites, this population was recruited from among the latter class and European emigrants, especially the Irish, who seldom get beyond the walls of American cities. Therefore, although noisily in favor of the slave-system, they did not look upon it as the very basis of society, nor did they defend the institution with as much zeal as did the whites who lived in the country in the midst of negro laborers. The Confederate States had but one city, New Orleans, which could rival the great cities of the North, and only two others, Richmond and Charleston, the two political centres of secession, with a population of more than thirty thousand inhabitants. Among these there were negro slaves, and free mulattoes, a pretty large class exclusively devoted to city life, and the more hostile to the whites because it was more intelligent, and the ban under which it lay was less justified by the color of its skin. The white population of the cities could not be estimated at more than two hundred thousand souls.*

When, therefore, the Southern leaders, beaten at the elections, were about to resort to arms in order to re-establish the supremacy of slavery among them, public opinion, long prepared for the occasion, was ready to applaud their action and to second their efforts with energy; while the various classes of society tendered them all the necessary means for speedily organizing their armies.

* See Appendix to this volume, Note C.

CHAPTER II.

THE CONFEDERATE VOLUNTEERS.

WE have shown how the influence of slavery, which dragged the Southern States into civil war, had also created certain classes among them ready to furnish all the elements of an army, the organization of which had long been in contemplation.

Consequently, while the North was sincerely trying to effect some kind of political compromise, companies of volunteers were seen assembling and arming in haste throughout the whole of the slave States. Their minds were bent upon war, and they went to work with the greatest energy. The zeal of the women stimulated that of the men; and in that population, essentially indolent, whoever hesitated to don the uniform was set down as a coward. The planters, being at all times in dread of servile insurrections, had given to the local militia an effective organization which it did not have in the North. They had *cadres* sufficiently trained and instructed to receive volunteers at once. Finally, the West Point Academy and the military colleges founded by several States had contributed to disseminate a knowledge of military affairs among the better classes.

The volunteers who took up arms at the first signal of their leaders did not wait for the announcement of the act of separation to assemble. In the border States, where, public opinion being divided, the Federal authority was at first able to sustain itself in the midst of the political convulsion, the future soldiers of the Confederacy met and organized under the very eyes of its agents.

Wherever the pro-slavery element, essentially intolerant, was in the majority, it exercised the same despotism over the minority that its leaders imposed upon it. Those who regretted the national flag, who questioned the constitutionality of the princi-

ple which had been invoked to justify the separation, or who did not consider its application well timed, were reduced to silence; and even this silence soon ceased to give satisfaction. As it happens in all revolutions, professions of devotion to the new order of things were exacted from those who were suspected of lukewarmness. Among the Northern men settled in the South, some embraced the cause of slavery with the ardor of neophytes, but those who did not atone for the crime of having been born in the free States, by this method, became the victims of popular hatred and violence. In the South-western States, where the manners are rough, they were subjected to downright persecution. In each of the growing centres of civilization, where farmers came from afar across the forests to attend to their political and commercial affairs, vigilance committees were formed, composed of men who had been conspicuous for their excesses during the electoral struggles. Assuming unlimited power without authority, they united in themselves the attributes of a committee of public safety with the functions of a revolutionary tribunal. The bar-room was generally the place of their meetings, and a revolting parody of the august forms of justice was mingled with their noisy orgies. Around the counter, on which gin and whisky circulated freely, a few frantic individuals pronounced judgment upon their fellow-citizens, whether present or absent; the accused saw the fatal rope being made ready even before he had been interrogated; the person in contumacy was only informed of his sentence when he fell by the bullet of the executioner, stationed behind a bush for that purpose. Personal animosities were at the bottom of the greater part of these decrees. In order to punish the workman or the settler from the North for his intelligence and success, his envious neighbors called him an abolitionist. If some courageous friend did not answer for his admiring approval of slavery, he was lost. At times, however, the fumes of alcohol, mounting to the heads of the judges, would enkindle quarrels between them, soon ending in bloodshed, in the midst of which both the trial and the accused were equally forgotten.

But if the latter was spared his life, it was only that he might devote it to the service of the Confederacy. He was to consider

himself fortunate in being able to prove his devotion, without which he would have deserved death. He therefore went to enlist as a *volunteer* at the nearest recruiting-office; and, by a bitter irony of fortune, he would sometimes find himself enrolled in some such regiment as the *Louisiana Tigers* or the *Mississippi Invincibles*, names in singular contrast with his gloomy thoughts.

A few executions and a considerable number of forced enlistments sufficed to crush out every expression of Union sentiments. Vigilance committees were formed in all the Southern States; and if they did not everywhere proceed to the extremes of violence, they everywhere trampled under foot all public and individual liberties, by resorting to search-warrants and other vexatious proceedings, which, by intimidating the weak and stimulating the irresolute, contributed to fill up the *cadres* of the volunteer regiments rapidly.

The burden of the war was to fall exclusively upon the white population of those States which at the commencement of 1861 had set aside the Federal authority; this population, according to the census of 1860, amounted to 5,449,463 souls—or nearly five millions and a half—out of which number 690,000 men able to bear arms were to be raised. This last figure represents the total of all the forces that the Confederacy was at any time able to command. Owing to the social causes we have mentioned, and the conviction of every person who played a decided part, there were enlisted in the course of the year 1861 nearly 350,000 men; that is to say, more than one-half of the adult and eligible male population. This first effort of the South was, in proportion to her resources, much greater than that of the North; and the military power she displayed so rapidly, added to all the advantages of a defensive position, could not fail to give her a superiority at the outset of the war.

But while the North, slow in making use of her resources, found in every disaster the occasion for increasing her army, which, by this means, was at the close of the war twice as large as it was at the beginning, the South was not in a condition to sustain the extraordinary effort she had made at the outset. Notwithstanding the idleness of her white population, which favored the adoption of military service, it was found necessary to resort to conscrip-

tion as soon as the conflicts had thinned the ranks of the first enlisted volunteers. The longer the war is continued, the more we shall find the Confederate government resorting to all sorts of violent expedients in order to drain an already exhausted country of the little strength it yet possessed. The despotic system which had so rapidly brought all its resources into operation will then have no other effect than to destroy irretrievably whatever is left; and if it compel all able-bodied men to don the uniform, it will not prevent one-half of the surviving soldiers from deserting their ranks at the end of the war, to return secretly to their homes, or to seek liberty among the forests.

At this period of intoxication which precipitated them into civil war, nothing could convince the men of the South of the fragility of their new political edifice. Although used to biblical citations, they had forgotten the history of that miraculous tree which grew up in one night to shield the prophet Jonah, but which the sting of an invisible worm destroyed as rapidly within the space of a single day. Their Confederacy had grown in the same way, and they already saw it spreading its shadow over the whole of America, little dreaming that it also bore within its roots a gnawing worm, slavery, and that its institutions, founded upon despotism and contempt for humanity, would be withered by the burning blast of civil war.

Everything was the subject of illusions in the South—illusions concerning the weakness of her adversary, illusions in regard to her own perseverance.

Accustomed to look upon Northern men, the Yankees, as peaceful merchants, the caste which had arrogated to itself the title of Southern chivalry would not believe that they could ever become soldiers. The grossest calumnies circulated by the newspapers about them remained uncontradicted, and after having been so long connected in politics as well as in business with their brethren of the North, the people of the South were absolutely ignorant of the resources of their character and their manly qualities.

It is true that they did not possess a better knowledge of themselves. The inflammatory speeches of their stump orators, called in America *fire-eaters*, although usually appreciated by the good sense of the public, had, in this instance, over-excited the pas-

sions of the multitude, and only reflected what the majority thought and what every one said.

No one was doubtful of success ; everybody was convinced that, despite all the obstinacy of which the Yankees were capable, the independence of the South would eventually be secured. No efforts would be spared to wear out the enemy and compel him to recognize it. If the organized armies should be destroyed, guerilla bands would be formed, which, hoisting the black flag and giving no quarter, should perpetuate the war through every available means, and fight as long as they could handle a knife. Events were destined to frustrate, in the most striking manner, these projects of war to the death ; instead of sheltering guerillas, as we have already stated, the virgin forests only became the refuge of deserters. But the illusions which inspired the people of the South with such blind confidence were sincere ; the harsh condemnation of history must be reserved for the leaders who flattered them, who kept up those illusions, and who were yet too well acquainted with the character of their countrymen, and saw too clearly the consequences of a defeat, to share them.

The volunteers repaired to the recruiting-offices which had been opened by the initiative action of the most zealous and ambitious persons in every district. The formation of regiments which were thus spontaneously called into existence throughout the Southern States was generally the private work of a few individuals, associated together for that purpose in their respective villages or quarters. One would collect a squad, another a company ; parish associations, *coteries*, and individual influence constituted the early ties among the soldiers thus recruited. The different detachments, once assembled, were grouped by counties or by towns to be formed into regiments ; all the higher grades were conferred, by election, upon those who by their birth, wealth, or recent services in the matter of enlistments were thought to be entitled to the choice of their future subordinates. This first organization, an entirely spontaneous creation of the national movement, often preceded the legal call for volunteers.

Presently, the governors of States intervened for the purpose of regulating the organization, by fixing the number of men to be raised and the quota of each county. The legislatures of the

States that had just voted in favor of separation confirmed the action of the governors by authorizing the necessary appropriations for the support of the troops destined to sustain their rebellion against the Federal authority. The regiments were then mustered into the service of the several States. The officers already elected were confirmed in their respective grades; brigades were formed, to which staff officers were assigned; a large number of generals were appointed, and the particular army of each State found itself thus constituted.

This organization by States, in conformity with the principle of their independence, would have been kept up in the new Confederacy, if the principle itself had been the cause, and not the mere pretext, of the war. But although useful at first, it proved subsequently to be only an encumbrance to the Southern leaders, who hastened to get rid of it. In order to succeed, they needed a despotic central power, capable of pushing the war to extremes, whose iron hand should be able to supply the want of popular enthusiasm when, as was to be expected, it should become weary. Such was the dominant idea of the delegates who established a provisional government at Montgomery, a small town in Alabama. In confiding the executive power to Mr. Davis, who had been the soul of the rebellion, they united into one solid whole the scattered forces of the Confederacy. While they inserted in their frail constitution a guarantee for all their new constitutional theories, they practically tightened the bonds of centralization; and deferring the fulfilment of their promises, which were all destined to be blown away by the same puff of wind, to a more auspicious season, they hastened to give the absolute control of all their resources to the pilot who was to guide the skiff, upon which they had rashly embarked their fortunes, through the storm. Consequently, without wasting time in the preparation of organic laws, of which it knew the weakness, the provisional government devoted all its attention to the consolidation of the military forces of the South.

It was well aware of the necessity of making preparations for a serious war, and, in view of that fact, of embodying all the independent regiments it had under its control into one homogeneous army. Congress had hardly assembled, the Confederacy only

counting seven stars on its new escutcheon, when it assisted Mr Davis in this work. It entrusted him with the supreme management of military operations, with authority to muster into the service of the central government the volunteers of the several States. On the 6th of March, 1861, the number of these volunteers was fixed at one hundred thousand, and their term of enlistment for one year, and, at the same time, orders were issued directing the formation of a general staff for the provisional army, and the organization of a regular army.

The provisional army was to be reorganized as soon as the adopted Constitution should be put in force, and it was decided that all the State troops of which it was composed should then be re-enlisted in the service of the Confederacy for a period fixed by Congress. Contrary to what had hitherto been the practice in the United States, where the Federal compact vested the right of maintaining troops in time of peace exclusively in the central authority, there were seen, among the particular contingents of the several States, what were called regular troops, intended to be kept in service after the end of the war and the recognition of their independence. But in the mean time, the Confederate government took them into its service and pay, and provided them with staff officers and administrative departments, either by appointing new officers or by confirming the appointments already made by the governors of the States. In both cases these officers held their commissions from the President, and retained them during the entire war.

We shall not now enter into details as to the recruiting and organization of the Confederate army. In this matter the men of the South, true to American customs and traditions, took for their model the levies of other periods, especially those of the Mexican war, under the Union flag; and their organization was precisely the same as that of the armies of the North, of which we shall speak more at length hereafter. The habits, the modes of thought and of action were so similar throughout every section of the republic that, in spite of their desire to be considered a separate nation, the people of the South could not disclaim the traditions they held in common with their brethren of the North, to preserve a distinct character. When they sought to enact laws

for themselves, they took the Federal Constitution, and altered the sense, without modifying its form. They selected for their new flag that which most resembled the banner of 1776. Finally, in their efforts to raise volunteers, and to organize the interior mechanism of their armies, they scrupulously preserved and applied the system which had prevailed before secession, and which we shall see put into practice by the North on a very large scale. They pursued this course so far as to organize a corps of regular troops, independent of the authority of so-called sovereign States, and they copied the old army of the United States so exactly that they limited its strength to the insignificant figure of ten thousand men. But this army, unable to compensate for its numerical weakness either by its traditions or the elements that composed it, was not in any way distinguished from the other Confederate troops, and had no special part to play in the war.

Never, perhaps, since the time of Cæsar, could the sad words of Lucan have been applied with so much truth to any civil war as to this one :

Pares aquilas et pila minantia pilis.

This war, however, developed important differences of character between men composing armies so similar in their organizations. Those of the South became good soldiers more rapidly than those of the North. They were more accustomed to follow leaders ; their life was rougher than that of the Eastern farmers, and more adventurous than that of the Western pioneers. Inured to privations, they were satisfied with rations which the Federal soldier looked upon as insufficient. Hence that rapidity of movement which was one of the principal causes of all their successes. Rarely paid by the government, which, unable to solve its financial difficulties, fairly ignored their claims, they never asked for the depreciated paper which was due to them, except when they thought their officers better treated than themselves, and then it was sufficient to lead them against the foe to pacify them. Nearly all of them were practiced in the use of firearms, and one might see them enter the recruiting-offices with the rifle on their shoulders and the revolver at the belt—weapons which they never laid aside, and without which they would not have considered them-

selves safe. In fine, they carried into the war more passion than their adversaries; the Federals to them were invaders who had always been painted in the blackest colors, and who, in coming to free the negroes, intended to make them the equals of the common whites, and consequently to humble the jealous caste to which those whites belonged.

On the other hand, the Confederate soldier was inferior, in point of intelligence and information, to that of the North. Southern society being divided into very distinct classes, the *élite* of the population only were cultivated; the rest had no education whatever. While primary schools were universal in the North, profound ignorance reigned among most of the inhabitants of the slave States. This difference, which the census tables of 1860 exhibit in a striking manner, had a great bearing on the issues of the conflict; for the nations that are really strong are not those which possess a few distinguished men, but those in which the moral and intellectual standard of the greatest number is most elevated. In the knapsacks of the Confederate soldiers there were found more playing-cards than books or writing materials, while the use of strong drinks was much more prevalent among them than among those of the North. Whether this vice was more congenial to their tastes, or whether it was deemed expedient to tolerate it as a kind of compensation for all their privations, the Confederate officers were unable strictly to enforce the rules which prohibited the use of spirituous liquors among their troops. Nor did the Southern armies have in their ranks any of those artisans skilled in all the mechanical trades that were to be found in the armies of the North, whose craft enabled every Federal regiment to supply the necessary men for the reconstruction of railroads, the repairing of locomotives, or for running a train; so that the Confederates were more than once under the necessity of applying to Northern men, forcibly enlisted, for this kind of service, or of confiding the task to their own officers, whose inexperience cost them dear. To the common whites, in short, taught to despise every kind of manual labor, the soldier's trade was, what used to be called formerly, a noble profession, and they felt degraded when called upon to handle the shovel. They often refused to work in those trenches which played such a conspicuous part

during the war. A few requisitions for negro help made upon the large slaveholders supplied this want, and, by sparing the free men a certain amount of hard work, enabled them to devote more time to their military training. They were not, however, relieved entirely from these labors; the authority of their chiefs succeeded in conquering their repugnance, and in cases of great urgency they constructed with their own hands the works which indicate to this day the progress of their campaigns.

The character of the soldiers and the composition of the Confederate armies had much to do with the manner in which the war was waged by the latter, and the part which the various arms played in it.

The Confederate foot-soldier, easier to manage and more excitable than his adversary, would rush to the charge with savage yells, and, in this way, he frequently carried positions which the latter, with equal courage, could not have captured. But on the other hand, possessing neither his patience nor his tenacity under a murderous fire, he was much less able to defend them. So that, in the course of the war, we shall always find the Southern officers trying to surprise some point or another of the Federal lines with heavy masses. This infantry, which would not have cut a very brilliant figure at a review by the precision of its movements, possessed the art of marching through the densest forests in good order, deployed in such a manner as to avoid trees, and yet without becoming separated. This art rendered those surprises easy of achievement, by enabling a body of infantry to hide within the depths of the forest without being preceded by any line of skirmishers, and to approach the enemy with sufficient rapidity to attack him suddenly in the clearing where he was encamped. The history of the war will show how useful this kind of tactics was to the Confederate generals—how they availed themselves of it to compel the enemy to extend his lines so as to cover all his positions at once; in this manner they frequently obtained advantages upon the point of attack with inferior forces; and if their columns were repulsed, they were quickly withdrawn and led elsewhere to attack some other position. We shall also find, however, that they did not apply these tactics to advantage when they found themselves among the unwooded hills

of Pennsylvania; there they could not avail themselves of the skill of their soldiers by deploying them as sharpshooters to cover their attacks against open positions defended by artillery. These soldiers, more practiced in the use of the rifle than those of the North, were well adapted for such service; they proved this during the sieges and those slow operations where the two armies, after having both fallen back into their respective entrenchments, reconnoitred each other in turn, and drew their lines closer by degrees without daring to charge each other openly. Posted behind breastworks, or in a rifle-pit, they would watch the Federal works with the cool vigilance of a hunter who has passed many days motionless by the side of some deserted lake, watching for the stag that is sure to come to quench his thirst at sunset; and it only required to place a hat on the point of a bayonet and raise it slowly above the Federal parapets to see all the bushes, which seemed to have been innocently planted in front of the enemy's line, enveloped in smoke, and that improvised target pierced by as many balls.

During the first campaigns, the habits and education of the Confederate soldiers gave to their cavalry a still more marked superiority over that of their adversaries. This superiority was wrongly attributed to the merit of the chiefs who commanded it; for if Ashby, Stuart, and all those brilliant officers who organized the cavalry of the South won at first the respect and admiration of their enemies, they found in front of them generals equally expert in the art of handling that arm of the military service: Sheridan, Stoneman, Kilpatrick, and many others demonstrated this as soon as they had good troops to command. The severe discipline which had been introduced into the Confederate army was the means of moulding those cavalymen to the difficult task they had to accomplish; but their superiority was chiefly owing to the fact that they had been recruited at the outset among the better classes of the population—among those countrymen who, before the war, were in sufficiently easy circumstances to own a horse, and who, on enlisting, had brought it with them. Inured to bodily exercise, and having learned horsemanship in a country where the roads really accessible to carriages were scarce, they formed a class of mounted men already

well trained, which did not exist in the North. They were moreover to have the advantage of almost invariably fighting on their own soil, of being well acquainted, therefore, with the minutest details of the ground on which they were to operate, and of being assisted by the connivance of the sympathizing inhabitants, ready to assume the character of volunteer spies in order to serve their cause. In the war they had undertaken, they were sure to meet at every stage with provisions and aid of all kinds, together with valuable information and the necessary guides to enable them to avoid the enemy or to surprise him as they saw fit. The negroes themselves, notwithstanding their sympathies for the cause of the Union, became the involuntary auxiliaries of the cavalymen of the South, who, long accustomed to live among them, knew better than the Federals how to make allowances for their lively imaginations, and to winnow out the truth from the exaggerated or contradictory reports which they hardly ever dared to withhold. It will be seen from the narrative of the war how much this element of success contributed to build up the superiority of the Confederate cavalry; for it lost this superiority whenever it ventured upon the soil of the free States, and it failed miserably in all the expeditions which it undertook in the midst of hostile populations.

In organizing their army the Confederates were unable to supply it with a field artillery equal to that of their adversaries. They had undoubtedly many able and well-trained officers; but as a general thing, their soldiers did not possess that intelligence and taste for the mechanical arts which, in a short time, converted the volunteers of the North into excellent artillerymen. As will be seen further on, their *matériel* was also of an inferior quality; and it required the courage and the daring of a few men like Pendleton, Stuart's chief of artillery, to compensate in part for this inferiority. This was not the case with the Confederate artillery in position. That portion of it which had charge of the defences of their seaports was mostly recruited in the cities, among men who, from their education, resembled more the artisans of the North than the common whites of the South. We shall see them, therefore, acquiring under able instructors a great precision of aim, and holding out in all the forts along the coast, especially at Charleston, against the Federal armies and the iron-

clad fleets that laid siege to them. But these men, who so coolly handled guns whose field of fire had long been studied, had a much easier task to perform than fell to the lot of those who, in the field artillery, had to place their guns in battery amid the confusion of battle, and to judge, by a single glance, of the exact distances on an unknown ground, in order to regulate the elevations and graduate the fuses.

The South had always regarded a partisan war as one of its principal elements of defence in the struggle for which it had long been preparing. As soon as it broke out bands were seen forming by the side of the regularly organized army, who declared their intention of fighting on their own account. The independence they expected to find in this mode of warfare, the hope of plunder, and the attractions of an adventurous life drew into their ranks the most desperate characters. The remembrance of the Mexican brigands had remained in the South surrounded in a kind of romantic halo since the conquerors of Texas had fought them and adopted their customs; and the men who only a few years before had attempted to wrest Kansas by violence from the Northern settlers, in defiance of all laws, set an example, which was promptly followed, by organizing armed bands destined to become very popular in the South under the Spanish name of *guerillas*. It will be seen, as we have already stated, how much the Confederates deceived themselves in relying upon these irregular troops to render it impossible for their adversaries to occupy any portion of the territory they might conquer, and in believing that they would persevere in the work of self-devotion when the cause should suffer on the field of battle. But if they never succeeded in playing more than an accessory part in regular warfare, that part was none the less an important one; and so long as the Confederate armies held out, despite the ground they were losing, the guerillas, by their daring attacks upon the invader, were of immense assistance to them.

Appreciating the services that such combatants were able to render, the Confederate Congress gave them an organization and an official character, which were to secure them the treatment of prisoners of war on the part of the enemy. They signed the enlistment papers like other volunteers, their leaders were brevetted,

and placed under the authority of a few generals, who, nominally at least, had the supreme control of their movements. In reality, however, they preserved a perfect independence, and became, according to their respective characters and the qualities of their chiefs, either formidable soldiers, animated by a true military spirit, or merely armed marauders, who knew nothing of war except its most melancholy excesses.

Accordingly, the partisans who were organized in Virginia, the most ardent, but also the noblest and most disinterested of the Southern States, were nearly all animated by sincere zeal, earnest devotion to their cause, and a sentiment of honor incompatible with such excesses. Young men of wealth and of good family enrolled themselves among them, certain of finding, in the humblest positions, an opportunity for acquiring that quickness of perception, that knowledge of the country, and that foresight into details which form the warrior. The landowners and farmers, more numerous in Virginia than in the other slave States, who formed a large portion of these independent organizations, scarcely changed their habits on entering this new career. They had been acquainted from their infancy with the vast forests where they were going to make war. All able-bodied men left the few villages scattered among these forests to enlist, and there was not a solitary house where some soldier of these bands was not sure of meeting some female relative or friend, where indeed all could not be greeted with a few words of sympathy, so calculated to add fresh courage to the wearied soldier when they fall from the lips of a woman. Such troops, so adapted for intercepting the despatches of an enemy, for picking up his stragglers, or attacking his convoys, for cutting railways and telegraph lines in his rear, were to form an excellent body of scouts to the regular army about to defend Virginia against the Federal invasion.

It must be admitted that the conduct of the Virginians was not always imitated by the other Confederate partisans, who were induced by less worthy motives to enrol themselves under the banner of the guerilla chiefs. The reputation of the latter promised them, with great fatigue, equally great plunder. Consequently, the volunteers who gathered in crowds around them soon formed into bands which at times numbered several thousand

horse. We shall see these bands constantly at work during those campaigns which desolated the Western States, destroying everything on their way, inflicting as much injury upon the most peaceful inhabitants of those regions as upon the Federal soldiers they came to fight, and getting so far from the regular armies, on which they were supposed to depend, that they were very seldom of any assistance in their operations. A minority, more or less numerous, in those States, being secretly hostile to the Confederate cause, this circumstance was made the pretext for offering, as an inducement to adventurers who abounded in the West, a regular system of pillage. All who joined these organizations were authorized to take whatever might be useful to the band—horses, arms, equipments, etc.—from those inhabitants who were suspected of entertaining Union sentiments, and the soldiers who brought their booty to headquarters were promised the full value of the articles thus stolen. The result might easily have been foreseen. No partisan could fail of finding some cause for preferring charges of sympathy with the North against any one who was worth the trouble of being robbed. This premium upon pillage necessarily rendered those soldiers who had to pass final judgment on the political opinions of those whose property they coveted very little scrupulous, and their number increased with their impunity. In short, they became a subject of so much dread to their own friends that, had the war ended in the recognition of the Confederate government, the latter would have been obliged to inaugurate a new civil war, to get rid of those guerillas who had become regular gangs of bandits.

One may form an opinion of the value of such soldiers by taking into consideration the character of their chiefs, and also by taking as a type of whatever there was of good and of evil among them, the three men who contributed most to their organization, and whose names will most frequently occur in the course of what we shall have occasion to say regarding these corps of freebooters—Mosby, Morgan, and Forrest.

Mosby was a Virginia lawyer, endowed with the instinct of that partisan war, so difficult in an almost uncultivated country. His character and political passion drew around him men full of the same zeal as himself. Consequently, he received from them

the most unbounded obedience and absolute devotion. A wary politician and a loyal citizen of his own State, when he saw, after the capitulation of the regular armies, that any further resistance would only unnecessarily increase the sufferings of his countrymen, he discharged his men with a few words full of noble sentiments, and with a pliability of mind peculiarly American, he quietly went back to his office and resumed his former life.

John Morgan, a daring horseman and a genial companion before the war, possessed all the necessary attributes for exercising an unbounded influence over the youth of Kentucky, his native State. Fiery before the conflict, but calm in action, of a generous disposition, but inflexible as a disciplinarian, he was better able than any other man to curb the brutal passions and develop the best instincts of the rough troopers who responded to his call. Although their number allowed him occasionally during the war to direct long and complicated operations, he preserved throughout his career that love of personal adventure which had made him so popular; and thanks to the presence of mind which enabled him to get out of the most perplexing difficulties, he soon became one of those heroes that abound in legendary story. We shall relate his campaigns, but it would fill a volume to enumerate all the daring exploits by means of which he set an example to his soldiers from the very beginning of the war, riding among the Federal posts in order to ascertain their positions by personal observation, sometimes in the garb of a farmer, sometimes in the uniform of a Union officer, taking advantage of the former disguise to draw the enemy into the ambuscade he had prepared for him, and of the second, to issue, with imperturbable assurance, orders which would throw the enemy's movements into confusion. Like a true Kentuckian, horses were his ruling passion; and if in the course of this narrative we shall find him attempting impossible enterprises, or suddenly diverting any of his expeditions from their apparent purpose, it is likely that the hope of carrying off some blood horses—the only booty he ever allowed himself to take—may have exercised an irresistible influence over his action.*

* See Appendix to this volume, Note D.

Differing widely from the other two chiefs, who, when hostilities commenced, gathered the greatest number of partisans around them, Forrest tarnished his undisputed military qualities by the appeals he made to the brutal passions of those he enrolled under his standard. Though never imitating the excesses of Quantrell—that brigand whose boast it was, throughout the war, that he never spared a single human being he met in whole counties of Missouri—this true captain of banditti, resembling those that infested Germany during the Thirty Years' War, used to encourage his men to acts of pillage, and would close his eyes to deeds of cruelty of which they were often guilty. And thus we find Forrest, after distinguishing himself by remarkable military achievements, signalizing himself at last by a sinister exploit—the massacre of the negro garrison of Fort Pillow. He organized the band under his command into a corps of mounted infantry, in which every man was provided with a horse—less for the purpose of fighting than for executing rapid marches, at the end of which the men would dismount, take up their muskets, and carry the enemy's positions, thus suddenly attacked, at the point of the bayonet. He found these tactics the more successful that he was not ashamed—no more than the Indian—to beat a hasty retreat whenever he found his adversary on his guard. His corps increased rapidly by the addition of other partisan bands, whose chiefs had acquired less celebrity than himself. He soon grew tired of being only a guerilla chief like Mosby and Morgan: the Confederate government testified their sense of his services, and of his own importance to themselves, by investing his band with the attributes of regular troops, and by conferring on himself the rank of general. This reorganization and these new titles, however, produced no change either in the leader or in his men: the latter still pursued, on a wider field, their adventurous career, alternating between battle and rapine, and the former slave-dealer, now commanding an army corps, too often behaved as if, instead of wielding a sword, he still flourished the blood-stained whip of the dealer in human flesh.

CHAPTER III.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

WE have shown in a former chapter the great and real cause of the civil war, and in another the military resources which the South called to its aid in order to sustain it. In this and the following chapter we propose to point out the principal features of the political crisis which preceded the civil war, and to relate the occurrences in the midst of which the United States became divided into two hostile camps.

We have stated that slavery had become the basis of the entire politico-economical edifice of the South; the servile institution must be placed beyond the reach of danger in order that this edifice might run no risk of falling to pieces, for, even though the institution itself was universally respected in the South, the mere vicinity of the free States was a perpetual menace to it. The prosperity of these States, the rapid increase of their population, which absorbed nearly all the emigration from Europe, and their still more rapid extension of territory, secured to them a daily growing influence in the councils of the Republic. The slave States had sought to balance this influence by extending the servile institution into the yet uncultivated sections of the continent, by disputing the territories recently opened to civilization with the settlers from the North, by wresting from Mexico some of her most valuable provinces; and they thought of further increasing the number of their States by seizing Cuba and the whole coast of the Gulf of Mexico. They had succeeded, by means of a shrewd policy, in creating for themselves a considerable party in the North, whose support had long given them a preponderance in the Federal elections, and had enabled them to govern the Union in the interest of their policy. The advocates of this policy had unscrupulously taken advantage of the deep attachment

which the great majority of the American people entertained for their Constitution, and, by constantly threatening to break it up, by recourse to the most violent measures, they had obtained from them all the concessions necessary for the maintenance and development of their system. But a day came when these concessions were no longer sufficient. Despite all their efforts, the slave-owners saw themselves outstripped—conquered by the progress of free labor. In order to secure the adherence of their partisans in the North, which alone could give them the control of public affairs, they were also obliged to make certain concessions in return. They could not impose upon the Republic, to its full extent, the policy on the success of which they had staked their fortunes. In 1860 it was easy to foresee that their rule would not be of long duration, and that even if they succeeded in legally securing a government of their choice, that government could not prevent free labor from planting itself in the best portions of the continent. Two alternatives, both equally violent, presented themselves to them for shielding the servile institution from the danger which threatened it. They must either separate entirely from the free States, and found a new republic of slave States, freed from the control of their former associates; or forcibly extort from the latter the guarantees henceforth indispensable to the institution of slavery, and thus make sure of their supremacy over all the continent. The aversion and jealousy entertained for the North led the majority of Southern slaveholders to adopt the idea of founding a separate Republic, in which they could, at their option, consolidate the servile institution. But clear-sighted politicians, while commending this project, which favored their designs, foresaw the danger for the future, and fully understood that, in order to exist, a community founded upon slavery must not only be independent, but mistress of America.

In fact, the maintenance of the Union, even under the Presidency of the most zealous abolitionist, would have been less dangerous to the Southern community than separation, pure and simple, dividing the United States into two unequal parts; one of these parts, supposing it to comprise all the slave States, without excepting those which remained faithful to the Federal flag, would have had a population of eight million whites and four

million blacks; the other would have been composed of the rest of the Union—that is to say, of the great body of the free States, continuing to form, under the Federal compact, a single nation from the Atlantic to the Pacific. From amiable, or at least tolerant, associates, the latter would have become formidable rivals and implacable enemies. Finding in their numerous population, in the productive system of free labor, and their vast financial resources, an irresistible element of colonization, they would have successfully competed with the Southern States, already fettered by slavery, divided into hostile castes, and deprived of the resources that emigration brings to the new continent. In a few years, the free States would have completely surrounded the territory occupied by the servile institution, and by thus closing the avenues of future expansion against it, they would have dealt it a mortal blow. Their vast frontiers would have been opened to fugitives from slavery, as soon as the shameful compact by which those neighboring States had pledged themselves to return the fugitive slave had been torn to pieces, with the very Union in whose name it had been procured. In spite of all artificial barriers, a double contraband, favoring the escape of the slave on one hand, would, on the other, have carried into the South those abolition publications so much dreaded by the latter, which a secret but irresistible propagandism would have circulated among enslaved populations whom the faintest glimpse of liberty was sufficient to excite. This inevitable consequence of separation was predicted long ago by the sagacious mind of De Tocqueville, who foresaw the day when slavery would bring on a terrible crisis, in the midst of which it would disappear, and which even seemed to him destined to prove fatal to one of the two races. He had therefore counselled the men of the South to remain faithful to the Union at all hazards, because, sustained by the numerous white population of the North, he told them, they would be able to abolish slavery slowly without subverting the order of things, and still preserving their social superiority; whereas, if they made an enemy of that population, the latter would soon find a way of freeing their slaves in spite of them and against them.

A war of races, which the defeat of the South has rendered

unnecessary, would have been the certain result of the separation. Consequently, the leaders of the slavery party needed the support of the people of the North. But it was for the purpose of maintaining and fortifying slavery, and not with a view of abolishing it gradually, that they asked for this support. There were two ways of obtaining it: either by reconstructing the Union to suit themselves; or, by dividing the North in such a manner that it would no longer have formed a compact nation by their side, the slave power would have found among its ruins a few weak States always ready to sue for protection. In either case, the servile institution would have secured its necessary ascendancy over the whole continent. The reconstruction of the Union for their own benefit was the first thought of Southern politicians. The capital of the Union was surrounded by slave States, inhabited by slaveholders, and the Federal laws sanctioned the existence of the peculiar institution of the South within its territory; they made sure, therefore, of its possession, and once assembled in the Capitol, they fully hoped that the necessity of forming one great nation, that fidelity to the Federal Constitution itself, would rally around them the majority of the Northern States. The Union would thus be reconstituted under their auspices, and New England, that focus of abolition, would perhaps alone be excluded from it, and left to vegetate in obscure mediocrity. The Montgomery Congress, therefore, in drawing up the new Constitution of the Confederate slave States, took care to adopt, purely and simply, the old compact of the United States, with two important modifications—one, to justify the past, the other, to guarantee the future. The first recognized the right of secession as a principle; the second proclaimed slavery as a fundamental institution of society. Through this deceptive resemblance to the Federal Constitution, it was hoped that all the States of the old Union would the more readily group themselves around the new Confederacy. In order to effect this, it was necessary either to intimidate them by a bold *coup d'état*, or to win them back, one by one, by dividing them, by wearying them out, and by showing them, in a manner calculated to impress them, the unanimous determination of the South. We have shown by what violent means this apparent unanimity of the Southern people was

procured ; there was no more respect paid to the doctrine of State rights, the very foundation of the Confederacy, than to the private rights of individuals ; and, at a later period, an attempt on the part of North Carolina to get rid of the despotism of Mr. Davis was treated as treason. If the re-establishment of the Union was not practicable, it was at least important to secure the supremacy of the new Confederacy by surrounding it with neighbors at once weak and divided. In order to accomplish this, war with the North was necessary, because a peaceful separation would have left her united under the old Federal Constitution. All the slave States, without exception, must be brought into the Confederacy ; the Mississippi must be closed against the Western States, and this outlet, so necessary for their produce, should only be opened in exchange for an alliance which would have reduced them to a state of vassalage. It was important, above all, to make the Northern merchants feel the superiority of the military power of the Southern States, in order to secure to the latter the rôle of arbitrators among their neighbors, ruined by war and discouraged by defeat. To realize this project, the leaders of the slave States counted chiefly upon the influence which the exclusive cultivation of cotton gave them. They were convinced that neither America nor Europe could dispense with an article which they alone could supply, and they saw in it a guarantee for the maintenance of slavery, of which it was the fruit. They did not believe that the working classes, in England and in France, would have the courage to undergo the severest privations, rather than give a word of encouragement to the cause of slavery, and they fully expected that these classes would compel the European governments to restore cotton to their looms, by intervening in behalf of the Confederates. Forgetting that the exports of the agricultural products of the North exceeded those of the South, they fancied that the whole world was dependent upon them, and, in their presumptuous language, they already announced the accession of *King Cotton*, before whom the sovereigns and the republics of the two worlds would have to bow.

Such were the views of the ambitious men who controlled the policy of the South. At the opposite extreme were the abolitionists, who, with the foresight and the logic of champions of

positive ideas, felt, like them, that slavery must either rule or perish, and who, resolved to contest its power, were not afraid of attacking it in front. Equally enthusiastic and ardent in the struggle, they made light of the Constitution in their harangues whenever it seemed to them to favor the propagation of slavery. Justly convinced of the rectitude and sacredness of their cause, persuaded also that, in combating the servile institution without intermission or compromise, they were saving their country from shame and ruin, they entered the political arena with the courage, the faith, and the sternness of their ancestors the Puritans. So long as the struggle which they had foreseen was deferred, they did not number many adherents, but a day came when the whole nation rallied around the abolition flag, which they had carried so loftily and firmly, and when they had the satisfaction of witnessing the triumph of the principles of truth and justice, which they had never sacrificed to the exigencies of politics.

Between these two extreme parties there were the masses of the people, loyal above all to the Union, loyal to the Constitution, the benefits of which they enjoyed. These masses were divided into two parties, called *Democrats* and *Republicans*, according as they favored or opposed the slave policy. The Republicans, who were in the majority in most of the Northern States, did not attack slavery directly where it existed, and, respecting the right of every State to preserve it, they confined themselves to the task of restricting its extension. The Democratic party was composed, in the first place, of a large portion of the Northern population, which desired to maintain the Union by making concessions to the servile institution and by tolerating its development; and secondly, of the immense majority of the Southern people who believed in their ability to retain the guarantees of slavery without resorting to illegal means or violating the Constitution.

The alliance between the Northern and Southern Democrats and the extreme slave party had given, at all the general elections, an important majority to the politicians who defended the servile institution over the Republican party, which was solely sustained by a small fraction of abolitionists. They might still have possessed such majority in 1860. But, as we have already

stated, this advantage no longer satisfied them ; they now wanted to establish their supremacy in a way not to be disputed, by a bold stroke of policy ; and they preferred threats of war, and even war itself, to compromises henceforth insufficient. They only required a pretext to draw after them their fellow-citizens who were yet faithful to the Union. We shall show how they sought this pretext in the Presidential elections of 1860. They had long used the entire power of the Federal government for the protection and extension of slavery ; they had introduced it into a great number of territories which had been acquired by that government in the name of the whole community ; sometimes protecting, in the name of the independence of the new States, those which, under their influence, admitted slavery ; at other times, causing the central power to trace an imaginary line, south of which all the territories were to belong to the servile institution. But when they thought of separating from the North, or at least threatened the North with violent separation, they denied that the Federal government had any right to interfere in the matter. This threat was a powerful political argument, and separation seeming to be the last resort when slavery should be in danger, a constitutional theory was needed to justify it. This was found in the dogma of the absolute sovereignty of the States—a doctrine which had for its apostle, between the years 1830 and 1840, Mr. Calhoun, the foremost statesman of South Carolina, who soon came to be considered as the palladium of the peculiar institutions of the Southern States. It is sufficient to sum up this doctrine in a few words, to show how specious and dangerous it was.

The object of the Federal compact, between the colonies that had been freed by the war of independence, was to protect them against the divisions which weakened them, to unite them into one indestructible group or cluster, and to make of them a single nation, while leaving them a local independence sufficient to protect them against the despotism of centralization. Each colony, in adopting this compact, made a perpetual cession of a portion of its sovereignty in favor of the new community. The rights which were thus ceded constituted the prerogatives of the Federal power. We cannot enumerate them here, but in order to show their im-

portance, it is sufficient to mention the right of waging war and making peace, the right of coining money, of collecting custom-house duties, and of representing the commonwealth in foreign countries. The flag was national; civil and political rights were enjoyed in common by the citizens of all the States; no custom-house could be established in the interior; the Federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over certain questions of general interest; it was the sovereign arbiter both between States and between such States and private individuals aggrieved by them. Finally, besides its limited jurisdiction in the States, it exercised a sovereign authority over the Federal possessions and the new territories acquired by the Republic. The forts, the arsenals, and the District of Columbia, which contained the seat of government, had been ceded to it with full right of property; the immense uncultivated regions where colonization daily extended were becoming peopled under its protection; and it alone could impart political life to territories sufficiently civilized to claim the right of adding another star to the azure field of the national flag. The very manner in which the national power was constituted proved that it represented one single nation, and not an agglomeration of independent States. This power was composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives, invested conjointly with political and legislative sovereignty; of a President, constituting the executive power; and finally, of a Supreme Court, whose province was to enforce the superior authority of the national laws, and to pass judgment as a court of final appeal upon all constitutional questions. With the exception of this tribunal, appointed by the President, the other powers (executive and legislative) were elective. While the Senate represented in a proper measure the autonomy of the States, and comprised within its organization two members sent by each of those political bodies, whatever their size or importance, the House of Representatives was the direct product of popular suffrage; the entire surface of the Union was divided into districts equal in population, each of which elected one member. The election of the President, although nominally of a twofold character, was also essentially national and proportioned to the population. Each State designated as many special electors as it sent Representatives and Senators to Congress, and these

electors assembled in an electoral college, which in 1860 was composed of three hundred and three members, whose only mission was to vote for a President. With the exception of South Carolina, which left the right of their selection to the legislature, these electors were chosen by popular vote, and all were positively instructed to vote for such or such candidate ; the result of the vote for President was thus known at the same time as the names of the electors designated by the ballot, and the election was thus practically reduced to a single point. The Federal law gave to the slave States an unjustifiable advantage in the formation of the electoral districts, by taking into account the servile population, which did not however possess any political rights, and by counting five negroes as equivalent to three white men. This advantage was also granted to them in the Presidential elections, and they were more than once indebted to it for successes which the free States only accepted out of respect for the Constitution. Strong party organizations, which are indispensable in proportion as the institutions are more democratic, could alone carry such an election into effect, and give to the choice of electors the character of a national manifestation. Accordingly, each party held free meetings or conventions, composed of distinguished men selected in all the States by permanent party committees. It was in these preliminary assemblies that the merits of the various candidates for the Presidency were discussed ; and, the choice once made, the whole party, owing to its innumerable ramifications and its permanent committees, went to work with the utmost harmony to secure the election of the delegates pledged beforehand to vote in favor of their candidate.

Such was the entire national edifice—an edifice founded on Federal institutions, on the common interest which they guaranteed and the public life they had developed—which the doctrine of State sovereignty was seeking to undermine. Those who had adopted it pretended that each State was at all times at liberty to resume the sovereignty it had ceded to the Commonwealth, in virtue of the Federal compact ; that the States which had been created since the Union had an equal right to do the same ; and that the powerful Republic, the unity of which had benefited each of them in turn, was thus to be dismembered at the first sign of local

opposition that the constitutional enactments and the voice of the majority might encounter. Such a theory, logically applied, would lead to endless divisions and to the destruction of all nationality, for no confederation could have existed under such conditions; the States themselves would soon have been broken up by the claims of the counties of which they were composed to separate from them; and if the Northern States had sanctioned this theory by allowing the slaveholders quietly to withdraw from the Union, they could not have prevented other secessions from taking place in their midst, at the first symptom of those inevitable differences the solution of which had hitherto been left to the popular vote.

We have already shown how little the Southern leaders thought of State sovereignty as soon as they had organized their new Confederacy; but at the time of which we speak this fatal doctrine had taken a strong hold of the public mind in all the slave States, and it dragged the most loyal citizens into the rebellion, as soon as the usurping legislatures had declared in favor of separation.

The various parties went to work early in the spring of 1860 to prepare for the Presidential elections which were to take place in November. On the 23d of April all the delegates of the Democratic party met in convention at Charleston. The drawing up of a programme or *platform*—to use the popular term—was the first task of those preliminary assemblies, after which, the choice of candidates destined to carry out that programme was more easy and had a more definite meaning; for the Americans have acquired the habit in political life of attaching more importance to principles than to persons. The Democratic party in the free States, so far as any calculations could be made, was nearly as numerous as the Republican party; it had adopted for its programme, under the name of Popular Sovereignty, the right of every new State or Territory to adopt or to exclude slavery. Its alliance with the Democrats of the South had already triumphed in many elections; this alliance had only to be continued to secure the nomination of Mr. Douglas, the recognized chief of the Northern Democrats. But the slaveholders of the South, as it has already been stated, desired to push matters to extremes. They demanded

a programme implying the right of secession, and imposing upon the Federal government the official recognition of slavery as a national institution. This was to render their union with the majority of their former allies impossible. In consequence of these conflicting pretensions, the convention accomplished nothing, and from that moment the success of the Republican candidate appeared certain. Those who had brought about this result were not afraid of the consequences; they preferred it to the surrender of the least portion of their imperious programme. They had thrown off the mask. In the mean time, the party of conciliation which never fails to come to the surface during a great political crisis—but whose good intentions are almost always powerless, because it seeks to remedy an evil by ignoring it—had been long in existence under the name of the *Whig* party. It had thought to be able to remove the evil by adopting a programme full of protestations in favor of the Constitution, in which slavery was not even mentioned; it held a convention in Baltimore on the 9th of May, and selected Mr. Bell as its candidate. A few days after, May 16th, the Republican convention which assembled at Chicago adopted for its platform the maintenance of the Union, a denial of the right of secession, a guarantee of the principle of free labor as the basis of the Constitution, and the restriction of slavery to the States or Territories where it already existed. The care of presenting this platform to the voters of the country—the only one honest, just, and worthy of the great Republic—was entrusted on the 19th to Mr. Lincoln, already known for his uprightness, his legal acquirements, and his political experience.

After several attempts at reconciliation between the various fractions of the Democratic party, its division became final. The Charleston convention was followed by two hostile conventions sitting at the same time in Baltimore—one of which, on the 21st of June, selected Mr. Douglas as its candidate, and the other, on the 23d, Mr. Breckenridge. The latter, who was at that time Vice-President of the United States, represented the ultra slave policy of the South.

On the 6th of November, 4,680,180 American citizens elected delegates: the Presidential electors pledged to vote for Mr. Lincoln received 1,866,452 votes; those representing the two frac-

tions of the Democratic party, personified by Douglas and Breckenridge, received, respectively, 1,375,144 and 847,933 votes; and the Whig party, personified by Bell, 590,631 votes. The Republican candidate had only a relative majority, but it was considerable; and, thanks to the machinery of the double vote, this majority was made absolute in the electoral college. He was elected by one hundred and eighty votes, whilst his three competitors, although strengthened by the eight electors from South Carolina, only received one hundred and twenty-three votes between them.

The Republican party had carried the day; the Federal executive power, which was to assume its functions on the 4th of March of the following year, had received the nation's mandate to oppose the extension of slavery; but it was also pledged to make no attempts against that institution where it already existed. The two fractions of the Democratic party and the Whigs, being in the majority in both houses of Congress, had it always in their power to unite in opposing constitutionally any infringements that might be attempted against what the South considered as her rights.

The leaders of the slaveholding States, who had rejected every compromise with their partisans of the North, were fully determined not to rest satisfied with this guarantee. They had loudly proclaimed the right of secession; they had announced their intention to avail themselves of that right if the entire nation did not submit to their demands; and they had prepared the Southern people, by their violent attacks upon the Republican candidate, whom they styled an abolitionist, to repudiate his authority and to set aside the national verdict. These people were not to be allowed time for reflection, lest love for the Union should resume its empire over them. It was necessary to stir up the timid and to persuade the wavering, either by fair means or by force; it was important, above all, to take advantage of the hour when the North was powerless and the Federal authority undecided, in order that secession might become an accomplished fact on the day when honest Mr. Lincoln should be installed into power. Consequently, the signal of separation was given several months in advance of his inauguration.

The joy of those who had been anxious for the struggle mani-

festated itself throughout the South on the receipt of the news of the election, while the Republicans, although happy in their success, surveyed the future of the republic with feelings of uneasiness. The Democrats of the North, forsaken by their allies, could not believe these allies capable of tearing the Constitution asunder, and the border States, equally attached to the Union and to slavery, already foresaw that if the war broke out it would be waged on their own soil and at their expense.

Not a moment was lost in giving the secession movement a decisive impulse. The popular mind was everywhere excited by inflammatory speeches. Some resistance was, however, met with; Mr. Stephens, who was soon to become the Vice-President of the Confederacy, was then opposed to separation; but his protests against that measure had no effect, inasmuch as they were accompanied by reservations in favor of State sovereignty, and because the defenders of the Union in the South declared themselves ready to follow the fortunes of their own States if they should withdraw from it. The legislatures of the cotton States were immediately assembled to consider the situation and issue calls for conventions to proclaim the act of secession. Without even waiting for this proclamation, the national authority was openly set aside, and from the day following the election of Mr. Lincoln, the judge of the District Court of the United States in Charleston, devoted to Southern interests, refused to take his seat on the Bench. Finally, the principal leaders of the movement met at Milledgeville to consult upon the subject of separation, and the military measures required to ensure success.

One month after the election—the 3d of December—the Federal Congress met in its turn. The President's message set forth the uncertainties and the weakness of the Washington government. Elected by the coalition of Democrats, Mr. Buchanan did not dare to break with his former allies. He affected to see in the choice of his successor an act of aggression against them, and sought in vain to find means of conciliation. He did not admit the possibility of secession. He condemned it, and yet did not consider himself justified in taking any steps for its repression. The partisans of the South were in the majority in his cabinet, and filled the greatest portion of the Federal offices.

They had taken advantage of this to facilitate, in a thousand ways, the designs of their accomplices, and were throwing impediments in the way of every measure proposed by those of their colleagues who were devoted to the Union. One of them, Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War, had sold in the Southern markets a portion of the arms belonging to the nation, and had forwarded nearly all the remainder to the arsenals situated on the soil of the States ready for insurrection. General Scott, commander-in-chief of the Federal army, had asked in vain before the election that some measures might be adopted to place the army once more on a respectable footing. Instead of this, it had been purposely weakened and nearly annihilated. The Federal government possessed a great number of fortifications along the coast—most of them constructed upon the plans of the French general Bernard—which commanded the ports and the most important positions to be defended in case of war. These forts were national property. The most important were Fort Monroe in Virginia, on the borders of the Chesapeake; Fort Macon in North Carolina; Forts Moultrie and Sumter in the bay of Charleston, South Carolina; Fort Pulaski in Georgia, near Savannah; Forts Key West and Garden Key on two small islands at the extremity of Florida; Forts McRae and Pickens at the entrance of the bay of Pensacola in the same State; Forts Morgan and Gaines in front of Mobile, in Alabama; and Forts Jackson and St. Philip on the Mississippi, below New Orleans. The garrisons of these forts had been so much reduced that they were all liable to be captured by a sudden attack.

The excitement in Congress was great. With the exception of the secession leaders, all parties were working sincerely to devise means for maintaining the Union. Committees were appointed for that purpose. The compromise measure which received the most serious consideration, and which seemed at one time to be favored by the majority of the conciliation party, was proposed by a venerable Senator from Kentucky—Mr. Crittenden. He wanted to divide the Republic by a line drawn from east to west as far as the Pacific, which would secure to the slave interest all the Territories situated south of thirty-six and a half degrees north. But the time for compromises had passed; the Republicans

could not accept them, and those who desired separation were fully determined to reject them.

The entire South was already in motion; special sessions of legislatures had assembled and called for conventions. Other conventions, held in the border States of both North and South, appealed in vain for conciliatory measures. In the North, immense meetings declared themselves ready to support the Union and the government that Mr. Lincoln was about to form. Congress, acting under the pressure of public opinion, authorized the issue of ten millions of dollars in Treasury bonds, to meet the most urgent national expenses, but the President refused to take any steps to sustain the Federal authority, and the loyal members of his cabinet—his Secretary of State, General Cass, among others—withdraw, because they would have no connection with a government which delivered up the country to its enemies.

South Carolina was the first to set up openly the standard of rebellion, and on the 20th of December her convention passed an ordinance of secession, declaring the Union severed, and demanding at the same time all the Federal property situated on its soil. This demand was a declaration of open war, unless the President, by complying with it, should himself sanction the right of separation. The signal was given, and preparations were made in the other cotton States to follow the example of South Carolina. However, while the most zealous partisans were in favor of proclaiming the secession of every State at once, moderate people, with a view of delaying action, insisted that, before proceeding further, all the Southern States should come to an understanding in order to act in concert. But the *co-operationists*, as they were called, were forcibly carried along by the revolutionary current. Moreover, the instigators of the rebellion understood each other but too well. Each man had his part laid out. Some, delegated by their own States, constantly visited the neighboring States in order to secure that unanimity to the movement which was to constitute its strength; others were endeavoring to win over the powerful border States, such as Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, as well as North Carolina and Tennessee, which stood aghast, terrified at the approach of the crisis brought on by their associates; some, again, were even pleading their cause in the North, in the hope of re-

cruiting partisans among those Democrats whom they had forsaken at the last election ; while others kept their seats in Congress in order to be able to paralyze its action, forming, at the same time, a centre whence they issued directions to their friends in the South to complete the dismemberment of the Republic. Jefferson Davis himself continued to take part in the deliberations of the Senate, and four days after the insurrection of South Carolina, he boldly presented the programme of his party—a programme which must be adopted in full in order to bring back the South into the Union—the basis of which was a constitutional amendment sanctioning for all time the recognition of slavery.

South Carolina did not wait for the reply of the President to her demands as to the possession of the Federal property. Mr. Buchanan gave the rebels indirect encouragement by his vacillating course. The Charleston arsenal was already in the possession of the secessionist authorities of the city ; the commandant of the forts, which guarded the entrance of the port, fully expected to see their demands backed by a sufficient force of militia to render all resistance impossible. Major Anderson had only eighty soldiers to garrison three forts intended for an armament of more than one hundred guns. Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney were situated on the main land ; Sumter, the most important of the three, was an enormous mass of masonry erected upon a small island in the centre of the bay. It was dismantled in 1860, and Anderson with his little band only occupied Moultrie, which he had labored hard to put in a state of defence. Well aware that he would not be able to defend himself with his little garrison, encumbered as it was with women and children, the Charleston authorities assured the President that they would let him alone for the time, provided no reinforcements were sent to him. The Secretary of War, feigning to accept these hypocritical promises from men with whom he was secretly in accord, gave Anderson no instructions, intending thereby to make him an easy prey for his friends. But this officer had the courage—a rare thing in revolutionary times—to take the responsibility of a step which was to ensure his safety, and which his superiors had not dared to suggest. On the 26th of December, during the darkness of the night, he evacuated

Fort Moultrie and occupied Fort Sumter with all his people. Rage and vexation rose to a high pitch in Charleston when, on the morning of the 27th, the Federal flag was seen hoisted over the walls of Sumter. The rebel authorities began by taking possession of the abandoned forts; great military preparations were ordered; the militia redoubled their activity, and the arms taken from the arsenal were distributed among them; the guns of Moultrie were turned against the fort which sheltered the little Federal garrison, and new batteries were begun on the beach to support their fire; finally, the commissioners appointed by South Carolina were instructed to again demand of the President the restoration of the fort, which was no longer in danger of a sudden attack.

Notwithstanding Mr. Buchanan's weakness, it was too much to exact from him the surrender of Fort Sumter; public opinion in the North was unanimous in reminding him that it was his duty to protect the Federal property. He refused to comply with the demands of the commissioners, contrary to the advice of his Secretary of War, who, thinking that he had done enough in that capacity for the cause of the South, availed himself of this disagreement to tender his resignation, on the 31st of December.

The year 1861 began under the gloomiest auspices. South Carolina had shown that secession was not an idle threat. Six of the Southern States were preparing to follow her example; the others, while deploring the dismemberment of the Union, declared themselves opposed to any energetic measures against the seceders. The North—divided into two parties, one of which looked upon the election of Mr. Lincoln as a victory, the other as a defeat—could not realize the magnitude of the danger, and was wasting precious time in idle declarations of attachment to the Constitution. The President, sincere but weak, oscillating between his public duties and party obligations, surrounded by traitors to the Republic, found himself isolated, forsaken by those who might have given him judicious advice, and reduced to the most deplorable helplessness.

He could not, however, bear the arrogance of the Carolina commissioners, and on the 1st of January he broke off all intercourse with them. The leaders of the slave party had only waited for this explosion to cause the rebellion to take another step. Those

who were in Washington formed a cabal, and on the 5th of January they advised their associates in the various Southern States to follow the example of South Carolina, and to proclaim the act of separation without delay. These States had taken in advance all precautions against the slightest opposition that might be offered on the part of the President; they had already seized all the Federal arsenals within their reach, and especially the forts which might be turned against them in the coming struggle. On the 3d of January the militia of Alabama occupied the Mount Vernon arsenal, and, without striking a blow, walked into Forts Morgan and Gaines, which their respective garrisons surrendered to them; on the same day, the Georgians took possession of Forts Pulaski and Jackson, and on the 6th the arsenals of Fayetteville and Chattahoochee fell into the hands of the authorities of North Carolina and Florida.

A few militia troops of the latter State assembled at Pensacola; the commandant of the arsenal allowed himself to be captured by them on the 12th, but an energetic officer, Lieutenant Slemmer, was in command of Forts McRae and Pickens. Not being able to defend both with a handful of men, he followed the example of Anderson, eluded the vigilance of the enemy who was watching him, and abandoned the first to retire into the second, which was thus wrested for ever from the hands of the Confederates. On the same day Forts Jackson and St. Philip on the Mississippi were delivered up to the authorities of Louisiana, and on the following day they took possession of the arsenal at Baton Rouge. On the 18th, in order to close the Upper Mississippi against any possible attacks from the north, the seceders began erecting around Vicksburg the first of those batteries which were destined to keep the Federal armies so long in check, but, on the other hand, and on the same day, an attempt by the Floridians to capture Fort Jefferson at Garden Key was frustrated by the timely arrival of reinforcements brought by Captain Meigs. We shall see this officer at a subsequent period occupying at Washington the important post of quartermaster-general of the army.

The secession excitement had even invaded Maryland, where the partisans of the South, although possibly in the minority,

were very active in organizing regiments of volunteers with the avowed intention of menacing Washington, and of separating the Federal capital from the North. While the insurrection was thus progressing, the conventions which had been called together throughout the South were already assembled or preparing to meet; in the Northern States the legislatures were all in session, and the Federal Congress continued to be the scene of the most exciting discussions. All these assemblies imparted a feverish activity to political life during the month of January, and distinctly demonstrated the position of the different parties that were contending for the possession of the Republic.

The word of command issued by the committee at Washington was promptly obeyed. Secession was proclaimed by the several conventions—in Mississippi on the 9th of January, in Florida on the 10th, in Alabama on the 11th, in Georgia on the 19th, and in Louisiana on the 26th. The secession intriguers had not achieved such an easy success in Texas, where they encountered a strong opposition on the part of the men who surrounded Governor Houston, the real founder of that State. Nevertheless, even there, their machinations succeeded in the end, thanks to a formidable association which inspired and directed them. The Knights of the Golden Circle constituted throughout the South a vast secret society, whose object was to extend the confederacy of slave States in a circle all around the Gulf of Mexico, and to found a great power comprising, besides the cotton States, the greatest portion of Mexico and the Antilles. This devoted and unscrupulous organization was one of the principal instruments used by Southern intriguers. It had spread especially all over Texas. By means of intimidation it overcame the resistance of the Unionists, and on the 1st of February a convention, irregularly organized, drew that State into the rebellion.

In the mean time, South Carolina, always anxious to be in advance of the other States, had not waited for their co-operation to consummate the rebellion by an overt act of hostility. On the 9th of January a merchant vessel, freighted by the Federal government with provisions for Fort Sumter, appeared in Charleston harbor. The new batteries that had been erected on the beach fired into her and obliged her to put back. Americans had fired

for the first time upon the Federal flag; the civil war had commenced.

Such acts could not fail to dispel any doubt that might still exist as to the intentions of the political leaders of the South. The States in which the Republican party was in the ascendant, those under Democratic rule, the border slave States, and the Federal government, while perfectly unanimous in condemning these provocations, took very different ways of resenting the outrage.

The first, on receiving the news of the rupture between the President and the commissioners from South Carolina, emphatically declared at their meetings, through the medium of their leading statesmen, in favor of maintaining the Union, whatever the cost might be. But at the same time, in order to prove to the South how little they had thought of making war upon her, they referred to the laws they had passed for the surrender of fugitive slaves—laws just in themselves, but unfortunately unconstitutional. The most zealous among them—who were also the most clear-sighted—followed the example of Massachusetts, who, since the 3d of January, had been busy in making military preparations. The outrage committed at Charleston against the national flag had caused a profound sensation throughout the great States of the West. The fate of the Union was in their hands; if they had hesitated to defend it, the Union was lost. The Southern leaders counted upon this hesitation, and in order to lead them to adopt their views, they announced that the navigation of the Mississippi—the necessary outlet for all Western produce—should be for ever free from all obstructions. But these precautionary measures had no effect; those States declared against them with a degree of unanimity and energy which foreshadowed from that moment the immense sacrifices they would make for the Federal cause.

Nor were the efforts of the seceders more successful in shaking the loyalty of those States where the Democrats were in the majority. The mayor of New York, Mr. Wood—who was indebted for his position to intrigues but little creditable to that great city—tried in vain to seduce her from her allegiance to the Union, by holding out the flattering prospect of making her a

free city. The legislature of that State—the most powerful in the Republic—although in favor of an attempt at impossible conciliation, declared, on the 11th of January, its unalterable attachment to the Union. That of Pennsylvania having followed its example on the 24th, all danger of secession in the North finally disappeared. Delaware, who preserved in her constitution the principle of slavery, although slavery itself was virtually abolished in her territory, repelled the Southern emissaries; and the legislature of New Jersey, while recommending the adoption of Mr. Crittenden's compromise measure, declined to separate from her neighbors who were faithful to the Constitution.

The slave States known by the name of border States were the theatre of bitter contests between the two hostile parties. But their old attachment to the Constitution got also the better of their sympathies for their neighbors engaged in rebellion. Governor Hicks of Maryland resisted every attempt to drag that State into secession. The legislature of Kentucky and the electoral colleges of Tennessee and North Carolina refused to call a convention at the bidding of the seceders, and the voters of Virginia sent to the convention of that State a majority of delegates favorable to the Union. These demonstrations, however, only occasioned a little delay, obtained by the partisans of the Federal authority, which did not prove of essential service to their cause. In fact, those States simply offered their mediation, but their offers, although sincere for the most part, were only a disguised support to the pretensions of the slaveholders; their professions of fidelity to the Constitution lost all their value in consequence of the restrictions which surrounded them; for, while acknowledging that Mr. Lincoln's election was no valid cause for separation, and while submitting to his authority themselves, they denied the President's right to compel the rebel States to submit to it likewise. They proclaimed the doctrine of State sovereignty, and thus pursued a course which irresistibly led them to make common cause with the insurrection on the day when the war should break out.

Congress was the arena where the antagonistic passions which developed themselves on every side struggled for the mastery, and attempts at conciliation were only brought forward to be defeated

through the absolute pretensions of the Southern leaders. The latter vacated their seats as the States which they represented proclaimed the act of separation; thus carrying out the policy through which the election of Mr. Lincoln had been effected; and by abandoning in Congress, as they had done in the electoral colleges, their former allies, the Democrats, who were still working to effect compromises, they secured a majority for the Republicans, who had bravely resolved not to make any further concessions. The latter rejected Mr. Crittenden's compromise, for the first time, on the 9th of January, declaring that the Constitution should be maintained as it was; thus answering the arguments of the instigators of the rebellion, who, even in the Federal legislature, attacked that Constitution in virtue of which they held their seats in Congress.

The mission of the South Carolina delegates had, somewhat late it is true, recalled President Buchanan to a sense of his public duties. On the 8th of January he sent a message to Congress in which he announced his firm determination to perform them. A few days before—the 5th of January—he resolved to revictual Fort Sumter. But instead of openly sending some vessels of war, he had despatched a simple transport-ship, which, as we have stated, was stopped by a few cannon-shots at the entrance of the bay of Charleston. Always tardy in his action, on the 18th he dismissed General Twiggs, who, on the 16th, had surrendered the troops under his command to the insurgents of Texas; and on the 22d he caused the seizure of a cargo of arms in New York, intended for the militia of the South, which had already received vast supplies through the same channel.

Such was the situation at the beginning of February. In response to an invitation from Virginia, a Peace Congress composed of official delegates from twenty-one States assembled at Washington on the 4th, under the direction of a former President of the republic, Mr. Tyler. This assembly would have exercised a large influence, if conciliation had been practicable; but a simple coincidence of dates demonstrated, by a striking contrast, the uselessness of its efforts. On the very day when it began its labors, the delegates from the rebel States were assembling at Montgomery to seal their alliance by the formation of a new

Confederacy. While the pacificators were wasting time in useless speeches, the secession leaders were acting and preparing for the struggle.

On the 8th of February the assembly at Montgomery decreed the Constitution of the Confederate States, and on the following day, the man who, through his talents and audacity, had been the soul of secession, Mr. Jefferson Davis, was chosen President. In order to conciliate those who still cherished a lingering attachment to the Union, the Vice-Presidency was conferred upon their chief, Mr. Stephens of Georgia, who, after fighting secession, had followed the fortunes of his State. The first bond which was to unite all the insurgents of the South together was thus formed. These provisional appointments, limited to one year, were made by the delegates without any intervention of the popular vote. The Southern leaders had deemed it more prudent thus to dispose of the principal offices without consulting those whom they precipitated into civil war, lest a speedy repentance among some, and a desire to leave at least the door of conciliation open among a large class of the community, might interpose obstacles to their designs. They at once invested their new President with the powers which enabled him to give a vigorous and unique impulse to the secession movement, and entrusted him, as has already been shown, with the supreme control of military affairs and all the necessary means for organizing an army.

Mr. Davis was installed into office on the 18th of February, and set to work without being troubled by the empty protests of Mr. Buchanan. The latter had yet fifteen days to remain in power. This was precious time, of which the seceders availed themselves to prepare for the coming conflict, not only in the States already in rebellion, but also in the border States, where, under various pretexts, they organized the militia which were subsequently to be embodied in the Confederate army. A disaster, which had long been brewing through their contrivances, contributed to weaken the power of the Federal government in their estimation, and to increase their faith in its helplessness. General Twiggs, who commanded the regular troops stationed in Texas, was in accord with the rebels. He suffered himself to be surrounded, in the city of San Antonio, by the militia under the command of McCulloch,

and, hiding his treason under a shameful capitulation, on the 16th of February, he surrendered to the latter the troops he had brought together for that express purpose. By a fatal coincidence, his successor, Colonel Waite, who had hurried from the depths of the wilderness to save this precious nucleus of an army, only arrived in time to share the captivity of those he was coming to command. The leaders of the secession movement, being still obliged to conceal their design to a certain extent, in order not to jeopardize their success, at first treated these troops like those of a foreign power with which they were not at war: the agreement by which they had been delivered up was called a treaty of evacuation, and Waite was conveyed, with about twelve hundred of his men, to Indianola, on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, where, although promised permission to ship for any of the Northern ports, he was detained under various pretexts. The capitulation of San Antonio was not long in bringing forth its fruit; by intimidating the Unionists of Texas it enabled their adversaries to secure the popular vote in favor of the separation of that State.

The 4th of March, which was to witness the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, was approaching, and that prospective event stimulated the audacity of the seceders. While Virginia was protesting against the presence in Washington of a few companies of regular troops, which through the foresight of General Scott had been ordered there, certain conspirators were planning to prevent the installation of the new President by means of a contemplated outrage upon his person, on his passage through Baltimore, which, as they hoped, might end in assassination. He frustrated this murderous scheme by assuming a disguise, and arrived in Washington on the 23d of February, where Mr. Buchanan, faithful to his trust, notwithstanding his inexcusable weaknesses, hastened to put himself in relation with him. The withdrawal from the Cabinet of those who favored slavery had left an open field to men attached to the Union, and one among them, Mr. Dix, Secretary of the Treasury, had even the courage, on being informed of the seizure of the mint in New Orleans, to reply by an order to shoot down on the spot the first man who should touch the American flag. Unfortunately, there was nobody left in that great city who would

dare to execute such instructions. The financial measures of Mr. Dix were more successful ; it was easy to foresee large expenditures ; the first issue of eight millions of dollars, part of the loan of twenty-five millions voted for by Congress on the 8th of February, were immediately subscribed for. The North was desirous to prove that she would sustain the necessary measures for defending the Constitution with all her resources. This, however, was but an insignificant sum ; Congress, therefore, feeling that it would soon be necessary to consolidate the national credit, and secure to Mr. Lincoln's government the means of paying the interest on the loans which it would be obliged to issue, raised the rates of custom-house duties, which until then had almost sufficed to meet the necessities of the national treasury.

We have already stated that the leaders of the secession movement who held seats in the national Legislature had followed the example of the members of the Cabinet, and left the Capitol the moment that their respective States had broken the Union compact. Consequently, Congress, whose powers expired on the 4th of March with those of Mr. Buchanan, found itself, during the last days of its existence, suddenly ruled by the Republicans, who had previously been in the minority. They took advantage of this circumstance to raise the character of Congress in the eyes of the nation by an act which was at once patriotic and foreseeing.

The Democrats of the North and of the border States made a last attempt to induce the Senate to adopt their plans of pretended conciliation. They endorsed at first the propositions of the Peace Congress, which, under their influence, had prepared a programme openly sanctioning the right of secession. Beaten on this ground, they again brought forward Mr. Crittenden's compromise. The adoption of this measure, which misled many timid minds on account of its specious promises to ward off civil war, would, in reality, have secured the triumph of the slavery principle. This fatal concession, by dividing the North, by taking from her all faith in the justice of her cause, would have prepared an easy victory for the seceders. After a long and grave discussion, it was rejected on the night of the 2d-3d of March. With this vote terminated the existence of Congress, which the enemies of

the Republic asserted loudly would be the last convened under the old Constitution.

On the following day Mr. Buchanan ceased to be the chief of that nation he had been called upon to govern four years before, when she was yet united and prosperous. The end of his administration had been disastrous. He had tolerated everything; he had done nothing to crush out the rebellion in its inception, and had left his successor without the means of fulfilling the task entrusted to him. He delivered into his hands the government of a shattered country; and if civil war had not yet drenched America in blood, it was simply because the rebellion was being organized with impunity on its soil.

The accession of Mr. Lincoln to power was destined to mark a new era in these events, and to precipitate the crisis of which his election had been the pretext.

CHAPTER IV.

FORT SUMTER.

THE inauguration of Mr. Lincoln at Washington on the 4th of March, 1861, will remain a memorable epoch in the history of the United States. The solemnity of that ceremony was due to the imposing gravity of concurring circumstances, and not to the mediocre pageantry with which traditionary custom surrounded it. When Mr. Lincoln, accompanied by Mr. Buchanan, his predecessor, and by his loyal competitor Mr. Douglas, his tall form towering above all those around him, appeared upon the portico of the Capitol to take the constitutional oath and to address the assembled multitude, every one felt that the time for fatal concessions had passed. The address of the new President, written in practical language and shorn of all rhetorical flourishes, ended with an appeal to the Union, the source of national greatness and dear to every patriotic heart—an appeal which, notwithstanding its strange and mystic form, must have been understood by all who heard it. The Republic had now a chief determined to defend it, while respecting the constitutional rights and liberties of all: those who regarded the principle of free labor as the essential basis of a free and democratic society saw at last the man of their choice regularly invested with the insignia of the chief magistracy; those who, notwithstanding their affinities with slaveholders, considered the maintenance of the Union as the first article of political faith for every good citizen, could rally around him without fear. The situation was clearly defined, and the rebellion was thenceforth without cause or excuses. Its leaders fully understood this; accordingly, they no longer sought to shelter themselves under the cover of false pretences.

Secession was an accomplished fact. The militia of the South were getting ready in every direction, while the North, scarcely

yet recovered from her first astonishment, was completely unarmed, did not know how far the insurrection extended, and still hoped to be able to recall to their allegiance those of the great slave States which had not yet proclaimed the act of separation. There was, moreover, a party in the North blind to all the lessons taught by the late events, which persistently talked of concessions and compromises, and, under the name of Peace Democrats, was trying to cool the patriotism of the defenders of the Constitution.

Whether by accident or intentionally, the Confederates selected the 4th of March to adopt a new flag, and on the day when Mr. Lincoln entered upon the discharge of his functions, the *Stars and Bars*, as the banner of the rebellion was called, were audaciously displayed in seven States. At the same time, more effective measures were taken to convince the North that those States were fully determined not to recognize the authority of the new President. On the 6th of March the Montgomery Congress ordered a levy of one hundred thousand men, as we have already stated, and on the 11th it adopted the project of a Constitution which had been submitted to it. Nothing more was wanting to put this Constitution in force but the ratification by the people of each State.

Out of the seven rebel States, one alone (Texas) had called for an expression of public sentiment upon the ordinance of secession voted by her convention, before having it promulgated; but the separation once irrevocably accomplished, the other States were not afraid of consulting the voters, for their vote could no longer influence the march of events. Thus it was that in the course of the month all the States ratified the new Constitution. Having no further occasion for using any precaution towards the North, the political leaders of the South loudly proclaimed their views on the subject of slavery, and in an address which has become celebrated, delivered by the Vice President of the Confederacy at Savannah on the 21st of March, he explained this impious doctrine without any circumlocution, showing that slavery ought to be the corner-stone of new communities; that slavery, founded on the inequality of races, was, in his opinion, in harmony with modern science, as also with biblical tradition; and that in re-establishing it in a formal manner, the founders of the Constitution at Montgomery had achieved, if we are to believe Mr. Stephens,

a revolution fruitful of beneficial results for the future of civilization.

In the mean time, the slave States which had not broken up their relations with Washington, oscillated between the two parties, undecided as to what course to pursue. On the 4th of March the convention of Arkansas pronounced against secession; on the 19th that of Missouri adopted, with some reservations, a similar resolution; finally, on the 4th of April that of Virginia rejected by a strong majority the propositions of the seceders. But these States struggled in vain to resist the example of their associates already engaged in the rebellion; linked to their fortunes by that terrible bond of complicity which, in politics as in private life, places every malefactor at the mercy of the most daring, they were, soon or late, drawn into the vortex by them.

Unfortunate Virginia, especially, who had contributed so much in former days towards the foundation of the Republic, might, by remaining faithful to the Constitution, have played even a more important part than she did in the days of Washington; but the servile institution had demoralized her; she had become a breeder of slaves, and the interests of that odious traffic bound her to the cause of the South. Consequently, seeing the Federal government in jeopardy, the border States simply desired to keep up their relations with it, in order to be the better able to profit by its weakness, to intimidate it, and to make it subservient to their demands. At a time when great political passions are struggling for the mastery, such a rôle is always dangerous for those who attempt to play it.

Mr. Lincoln had gone to work without allowing himself to be discouraged by the difficulties of the situation. On the 5th of March he formed his Cabinet, assigning the highest position, that of Secretary of State, or minister of foreign relations, to Mr. Seward, the most influential man in the Republican party. Possessing great mental acuteness, large experience of men and public affairs, a perseverance equal to any trial, and rare vigor of body and mind, in spite of his sickly appearance, Mr. Seward concealed under the gloss of the lawyer a truly political acumen and sincere patriotism.

Mr. Davis's government was not slow in giving the Federal

government an opportunity to assert its policy. Looking upon the States from which they had severed themselves as a foreign country, the Confederate authorities sent an embassy to Washington to ask Mr. Lincoln to recognize them. Naturally enough, the President would not look upon those envoys in any other light than as citizens of the Union; yet notwithstanding this cold reception, they remained in Washington for more than a month, being still in hope of extorting from the President one word which might subsequently be brought up against him if he resorted to force against the insurrection.

Mr. Lincoln had not then the means for adopting such a course. His first duty was to save some few remnants of the national property situated in the rebel States, which the latter had not yet succeeded in taking possession of. These were Forts Pickens and Sumter, and the two forts located at the extremity of Florida, both of which were protected against any sudden attack. Moreover, the regular troops included in the capitulation of San Antonio, which, according to that agreement, should have been restored to their country, were still in Texas. The transport ship *Star of the West* was sent to take them on board and bring them back to the North.

The large sloop-of-war *Brooklyn* had been lying at anchor for some time in the bay of Pensacola, in front of Fort Pickens, with troops, supplies, and ammunition; but Mr. Buchanan, yielding to the representations of the seceders, had not allowed that vessel to land her cargo at the fort. By order of Mr. Lincoln, this landing was effected on the 12th of April.

The fate of the small garrison which defended the Federal flag floating on Fort Sumter had become a subject of engrossing anxiety both in the North and in the South; the whole political question which divided the two parties was here at stake. The authorities of South Carolina kept that garrison closely blockaded, demanding the immediate surrender of the fort it occupied, and continuing to build powerful batteries on both sides of the bay of Charleston in support of this demand. The border States, Virginia in particular, true to the principles of State sovereignty, also strenuously insisted upon the surrender of the fort by the Federal government. At the North, the peace-at-any-price party

—those who dreaded war more than humiliating concessions—boisterously sustained these demands. In short, the military authorities having been informed by Major Anderson that he should be obliged to capitulate on the 15th, for want of provisions, and not thinking it possible to revictual him in time, advised him to abandon the place of his own accord. Fortunately for the honor of the Federal government, there was one man who believed it possible, by the force of energy, to overcome these difficulties. Mr. Fox, who was Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the entire period of the war, possessed that peculiar kind of activity and intelligence which rises superior to all obstacles, and can turn the least resources to account when all hearts are discouraged. Having visited Anderson at Fort Sumter, a plan had been agreed upon between them for revictualling the garrison, and he proposed to Mr. Lincoln to be himself the instrument for carrying it out. A decided course of action had to be adopted. The President felt that the military necessities for the evacuation of Sumter would not be appreciated either at the North or at the South, and that it would be viewed on both sides as simply an act of weakness and a voluntary concession to the demands of the rebellion. It was better to fail than not to attempt to revictual the garrison. Mr. Lincoln did not hesitate; but being always disposed to deal fairly even towards a perfidious enemy, he deemed it proper to inform the authorities of South Carolina of his intentions (April 8). The excitement among the seceders was great, for they had not anticipated so much determination and energy on his part. The Confederate envoys left Washington suddenly, and the authorities of Charleston went immediately to work to prevent the revictualling of the garrison, by taking forcible possession of Sumter. By the 9th of April, Mr. Fox had succeeded, despite the incredulity and indifference of most of the authorities, in fitting out, as if by magic, a naval force in New York. He himself embarked on board the *Baltic* with two hundred soldiers secretly shipped. Three sloops-of-war with two tenders had preceded him, and were to join him in front of Charleston. But a fatality attended this expedition which had been so ably organized. Contrary orders had changed the destination of the principal sloop—the *Powhatan*, which carried the launches for

landing—and sent her to Fort Pickens, the condition of which also caused serious uneasiness. A storm dispersed the rest of the fleet, and when, on the 12th of April, the *Baltic*, tossed by a very stormy sea, which did not permit communication with the land, appeared before Charleston, only two vessels were present at the *rendezvous*.

In the mean time, the Confederates had determined to commence hostilities. The moment for striking a decisive blow had arrived. It was necessary to force those States which still hesitated into the war, by making a direct attack upon the Federal flag, which exercised over them so powerful a prestige. On the 11th of April, Beauregard, who had been appointed general of the Carolina troops, summoned Anderson to surrender the fort to him, offering him every facility for evacuating it. This loyal soldier had received no instructions from his government, and the idea of inaugurating a civil war might have staggered him; but he was one of those who do not fear responsibility when the path of duty is clearly defined. He replied that he had only four days' rations left, but that so long as he had anything to eat he should not deliver up the fort confided to his custody.

On the following day, all the batteries which had been leisurely erected along the beach opened a converging fire on the fort. The excitement in Charleston, that hottest focus of secession, was at its height. An old Virginian seventy-five years of age—Mr. Ruffin—who had made himself conspicuous at all the popular meetings by speeches, the violence of which contrasted strangely with his venerable countenance and long white flowing hair, requested the sad honor of being allowed to fire the first shot against the national emblem. After one discharge, Anderson returned the fire, and the battle was fairly commenced. But the garrison of Sumter, being destitute of the proper accessories, could only serve a small number of guns, and was already suffering from want of provisions. The shells of the besiegers soon set fire to the wooden buildings which covered the esplanade of the fort. The cast-iron cisterns were broken in, and it became evident that the defenders, driven into the casements by the stifling smoke, would not be able either to silence the batteries of the enemy or to resist his attacks much longer. The Confederates continued the

bombardment during the whole night of the 12th-13th. The garrison, however, had only a few wounded; there was no lack of courage, and the men were sustained by the sight of the Federal vessels, which had been discovered in the horizon, even in the midst of the conflict. But this distant apparition only made them suffer the torments of Tantalus; for if those ships were ready to brave the enemy's batteries, a heavy, rolling sea did not allow them to venture among the narrow and difficult passes at the entrance of the bay. At last the conflagration burst forth with renewed fury, and to avoid an explosion it was found necessary to saturate a portion of the powder with water. The ammunition was nearly exhausted; six guns only replied to the enemy's fire, and the garrison was reduced to the last extremity. The only food left consisted of a few pieces of salt pork, the rest having been all destroyed by the flames. Resistance was no longer possible.

An officer bearing a flag of truce came to demand the surrender of the fort, and after some parley, Anderson went out with the honors of war, to embark on board the *Baltic*, which, having failed to revictual him, gave him at least an honorable refuge. The garrison had only lost one man, and this was a soldier who was killed after the surrender of the fort by the fragment of a gun which exploded in saluting the Federal flag. This comparatively harmless commencement was hardly a foreshadowing of the bloody struggles which were to mark the course of the war.

The fall of Fort Sumter was received by the people of Charleston, who had witnessed the bombardment, with transports of joy. One would have supposed that the Federal government had been vanquished beyond retrieval. The Southern militia were invincible in the eyes of the rebels, and no one doubted, after such an achievement, that the North would abandon the idea of troubling the pretended independence of the South. The news of this event rendered the secession intriguers more daring everywhere, and it was glorified as a victory even in those slave States which had not yet broken with the Union.

But the North, so far from allowing herself to be discouraged by a check which was in reality very trifling, only viewed it in the light of a bold challenge which it behooved her to take up im-

mediately. On the very day that Sumter capitulated, Mr. Lincoln, in reply to the delegates from Virginia, who, in their turn, had united in a request for the surrender of that fort, defined the duties imposed upon him by the Constitution and the will of the people who had elected him. He did not wish to interfere with the local affairs of the rebel States, but he would protect, by force if necessary, the rights with which the central government was invested in virtue of the Federal compact; he would not give up the forts, nor renounce the custom-house duties, which he alone had a right to collect all along the coast of the United States, and he would close up the Federal post-offices throughout the rebel States. When he heard of the attack and capture of Sumter, he did not wait for the explosion of popular indignation which that hostile act would produce in the North. He immediately called an extra session of Congress to meet on the 4th of July; and making use of the powers vested in him, he issued a call for seventy-five thousand volunteers to defend the national cause. His proclamation, addressed to the governors of all the States that had not yet joined the rebellion, fixed the contingent that each State was to furnish. The levies of volunteers were not made directly by the government at Washington; their enlistment and organization were left to the care of each State. It was a means to try their fidelity, and to distinguish the earnest supporters of the Constitution from its secret enemies.

The replies to this proclamation were not delayed. All the free States protested their attachment to the Union, and immediately took the necessary steps to raise a much larger force than the contingents required of them; finding themselves sustained and directed by the central power, which clearly pointed out to them where the common danger lay and what was the duty of every man, the people of the North rushed to arms with a degree of unanimity which never abated afterwards.

The slave States, on the contrary, utterly refused to co-operate in the national defence, while the seceders, availing themselves of this pretext, made a last effort to force them into the rebellion, in the name of the sovereignty of the States, which, they said, had been ignored by the President. They succeeded in almost every State, thanks to the intimidation used towards the few Union

partisans that were left. On the day following the proclamation (April 16th) the governor of Virginia called out the State militia for the purpose of preventing the Federal troops from entering her territory, and his colleagues of the other slave States followed his example by addressing insulting replies to Mr. Lincoln. The few governors who remained faithful to the Union could not prevent the secessionists from taking the initiative of insurrection.

The militia of Maryland, having assembled spontaneously in spite of Mr. Hicks, took possession of Annapolis, the capital of the State, and of the Federal naval school, which was located there. The Texans seized the transport-ship *Star of the West*, which was lying at anchor in the bay of Galveston. Finally, the Confederate government, having openly declared war, announced the issue of *letters of marque*, and invited the rebel States to fit out privateers to prey upon the merchant-vessels of the North. The secession excitement reached the capital. This city, surrounded by slave States, had always lived under the servile institution, to which its population was ardently attached. The secessionists flocked to it in great crowds, and loudly proclaimed their sentiments; they even thought of attempting a revolution for the purpose of driving the Federal government away, and some among them were actually arming with a view to that daring feat. The position of Mr. Lincoln was a critical one, for he had only a few companies of regular troops to make any defence with. On being advised of this state of things, the Northern States redoubled their activity in order to be in time to succor the capital, the loss of which would have been a disastrous check to the national cause. Massachusetts, always the most zealous, was the first in the field, and on the 17th she forwarded two regiments of volunteers from Boston to Washington. Pennsylvania, although nearly one-half of her votes had been given for Mr. Breckinridge, followed this example; and owing to her geographical position, her volunteers reached the shores of the Potomac in advance of all the others. After passing through the great city of Baltimore in the midst of an incipient insurrection, they encamped around the Capitol, on the 18th of April.

The seceders, on their side, had not lost a moment in Virginia.

They were in possession of Richmond, where the convention was in session; they availed themselves of these circumstances to consummate the rupture with the Federal government. Nothing was left undone that might help to bring over the hesitating deputies. The ordinance of secession was passed, but merely by a vote of eighty-eight to fifty-five. This act was of great importance to the Confederates, for Virginia alone brought more strength to their cause than the seven States which had given the signal of insurrection. It also promised to deliver into their hands the vast establishments which the Federal government possessed in Virginia—the Norfolk navy-yard and arsenal, the largest in the United States, the great armory at Harper's Ferry, and Fort Monroe, situated between the mouths of the James and York Rivers in Chesapeake Bay, and commanding all those inland waters. The Federal government had neglected until too late to adopt the necessary precautions for the protection of those establishments against any sudden attack, or at least for saving their valuable contents. The workshops and arsenal of Harper's Ferry, situated at the confluence of the Potomac and the Shenandoah, on a spot which was destined to play an important part during the war, were only guarded by a detachment of sixty-four dismounted dragoons; and the Virginia volunteers, assembled in the valleys of the Blue Ridge, were ready to take possession of them as soon as the ordinance for the secession of Virginia should furnish them a pretext. They were then to cross the Potomac and join the insurgents of Maryland, for the purpose of attempting the capture of Washington, where their accomplices were expecting them. On the morning of the 18th, a portion of them were on their march, in the hope of seizing the prey which was to be of so much value to the future armies of the Confederacy. But Lieutenant Jones, who was in command at Harper's Ferry, had been informed of the approach of the Confederate troops under the lead of Ashby—a chief well known since; notwithstanding their despatch, they only arrived in sight of Harper's Ferry in time to see from a distance a large conflagration that was consuming the workshops, store-houses, and the enormous piles of muskets heaped in the yards, while the Federal soldiers who had just kindled it were crossing the Potomac on

their way to Washington. The Confederates found nothing but smoking ruins, and some machinery, which they sent to Richmond; their allies from Maryland had not made their appearance, and they did not feel strong enough to venture alone to the other side of the Potomac.

During the last few days the authorities of Virginia had been making preparations for capturing the Norfolk arsenal (navy-yard). That establishment possessed a magnificent granite basin, construction stocks, and a dépôt of artillery with more than two thousand guns; a two-decked vessel was on the stocks, two others, with a three-decker, three frigates, a steam sloop, and a brig, lay dismantled in the port; the steam frigate *Merrimac* was there undergoing repairs; the steam sloop *Germantown* was in the harbor ready to go to sea, while the sailing sloop *Cumberland* was lying to at the entrance of the port. The possession of all this material of war would have enabled the Confederates to create a navy, and the guns would have sufficed to arm all their forts. The process of obstructing the passes, in order to blockade the Federal vessels, had commenced on the 14th of April; on the 18th, the day of the attempt against Harper's Ferry, the railroad cars brought a number of Virginia militia to Norfolk, sent there for the express purpose of taking possession of the arsenal.

Commodore McCauley, the Federal commandant, was surrounded by traitors, who were numerous both among the workmen of the arsenal and his own officers. The latter, who were mostly Virginians, assured him of their devotion to the Union, and, taking advantage of his weakness, persuaded him to suspend the execution of an order just received from Washington, in consequence of which the *Merrimac*, of more value to him than all the other vessels then at Norfolk, was getting ready to go to sea. On the following day they all tendered their resignations, and joining the insurgent militia made preparations to capture the arsenal. The fatal error of McCauley, however, was not without a remedy; he could have evacuated the arsenal, and, with the armed vessels, have defended its approaches from the land side until he should receive assistance, or should be able to take away all the vessels that were afloat, by steering clear of the obstacles, which did not completely obstruct the passes. But

when he saw the Virginians present themselves at the gates of the arsenal with cannon, he believed everything was lost; he promised not to change the position of a single vessel, and on the 20th he ordered every ship to be sunk except the *Cumberland*. Just as these vessels were slowly sinking into the water, Captain Paulding arrived from Washington with a reinforcement of troops to defend the arsenal, and also to supersede McCauley.

It was too late. Paulding could do nothing more than set fire to the vessels, which the Confederates might otherwise have easily raised again; some were completely consumed, others, like the *Merrimac*, foundered before they had been destroyed by the fire. There only remained afloat the *Cumberland* and the *Pawnee*, which had brought Paulding over; this officer, having no longer the means to maintain himself at Norfolk, did what he could, on the morning of the 21st, to destroy the arsenal buildings, and then retired into the harbor of Hampton Roads. The Confederates found abundant resources in artillery and *matériel* of every description in Norfolk; the fire was soon extinguished, the docks repaired, and they succeeded in raising the *Merrimac*, which we shall see at work the following year.

Fort Monroe had just been occupied by a small Federal garrison. Its loss would have been even more disastrous to the Federal cause than that of the Norfolk navy-yard and arsenal, because the Confederates, instead of having to cover Richmond, would have been able to blockade Washington by sea and besiege it by land; this circumstance alone would certainly have prolonged the war far beyond the period to which it extended.

The vast importance of this small fortress, however, could not be appreciated at a time when no one knew where defection would stop. Nearly all the offices in Washington, from that of chief-justice of the Supreme Court to that of the humblest department clerk, were filled by friends and accomplices of the insurgents. Some quitted their posts, as people abandon a sinking vessel, and threw the whole service into confusion. Others only continued in office to betray the secrets of the government to the enemy. In the army such acts of perfidious treason did not occur, but, as we have stated, defections were also very numerous. Each day increased the number, and there were even some officers who,

after hesitating a long time between their military duties and their allegiance to the dogma of State sovereignty, decided to go over to the enemy after the war should have assumed a serious character.

In order to form an idea of the extent of this defection it is only necessary to take up the *Annual Register* for September, 1861, a small pamphlet proportionate to the size of the army at that period, and examine the chapter of losses by resignation and otherwise. By the side of the death record, which contains only eighteen names, there will be found a long list of officers who had resigned their commissions in the regular army, beginning with two generals, the two Johnstons, six colonels, Robert E. Lee among the number, a great many of the higher class of employés in the military departments, and occasionally more than half the officers belonging to a regiment; all together two hundred and sixty-nine names out of about six hundred which the regular army contained. This list, which one cannot read without painful wonder, comprises nearly the whole of the general staff of the Confederate army, whose ranks were opened to the greater part of those who had thus resigned their commissions.

The example of Virginia fired the enthusiasm of the secessionists everywhere, and they applied themselves to the task of drawing into the conflict those slave States which were still hesitating. On the 18th of April, the same day which witnessed the burning of Harper's Ferry, they assembled at Louisville, in Kentucky, for the purpose of openly organizing the rebellion. On the 20th the authorities of North Carolina took possession of the Federal mint at Charlotteville, and finally, the secession movement broke out in Maryland. The sight of the Pennsylvania volunteers had caused a great irritation in Baltimore. That city, the largest in the slave States, containing a large number of proud and powerful families, still wealthy, but already touched with the first symptoms of that decay which slavery engenders soon or late, was envious of the prosperity of New York and Philadelphia, and warmly sympathized with the South. Her location on the railway line which connects Washington with the great cities of the North imparted to her a peculiar importance. Consequently, the accomplices of the South, who were numerous in Baltimore,

determined to seize the first opportunity that might offer to drag that city into the rebellion. The arrival of the troops which the North was sending on for the purpose of protecting Washington against a *coup-de-main* furnished them with an excellent pretext. It was determined to oppose their passage, as the greatest service that could be rendered to the Confederate cause. The populace, exasperated by the destruction of the arsenal at Harper's Ferry, and stirred up by the conspirators, was to take charge of the matter; the authorities did not interfere. The looked-for opportunity occurred on the following day, April 19. When the Sixth Massachusetts regiment, with a few battalions of Pennsylvania volunteers, arrived at the northern station, an immense crowd bore down upon them. A line of rails, laid in the centre of the streets, connected this with the southern station, and enabled the cars, drawn by horses, to pass through the city. The crowd surround the soldiers of the Sixth Massachusetts, who occupy these cars. The last cars are stopped, and the occupants, being obliged to get out, endeavor to make their way through the crowd.

But being hemmed in on all sides, they are soon attacked by a shower of stones, which wound many of them, and injure a few mortally. The soldiers have to defend themselves, and the first discharge of musketry, which has considerable effect, opens them a passage. But the aggressors, being armed, rally, and a regular battle ensues between the small band of Federal troops and the crowd, which presses them on all sides. At last, the Massachusetts soldiers rejoin their comrades at the southern station; and getting on board a long train of cars that is waiting for them, they slowly proceed towards Washington, followed at a distance by the enraged multitude. The other troops, who remain at the station where they have alighted, being unable to pass through the city, are compelled to turn back. Baltimore was thenceforth in possession of the secessionists, who were fully determined to take advantage of the situation of that city to intercept all communications between Washington and the North. Accordingly, they hastened to burn the railroad bridges which had been constructed over large estuaries north of Baltimore, and to cut the telegraph wires. Deprived of all sources of informa-

tion from the North, the capital of the Union was soon wrapped in mournful silence. For some days the occupant of the White House was unable to forward any instructions to the people who had remained faithful to the Union; but their zeal did not abate on that account. Patriotism extinguished all party animosities in the hearts of most of the Democrats who had opposed the election of Mr. Lincoln. In the presence of the national peril they loyally tendered their assistance to the President; and breaking loose from their former accomplices of the South, they assumed the name of *War Democrats* in opposition to that of *Peace Democrats*. Their motto was the support of the Union, pure and simple. On the 20th of April, when tidings of the Baltimore riots were received, the leaders of the party—Messrs. Dix, Baker, and others, who were to become distinguished in the war—held a mass-meeting in New York for the purpose of asserting their fidelity to the Constitution, and of imparting thereby a truly national character to the efforts of the North in its defence.

On the same day General Wool, who was in command of all the Federal troops east of the Mississippi, being without instructions from Washington, took the responsibility of forwarding to the capital, by passing round Baltimore, all the forces already organized he could dispose of. The way was opened by a Massachusetts general—Mr. Butler, one of the most distinguished men in the Democratic party; at the head of a few troops from his own State, he embarked on the Susquehanna River, proceeded down Chesapeake Bay, and came to anchor in front of Annapolis, which had been in possession of the rebels for three days. This little town was connected with Washington by a railway which made a junction with the main line south of Baltimore, thus rendering it easy to avoid the insurgent city.

Again, on the same day—April 20—the volunteers raised by the State of Illinois occupied a position in the West highly important for future army operations—that of Cairo, a town situated on a marshy peninsula at the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. In the mean while, the Federal authorities determined to frustrate the intrigues of the insurgents' accomplices in the North by seizing all the telegraph wires, which the latter had used with impunity until then for their criminal purposes. Finally,

on the 26th of April, Fort Pickens was placed out of all danger by the arrival of the *Powhatan*, which, as we have stated, had been detached from the expedition fitted out by Fox for revictualling Major Anderson, and which was at least able successfully to accomplish the new task assigned to her.

Thus the week following the attack and capture of Fort Sumter witnessed the cessation of all hesitancy on both sides. Blood was flowing ; the struggle was extending farther and farther, and the march of events was progressing rapidly.

On the 22d of April the Virginia convention conferred upon Colonel Lee the command of all the forces of that State ; on the 24th, repudiating its former declarations, it announced the accession of Virginia to the Southern Confederacy, without waiting for the popular vote, which had yet to be taken on the act of separation itself. On the following day the same convention ordered a levy of volunteers, and invited the Confederate government to remove its head-quarters to Richmond, until they could be transferred to Washington. These violent measures met with a strong opposition on the part of those counties occupying the western slopes and elevated valleys of the Alleghanies. This region, known by the name of Western Virginia, had been settled for the most part by people who had come from the north-east, like those who inhabit the free State of Ohio, from which it was only separated by the river of that name. These people had kept up a constant intercourse with the State they had emigrated from, and to which they were bound by their own interests and the configuration of the country in which they lived. Slavery only existed in a legal form, but not in their customs. Their delegates to the convention, therefore, had all voted against secession. They refused to acquiesce in it, and on the 22d of April they held a meeting at Clarksville for the purpose of sustaining the Federal compact which their colleagues wanted to compel them to break.

In the mean time, volunteers were hurrying from all parts of the North ; the danger which threatened the capital stimulated their zeal, and their organization—which we will explain at full length in the following chapter—was everywhere pursued with feverish activity. Reinforcements were promptly sent to Butler, who landed them and took possession of Annapolis ; then, follow-

ing the line of railway, which the insurgents had destroyed, he repaired the line, and on the 25th of April took sudden possession of the point where this branch of the railway connected with the main line.

Communications with Washington were thus reopened, and on the following day three New York regiments came to guarantee the safety of the capital. The plans of the secessionists for its capture were frustrated, and the Federal government was at last enabled to devote itself with more safety to the immense task it had on hand. The legislature of Maryland, having met at Frederick, the very centre of the insurrection, despite the loyal though feeble efforts of Governor Hicks, protested in vain against the bold proceedings of Butler; but the militia, which had been called out, did not dare to trouble the latter.

At the other extremity of the line which separated the free from the slave States, the Unionists of Missouri were at the same time organizing for the purpose of resisting the governor of that State, who was openly preparing for secession, and had called out the militia of the counties devoted to the cause of the South to sustain him.

In the Tennessee legislature, convened to meet on the 25th, the Confederates, by means of threats, could count upon a devoted majority. On the 1st of May this assembly authorized the governor of the State to enter the Confederacy, while on the same day that of North Carolina voted a levy of thirty thousand volunteers to oppose the Federal troops. The Confederate Congress, having assembled at Montgomery on the 29th of April, directed this movement, which was increasing and spreading with rapidity, promising soon to draw the representatives of all the slave States into its fold.

It was no longer possible to indulge in any self-deceptions regarding the power of the rebellion. The seventy-five thousand volunteers that had been asked of the several States were evidently insufficient to fight it. As we have stated, the slave States had refused to contribute their quota for the maintenance of the Union, while the Northern States were ready to double or triple it whenever the President should ask them to do so. The latter determined to order a new levy on the 3d of May. He called for

forty-two thousand volunteers. But this time, instead of appealing to each State, as he had done in the first call, for a fixed and fully organized contingent, he simply asked them for regiments, which were afterwards to be enrolled and formed into brigades by the Federal authority; the terms of enlistment were no longer to be for three months, but for three years, or during the war if it should terminate sooner. This clause showed that the authorities comprehended at last what the duration of the war might be, but it did not prevent volunteers from rushing in crowds to offer their services. The desire to defend the Union animated all hearts, while the want of work, caused by the prevailing stagnation in every kind of business, facilitated enlistments. Two hundred and eight regiments were organized without the least delay or difficulty in the Northern States, and one hundred and fifty-three of these, amounting to more than one hundred and eighty-eight thousand men—that is to say, four times the number asked by Mr. Lincoln—were mustered into service two months after. The standing army was to be reconstructed by the call, made at the same time, for twenty-two thousand seven hundred and fourteen regulars. Finally, a levy of eighteen thousand sailors to fit out a naval fleet was ordered.

The navy was about to have a hard task to perform. The extent of the Southern coasts, indented with deep bays, possessing excellent ports, and presenting numerous inlets for shelter and safety to those acquainted with the labyrinth of islands and estuaries to be found there, afforded great facilities for trade, smuggling, and maritime warfare. The leaders of the rebellion were preparing to take advantage of this. The Southern States, devoted to the cultivation of cotton and the sugar-cane, had hitherto depended entirely upon Northern merchants and navigators, who exported their produce, and brought them in exchange, either from America or Europe, nearly all the commodities necessary to a civilized community. They thought the old continent could not dispense with their produce any more than they could with its commodities. They relied, moreover, upon the spirit of speculation, being convinced that it would not fail to come to them for cotton, of which they were the sole possessors, and supply them with arms and munitions of war in return. In short, if they

could exist without articles of luxury, and if a change in the cultivation of the soil would secure them provisions, the spoils of the Union arsenals would not suffice to equip all the troops they proposed to raise. A direct trade with Europe was therefore indispensable to them; this was carried on under the flags of neutral powers, especially that of England. The flag of the new Confederacy could not be hoisted except on vessels fitted out for war-purposes, otherwise it would have been at the mercy of the numerous Federal cruisers; but the few privateers that carried it—many of which never even once touched at a Confederate port—showed, by the injury they inflicted upon the merchant navy of the North, what a formidable arm the insurgents would have had in their hands if they had been able to fit out those vessels in their own ports. It was necessary, therefore, in view of these facts, to establish a strict blockade of their coasts. Every government has the right to blockade the ports under the jurisdiction of its sovereignty through the medium of a proclamation. The Constitution having conferred upon the Federal power the exclusive privilege of establishing and collecting custom-house duties, the moment that the insurrection prevented the government from collecting such duties on land, the blockade was its only alternative for maintaining this privilege, and it could resort to such alternative without going beyond the limits of its prerogatives. Accordingly, on the 19th of April Mr. Lincoln issued a proclamation declaring all the coasts of the States then in rebellion in a state of blockade, and on the 29th, when the secession of North Carolina was imminent and that of Virginia had been proclaimed, he extended the blockade to those States likewise. To establish an effective blockade along a coast which extends from the Rio Grande on the frontier of Mexico to the mouth of the Potomac near Washington, was an immense undertaking; we shall see presently how the Federal fleet went to work to accomplish this task. Disorganized, scattered, and lacking the necessary number of vessels, it naturally could not at first establish the blockade as strictly everywhere as modern usages require in cases of international wars; this gave rise to frequent disputes with European powers, whose commerce was attracted to Southern ports by the precious deposits of cotton which had accumu-

lated there. But, as we shall explain at the end of this volume, those powers transcended their rights when, instead of protesting against the blockade, if they found it ineffectual, they made its establishment a pretext for recognizing the belligerent rights of the insurgents.

The manner in which the North had answered Mr. Lincoln's call, enabled the government, not to attack the rebellion on its own ground as yet, but at least to limit its progress. It was necessary, first of all, to free the Capital completely from danger and secure its communications with the loyal States. The safety of Washington depended upon the possession of Baltimore; and if the enemy had remained master of that city, the war would have been carried to the borders of the Susquehanna.

The Unionists, although in a minority in the city of Baltimore, had taken fresh courage, and no longer concealed their sympathies. Butler, who had remained at Annapolis Junction, determined, with the forces at his disposal, to reinstate the Federal authority in that city, and on the 5th of May he took possession of the Relay House, another important railway junction, which was only a few leagues distant from the first. On the 9th, Colonel Patterson joined him with some Pennsylvania volunteers, after passing rapidly through Baltimore, that city being too much astonished at such a daring act to oppose his course. On the 14th, Butler made a feint to the westward, and, while General Scott was preparing the plan of a regular campaign for the purpose of capturing the rebel city, he suddenly, after a night's march, took possession of the heights surrounding it without a fight. Baltimore was at his mercy; on the same day he entered the city with his troops, reopened the direct line of railway which traversed it, and compelled the leaders of the secession party, who had held control of it during four weeks, to submit. His first step was to take away from them the means of making another attempt in behalf of the Confederates. The Constitution granted to the President, in the event of an insurrection, the most extensive powers, subject to the approval of Congress. Mr. Lincoln availed himself of this prerogative to suspend the *habeas corpus*, that essential guarantee of individual liberty without which no people can be really free, the privileges of which, however, cannot be

accorded by a nation in arms to those who are in open rebellion against her laws. The forts which command the entrance to Baltimore were soon turned into prisons for those secession leaders who had conspired to invite the enemy to take possession of their city. This severe step consolidated the Federal authority, pacified the city, which had been the scene of the bloody riot of the 19th of April, intimidated those who were preparing for a renewal of similar disturbances elsewhere, and gave the Northern States confidence in the vigor of the new government.

All these States, through the medium of their legislatures, encouraged the government to fight the rebellion resolutely; and the events which transpired both in the West and in the South, between the call for volunteers and the capture of Baltimore, did not permit any further hesitation as to what that government ought to do. In fact, on the 6th of May, while the Confederate Congress was endorsing Mr. Davis's proclamation announcing the issue of *letters of marque*, the Arkansas convention, intimidated by the threats of the rebels, was voting in favor of secession.

On the following day the legislature of Tennessee joined the Confederacy, without waiting for the popular vote on the ordinance of secession, and in spite of the determined opposition of the eastern districts, which were as much in favor of the Union as their neighbors of West Virginia; they crowned this act of violence by ordering a levy of fifty-five thousand men. In Texas, Van Dorn continued to pursue the remnants of the regular army with all the eagerness of a man who had deserted his colors. His former comrades, betrayed through the defection of Twiggs, were, some of them, in San Antonio with Colonel Waite, the remainder with Major Sibley at Indianola, where they had been conveyed under promise of being allowed to ship for the North; none of these soldiers, notwithstanding the many offers they received, had forsaken their commanders to enter the service of the rebels. The latter, astonished and annoyed at this persistent loyalty to the Federal flag, sought out an opportunity to retain them as prisoners.

The bombardment of Sumter furnished them such an opportunity in time. As soon as the Texas authorities received information of the fact, they declared that, being at war with the gov-

ernment of Washington, they no longer recognized the capitulation of San Antonio, and that all the Federal troops which happened to be on their territory must be considered as prisoners of war.

Van Dorn was charged with the execution of this order, which was a violation of a sacred pledge. Sibley was waiting at Indianola to embark on the *Star of the West*, the same transport-ship which, a short time before, had vainly attempted to revictual Fort Sumter. Being ignorant of the fate of that vessel, which had been seized in the port of Galveston, he had already got into the boats that were to take him and his soldiers on board, outside the bay of Matagorda, when instead of the *Star of the West* he saw several Confederate steamers loaded with troops under the command of Van Dorn. He was obliged to disembark; and being without means of defence, he had to submit to the conditions imposed upon him. After being kept for some time prisoners, the Federals were released on parole until they could be exchanged. Waite and the officers who were with him in San Antonio experienced the same fate. There was still left a detachment of the Eighth Regulars, consisting of about three hundred men, who were slowly returning from the posts situated in the neighborhood of El Paso del Norte; on reaching Central Texas, they found the insurgents in possession of all the dépôts upon which they were to subsist; and being soon surrounded by Van Dorn, who had come to meet them with fifteen hundred men, they were obliged to lay down their arms at San Lucas Springs, on the 9th of May.

In making his preparations, while Secretary of War, for the surrender of the Federal army stationed in the South-west of the Union into the hands of his accomplices, General Floyd had not confined his operations to Texas, where we have seen the treason of Twiggs and Van Dorn fully successful. He had sent Colonel Loring to Santa Fé to take command of the regular forces, numbering twelve hundred men, stationed in New Mexico, with Colonel Crittenden as second in command; these two officers were entirely devoted to the cause of the South, and we shall soon find them again with Floyd at the head of Confederate armies. The news of the breaking out of the civil war only reached that distant

Territory at a late date; but as soon as it was received, Loring and Crittenden set to work to withdraw it from the jurisdiction of the Federal government, and to carry with them the troops which had been confided to their care. But as it had occurred in Texas, the soldiers and most of their officers nobly resisted the solicitations of those faithless chiefs, who failed to find among the settlers, as Twiggs had found, an armed force ready to assist them. Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, having fathomed their schemes, encouraged and directed this opposition; and when Loring sought to lead the forces under his command into Texas, the officers stationed at Santa Fé, Albuquerque, and at Forts Craig and Stanton refused to obey him. Notwithstanding their isolated position, they thus succeeded in securing New Mexico to the Federal government. Loring and Crittenden, still trying to conceal their intentions, then took refuge in Fort Fillmore, situated at the southern extremity of that Territory, near El Paso del Norte, where they had previously massed half their troops under command of officers upon whom they could more thoroughly rely. Major Lynde, who was in command, became, either through incapacity or connivance, an instrument in their hands, the more useful on account of his continued professions of allegiance to the Federal flag. It so happened that during the month of July, Lynde, having gone out of the fort for the purpose of dispersing a body of Texas partisans, allowed himself to be shamefully beaten by them near Mesilla, and soon after he was ordered by Loring to evacuate the fort and to retire towards Albuquerque, on the Santa Fé route. This was to lead his troops to certain destruction. Nothing was neglected to secure this result. The canteens of the soldiers who had to march across a burning plain were filled with brandy. The Texans, being informed of their approach, gathered from every part of the country to waylay them on their passage. The Federals left on the evening of the 1st of August; when, tired out by a night-march, and most of them intoxicated through a free use of the liquor which had been perfidiously administered to them, they reached, at day-break, the ambushade towards which their officers were leading them, they found themselves suddenly surrounded by a swarm of enemies, and just as they were preparing for a fight they were

ordered to lay down their arms. Their baggage and the funds belonging to the army were delivered over to the enemy, who, after extorting from them a promise not to serve during the war, allowed them to resume their march in the direction of Albuquerque. Deprived of all that was needed for crossing those sterile regions, abandoned by a portion of their officers, overwhelmed by the treason which had taken away their arms, those unfortunate men only reached their place of destination after experiencing great sufferings, and leaving a considerable number of their companions behind amid the gloomy solitudes into which they had been driven.

They had at least the consolation of beholding once more the national flag, and of meeting comrades at Albuquerque who had remained as faithful to their oaths as themselves. Notwithstanding this disaster, New Mexico was saved, and during that whole year (1861) the Confederates did not make another attempt to dispute its possession with the Federal government.

The remoteness of the States that are to be the theatre of war has compelled us to anticipate for a while the chronological order of this narrative. We hasten to return to it.

In Missouri the secessionists, sustained by Governor Jackson, had become even bolder since the capture of Fort Sumter than those of Maryland. The great city of St. Louis, situated near the triple confluence of the Mississippi, the Missouri, and the Illinois, was a tempting prize for them; they were above all anxious to seize the Federal arsenal, situated at no great distance from that city, and containing arms and ammunition, of which they stood in great need. Since the end of April more than ten thousand men had been raised and equipped under the supervision of the governor, and a regiment of militia, nearly twelve hundred strong, was encamped at the very gates of St. Louis, in a camp destined to serve as a centre for the rebel army. Fortunately for the Federal government, there was in St. Louis a man of energy and daring, Captain Lyon, who occupied the arsenal with four or five hundred regular troops. Having observed for more than a month past that the slaveholders were openly organizing, he had made his own preparations; the Union men of St. Louis had enrolled themselves to the number of more than six

thousand, mostly German emigrants, in a corps which the Federal government had recognized, and which ensured the safety of the arsenal. On the 10th of May, Lyon led these troops secretly towards the rebel camp, surrounded it, and captured all that were there without striking a blow. This bold stroke frustrated all the plans of the governor and his accomplices, and caused a great sensation in the city of St. Louis. The soldiers who were escorting the prisoners to the arsenal were assailed by a large crowd; they fired upon it and wounded a considerable number of persons. On the following day the exasperated secessionists returned to the charge, and musket shots were exchanged between them and the troops. But the efforts of the rebels proved fruitless; order was promptly restored in St. Louis, and that great city was wrested for ever from the Confederates. It was three days after this that Butler recaptured Baltimore.

The occupation of these two cities forms an important era in that gloomy period, when it was difficult to say whether the country was at peace or at war, for it finally put a stop to the progress of the rebellion. At the East, Baltimore was the key to Washington. In the West, St. Louis, the third city of the South in population, was second to none in the importance of her military and commercial position. In the hands of the Federals, she opened to them the gates of the Mississippi, which flowed directly through the enemy's territories; in the hands of the Confederates, she would enable them to dispute with their adversaries the possession of the great States of the North-west, watered by the three rivers which meet at St. Louis. The leaders of the secession movement had lost these two important positions for want of promptness and vigor. Being themselves astonished at the success of their rebellion, they had failed to take advantage of that critical moment in all revolutions, when he who has taken the initiative may dare and accomplish everything. They had allowed themselves to be forestalled at St. Louis, and had neglected to make use of the four weeks during which Baltimore was in possession of their friends, to bring that proud city irretrievably to their side, garrison it with troops, and place it in a state of defence. A Massachusetts lawyer, an improvised general, had been more clear-sighted and active than themselves.

War had therefore commenced, but it was a local war, and all along the line which separated the free from the slave States, those who were friendly neighbors the day before, having become enemies, mutually watched each other, not yet knowing when or how they should come to blows. The capture of Baltimore had not discouraged the secessionists, who were still organizing in different counties of Maryland. Virginia, with the exception of the western counties, was in full rebellion; she was erecting batteries all along her coast which were being rapidly armed; those at Sewall's Point, in front of Fortress Monroe, fired upon a Federal vessel on the 19th of May, while those which were in process of construction along the right bank of the Potomac, threatened to blockade before long the navigation of that river, through which all the supplies for the capital were obtained. On the 23d of May, while the majority of the electors of Virginia were going through the idle formality of voting for the ordinance of separation, which had been put in force without waiting for their verdict, the militia of the State were assembling at Harper's Ferry to occupy that important point permanently and complete their organization. Placed under the command of Johnston, one of the two generals of that name who a month before had left the Federal service, they served as a nucleus to one of the armies of the rebellion. It was the first organized corps which threatened the Federal authorities at Washington and in Maryland.

Kentucky, on her side, was still hesitating, and her alliance was deemed of so much importance, that neither of the two parties dared to violate her neutrality, for fear of turning her into a foe.

The slaveholders of Missouri, despairing of their ability to compel that State to espouse the cause of the South, were endeavoring at least to exclude the Federals from it. Sterling Price, whom we have already met in New Mexico, and of whom we shall yet have frequently occasion to speak, wrested from the weakness of the Federal general Harney a treaty which guaranteed the neutrality of that vast country; but Mr. Lincoln, better advised, refused to sanction that act.

North Carolina, who had been one of the last to enter the

Union, was also the last to leave it to join the Confederates; but, being surrounded on all sides by the latter, she allowed herself at last to be carried away, and on the 20th of May her convention proclaimed the ordinance of secession.

In the mean while, the Montgomery Congress was consolidating the new Confederacy which it represented, and adopting stringent measures to prepare for war. On the 16th of May it had ordered the issue of paper money to the amount of twenty million dollars. On the 21st it resorted to an ingenious experiment for the purpose of increasing its financial resources, through the promulgation of two decrees. The purport of the first was to absolve all Southern merchants from the obligation of paying their Northern creditors, but instead of cancelling these debts, it sought to appropriate them to its own profit. As may be imagined, not one of them was willing to conform to this requirement, which did not diminish their burden, but left them under the weight of a double claim. The object of the second decree was to concentrate in the hands of the government all the power which the ownership of cotton conferred. It reserved to itself the right to export this precious article, either by sea or land, to the exclusion of private individuals. It purchased the cotton from the latter, and paid in bonds, which it had the power to issue in unlimited quantities; then it sent this cotton to Europe to get gold in exchange, with which to procure such arms and outfits as it might require.

This lucrative trade could not be entirely prevented by the blockade; but as it encountered numerous obstacles, the financial combination of the Confederate government was more cleverly developed at a later period, to the cost of English capitalists, by means of what was called *cotton loans*, an operation through which that government obtained a large sum of money in specie on the London Exchange—the use of which we shall mention hereafter—offering as a sufficient guarantee those cargoes of cotton accumulated in its ports, the exportation of which was interfered with by Federal cruisers.

The line which was to separate the belligerents was therefore beginning to be distinctly drawn. The insurgents could find no more national property upon their soil to seize; street fights had decided the fate of the two large cities which they might at first

have carried with them. The Federal government knew thenceforth where its friends and foes were to be found—an advantage which had been dearly bought, it is true. These sad preliminaries were completed before the end of May, and throughout the States where secession had been proclaimed, the Federal flag only floated upon three isolated points on the coast—Forts Pickens, Monroe, and the forts on the twin islands of Key West and Garden Key. In one word, with the exception of two tongues of sandy land and two barren rocks, the whole of that immense territory was to be conquered anew.

Neither of the two governments, however, had formed an exact idea of the task that lay before it, and the means to be used in order to accomplish it. Mr. Davis and his advisers were unable to say whether a single victory would open the doors of the White House to them and bring the disheartened North to their feet; should they make a bold attempt to carry the war into the heart of the enemy's country, or remain everywhere on the defensive? The choice for them between these two kinds of tactics depended upon the determination and moral resources of their adversary; and the latter did not even know them himself. The duty of the Federal government was clear: the insurrection must be suppressed, but there was no precedent to enable the government to appreciate the magnitude of the undertaking. An unconstitutional power, organized under the name of Confederate government, had seized the national property, and resisted the collection of custom-house duties and the execution of the Federal laws. Would it suffice to retake possession of the forts, arsenals, and mints; to reinstate the custom-house officers and drive out the so-called government? Or would it be necessary to reconquer, foot by foot, from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, those vast regions of country which the largest armies would be inadequate to defend at all points? Would it be a military promenade or a war of conquest? No one was able to predict; but in the North, as well as in the South, the impression was universal that the war would not be of long duration, and that the first encounters would settle the question; nobody believed that the volunteers summoned by Mr. Lincoln to serve for three years, or during the war, would see their terms of enlistment expire amid the din of

battle ; neither party had as yet formed an idea of the sacrifices its opponent was capable of making.

Although neither government was yet in a condition to undertake a serious war, both parties were anxious for hostilities to commence.

The Confederate Congress on its adjournment, May 23d, had decided to meet again at Richmond on the 20th of July. On the 27th of May, Mr. Davis removed, with all his government, to the capital of Virginia, thus binding that powerful State to his cause by indissoluble ties. By fixing his quarters as near the Capitol as possible, he at the same time braved the Federal government, and thereby hastened the breaking out of hostilities on the soil of the State which had so imprudently claimed the honor of possessing the central government of the new Republic. So that, while in the West the efforts of the secessionists, confined to the sphere of partisan warfare, did not reach beyond the right bank of the Missouri, while Kentucky was waiting for the decrees of fortune to regulate her course, while West Virginia, true to the Union, was removing the seat of war from the borders of the Ohio,—the position of the two hostile capitals rendered it necessary, for their mutual protection, to concentrate the first armies within the narrow space which divided them. It was between the Potomac and the James River that the first serious engagements must naturally take place.

The organization of a body of troops under Johnston at Harper's Ferry showed that the Richmond authorities had fully understood this. At the same time, and with all possible secrecy, they massed their new levies at Manassas Junction, which has become so celebrated since. These two points protected Richmond from all attack, while menacing Maryland on one side and Washington on the other. Harper's Ferry was the key to the great valley of the Shenandoah, which penetrates into the heart of Virginia, and Johnston was thus master of the two lines of railway which branch off at that place—one to follow the course of the Shenandoah in a southerly direction, the other, the right bank of the Potomac westward. The occupation of Manassas Junction, which is only forty kilometres from Washington, warranted the assumption that the first battle would be fought nearer this city than

Richmond; it gave the Confederates control of the only railway which connected the two capitals, and of a branch which, penetrating by way of Manassas Gap into the valley of the Shenandoah, secured easy communication with Harper's Ferry.

The Federal government was likewise preparing for the struggle at various points in Virginia. On the 22d of May, Butler arrived at Fort Monroe, where he soon received considerable reinforcements, for the importance of this position was at last appreciated. He found there a number of negroes who had run away from the neighboring plantations; being in want of laborers for the purpose of fortifying the approaches of that place, he employed them on the work, giving them food and a certain amount of wages. Their owners came to claim them. This incident thus raised at the outset of the war the very question which had been the cause of it. To surrender the slaves would have clashed with all the sentiments of equity in the North, who, since the act of secession had been consummated, no longer felt under any obligation to make those concessions to the South which she was ready to grant before, for the sake of maintaining the Union; to declare them free would have been to overstep the limits of Mr. Lincoln's programme, who did not feel himself justified in fighting the insurgents except in defence of the Constitution, and not for the purpose of interfering with the peculiar institutions of the States. Butler had always been politically opposed to the Republican party; he nevertheless refused to surrender the fugitives, and found an ingenious method of setting aside the question of principle by declaring that, as they belonged to the enemy and might be employed by the latter in constructing military works, he seized them as *contraband of war*. This term *contraband* was afterwards applied to those negroes who came to seek the protection of the Federal flag, even after their emancipation had been proclaimed. By the 27th of May, Butler had firmly established himself around Fortress Monroe by occupying Newport News, which commands the best anchorage in the neighborhood.

In the mean time, Washington was placed beyond the reach of the *coup de main* which the secessionists had been contemplating for the last six weeks; large earthworks had been thrown up on the heights which surround the city on the Maryland side, but

these were not sufficient to protect it. On the opposite side of the Potomac there is another range of hills which entirely command the capital of the Union, a rugged ground, covered with magnificent forests, where the movements of troops may easily be concealed. These hills, the largest of which is crowned by Arlington House, then the property of General Lee, slope down gradually to the edge of the Potomac, from the point where the river begins to feel the influence of the tide, to the little town of Alexandria, where it becomes navigable for large vessels. They are connected with the opposite side of the river by a bridge of the Ohio Canal at Georgetown and the Long Bridge, a wooden structure situated in front of Washington. These hills were formerly a part of the District of Columbia, a Federal territory placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, but all the right bank of the Potomac had been ceded back to Virginia. It was of great importance to occupy these heights and fortify them. On the 24th of May several regiments left Washington secretly, and took possession of the whole chain of hills from Georgetown to Alexandria. Only a few mounted Confederates were seen in the latter city. The population, which consisted entirely of secessionists, made but a feeble resistance; but Colonel Ellsworth, a young officer of great promise, was assassinated while in the act of hauling down the rebel flag from the top of a house, and the tragic death of this officer, the first news of the kind that had reached the North, caused a great sensation. The Federal troops immediately set to work to fortify the positions they occupied; in a few days they covered them with a line of redoubts and breastworks, which, although constructed in haste, were nevertheless sufficient to put them in a state of defence. In proportion as the volunteer regiments arrived in Washington, those which seemed most able to take the field were forwarded to the right bank of the Potomac. There was at last stationed near the capital, if not an army, at least a vast assemblage of armed men. The command of these troops was conferred on General McDowell, who had long held an important position on the staff of General Scott. It was a difficult task, but McDowell possessed as much experience of military affairs as it was possible for any American officer to have acquired; he was well acquainted with his profession, and

had too much good sense to share the delusions entertained by those around him, regarding the qualities of his soldiers.

The Richmond government displayed extraordinary activity in its efforts to place in the field forces superior to those that McDowell had at his disposal. On the 1st of June, Beauregard, who since the capture of Sumter had become, too soon for his own reputation, the favorite general of the South, was placed in command of the so-called department of Alexandria, comprising all the tract of country between Richmond and Washington. He found a little army already assembled at Manassas Junction. On the same day shots were exchanged for the first time between the two parties on the soil of Virginia. A detachment of regular Federal cavalry proceeded as far as the village of Fairfax Courthouse, west of Alexandria, and dislodged a post of the enemy from it, while a few Confederate guns drove off a Union vessel which was trying to effect a landing at Aquia Creek; this latter point, situated on the right bank of the Lower Potomac, is the head of a line of railway leading direct to Richmond through Fredericksburg.

The two armies felt thenceforth sufficiently strong to defend the positions they had chosen, but neither was yet in a condition to assume the offensive. It was a little more to the westward, in West Virginia, that the first serious engagements were to take place. This district, as we have stated, had remained loyal to the Union, and had refused to submit to the ordinance of separation which had been voted by the State convention. The Richmond authorities could not tolerate this secession in opposition to that which they had just proclaimed. It would have been to belie the pretended unanimity of the South. Reinforcements were sent across the Alleghanies to their few partisans, who had already taken up arms, and the militia troops of Virginia made a movement to seize the only railway in that part of the country, the line of the Baltimore and Ohio, which was of great service to the Federals in maintaining communications between Pennsylvania and the Central States. This was more than sufficient to rouse the latter and justify their intervention. General McClellan, who was employing his rare organizing talents in forming an army on the borders of the Ohio, ordered the occupation of the little town

of Wheeling, situated at the extreme north of West Virginia, and designated as a place of rendezvous for those who resided in that section of country ; soon after this he sent the few troops he had then at his disposal to occupy the points it was most important to defend south of that town. By a singular coincidence, General Lee, destined to be his formidable opponent in the great battles that were fought around Richmond one year later, was ordered to take the field against him in West Virginia. Lee had but few troops, and met with no support among the inhabitants upon whom he was desirous to impose the rule of Mr. Davis. Nevertheless, appreciating the importance of the Baltimore and Ohio railway, he had despatched Colonel Porterfield with fifteen hundred men to take possession of that line at Grafton. On the approach of the Federals, the Confederates abandoned that post and retired to the town of Philippi, farther south. The Unionists, numbering about five thousand men, determined to take Porterfield by surprise, and in order to surround him, they formed into two columns, which started on the evening of June 2d. The column having the least distance to march arrived in front of the enemy's positions on the morning of the 3d ; but the other, having wandered from its course, instead of cutting off Porterfield's retreat, struck his flank, and all that it could do was to accelerate his rout. The manœuvre attempted on this occasion by the Federals, for the purpose of surrounding the enemy, became, as we shall find, the favorite strategy of all the improvised generals, who were unable to devise plans for a campaign except on paper. They might have observed on this occasion how hazardous and difficult of execution such manœuvres are. They however succeeded, with little loss to themselves, in clearing a considerable portion of West Virginia, and especially the Baltimore and Ohio Railway.

This trifling success increased to an inordinate degree the confidence of the other Federal commanders, and stimulated their zeal. Butler, who had then four or five thousand men under his command around Fortress Monroe, also determined to try his hand at a battle. The peninsula, narrow and intersected by deep and marshy streams, which separates the mouth of York River from that of the James, was occupied by a few Confederate troops under the command of Colonel Magruder, an excellent officer who

had formerly belonged to the regular army. It was easy for them to defend that position, and the Federals had no interest in extending their lines in that direction. The only point which it would have been of advantage to them to possess was Yorktown, a small place, celebrated for its siege and the capitulation of the British army under Cornwallis, for it commanded the entrance of that arm of the sea which, under the name of York River, runs far inland in the direction of Richmond.

Butler must have known that Magruder had put the place in a state of defence, and that he could not capture it by any means short of a regular siege, which was not to be thought of. But no concert of action had been established in the employment of the new levies which the Federal government forwarded in haste, to be stationed at the points most threatened; and Butler took upon himself the responsibility of ordering Magruder to be attacked in his positions in front of Yorktown, concerning the strength of which he had very vague information. After having prepared the plan of this operation, he remained in person at Fortress Monroe, and entrusted its execution to General Peirce, who took with him twenty-five hundred men and two field-pieces. This little band was divided into two columns—one coming from Fortress Monroe, and the other from a camp established at Newport News. Having started during the night of the 9th–10th of June, they were to meet at daybreak at the village of Little Bethel, where they expected to find the Confederates; they did in fact reach the place of rendezvous at the same time, but the enemy was not there; and as the necessary precautions for mutual reconnaissances had not been taken, each column mistook the other for a Confederate detachment; they immediately commenced firing upon each other, and many fell before the blunder was discovered. On hearing that Magruder was waiting for him at Big Bethel, a short distance from that spot, Peirce went out to attack him. But the mistake that had just occurred had shaken the confidence of his soldiers and the few regular officers who accompanied him; the latter saw at once that with such inexperienced troops no serious operations were practicable. Magruder, with eighteen hundred men, occupied a strong position in front of Big Bethel, on the borders of a marshy stream. The bridge over which the road

from Fort Monroe to Yorktown crossed this stream was defended, in the rear of the obstacle, by two small earthworks, upon which were mounted a few field-pieces. As soon as the Federals showed themselves openly in the vicinity of the swamps, the first volley of musketry from the enemy drove them into the adjoining woods; it took their leaders more than two hours to induce them to return to the charge. During this time, their three guns, ably handled by Lieutenant Greble, a young regular officer, kept up the fight alone. At last Peirce attempts a serious attack, and divides his little band into three detachments. A portion of the centre detachment, led by a few regular officers, crosses the stream and temporarily dislodges the enemy from one of his works, but it cannot hold that position, for it is not sustained by the rest of the line, where the greatest confusion prevails. The right and left columns have come to a halt in front of the stream—one, because it considered it unfordable, the other because it has mistaken one of its own companies for a body of the enemy's troops threatening to turn it. Peirce, at the head of his reserves, boldly crosses the swamp on his extreme right, but in vain; the Confederates concentrate all their efforts upon him and drive him back. The attack was a failure; and notwithstanding the insignificance of the losses, the soldiers became discouraged. Fortunately for them, a reinforcement of two small battalions arrived in time to prevent their retreat from degenerating into a rout; and Greble, remaining to the last, with his guns, on the road which had been followed in the morning by the assailants, prevented the enemy's artillery from enfilading them. He was killed while protecting his companions. The Federals had only thirty-six killed and thirty-four wounded, many of whom were officers. Greble and Major Winthrop were among the former; among the latter, there was another regular officer, Captain Kilpatrick, whose name, already mentioned, will frequently occur during the narrative of the war. While Peirce's soldiers were rapidly falling back upon Fortress Monroe, Magruder felt but little disposed to pursue them, and, having no great confidence in his own troops, determined, notwithstanding his success, to fall back upon Yorktown.

Similar engagements, with as little loss of life, served everywhere as a prelude to the bloody war that was to follow. But

those of which Missouri was then the theatre sufficed to secure to the Federals the possession of a territory as large as five or six French departments. On the 29th of May, Lyon was appointed to the command of the Federal troops in place of General Harney, who was relieved for having concluded the treaty of neutrality with Sterling Price. The State of Missouri was thenceforth irrevocably divided between the Unionists and their enemies. Governor Jackson, a partisan of the latter, relied upon the legislature and on Price, who commanded the rebel militia. The State convention, on the contrary, had pronounced in favor of the Union, and it was in consequence of its decrees that the volunteers loyal to the Union flocked to the encampments established by Lyon. On the 12th of June, Jackson and his legislature, which had assembled at Jefferson City, on the Missouri, the official capital of the State, issued a real declaration of war against the Federal authorities and all those who recognized their power. Lyon determined to answer this provocation by driving them out of the city, and thus clearing the whole course of the Missouri. A detachment sent by him as far as Gasconade River having made his opponents believe that he was following the railway line, they prepared to receive him on that side, and destroyed all the bridges in order to stop his progress. But instead of taking that route, Lyon embarked, with two thousand men and all the necessary *matériel* for a long campaign, on board two large steamers plying between St. Louis and New Orleans. He thus inaugurated a method of waging war which was much in vogue during the subsequent campaigns. Price and Jackson, surprised by this unexpected movement, abandon Jefferson City, where the Federals arrive on the 15th of June, and retire to Booneville, situated sixty kilometres higher up on the Missouri. Lyon pursues them on board his vessels, reaches the positions occupied by the enemy on the 18th, lands his soldiers, and vigorously leads them to the attack; after a short engagement he throws the rebel troops into confusion and disperses them. The losses at the battle of Booneville were insignificant on both sides, but the Confederates, being utterly disorganized, were obliged to retreat southward into the interior of the State of Missouri, leaving Lyon in possession of both sides of the river.

In West Virginia and on the Upper Potomac both parties were keeping up the war. The battle of Philippi had freed the north-western districts, and a convention assembled at Wheeling in West Virginia for the purpose of organizing that section of country into an independent State. In the mean time, the Confederates, having taken courage, were again endeavoring to intercept the great Ohio line of railway. A small body of troops had been collected at Romney to menace Cumberland station, on that line. The Federal Colonel Wallace, who occupied this place, went to attack those troops at Romney, took them by surprise, after a long and difficult night-march, and returned after having dispersed them. A little more to the eastward, at Harper's Ferry, Johnston's forces were increasing at a rate to cause great uneasiness to the Federals. In the beginning of June, he occupied, with more than twelve thousand men, the formidable position of Maryland Heights, on the opposite bank of the Potomac, which enabled him, while covering the entrance of the Shenandoah Valley, to extend his lines into Maryland and menace Washington or Pennsylvania. In order to protect the latter State, General Patterson had assembled all the available volunteers and militia at Chambersburg. When his forces numbered about fifteen thousand men he marched toward the Potomac, for the purpose of disturbing Johnston at Harper's Ferry in his turn. The little confidence that generals like Johnston then placed in their troops was the cause that, during the early stages of the conflict, marches and counter-marches played a more important part than actual engagements, which were gladly avoided on both sides. Fearing to be turned, the Confederate general evacuated Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry on the 13th of June, and retired to Charlestown, a short distance from the place last mentioned, after destroying the Ohio canal, the great railway bridge, and all that had escaped the conflagration of the 18th of April in the arsenal. Patterson, hastening his march, with nine thousand men, forded the Potomac on the 16th of June near Williamsport, above Harper's Ferry, which he occupied shortly afterwards. This movement should have enabled the Federals to take possession of the whole line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, which, at Harper's Ferry, crosses to the right bank of the Potomac. In order to

effect this, it would have been sufficient to drive Johnston into Winchester and to join hands, by means of a few posts, with Wallace's troops at Cumberland; but the hesitations and contradictory orders of the government at Washington, which so frequently embarrassed the operations of the Federal generals, caused the loss of all the advantages that had been gained by the occupation of Harper's Ferry. Patterson had scarcely reached this place when Scott, always anxious for the safety of the capital, ordered him to send the greatest portion of his forces to Washington.

Obeying this untimely order with regret, Patterson was obliged to recross the Potomac on the 18th, and to fall back upon Maryland, by way of Williamsport, with about ten thousand men scarcely armed, without artillery, and without cavalry. His retreat left Wallace at Cumberland in a difficult position, and emboldened the Confederates who had assembled in the Alleghany valleys, which open on the Upper Potomac.

Four thousand of them again occupied Romney, and destroyed the bridge of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway at New Creek they thus cut off all communication between Wallace and McClellan, who had come to Grafton on the 23d to prepare for the serious campaign, of which West Virginia was to witness the inauguration fifteen days later. But although threatened on all sides, Wallace succeeded in keeping the enemy in check and in maintaining his position.

In the vicinity of Washington, the two armies watched each other at a distance so effectively that during the whole month of June, they only once exchanged musket-shots. On the 17th, an Ohio regiment, commanded by Colonel McCook, who subsequently became a Federal general, was making a reconnaissance in the direction of the village of Vienna, but instead of scouting the road, the whole regiment got into open cars and started for Vienna by rail. It so happened that a Confederate regiment, commanded by Colonel Gregg, who also attained the rank of a general afterwards, was passing by precisely at that time, and on hearing the whistle of the locomotive, he formed an ambuscade. Just as the train was turning a curve, it received a discharge of grape-shot fired by two guns which had been placed on the track,

Fortunately, the aim of the guns was too high; the Federals sprang to the ground, formed under the enemy's fire, and, although taken by surprise, finally compelled the Confederates to retire, leaving several dead and many more wounded behind them. One may judge from this incident how little military experience there was on either side.

On the Lower Potomac, a naval officer, Captain Ward, was endeavoring to erect a battery at Mathias Point, a long promontory on the Virginia side, from which the Confederates fired constantly upon vessels going up the river, either with rifle or cannon; but he was driven off, and finally lost his life in the attempt.

With the 4th of July we shall conclude this chapter, which is to serve as a transition epoch between the political events which followed the presidential elections and the veritable acts of war, the narrative of which will commence presently.

The new Congress had been convened for the 4th, and at the time it was assembling, the volunteers who had responded to Mr. Lincoln's calls already numbered 300,000 men. Throughout the Northern States regiments were being recruited and organized. A military ardor had seized all minds.

Before taking a survey of these soldiers at their work, we propose to show, in the following chapter, what were the predominant characteristics of the movement which improvised the Federal armies.

CHAPTER X.

THE FEDERAL VOLUNTEERS.

IN one of his poetic visions, the Prophet Ezekiel describes a plain, deserted and silent, on which lie innumerable scattered and dry bones. At the sound of his voice those shapeless remains come spontaneously together; the skeletons resume their forms and are covered anew with flesh; finally, a divine word from the lips of the inspired spectator restores them to life; and that wilderness, till then shrouded in the darkness of death, becomes peopled with an animated host. The rapidity with which battalions of volunteers were recruited, assembled, and organized in the North may be likened to the sudden uprising of those mysterious legions taking form and life in the presence of the Hebrew prophet.

The hasty creation of large armies among the States loyal to the Union was no less strange and unlooked for than the miracle in Holy Writ. Indeed, the little army which we have seen making war in the Western wilds alone preserved military traditions; the American people were ignorant of their labors and showed themselves indifferent to their successes. The inhabitants of the great Eastern cities had never seen a company of regular troops, and all they knew of the national army was a handful of invalids, the solitary guardians of the Federal forts. All that related to the army had fallen into neglect, and while the other branches of the government at Washington occupied marble palaces, the offices of the War Department were huddled in a miserable tenement.

On national holidays, however, there was no scarcity of uniforms. On such occasions the veterans of 1812 would parade in their motley costumes, followed by militia regiments with enormous bands of music and a superfluity of officers. But these

troops, which at a later period were to impart lustre to the numbers which they wore, were then only fit for parade-duty and utterly inexperienced in military matters. French wit, ever facetious, had seized the ludicrous side of these useless displays of epaulets and drums, and the officers of the Fifty-fifth New York, who in the hour of danger freely shed French blood in the cause of their adopted country, under the command of a brave and able chief, M. de Trobriand, had dubbed themselves at one of the regimental banquets which always followed such demonstrations, *Gardes Lafourchettes*, or Knife and Fork Guards. Charmed by a showy procession, the multitude mechanically rehearsed the official statistics, according to which the strength of the national troops might reach the total of three million and seventy thousand men. If some now and then called to mind the behavior of the militia of 1776 and 1812, this idea was as quickly dismissed under the conviction that the troops then marching past would never have to face the dangers of the field. Those who felt a natural desire for a military vocation were obliged, like Sherman, to seek, as professors in the special schools founded by the Southern States, an opportunity for placing their knowledge to account.

But when the events we have just related had opened the eyes of the least clear-sighted, the formation of an army for the defence of the Constitution was regarded as a national affair. Everybody set to work under the impression that the part of duty was to act, and not to wait for instructions.

The administrative system of America leaves a large part to the initiative of localities and individuals, seldom trammelled by governmental restrictions. The central power has not at its command an army of public functionaries invested, in the eyes of a docile population, with an almost sacred character; it does not possess the thousands of arms which, among us, stretch forth at a given signal to knock simultaneously at every citizen's door, and, if need be, to push him forcibly by the shoulder. A levy being once sanctioned by Congress or proclaimed by the President in virtue of extraordinary powers, the Federal authorities interfere no further in the enlistments, and have only to receive the regiments formed in the several States according to the quota assigned to each. Nor is the administrative machinery

of the States themselves more complicated. The constant control exercised by the citizens, from whom the magistrates everywhere hold their authority, moderates the corrupting influence of favoritism—disguised under the English name of patronage—which the continual changes of elective functionaries tend to develop. So that, while the central power does not trammel the liberty of the local authorities, the latter, in their turn, only interfere to direct the citizen where his individual action is no longer sufficient. The President's first call, therefore, addressed to the different States of the Union, after the taking of Fort Sumter, was promptly responded to by all. Patriotism, ambition, vanity, and the spirit of speculation, entered at once into competition and contributed, though unequally, to stimulate the national movement. The ingenious, practical, and calculating mind of the American neglected no means to hasten the organization of the volunteer corps so imperatively demanded by the national danger. Recruiting-offices were opened in the very smallest villages, and soon became the daily rendezvous for the entire population; some from love of adventure, others from attachment to the Constitution, others still from a desire to signalize their strong anti-slavery proclivities, registered their names as common soldiers. Those who possessed sufficient influence undertook to raise companies, sometimes a regiment, and not unfrequently a whole brigade. The governor, as the chief of the executive power in each State, would promise to this or that lawyer or merchant the rank of colonel if he should within a stipulated period of time succeed in raising a regiment. The latter, thus provided with the simple authority for an operation which elsewhere would have required the concurrence of a multitude of different functionaries, communicates with his friends and appeals to the public according to the custom of the country. By holding out the promise of an epaulet or the lucrative monopoly of a sutlership, he easily finds co-operators, each of whom undertakes to raise him a certain number of men. Gigantic placards posted on the walls, or stretched across the streets, enumerating the advantages of the regiment whose ranks are to be filled, or representing on canvas amid smoke and carnage some heroic deed proposed for their imitation, invite the public gaze. But the martial instincts of the people are not the only passions

appealed to. The new recruits are paraded in the streets to dazzle and attract by their showy uniforms; that of the zouaves—although often unseemly when hanging ungracefully on the bony frames and lank limbs of some stalwart American—having the greatest success. A certain regiment of heavy artillery, which proved afterwards one of the most efficient at the terrible battle of Gettysburg, sought to increase the number of its recruits by an announcement which, although not to be taken in a literal sense, is nevertheless worthy of record as offering the strangest of all inducements to future soldiers. It ran thus: "As this regiment is to be constantly garrisoned in the forts around Washington, those anxious to enter the military service will find in it the inestimable advantage of exemption from the hardships and privations incidental to camp-life." On the contrary, the remembrance of the panic which overtook some Indiana troops at the battle of Buena Vista having always been preserved in that State, which has often been taunted with it, several volunteer regiments inscribed the following words on their programmes, "Remember Buena Vista!" thereby promising to wipe out that stigma by their conduct on new battle-fields.

Individual initiative at times sought to act independently even of the feeble control of the State authorities. Some regiments were offered directly to the President by those who had raised them. Such was the Excelsior Brigade, composed of five regiments raised in New York in the course of a few weeks by Mr. Sickles, a former diplomat. The governor of the State insisted upon their forming a part of his contingent, but Mr. Sickles, in order to evade his authority, assembled his brigade in a fort then under the Federal jurisdiction, and set out shortly afterward for Washington. The quarrel was of long duration, but Mr. Lincoln was at last induced by general representations to incorporate all independent troops into the particular contingents of the States in which they had been raised. This was but justice; for if those regiments had not been included in the quota of each of those States, their competition would have raised the enlistment bounties, lessened the number of available men, and thus hastened the period when it would have been necessary to resort to conscription. But by the time this question was settled, the Excelsior

Brigade had already been reduced by the enemy's fire and the hardships of war to one-half of its original strength.

A few days sufficed to prove that the generous indignation aroused in the North by the tidings of the capture of Fort Sumter was not a mere momentary effervescence, but the firm resolve of the people to sustain their words by deeds.

Thanks to the different simple and expeditious methods of proceeding we have just described, soldiers were pouring in from all parts. As may well be supposed, the most varied specimens of civilized humanity presented themselves at the recruiting-offices; but, generally speaking, the volunteers who responded to Mr. Lincoln's first call for troops were very inferior in quality to those who composed the subsequent levies. As the middle or working classes of the North had not yet recognized the duty of quitting their respective occupations for the battle-field, these volunteers were for the most part picked up among the unemployed, both in town and country. They were without discipline, for their too brief term of enlistment prevented them from entering seriously into the spirit of their profession, and they had no idea of the trials and hardships for which a soldier should always be prepared. They greatly resembled, in short, those militia troops that had caused so much anxiety to General Washington during the War of Independence. Some even went so far as to abandon their posts on the eve of an engagement, because the precise hour at which their term of enlistment expired had struck. The army assembled at Washington under McDowell in June, 1861, was mainly composed of such men.

The magnitude of the danger, at last apparent, called out a second levy, which rallied around the flag a very different class of men. It was no longer a matter of three months' excursion or a mere military demonstration; those who then enlisted for three years were fully aware of the sort of life they were entering upon, and what perils they would have to encounter. Whether actuated by patriotism or the love of adventure, or influenced by the hope of gain, they one and all embraced their new profession with a firm and resolute determination. Good soldiers they were not—indeed, they were scarcely soldiers—but they were honest in their

desires to become such, and this was the surest way of attaining that end.

The enlistment fever, as it was called in America, had spread all over the country, and the recruiting-agents appointed everywhere to receive enlistments, stimulated by the spirit of competition, vied with each other in zealous endeavors to complete the contingents of their respective districts. The city artisan and the husbandman laid down their implements to put on the uniform, nor did the aristocratic hands of the man born in affluence fear to handle a musket in defence of the laws. Side by side with these were assuredly other men who had enlisted from motives less pure. The reaction of the political crisis upon commercial enterprise had caused the suspension of certain industries, and as we have observed before, the Confederate government, whose chief had already become notorious through the great bankruptcy of the State of Mississippi, had repudiated all indebtedness to the North, to the ruin of numerous families whose sons had no other means left them for earning a livelihood but to enlist. Besides the pay, which was enormous, the volunteers were promised, as in former times, land bounties at the expiration of their term of service—a wise measure which induced many workingmen to enter the army by ensuring to them the certain means of existence at the end of the war. Lastly, the recruiting-office opened a new field to that unfortunate, restless, and ambitious population which America renders Europe the good service to absorb as fast as she receives it, and which, like foam upon the waters, floats for a time in the large cities of the Union, and is ultimately lost in the great current which bears it towards the far West.

In the same city, each class of volunteers would adopt particular regiments by preference. The Irish, pugnacious by instinct, organized several of them in the seaboard cities, it being natural that the same inclination which prompts so many of them to enter the British army should have been even more potent in drawing them into the service of the country they had adopted of their own free will. While serving it, however, they were influenced by strange delusions artfully encouraged by designing men, who took advantage of their credulous imaginations. A great many Irishmen, in fact, looked upon the war as nothing

more than a favorable opportunity for preparing to crush England. The more enlightened among them were doubtless aware of the fallacy of such dreams, and, on the other hand, the Constitution they were about to fight for could scarcely be an object of such devotion for them as for citizens of American birth. But the green flag of old Erin, given to them as a distinguishing mark, proved a powerful attraction, and the sight of it on the battle-field had the effect of adding fresh vigor to their courage. It is necessary to have passed through the trials of exile to comprehend the magic influence exercised on the heart of man by every symbol of his distant native land, and among them the most expressive of all, the national flag.

In like manner, citizens of German descent or of German birth, still adhering to their mother-tongue, although identified with America, without any intention of ever returning to their native land, and generally without regrets, grouped together in special regiments where they could foster the traditions and usages which life in the New World never caused them to forget.

The French, comparatively few in that land which is overrun by the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic races, swelled the ranks of the La Fayette Guards, and subsequently of the Enfants Perdus, in both of which organizations they worthily sustained the honor of the red pantaloons, the distinguishing mark of our army. A few of our compatriots, driven to America either by the chance of revolutions, or by a desire to serve the cause of liberty, had rank conferred upon them in the Federal army, which enlisted all their sympathies; they were thus able, under the protection of a flag ever friendly to the France of other days as to the France of the present time, to forget the quarrels by which they were divided. The contingent of the Latin races was completed, without being much increased, by the addition of a small number of Spaniards, Portuguese, and Italians.

The dregs of the large cities were gathered into a few regiments with brilliant costumes, but somewhat lax in discipline if report may be credited. It was observed that the average of crime in the great city of New York decreased by one-half after the departure of the Wilson Zouaves. The volunteer fire companies of New York, proverbial for their turbulence, quitted for a time

the service of the corporation to organize a regiment of Fire Zouaves.

But let us hasten to reduce to their proper proportions these details, which, striking the eyes of Europeans recently landed, may have led them to form erroneous opinions of the American army. In spite of all they could say, it was an essentially national army, both in sentiment and in the materials of which it was composed. The soldiers for the most part were animated by a sincere desire to serve the national cause, and the proportion of different elements which constituted its strength accurately represented the whole American nation.

A thousand examples might be cited of soldiers and officers who sacrificed lucrative positions to join the regular army. The records of war-victims abound with the names of wealthy and honored citizens, not a few of whom were advanced in years and surrounded by a numerous family. Side by side with the old West Pointers who had resumed the military harness were men possessed of no practical military knowledge, but who, like Wadsworth, Shaw, and many others, were at least determined to set an example of the cause which finally cost them their lives. Many American villages displayed the same disinterestedness as Phoenixville, in Pennsylvania, which, almost exclusively inhabited by blacksmiths, the least skilful of whom could, during the war, earn in a week more than a soldier's pay for a month, alone furnished an entire company.

Individual examples may always be set aside, yet it would be easy to prove, in a general way, that the rapidity of enlistments is to be attributed, not to want of work, but to earnest patriotism. If a few branches of industry had to suspend operations, business in general was but little affected by the shock of the war; if the Federal flag experienced reverses, the chief occupation of the laboring population of America—the cultivation of cereals—continued to flourish; and although a few families were ruined, the New World was not afflicted for a single day with the pauperism which stalks abroad in the most civilized States of Europe. Wages, already very high, increased in proportion as the ranks of the army were filling up, rendering workmen scarce. The constant increase in the rate of bounties shows that, in a purely business point of

view, the salaries paid in civil employments competed favorably with army enlistments, while the bounties themselves, so far as regarded the immense majority of volunteers, afforded but a meagre compensation for the sacrifices they made. In a country where every able-bodied man can easily earn a living, and where the products of the soil are so abundant as to admit of an almost indefinite advance in wages, the government could never have held out sufficient inducements to attract the six hundred thousand men who in a single year responded to its call, if a large majority of them had not been actuated by sterling patriotism.

This army was as national in its composition as it was in spirit, representing in due proportion the various elements of the American population. It has indeed been urged that foreigners predominated in its ranks; this is a great mistake, but easily susceptible of explanation, from the fact that the German accent and the Irish brogue frequently struck upon the ear wherever the volunteers were collected.

Vast regions in Pennsylvania were settled by Germans even before the War of Independence, and its inhabitants to this day speak a Germanic *patois*; but notwithstanding their nickname of Dutchmen, applied to them by their Anglo-Saxon neighbors, they are just as much Americans, in every sense of the term, as the latter. Those who still continue to emigrate for the purpose of clearing the virgin forests of the New World become Americans while engaged in fertilizing the soil, precisely as their predecessors did long ago. The hundreds of thousands of emigrants who arrive yearly, and who by their labor increase the wealth of the country and extend the boundaries of civilization, acquire thereby the rights of citizenship, and are as much interested in the greatness and good government of their adopted country as the descendants of the old colonists. And yet, notwithstanding the ties which bound the emigrant to that country, the foreign element was not proportionately represented in the composition of the national army. The soldiers born on American soil were more numerous than if the army had been recruited by a draft bearing equally on all the citizens of the Union.

A few figures will suffice to confirm this assertion. Of the volunteers who enlisted during the first year, only one-tenth were

foreigners; of the remainder, two-thirds were born on American soil, and seven-thirtieths, or rather less than one-fourth, were naturalized Europeans. By examining separately the contingents of the Eastern States, where but a small number of emigrants settle, we find a still larger proportion of natives—a proportion which in 1864, when conscription was partially resorted to, reached as high as eighty per cent. This army, two-thirds of which consisted of native Americans, and only one-third of foreigners, was raised out of a population of about 19,000,000 souls. In order to ascertain which of these two elements supplied the largest proportion of men, we have only to compare the number of able-bodied men that each of them was able to contribute. The statistics of 1860 render this comparison impracticable; but the census of 1863, taken in the loyal States preparatory to the conscription, gave upwards of 3,100,000 as the number of men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years. By adding 900,000 more, the maximum number of soldiers then in actual service or disabled, it may safely be affirmed that the class which in 1861 contributed exclusively to the recruitment of the army did not exceed 4,000,000. With the help of the emigrant rolls, it is easy to calculate how many of these were born in America and how many in Europe. During the decade from 1849 to 1858 the United States received 3,000,000 new-comers, 1,200,000 of whom were women and 1,800,000 men; 1,370,000 of the latter being over fifteen and under thirty-five years of age. Deducting 8000 from this number, which, according to the tables of mortality, is the decrease of that population since its arrival in America, we find that emigration had, in the course of ten years, brought over to that country 1,362,000 men, who, when the levies of volunteers took place, were still living and between the ages of eighteen and thirty-eight, and, consequently, forming part of the 4,000,000 among whom the American army was recruited. This number already exceeds by 31,000 the third of those 4,000,000; but in order to make our statement complete, we should add thereto the number of Europeans who in 1861 were between thirty-eight and forty-five years, as well as those who at the time of their landing before 1849 were under thirty-three years of age, inasmuch as both categories were comprised in the 4,000,000. We see, there-

fore, that those of European birth constituted considerably more than one-third of the effective male population of the Northern States, while they only entered in just the same proportion of one-third into the composition of the army, thus leaving to the native Americans the largest proportion in the aggregate representation of races.

We are not in possession of the necessary documents to continue this comparison by ascertaining the number of those emigrants who became naturalized, and those who retained their condition of aliens; such a comparison would, however, be of little value. Naturalization is so easily obtained in the United States that after a few years' residence in the country nearly every person settled in business exercises the rights of citizenship.

It was only when the conscription attached onerous duties to the exercise of these rights that people who had enjoyed them endeavored to discover informalities in their naturalization papers, in order to get rid of the obligations devolving upon Americans. All emigrants who have left Europe without any intention of returning—*sans esprit de retour*, as the French law tersely expresses it—should, in reality, be reckoned as Americans, the number of those who persist in preserving their nationality unimpaired being altogether insignificant.

Strictly speaking, those belonging to the latter category alone, and the recruits obtained from outside the territory of the Republic, could be considered as foreigners, among the Federal soldiers. The Federal government could only have introduced a large foreign element into the ranks of its army by enticing volunteers from Europe or from countries adjacent to the United States. Now, notwithstanding the close vigilance with which all the actions of that government were watched, its enemies never could prove that such enlistments had been made on its account upon any large scale; there was seen nothing in America to be compared with the foreign legion organized by England for the Crimean War. The navy may indeed have picked up a handful of sailors from the coasts of France or England, or it may have received a few of the deserters which every European ship drops into the ports of the New World. Doubtless, also, some English soldiers from the garrisons of Canada may have crossed the fron-

tier, allured not only by the bounties and high pay, but also by the hope that their military experience would secure them positions among such raw troops. It was easy to recognize under the Federal uniform the old English soldier by his unexceptionable bearing, his polished arms, and the precision of his movements. If not disqualified by drunkenness, he soon became drill-sergeant or sergeant-major; if able to read and write, the epaulet was within his easy reach. These, however, were only isolated instances. It is true that recruiting agents, hoping to make a profit on the bounties, went to Canada and Ireland to decoy recruits in spite of the Federal government, and that they engaged emigrants to come over in the name of fictitious industrial associations, expecting to entice them into the service after they had landed, partly of their own free will, partly by force; but the measures taken in New York and elsewhere to protect these emigrants against the impositions of which they were formerly the victims enabled them to free themselves as soon as the fraud was discovered. This was the case with most of them; and although the recruiters were always on the watch to entrap the most destitute among those whom want had driven from Europe to the American shores, they were less successful with these new-comers than with those who had been for some time settled in the United States.

We may therefore sum up all these details by affirming that, from the native-born American down to the latest-landed European, the proportion of volunteers furnished to the Federal government by the different classes of the community was in a direct ratio to the interest that each took in the affairs of the Republic, and that the longer the emigrant had lived upon its soil, the more largely did he contribute toward its defence.

It must not be imagined, therefore, that the increase of emigration, so remarkable during the war, was a means of directly supplying the Federal armies. It was an indirect result due to the sudden advance in the price of labor occasioned by the war. The difference in the rate of wages between the two continents is the sluice which regulates with precision the current of emigration; and the new-comers, instead of swelling the ranks of the army, went for the most part to fill, either at the plough or in

the factories, the places of the Americans who had put on the uniform.

It is by the average age of the soldiers that national armies are most readily distinguished from mercenary troops. An army of mercenaries is made up of men who make a trade of warfare, serving for a livelihood and enlisting from motives of interest; the larger their number the higher the average of age. A national army, on the contrary, is recruited in equal proportions among all the youth of the country, as well from voluntary as from forced service. Now, the average age of the volunteers who enlisted in America before any conscription had taken place was between twenty-four and twenty-five years, or the same as that of our own soldiers before it was raised above this figure by the exoneration law and the multiplicity of substitutes. The larger or smaller proportion of Europeans, or at least of men recently from Europe, in the contingents of the several States, was made manifest in the military statistics by a remark we may be allowed to quote, as throwing a curious light upon the movements of the populations that elbow one another for a long time in America before they become finally mingled. Nothing, in fact, appears more strange, at first sight, than the comparison of the average statures in the contingents of the several States, as shown by the tables published at the end of the war, at a time when the conscription necessitated a scrupulous examination of all the men enrolled. Neither climate nor latitude can explain why that average varied so strangely from one State to another, in the Middle as well as in the Northern and Western States; or why Pennsylvania and Kentucky, for instance, furnished the highest average, while, after the State of New York, those of the far West, such as Minnesota and Michigan, sent the smallest men to the army. This last result is all the more striking because in those new States, where the human race seems to develop with greater freedom, there exists a truly athletic population of lumbermen, living from generation to generation in the virgin forest, who, when formed into companies and at times into regiments, presented a line of perfect grenadiers that struck the officers of the British Guards with admiration. The reason is that alongside of them, in the same contingent, there was a race whose inferiority

was but poorly compensated by the former, namely, that of the German emigrants and their descendants down to the second generation. These strange variations are all explained by the movements of emigration on the soil of America, and the average stature of each contingent was in inverse ratio to the number of emigrants who had settled in the State that furnished it. The current of emigration emptied itself at New York and certain points of the northern coast, where the weakest and the least robust took up their residence, while the others, passing through the Middle States, where the population was comparatively numerous, and shut out from the South by the insurmountable barrier of slavery, went to seek their fortunes in those vast Western States that are watered by the Upper Mississippi, the Missouri, and the great lakes. This current leaving Vermont at the north and Kentucky at the south, and traversing Pennsylvania too rapidly to leave traces of its passage behind, these States possessed therefore a population which, for the most part, had already become American for two or three generations back. It is from this time that the beneficent influence of the New World upon the European races is felt; hence the physical superiority, seemingly inexplicable, of the contingents furnished by these three States.

The elements of a truly national army were therefore assembling in the recruiting-offices which had been opened from one end to the other of the States loyal to the Union; we must now show how this improvised army was organized. A certain number of these offices would co-operate to form a regiment, the effective strength of which, as in the regular army, was usually fixed at a minimum of 850 men. As soon as this figure was reached the regiment entered in numerical order into the contingent of its State, and nothing remained to be done in order to establish it but to arrange its list of officers and give it a regimental *cadre*. In all the States of the Union, the governor is the commander-in-chief of all the local armed forces, as the President is of the Federal troops, and he has the disposal of all the grades appertaining to those local forces. But custom prevails everywhere over law, and so inveterate is the habit of electing nearly all public functionaries, that in several States the governors had to confine themselves to the confirmation of the choice already made by

the soldiers themselves. During the Mexican campaign the volunteers, being far away from their respective States, had already fallen into the habit of replacing such of their officers as had fallen in battle by improvised elections held around the camp-fires. But in the formation of the new regiments of which we are now speaking, there were certain circumstances which interfered with the choice of the soldiers as well as that of the governor. Whether it was owing to some tacit agreement, or a positive contract between the governor, the new soldiers, and the principal recruiting-agents, the latter were generally made sure in advance of grades proportionate to the importance of the services rendered. Thus the application of the extreme principles of democracy revived the system of proprietary colonels, and the course pursued by American communities for the prompt organization of their military forces resembled in many respects the formation of those independent companies of cavalry (*compagnies d'ordonnances*) which in the Middle Ages constituted the nucleus of standing armies. Indeed, the man who by his activity and influence, and the expenditure of his time and money, succeeded in raising a regiment, and had perhaps even given his name to it, occupied quite a different position from that of an officer in the regular army, who can only rise to superior rank in the order of seniority. He became colonel of that regiment by right, and, without positive proof of unworthiness, he could not be deprived of its command, unless, indeed, the difficulty was compromised by making him a general.

Besides these volunteer regiments formed for the occasion, the greatest portion of the old militia organizations, filled up by new enlistments, were incorporated in like manner into the contingent of each State. As soon as organized they were all received by the Federal agents and regularly mustered into the service of the Republic, without, however, breaking off their connection with the authorities of their respective States, who reserved to themselves certain important rights in their administration. The intervention of these two different powers, at the beginning of the war, was productive of more advantage than inconvenience. Instances of conflict between them were rare and insignificant; and this system, by making a division of labor, and encouraging a

wholesome rivalry between the States, enabled the army to acquire a much more rapid organization than it would have done if the Federal government had undertaken this formation alone. In those critical moments when a nation's life depends, not upon the perfection of the means employed for saving her, but upon their prompt application, people accustomed to leave individual action entirely unfettered well know how to turn all their resources to immediate account, whereas a centralized administration, accustomed to do everything itself, has but too often to struggle in hopeless incapacity.

The Federal government, therefore, was required by law to arm and equip the volunteers; but as it stood in need of everything at the very moment when all had to be created at once—as its arsenals, which would have been insufficient for the emergency even if well supplied, had been emptied by the instigators of rebellion, most of the States themselves undertook to furnish those outfits for troops which they raised. The small State of Rhode Island, whose specialty has always been the manufacture of ordnance, sent to Washington several batteries provided with horses, and all the necessary accoutrements for taking the field at once.

The day when a new regiment was delivered over to the Federal authority and took the oath of allegiance to the Union, that authority took it under pay, and assumed the responsibility of providing for its maintenance; each soldier received an entrance bounty, and the promise of a land-grant on the day of his discharge. This promise secured to him a fixed and certain remuneration at the close of his term of service; for if his bounty, paid in paper money, decreased in value in consequence of the depreciation of the currency, the nominal price of the land, having increased in like proportion, enabled him to gain on one hand what he lost on the other. The depreciation of paper money, however, weighed but lightly upon the volunteer, even during his term of service. for from 1861 to 1865 his pay was gradually raised from eleven to sixteen dollars per month, and the value of bounties given by the Federal government was increased in like manner. Here again the independent initiative already referred

to is seen lending a helping hand to the central authority ; States, large cities, individual corporations, and even private subscriptions, would occasionally swell the amount of those bounties by direct contributions of more or less importance, and, either by donations or fixed pensions, secure the means of existence to the wife and children of the soldier, who was thus enabled to face death without fear of leaving his family in want. Although mustered into the service of the Federal government, the regiment was still subject to the authority of the State whose name it bore, in all matters affecting its *personnel* ; and if the process of recruiting continued, which was unfortunately rarely the case, it could only be within the limits of that State. Each governor had under his control a sort of miniature war department called the adjutant-general's office, which kept up relations with the regiments scattered throughout the Federal armies, and despatched special inspectors to watch over them and inquire into their wants ; in short, it continued to exercise the exclusive right of filling up vacancies among the officers, from the rank of second lieutenant to that of colonel. The central government, in taking these officers into its service, had, it is true, reserved to itself the right of dismissing such as were deemed incapable, and even of withdrawing their commissions and suspending their pay at will, without any explanation ; but it had not the power to replace them itself ; generals commanding in the field had to apply to the adjutant-general of each State for the promotion of any officers belonging to the contingent of that State.

These rights once reserved to the local authorities of the States, the volunteer regiments only obeyed the Federal authority. They were governed by the military code of the United States ; the government at Washington alone directed their movements, and could send them at will from one extremity of the continent to the other ; it could separate them from those who had originally formed the same contingent with themselves, and distribute them among armies, divisions, and even brigades, where they would meet with soldiers belonging to another section of the Union. Finally, it had the direct appointment of generals, staff officers, and of the administrative departments in the armies thus constituted.

Besides these national troops, the States more immediately threatened by their proximity to the seat of insurrection, also organized forces for the defence of their respective territories ; and in order to attain this end more effectually, they sometimes formed mutual associations without the intervention of the central power. Wherever danger appeared imminent, the spirit of local initiative called into existence new and sudden resources.

When, in July, 1861, for instance, Congress voted the levy of five hundred thousand men, of which we shall speak in proper time, the States adjoining the frontier of slavery had anticipated the call, and organized forces for their own protection against the insurgents, who, as we have seen, were arming in Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky. These troops had their own generals and staff officers, whose rank was confined to the State that had conferred it upon them. Numerous regiments were thus raised in Pennsylvania. Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, united under the auspices of a free association, organized a provisional army, and had the good fortune to entrust its command to Captain McClellan, whom the regard of his former companions in arms had unanimously designated for that arduous position.

Thanks to his exertions, this preliminary organization had the advantage of serving as a school for those troops which were soon to enter the Federal service, and with which, shortly afterwards, he achieved in West Virginia the first success of the war. We shall see it again on all critical occasions during the struggle, and especially when the territory of the free States was invaded by the Confederate armies. These militia troops thus assembled in haste may occasionally from a distance have deceived those armies and retarded their movements, by making them believe in the presence of a powerful force, but they were more frequently a source of embarrassment than of support to the generals of the Union, and the insignificant part they played on all occasions was the only one suited to troops so utterly destitute of all the qualities that constitute a true soldier.

Before we follow to the field the armies whose improvised organization we have just described, it is proper that we should point out the peculiar characteristics which, in every branch of the service, distinguished them from the regular troops whose bat-

tles are closely watched by Europe; this is necessary to a proper understanding of the first events of the war which we are about to relate. In order to form a correct judgment of the military commanders who directed that war, it is necessary to have a perfect knowledge of the good qualities and defects of the instrument they had to handle.

The American foot-soldier displayed from the very first a great deal of personal bravery. The conflicts among the woods, where he was to fall unnoticed and to die without help, afforded the strongest evidence of this kind of courage, for they deprived him of that powerful incentive of all human action, the hope that his name would not die with him; it was nevertheless in these encounters, under the green shroud of the forest, that he exhibited all his firmness.

He very soon acquired a remarkable skill in firing, and quickly learned to hit his mark as a skirmisher. While fighting in line, his fire had not the regularity of the drill-ground, but every soldier, using his weapon as he pleased, would hide behind a tree; and picking out the enemy from under the foliage as soon as he partially exposed himself, he knew how to aim with fatal precision. One fact which was brought to light by the report of the surgeon-general on the war demonstrates this peculiar skill of the combatants on both sides, and throws a curious light on the nature of the struggle of which the American forests were the theatre; it shows that in a certain number of Federal hospitals there were under treatment more than thirty-six thousand wounds in the head and arms, against only twenty-nine thousand in the legs; and this is easily explained by the position of the soldier, who, concealed behind the trunk of a tree, only exposed his head and arms when he discharged his piece.

But these personal qualities are not sufficient to impart to a body of troops that collective courage which inspires every man with the same spirit, and enables it to undertake with unanimity of purpose what no individual among those composing it could have attempted by himself. This distinctive trait of well-trained armies, which constitutes their superiority, is the result of long habits of discipline, and the influence of old and experienced *cadres*.

Indeed, whatever may be his personal courage, the soldier who is unaccustomed to being under fire, placed between comrades who are as great novices as himself, and opposite to a large body of the enemy, very soon persuades himself that every musket in the enemy's ranks is levelled at his breast, forgetting that as many friendly weapons are by his side to sustain him. He may brave his peril, but will lack that entire confidence in the courage of his neighbors and the skill of his chiefs which tends to draw closer the ranks of a broken force, and urges the soldier to follow the lead of his officers in a desperate effort. The controlling influence of a severe discipline could not be felt among armies entirely new, where the epaulet did not carry with it that moral authority which is acquired by long service, and where the soldiers did not possess the assurance of men who have seen each other under trial. Easily impressed, like all multitudes, these men, accustomed to complete freedom of action, went into battle in a spirit of obedience which is rather rational than passive, and were actuated more by a sense of duty as citizens than by the habitude of the disciplined soldier, who forgets his own volition to follow that of his chief.

Consequently, notwithstanding their bravery, it took them a long time to learn that, upon ground where the fighting had to be done at short distances, it was almost always less dangerous to rush upon the enemy than to be decimated by his fire while standing still. For want of that mechanism which, in well-regulated armies, communicates the will of the directing power to each man, as rapidly as the nerves in the human body, they were frequently to lose the opportunity of turning a first advantage into a decisive victory. When certain death awaited those occupying the first ranks, when it was so easy to march with less rapidity than the rest, personal courage could not be displayed to the same extent by all; if a single man hesitated or was allowed to hesitate with impunity, it was enough to render that hesitation contagious, causing the bravest soldier to lose his dash, and the most resolute chief all his daring. So long as that absolute despotism alluded to by Washington did not impose the same obligations upon the timid, to be found everywhere, as upon the

bravest, the American volunteers could not escape those inevitable consequences of the human character.

Encounters with sword and bayonet, which seldom occur even between well-trained troops, were consequently very rare in American battles. Besides, infantry charges could only take place in open spaces or clearings, which form a kind of oasis in the forest, too dense for troops to march in serried ranks and suddenly to charge the enemy with the bayonet. In those close fights everything was in favor of the party acting on the defensive. The assailant was openly exposed to the fire of an adversary hidden along the skirt of the wood; if he reached the spot, the density of the forest rendered all pursuit impossible. A barricade of fallen trees enabled the party assailed to rally and to drive the aggressor back into the clearing, more dangerous to cross a second time than the first; finally, if the latter had not well reconnoitred his flanks resting on the sides of the clearing, he was liable at any time to be exposed to an oblique fire from artillery concealed under the foliage; we shall see how this fear of masked batteries played upon the imagination and colored the stories of the Federal soldiers in the beginning of the war.

These forest conflicts, however, possessed a great advantage for new troops; the view being intercepted, panics could not be propagated, and the firing of the soldiers was slower, and consequently much better, than when they found themselves in an open space, where the terrible sights which surrounded them disturbed their equanimity. A curious circumstance mentioned in the official accounts of the battle of Gettysburg, which was fought upon ground comparatively little wooded, shows to what extent, on both sides, the excitement of the conflict caused the loss of self-possession among soldiers who had been accustomed for some time to handling their arms. Among twenty-four thousand loaded muskets picked up at random on the field of battle, one-fourth only were properly loaded; twelve thousand contained each a double charge, and the other fourth from three to ten charges; in some there were six balls to a single charge of powder; others contained six cartridges, one on the top of the other without having been opened; a few more, twenty-three complete charges regularly inserted; and finally, in the barrel of a single musket there were found con-

fusedly jumbled together twenty-two balls, sixty-two buck-shot, with a proportionate quantity of powder. These souvenirs of the battle admirably depict the confusion ; we can easily imagine the soldier stopping to load his gun while his companions are advancing, and instead of stepping to the front and firing off his piece, renewing the operation of loading until the weapon becomes a useless instrument in his hands ; but we should not severely criticise the American soldier on this account, for it appears that an examination of the battle-fields of the Crimea gave similar results. In consequence of the independent character of the Federal volunteers, more than one general saw, in the battles we shall have to describe, a certain victory turned into defeat, while on the other hand, the most disastrous checks could almost always be remedied ; a sort of public opinion existing among them even in the midst of conflicts, we shall find them stoically suffering themselves to be killed at their post so long as they are actuated by a spirit of rivalry ; then, suddenly persuading themselves that further resistance is useless, at the very moment perhaps when it would have decided the fate of a battle, they fall back to the rear in search of a better position. This retreat, which no effort on the part of the officers can prevent, is however effected without hastening their pace, in spite of a shower of balls, and with a degree of coolness which would be admirable under other circumstances. And, what is still more remarkable, this temporary disorder seldom degenerated into a rout ; a few minutes would often suffice to stop the fugitives, restore confidence among them, re-form their ranks, and restore all the authority of their chiefs. A moment after, these soldiers, so suddenly discouraged, would refuse to believe themselves beaten, and this conviction would be almost equivalent to a victory.

At the very outset of the campaign, the inexperience of the Federal volunteers was made evident, even more on the march than on the battle-field. In fact, a body of troops which has had no practice cannot, with the best intentions in the world, make a long march without straggling on the road. We shall see at the end of the war Sherman's soldiers traversing the half of a continent and conquering success through the vigor of their legs, while those of Grant carried a load of forty-five pounds on their shoul-

ders. But at the time of which we speak, they had not yet acquired that great art of the soldier which consists in bearing fatigue and taking rest in a systematic manner. They ate a great deal, did not know how to economize their food, adjusted their knapsacks clumsily, and could only carry two days' rations. The first day's march, which used up a great number, although very short, already filled the road with stragglers, who, while directing their steps towards the place assigned for the halt, did not consider themselves bound to keep up with their comrades, and whom a fresh spring of water or a shady spot would keep back; fortunately for the Federal armies, the Confederate guerrillas, in picking up such stragglers, did more towards putting a stop to this fatal habit than the severest orders of the day.

The mounted volunteers naturally took the regular cavalry for their model, and imitated their mode of fighting, which, as we have already observed, recalled that of the old dragoons of the seventeenth century—a curious comparison between the ancient military customs of Europe and those of modern America. If those troopers borrowed the carbine of the regulars, it was not because they had to fight an enemy as swift in flight as the Indian of the prairies, but that every inexperienced soldier, when he can choose between side-arms and firearms, always prefers the latter, which does not compel him to come to close quarters with the enemy. Besides, in order to handle a sabre or a lance, one should be fully able to manage a horse, and the horsemanship of the Federal volunteers at the beginning of the war was deplorable. They did not fire from their saddles like the troopers of the times of Louis XIV., but got into the habit of fighting on foot, leaving their horses in charge of one-fourth of their number. The wooded and rugged character of the country was suited to this mode of warfare, but would not have admitted of those great and rapid evolutions of a cavalry relying solely on the swiftness of their horses, if such cavalry had existed in America.

The cavalry, however, at the outset of the war, confined itself to the complicated task of scouting for the armies, and acting as skirmishers. This service, although difficult for young troops, was not altogether new to American horsemen, accustomed to an adventurous life which suited their spirit of personal enterprise.

If they did not always possess the just instinct of war, nor that abiding vigilance indispensable in the presence of an enemy, they made up these deficiencies by their intelligence and daring ; a great number of little engagements, which cannot find a place in our narrative, afforded them opportunities to show that the inventive mind of the Americans was never at fault when it became necessary to devise a stratagem or to make combinations for some bold stroke.

At a later period the importance of the cavalry was developed by the new part assigned to it in those *raids* or large independent expeditions, of which we shall speak hereafter.

The artillery could not find amid the American forests favorable ground and those large open spaces where it can operate with most effect. It was, however, from the first day in large force and constantly employed, because this arm of the service had, from the very first, been highly popular among the volunteers, while the infantry, before it had been well trained, did not like to move without feeling itself supported by some guns, even for a simple reconnaissance. As we have seen at Big Bethel, field-pieces were placed as *vedettes* near the most advanced sentinels of those new armies. This practice, common to both parties, frequently led to a noisy kind of artillery duel rarely bloody. If the position of one of those advanced batteries displeased the enemy, or if one of the two adversaries desired to try some newly invented projectile, the first fire was sure to bring on a lively cannonade, which the distance and the small number of combatants generally rendered harmless. But when the rattling peals of musketry announced a serious engagement, the artillery of the volunteers, worthy rival of that of the regulars, would always rush across woods and swamps to seek a position where the danger was greatest, even at the risk of being abandoned by the raw troops who were its only support.

We have dwelt upon the defects of the American volunteers because they were the cause of their first reverses, and because, in exposing them, we are only exalting the merit of those men who had so much to learn, in order to become capable of accomplishing the great task they had undertaken, and who succeeded by dint of perseverance and devotion. One trait in their character redeemed all these defects, and already displayed, under the garb

of these inexperienced men, those valiant champions who, at the end of the war, carried the enemy's strong works by assault: they went under fire more resolutely the second time than the first. Bad soldiers, if unconscious of the impression which the reality of war will produce upon them, are apt to rush into the fight with as much daring and resolution as veteran troops, and once engaged they will sometimes continue to behave well; but experience makes them timid, and their courage fails them afterwards, when called upon to face a danger they have learned to appreciate. On the contrary, participation in those dangers, the loss of their comrades, the sufferings and hardships of the war, were to strengthen the courage and increase the self-possession of the volunteers whom a patriotic duty had taken from the occupations of civil life. Iron, when pure and of good quality, acquires shape and strength under the repeated blows of the blacksmith's hammer, while metal adulterated with bad alloys splits and soon flies in pieces.

BOOK III.—THE FIRST CONFLICT.

CHAPTER I.

RIVERS AND RAILWAYS.

THE modes of warfare vary in every country according to the nature of the ground. What is possible on the wide plains of Germany or in the rich provinces of Italy becomes impracticable among the mountains of Switzerland or on the parched and rugged soil of Spain. It follows, therefore, that in this recital, which takes us upon another continent, before we judge men, and compare what they have done with what might be accomplished in any stated part of Europe, we must consider the conditions imposed upon them by the physical characteristics of the country in which they had to operate.

Let us therefore begin by casting a glance over the map of that vast country where, for the last half century, modern civilization, taking a marvellous flight, has developed itself amid the grandeurs, almost intact, of virgin Nature. What strikes the observer at first is the simplicity of the geographical configuration of the United States. We set aside the Pacific basin, which, closely connected with the other sections of the confederation by political and social affinities, is separated from them by the Rocky Mountains and the plains which guard the approaches of that wild and desolate chain to the eastward. Those spacious deserts, which the emigrant crosses without settling, envelop the new States, where he goes to seek his fortune, with a belt that is impassable for large armies. No great natural divisions are to be met between the foot of the Rocky Mountains and the Atlantic borders. There is but one solitary range of mountains to be seen—that of the Alleghanies, of great length, but deficient in altitude, extending from north-east to south-west, and consequently not presenting diversities of climate; intersected by numerous rivers of considerable size, divided throughout its whole extent by large and fertile val-

leys, but without the snowy crown of the Alps and the Pyrenees, and devoid, therefore, of all that can render a chain of mountains a real barrier and a political boundary. The American rivers, slow and deep, easily navigable, instead of being an obstacle, are so many open highways for war as well as for commerce. The general aspect of America, therefore, is grand and imposing, but singularly monotonous and uniform, and very different from that of Europe, where Nature and man have vied with each other in producing striking varieties of form. It is easy to take in at one glance the collective features of that country; but the details of its different parts are so much alike that the observer can with difficulty identify any of them. Under the artificial divisions of States and counties traced by rule and line across hundreds of leagues, where no historical associations exist, and which make a perfect checker-board of the map; between towns and villages whose names, by turns classical and vulgar, are so frequently repeated that they become a useless embarrassment to the memory, nothing can be distinguished but a network of water-courses more entangled than the blood-vessels of the human body. It is a country possessing an even surface, with equal undulations throughout its whole extent, and covered with forests that collect the dampness and stock it in a multitude of valleys. Except among the Alleghanies, no clearly defined division of waters occurs, no large table-lands nor open spaces, no deep depressions, so that on nearing the Atlantic the level of the ground gradually lowers, until land and sea become interlaced; the smallest valleys are transformed into estuaries and the faintest undulations into long peninsulas. It is not a part of our subject to point out the effect of this configuration upon the political condition of America. Being without the long and bloody history of Europe, and not divided between different races or hostile civilizations, she has not witnessed the formation of artificial frontiers upon her soil, to take the place of those natural divisions that are at variance with them. The same single people have spread over a uniform territory, and have everywhere implanted the same institutions. And by a truly providential coincidence, the day when the immensity of her domain might have weakened the bonds of her unity, railways were introduced which averted the impending

danger. Thanks to them, New Orleans is to-day nearer New York than Marseilles was to Havre forty years ago, when France could count as many inhabitants as constitute the population of the United States at the present time. It is wrong, therefore, to suppose that the extent of their territory is an obstacle in the way of their commercial development and a cause for political dissolution.

But it is otherwise in a military point of view. The distances, the nature of the country, and the condition of its settlements, interpose extraordinary difficulties to the great movements of armies and their manœuvres on the battle-field. The population is distributed very differently from what it is in Europe. While centuries of war, of violence, and oppression have concentrated the inhabitants of the Old World in cities and villages, peace, safety, and freedom have induced the settlers of America to spread themselves over the surface of the country; and each of them settling down upon the patch of land which he has undertaken to clear with his individual resources, the rural families, instead of drawing near their neighbors and forming small straggling towns, have preferred an isolated country life. Since then, immense cities have undoubtedly sprung up in the free States—not as a consequence of public danger, but, on the contrary, as the natural results of accumulated wealth and powerful commerce; but in the matter of social organization, these cities play a totally different part from that of our great European centres. In America it is not the man from the country who goes to seek his fortune in the city; it is, on the contrary, the city people whom the hope of higher wages or of rapid profits draws into the country. Far from absorbing the vital forces of the nation, the city is only a vast reservoir from which they are poured over the whole country. Nor must it be forgotten that these great cities only exist in the Northern States. In the slave States, which have been the exclusive theatre of the war, prudence on one side, the demands for field-labor on the other, caused the servile population to be distributed among the vast plantations of their respective masters. So that in those States there are neither large cities nor villages; small towns are scarce, the chief county place being designated by a solitary building, generally situated at the intersection of two roads, and the Federal armies

had frequently to march for many long days without meeting with more than four houses together in the same clearing. Essentially expansive in its tendencies, the population of the United States, like a liquid which nothing can keep within bounds, has always spread itself over new tracts of land before it has completely settled those already occupied. Thus, in the slave States this slight sprinkling of white population represented in 1860 less than six inhabitants to every square kilometre, and the proportion of cultivated lands to the entire surface of the territory was only 16.07 per cent. in the South-eastern States and 10.17 per cent. in those of the South-west. During the eighty years which followed the war of Independence, this proportion was scarcely increased, while during the same period of time, the total population of the Republic increased tenfold. Forest and swamp are yet in exclusive possession of the eight or nine-tenths still undisturbed by man—the forest, ordinarily an assemblage of lofty trees mixed with coppice; the swamp, a woody marsh where the combined action of sun and water develops a powerful vegetation, the thickness of which interposes serious obstacles to the movements of armies.

To the natural difficulties which a too scanty population has not yet been able to overcome, there was added in the South the enervating influence of slavery. This fatal institution paralyzes that spirit of enterprise which, in the North, produces a striking contrast between the triumphs of industry and the splendors of a yet rebellious Nature only half conquered by civilization. Turn-pikes are few and poorly kept. The roads, laid out at random from clearing to clearing, over a rich soil easily softened, become impassable at the first rainfall. Magnificent rivers roll their unexplored waters through the great shadows of the virgin forest, as in the days when the canoe of the Indian was gently wafted upon their currents. There were no maps, or at least bad maps, which is even worse yet for the purposes of war. It appears that the drawings made by Washington during the leisure hours of his youth still constitute the best topographical charts of Virginia, and the only States which possess correct drawings of land-surveys are those most recently admitted into the Union, which, as Territories, were for some time under the jurisdiction of the Federal government and surveyed by Federal officers.

Those portions of America which were the earliest colonized are those whose geography is the most imperfect.

Another capital difficulty in the way of military operations arose from the fact that the products of the Southern States, especially during the early stages of the war, were not adapted for the subsistence of armies. The cotton-plant and the sugarcane reigned without rivals in the extreme South, and, more to the northward, tobacco. Virginia alone cultivated wheat to a great extent in the elevated valleys of the Alleghanies, but like the neighboring State of Kentucky, her principal product was the slave himself. She took him out of her infamous pens to supply the sugar and cotton plantations, and to repair the ravages of forced labor and an insatiable climate. This interior traffic, which an odious application of the politico-economical principle of the relations between supply and demand had developed since the suppression of the African slave-trade, had by a just retaliation struck a death-blow to the prosperity of those States. The production and raising of slaves, to which everything was sacrificed, had ruined agriculture by multiplying the number of useless mouths, without increasing the number of strong arms, which were constantly being exported into other markets. Consequently, at the opening of the war, the Southern States depended entirely for their flour and salt meats upon enormous importations from the Western States.

The vast blockade in which the North held them shackled during the war compelled them at last to make their own soil yield them the necessary means for sustaining life. Cotton, sugar, and tobacco, having lost their value, gave place to cereals, the cultivation of which, contrary to many predictions, spread and prospered as far as the warm plains of Georgia. It was alone owing to this change in the cultivation of the soil that the Confederate armies were able to subsist, but, at the same time, it deprived the South of one of her strongest defences, by rendering invasion easier.

Sherman understood this, and attempted, in 1865, that decisive march which, all other things being equal, he could not have undertaken two or three years before, across those States then exclusively devoted to the cultivation of cotton. And yet

his example affords no proof that an army can subsist in America upon the resources of the country it occupies. It was only by avoiding all stoppages, by always marching on, and constantly occupying a new section of country, that Sherman was able to get along for some time without the supplies forwarded from the Northern States. When the large American armies, proportioned not to the density of the population, but to its entire number, found themselves, with all the requirements of a refined civilization, in the midst of a country yet so little cultivated, they encountered difficulties unknown in our European wars, and which Washington, Rochambeau, and Cornwallis had formerly escaped, owing to the small number of their soldiers. The population is too limited to supply, out of its husbanded resources, the wants of such masses of men gathered together within a narrow space by the chances of war.

We have shown that this population does not form any agglomerated centres, where the products of the country are naturally brought together, and where armies can easily obtain supplies. The railways, which facilitate the circulation of such products and favor their exchange, have rendered dépôts where capital remains inactive—a thing always repugnant to an American—unnecessary, by carrying off at once all the fruits of the soil except what is strictly necessary for local consumption. Armies, therefore, except under peculiar and fleeting circumstances, are obliged to draw the largest portion of their supplies from sections of country remote from the seat of war. To concentrate provisions in the quiet and productive districts, to have these provisions safely forwarded to the dépôts stationed *en echelon* in the rear of the army, and by means of these dépôts to issue daily supplies to all the corps on their march,—such is the first requirement for conducting a campaign in America, and one of the most difficult problems which a general-in-chief has to solve. The almost entire absence of turnpikes, the necessity of subjecting the thousands of tons of provisions consumed daily by a large army to such long and complicated transits, limits the transportation by wagons considerably, and renders the powerful assistance of steam indispensable both by water and by rail.

These fruitful arteries, which have permitted the concentration,

at different points, of the resources of an immense territory, and whose life-bearing current has alone been able to feed those artificial and unproductive masses of humanity called armies, are so important that the Southern Confederacy died of inanition the very day it was deprived of their help. Hence the decisive influence of the combined system of these river and iron highways upon the conduct of the war; it traced in advance, so to speak, the route of armies, and indicated the points the possession of which they contended for. It is important, therefore, to a proper understanding of the manner in which the war was conducted, that we should offer a few remarks regarding this system, notwithstanding the little attraction geographical descriptions possess in general.

All travellers have vaunted the majesty of American rivers, but have failed to present an idea of their number. These rivers penetrate the continent in every direction, and are navigable at all times for a certain distance; but when the rainy season comes, the shallows disappear, the smallest tributaries are rapidly swollen, extending the limits of navigation to the very heart of the Union, and opening thereby an easy way of access to the steamboats that have come from the remotest parts of the continent. It is for this reason that the American journals always published a register of the water-marks of their great rivers as among the most important news-items of the war. The American steamboat, a huge flat-bottomed structure resembling a castle many stories high, with its strong engine and powerful wheels, can transport, in a single trip, enormous cargoes of provisions, ammunition, and even soldiers. An army *appuyée* upon one of these rivers can easily receive all the supplies it needs. So long as it controls the waters its resources are unlimited. Piers can easily be improvised from the forests which border the banks; upon this level highway no impediments are ever met with, no intermediate loadings or unloadings; the cargoes can be transported directly from the large cities of Cincinnati or St. Louis to the vicinity of the Federal camps on the banks of the Tennessee or the Mississippi, a distance of three or four hundred leagues from the point of departure.

Let us, in a few words, give an outline of the general configu

ration and the *ensemble* of those rivers in the States that were the theatre of the war.

The whole system of water-courses in that vast region of country may be divided into two parts, entirely distinct and separated by a long line, which, broken at a single point, extends from the banks of the Mississippi to those of the Potomac. Formed at first by an insignificant chain of hills, this line runs from west to east, from the great river to a point south of Chattanooga; leaving this point, it follows the chain of the Alleghanies, from south-west to north-east as far as the gap made by the Potomac, and to the boundary of the free States. To the south and south-east of this great division, the waters flow directly into the sea, emptying either into the Atlantic or into the Gulf of Mexico. On the opposite slope, these waters rush from every point of the horizon to meet again in the Mississippi, that immense and only drainage of half a continent. This dividing line, uninterrupted by any water communication, proved a very serious obstacle throughout the entire war.

The Atlantic basin is an elongated triangle extending between the Alleghanies and the sea, its highest elevation being on the estuary of the Potomac at Washington, and the base lying from Chattanooga to the peninsula of Florida, comprising the States that were the earliest colonized. The James, the Roanoke, the Savannah, the Altamaha, and other streams which descend from the mountains to lose themselves in deep bays or vast swamps, intersect this triangle perpendicularly to the coast.

A slight undulation of surface, connecting the Alleghanies with Florida, separates the Atlantic slope from that portion of the basin of the Gulf of Mexico which lies east of the Mississippi; it is a fertile country, very well watered, but more recently settled and less populated. Consequently, its importance in connection with the war was only secondary. Although Sherman crossed, near their sources in Georgia, the three large rivers which flow through the State from north to south, the Chattahoochee, the Alabama, and the Tombigbee, the fantastic names of the first and the last are still as little known as when they were only uttered by Indian warriors. The Alabama owes its celebrity, not to the insignificant battles fought upon its banks, but to the

chance which caused the same name to be bestowed upon the famous Confederate pirate whose fragments lie at the bottom of the sea not far from Cherbourg.

There are two not far apart points in the very centre of the continent, both situated on the borders of the Mississippi, which in their combination constitute one of those exceptional locations which, like the Bosphorus, seem to have been intended by a special favor of Nature for an extraordinary destiny. We allude to that magnificent rendezvous of the waters, descending from all the cardinal points, and forming between St. Louis and Cairo an immense river which afterwards runs into the sea without gathering any tributary of importance from the east, and only two from the west. St. Louis, whose French name recalls the period of our brief sway over those vast regions, and whose present prosperity reflects honor upon those sturdy colonists who had the sagacity to select that site on the very day following our disasters in Canada,—St. Louis is situated at the confluence of the Missouri, the Mississippi, and the Illinois, flowing from the west, the north-west, and the north.

At Cairo, her unfortunate rival, infected with fever, these rivers connect with the Ohio, the "*Beautiful River*," swelled by the Tennessee and other tributaries which pour into it from the south.

This wonderful concourse of waters greatly facilitates communications of all kinds, commercial intercourse as well as military operations.

The regions watered by these rivers were differently affected by the war; the borders of some were devastated, their hills made to bristle with cannon, their waters ploughed by armed vessels, and many lives sacrificed; while others had to supply the combatants with provisions and gather together the produce of rich and undisturbed districts for the use of the army.

The events we have narrated, which marked the line of separation between the belligerents, divided this vast basin into three parts.

One, situated north of the Ohio, that boundary between freedom and slavery so admirably described by De Tocqueville, comprised the rich Middle States, the granaries of America, and soon to be those of the whole world. It was to know nothing of the

war except through the accounts given by its sons, and by the absence of those who were doomed never again to revisit the domestic hearth.

The second extended along the right bank of the Mississippi, the home of the Indian and the buffalo, and the new country of the pioneer, the eternal enemy of both—a country the immensity of which seems to stimulate individual energy, and where the laws are as vague as its boundaries. There, under the influence of violent passions, the legal struggle which was going on elsewhere between slavery and free labor had already for some time assumed a fierce and sanguinary character, and the outposts of two hostile institutions, constantly facing each other, had anticipated the declaration of war by many years. So, no doubt, we shall see the still burning embers of that great conflagration lurking in their ashes for a long time to come. But, at the critical moment, the irregular warfare of which those too spacious regions were the theatre exercised no influence upon the great plan of military operations.

Finally, the third part, bounded on the west by the Mississippi, and on the north by the Ohio, comprising West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and portions of the neighboring States, was the territory the possession of which the Federals, taking the offensive, disputed with their adversaries. This almost virgin soil was to be trodden by the largest armies that were ever assembled on either side, and witnessed such torrents of human blood as it is the sad privilege of an advanced civilization to shed.

In those vast regions, some of the most decisive blows of the war have brought into unexpected notice the name of some humble settler of the wilderness who had helped to clear it with his own hands; while, by some singular coincidence, the mysterious meaning of some curious appellation, the only legacy left by an unhappy race, as a fatal prophecy to the country it had been dispossessed of, has been unravelled. When the Indian called one of the thousand rivulets which meander across the upper ridges of Georgia, Chickamauga, or "The River of Death," could he have foreseen, by a secret instinct, the fratricidal war which was to strike down the white men in expiation of their past crimes, and the autumnal evening which was to witness the destruction

of thirty thousand of his future enemies upon the borders of that insignificant stream?

The waters of this third part, the only one that has any interest for us, are all tributaries of the Ohio. Among all the important streams of this basin, however, two only, the Great Kanawha and the Kentucky, descend directly from the Alleghanies towards this river, and yet, their currents being too rapid to be long navigable, they possess no military importance. All the others begin by diverging from the course of the "Beautiful River," and meeting again in two large streams, the Cumberland and the Tennessee, which envelop the whole basin in two concentric curves at the south, only empty into the Ohio just before it loses itself in *the Father of Waters*. Thence extends a vast space without any rivers, separating the course of the Ohio and its fertile borders from the neighboring regions of the Alleghanies, and obliging those who desire to reach that country by water to follow the immense circuit of the Tennessee, the length of which is greater and navigable for a longer distance than the Cumberland.

There remains the great line, sinuous in its details, but straight in its general direction, which the Mississippi traces from the centre of the continent to the Gulf of Mexico, and the waters of which may mark a geographical division, but really constitute a powerful link between the Northern States whence they flow, and those of the South, in the centre of which they have opened a gap abundantly fertile.

Let us sum up in a few words this general view of American rivers. They may be divided into two parts—those that flow directly into the sea, and those which unite in forming the Mississippi. The former are divided into two distinct basins, that of the Atlantic and that of the Gulf of Mexico; the one of peculiar importance, the other comparatively insignificant in connection with the late war. In the vast basin of the Mississippi, composed of the latter, three regions may be observed—one to northward, whose territory was respected by the war; another to westward, yet almost a desert; and a third to south-eastward, which alone was the theatre of the great military operations.

The war we are about to describe has shown what great advan-

tage an army could derive from these rivers, especially when used in combination with railways; nor has the part of the latter been an unimportant one. In those sections of America which Nature has not supplied with navigable rivers, railways have been substituted to a certain extent, but they are far from possessing the same advantages. On the one hand, being constructed on principles of economy, they have only a single track, and consequently can only transport a limited amount of material; and besides their innumerable bridges and long viaducts being frail wooden structures, always at the mercy of a single spark, travel is liable to constant interruptions. An army in retreat easily destroys them in its rear, and compels the invader who wishes to pursue to reconstruct them under great disadvantages. In short, a happy *coup-de-main* is sufficient to cut them in the rear of an enemy even superior in numbers. But as these modes of conveyance for forwarding supplies are indispensable, the more precarious they are, the more carefully they require to be guarded, and consequently the greater their bearing upon the entire conduct of the war.

It is necessary, in order to render the narrative explicit, to explain the system of railways in the Southern States, which form three distinct groups in the three basins of the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Mississippi, with scarcely any connection between them.

In the first group we find three principal lines running nearly parallel to the coast. One, following the Alleghanies along their whole range, belongs strategically to this group, although its principal portion is situated upon the opposite slope of these mountains; isolated among their elevated valleys, it runs for a distance of nearly two hundred leagues between Lynchburg, where it connects with the Virginia lines, and Chattanooga, where it strikes again the railways of the Ohio basin; its length and direction prevent its being an effectual link between the two groups. The other two lines, on the contrary, are intersected by cross-roads forming numerous junctions, the names of which have nearly all figured in the war. Along the line which runs close to the shore, rounding the gulfs and striking the sea from port to port, it is sufficient to mention Richmond, Petersburg, Goldsborough, Wil-

mington, Charleston, and Savannah, where the track leaves the Atlantic basin to connect with that of the Mexican Gulf at Macon. Along the intermediate line between the mountains and the sea, we find the names of Manassas, Gordonsville, Burkesville, Greensborough, Columbia, Augusta, and finally Atlanta, which is its terminus. At Atlanta, the central point between the three groups, we also find, in another direction, the principal artery of the Gulf basin, together with an important branch which, availing itself of a gap in the Alleghanies, runs direct from Chattanooga to connect the group of the Ohio basin with the other two groups.

The States bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, more recently settled and less populated than those of the East, are naturally ill supplied with railways. Yet two lines contiguous to the Mississippi, and running parallel with its course, connect the great ports of Mobile and New Orleans with the Middle States; whilst another, having one terminus at Vicksburg on the Mississippi, and built during the war, for the purpose of opening easy communications with Texas, extends as far as Atlanta.

In the Ohio basin, the western part, already exclusively favored by water-courses, is alone in possession of railways. One line, single at first, which runs southward from Cincinnati and Louisville, forks successively at Bowling Green and Nashville, and further on at Hardinsville, and spreading out like an immense fan south of Cumberland, extends its numerous arms from the foot of the high cliffs which terminate the Alleghany range, at the very point where the navigation of the Tennessee commences—so appropriately called *Lookout Mountain*—as far as the banks of the Mississippi, to Columbus at the west, and to Memphis at the south.

A transversal line connecting the latter city with Chattanooga, and uniting the extremities of five branches of this fan, was not of the same importance for military operations as it had been before in a commercial point of view; being exposed in flank, it could easily be cut and rendered equally useless to both belligerents. More to eastward, the vast region of country comprised between the Ohio and the Alleghanies, already without navigable rivers, is also deprived of railways; it is the same with the section of country extending from the railway running

parallel with the Mississippi to the Chattanooga gap, and separating the Ohio basin from that of the Mexican Gulf.

Consequently, the railways found in that part of America which was the theatre of the war, form three groups corresponding with the three basins of the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico and the Ohio respectively. They are only connected by a few lines located at great distances from each other, leaving vast intervening spaces equally inaccessible to the locomotive and to the steamboat. These spaces, destitute of all means of communication, extend through the whole length of the Southern States, and separate them completely, dividing the waters into two great basins and the railways into two independent systems.

It is easy to conceive the bearing they had upon the war. They present, in fact, an insurmountable obstacle to the march of an army anxious to preserve its communications. From the vicinity of the Mississippi to the borders of the Potomac they form one continuous line, only once broken, in the centre, between Chattanooga and Atlanta. This was the weak point in the Southern armor which, after the loss of the Ohio basin, could have protected the heart of the rebel States, by compelling the Federals to attack them at either of the two extremities, through the borders of the Mississippi and the Chesapeake, or by landing upon an inhospitable coast. It was through this flaw in the cuirass that we shall see Sherman thrusting his formidable sword. It was owing to this railway from Chattanooga to Atlanta that he was able not only to reach the latter place, but to establish himself in it and make it the point of departure for his decisive campaign in Georgia.

But at the time of which we are speaking, it was in the vicinity of the Ohio that the conflict was about to begin, and the division we have laid down in the network of rivers and railways will share in the first military operations in three distinct zones, each of which will have the banks of one of these rivers as the scene of action.

As we progress with our narrative, the very examples it furnishes will demonstrate more clearly than anything we could say in this place, the importance and the special use to be made of the ways of communication both by water and rail. We shall therefore confine ourselves to a few words in justification of the

foregoing lengthy description, and to show that it was an indispensable introduction to the history of the war.

We shall see the rivers performing a double part in the strategic movements. On the one hand, they secure unlimited resources for revictualling the armies, being accessible to an indefinite number of steamers, which can convey the supplies and reinforcements that are needed. On the other hand, they afford armies powerful means for assuming the offensive, by enabling ships of war to support their movements and protect their lines of communication in proportion as they are extended. Railways, on the contrary, with their limited capacity for transportation, are an instrument purely defensive; they cannot support the movements of an aggressor, who is obliged to regulate his march according to the greater or lesser rapidity with which they can be reconstructed.

The two essential requisites, therefore, for directing the movements of an army are—first, to secure a safe channel of transportation for its supplies, and then to know how far it can venture from the river or the railway by means of which those supplies are received. Consequently, while in those countries that abound in provisions, like Europe, an army extends its lines for the purpose of procuring sustenance, and concentrates to fight, in America, the larger the army, the greater the necessity for concentration in order to obtain provisions; because, being able to procure scarcely anything from the country it occupies, the more its lines are extended, the more difficult it becomes for those who are at a distance from their only sources of supply to procure food.

In order to calculate the distance to which an army may venture from the dépôts established at the railway stations or river landings which constitute the base of its operations, we must begin by premising that there are no roads, in the European sense of the term, which can connect this base with the various positions occupied by the army. Cross-roads disappear rapidly under the combined effects of the first rain and the incessant passing of wagons; new ones have to be opened across fields and woods, and these must be kept constantly in order, to prevent their being rendered impassable at the end of a few days. The number of mouths to be fed is the criterion by which to determine this dis-

tance; for, on the one hand, a road can only be made available for a certain number of wagons, while on the other, even if several practicable roads be opened, an army cannot be accompanied by an unlimited number of wagons without embarrassing all its movements.

At the beginning of the war the American soldier consumed nearly three pounds of food per day; if to this we add ammunition of every kind, personal accoutrements, and all that is necessary for the maintenance of troops, it will be readily admitted that the average weight of articles to be transported for the necessities of a large American army is about four pounds daily to each man, without counting the food for horses and mules, which amounts to about twenty-five pounds for each animal. The American wagon, drawn by six mules, carries a load of 2000 pounds, sufficient, therefore, to supply 500 men, provided it can make the trip daily, going and returning, between the army and its dépôts. If the distance to be traveled is such as to require a whole day's march, one day being lost in returning empty, it will only be able to supply 500 men every other day, or 250 daily. To go a distance of two days' march from its base of operations is a very small matter for an army that is manœuvring in front of the enemy, and yet, according to this computation, it will require four wagons to supply 500 men with provisions, or eight for 1000, and consequently 800 for 100,000 men. If this army of 100,000 men has 16,000 cavalry and artillery horses, a small number comparatively speaking, 200 more wagons will be required to carry their daily forage, and, therefore, 800 to transport it to a distance of two days' march. These 1600 wagons are, in their turn, drawn by 9600 mules, which, also consuming twenty-five pounds during each of the three days out of four they are away from the dépôt, require 360 wagons more to carry their forage; these 360 wagons are drawn by 2400 animals, and in order to transport the food required by the latter, 92 additional wagons are necessary. Adding twenty wagons more, for general purposes, we shall find that 2000 wagons, drawn by 12,000 animals, are strictly necessary to victual an army of 100,000 men and 16,000 horses at only two days' march from its base of operations. In the same proportion, if

this army finds itself separated from its base of operations by three days' march, 3760 wagons, drawn by 22,000 animals, will be found indispensable for that service. This calculation does not take into account the difficulties in the way of transportation; for if these wagons are necessary to convey the materials as far as the dépôts of the division, the others are required to distribute them afterwards among the regiments; an army, in fact, is obliged to keep a number of such wagons constantly with it in order to secure a certain degree of mobility and to be able to send a few detachments forward, accompanied by a wagon-train carrying several days' provisions. Thus an American army of 100,000 men with nearly 4000 wagons, from 2000 to 3000 of which pass and repass over three or four parallel roads, the distance of two days' march, or about forty or fifty kilometres, had established for it, during the war, the utmost distance to which it could venture from its base of operations, while continuing to receive its supplies from that source.

In an offensive campaign, therefore, an army cannot go beyond two days' march without at the same time removing its dépôts. If it follows a line of railway, it must stop and wait for the repairing of the track as far as the new point where it wishes to establish them. If its line of march lies contiguous to a river, it is generally accompanied by a fleet of transports, which, by reason of their flat bottoms, can be run upon any beach and their cargoes speedily landed. If it has to pass through a country deprived of easy communications, it may abandon the base of operations upon which it has rested and go in search of another; this apparently bold movement proved successful with all those who tried it, either for the purpose of striking the head of some railway already occupied by friendly troops, or for securing new positions on the margin of some distant river, where the fleet could again overtake the army and revictual it. By thus advancing its base of operations on the same line, or by changing from one line to another, the wagons were relieved of two trips; and by taking them along loaded with provisions, it doubled the number of days during which the troops could march in an enemy's country. A certain number of rations in the haversack of each soldier increased the number of days, while herds of cattle, at the season of the

year when they could find pasturage in the vicinity of the army, afforded a supplementary resource. In proportion as he acquired experience in war, the Federal soldier became more sober, more sparing of his rations, and learnt at the same time to carry a heavier load on his shoulders. Among the necessary elements for calculating the number of days he could remain separated from his dépôts, there are some, as will be seen, which are essentially variable. We shall confine ourselves, in regard to these, to the figures furnished by the experience of the same army at two different epochs of the war. In October, 1862, McClellan being desirous to move his quarters from the head of one line of railway to another, as we will show presently, with an army of 122,000 men—an operation which might oblige him to subsist for ten days without any other supplies than those he carried with him,—these supplies were transported by a train of 1830 wagons. These wagons were drawn by 10,980 animals; there were besides 5046 cavalry horses, and 6836 belonging to the artillery; in order to carry ten days' complete rations of forage for these animals, it required a second train, with an addition of 17,832 beasts, which had to supply the 40,664 horses or mules which in some capacity or other thus followed the army, with half rations, the country through which that army passed having to furnish the rest. This enormous figure only comprised the transportation of provisions, exclusive of ammunition and of the sick and wounded. In May, 1864, this same army was of nearly the same strength, numbering 125,000 men, 29,945 cavalry horses, and 4046 belonging to officers, 4300 wagons, and 835 ambulances—56,499 animals in all—when it took the field under the command of Grant, prepared to fight and march for three weeks, if necessary, before re-joining any of its dépôts. The rations had been greatly diminished, and the soldiers were accustomed to carry heavy loads; they had three full rations in their knapsacks and three days' allowance of biscuits in their haversacks; each wagon having capacity for 1400 small rations, the train could furnish ten days' provisions and forage, while the droves of beef-cattle that accompanied the army provided for three more. So that, while McClellan had only provisions for ten days at the utmost, two years later, Grant, with the same army and the same resources, was able to take with him

sixteen days' supply. These figures fully show that experience in the war had succeeded in rendering certain operations possible which, in the beginning, were not so with the improvised troops whose first campaigns we are about to narrate.

The amount of transportation that can be effected by means of railways enters as a no less important element in the movements of armies, and will prove a source of embarrassment when those armies are large and depend upon a single line for their supplies. Frequent examples of this will appear in our narrative; consequently, the organization of the railway service, and the skill with which all its details were regulated, contributed essentially to success during this difficult war. We will only cite one instance at present—that of Hooker's army, 23,000 strong, which in 1863 was transported with all its *matériel*, its horses and wagons, from the Rapidan to Stevenson in Alabama, a distance of nearly 2000 kilometres, by rail in seven days. This shows the great services railways were able to render by concentrating an army on any given point of the continent; but it was much easier to accomplish a movement of this kind than to supply a large army daily with provisions at the terminus of one of those long single-track lines which run through the Southern States; in fact, their rude construction required constant repairs, and consequently occasioned frequent interruptions, so that beyond a certain distance, varying naturally according to circumstances, they were not sufficient to transport the required supply without the aid of another line, or, better still, of a river.

Naturally, the amount of transportation that could be made by water was only limited by the number of vessels at hand. But, as we have said before, the rivers afford at once the best means for provisioning an army, and a powerful auxiliary for all offensive operations. We shall always find, therefore, that whenever the Federals were supported by a river, their progress was certain and their conquests decisive; whilst the successes they obtained by following a simple line of railways were always precarious, new dangers springing up in their rear in proportion as they advanced. The revictualling of an army in sight of the enemy

by a fleet of transports, the bombardment of fortified places, constructed for the purpose of impeding navigation, and the naval battles fought upon the rivers will occupy so considerable a space in the history of this war, that the combined operations by land and water may be regarded as imparting to it an entirely distinctive character among all modern wars. The appellation of *fresh-water sailor*, instead of being a term of contempt, should be in America a mark of honorable distinction.

A few words at the conclusion of this chapter will suffice to convey an idea of the causes which imparted a strategic importance to certain points situated along the water-courses or line of railways. The latter being everywhere vulnerable, and not admitting of defence by means of posts throughout their whole extent, it was found necessary to fortify stations at the intersection of several lines, chosen because they were the most convenient places for dépôts, and because whoever was in possession of them could at once intercept all the lines which crossed at such points. The great American rivers, on the contrary, being never liable to obstruction, the most important points to occupy along their courses were those where it was most easy to erect batteries which could, by their fire, interrupt the navigation; these were generally the cliffs which rise in certain localities above the low flats which border nearly all the rivers of the new continent, for, from their height, they protected the batteries which crowned their summits, from the fire of gun-boats.

It will be seen, in short, that the most important points were those at which one or more lines of railway crossed a navigable river or were arrested by its banks; for it was at such points that those immense supplies which were afterwards to be conveyed by rail to the armies in the interior were to arrive by water.

These two modes of communication, which we may be pardoned for having dwelt upon at such length, were therefore so combined and perfected as to render possible the concentration of such armies as America had never before seen. Consequently, these armies could not separate themselves from these points of communication for any length of time—a singular circumstance which was to exercise a powerful and abiding influence on the war.

We have shown in advance how the combatants learnt by degrees to take the greatest possible advantage of these ways of communication. It will be seen a little later how dearly that experience cost them.

After this necessary digression, we resume our narrative at the moment when the conflict is about to commence in earnest.

CHAPTER II.

BULL RUN.

ON the 4th of July, 1861, the anniversary of the foundation of the United States, an extra session of the new Congress which had been elected a few months before was convened by Mr. Lincoln, and assembled in the Capitol at Washington. Never had the representatives of the nation met under such grave circumstances. Four months had elapsed since Mr. Lincoln had taken the constitutional oath in that same edifice, and the sad forebodings which at that time alarmed all true patriots had been realized. The insurgents had fired the first shot; they had carried with them nearly all the slave States; their sentinels, stationed in the woods adjoining the Potomac, watched the capital; war had commenced, and it imposed upon the Federal government the colossal task of reconquering one-third of the national territory. But, on the other hand, the States loyal to the Union had not been shaken either by the solicitations of the insurgents or by their constitutional theories; they had displayed a determination to undergo every sacrifice in defence of the Republic, and had already raised 300,000 men for that object; they had found a chief who loyally represented their sentiments, and whose only care was to perform the duties incumbent upon him with firmness.

Mr. Lincoln had shown no weakness when treason surrounded him on every side. Having measured the magnitude of the danger, he had taken extraordinary steps to avert it; he had issued two calls for volunteers, and had authorized expenses for their equipment which the budget had not contemplated; he had, in short, yielded to the necessity of suspending the ordinary guarantees of personal liberty in order to maintain his authority in cities like Baltimore and St. Louis, where it had been assailed by armed force. Owing to these measures, the insurrection had been limited and deprived of some of the most important strategic positions.



THE FIELD OF BULL RUN.

Burk & M^{rs} Petridge Lith Phil^a

Scale of $\frac{1}{125,000}$

Scale: $\frac{250}{1000}$ in = 1 Mile.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Kilometers.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Miles.

The armies destined to participate in this struggle were being rapidly organized, and 50,000 soldiers already protected the capital. But the President made haste to have his acts legalized by the national representatives, and to ask for additional means to meet the exigencies of a war the proportions of which could not then be realized.

The insurgent States having sent neither Senators nor Representatives to Washington, only twenty-three States were represented in the Senate, and twenty-two, with one Territory, in the other house. The Unionists, composed principally of Republicans and a small number of War Democrats, were therefore absolutely in the ascendant in both of these assemblies, and assured the President of the energetic support and co-operation of Congress.

The accord between these two parties was the best refutation of the sinister predictions gratuitously circulated by the enemies of the great American democracy, who announced its impending dissolution to the Old World. It was, above all, the best answer to the attitude assumed by most of the European governments, who, before the commencement of hostilities, had with unseemly haste exercised their right to proclaim their neutrality. In reference to a civil war such as we are about to describe, this right was certainly unquestionable; the importance of that war rendered it incumbent upon them to prescribe and point out to their citizens the duties of neutrality. But the real wrong committed by them towards America was in openly tolerating a violation of that neutrality. In recognizing the belligerent rights of the insurgents even before the latter had become belligerents, they had prejudged a question which did not lie within their province; they had exhibited feelings of hostility towards a great nation; they had distrusted her at a moment when she was making patriotic efforts to preserve her unity; and if they did not overstep the limits prescribed by the strict requirements of international law, they had nevertheless made a great political mistake.

The French government was to find a powerful argument in favor of Cæsarism in the misfortunes of a liberal democracy, and its wishes for the success of the insurgents were not a matter of secret to any one. Public opinion in England was very much

divided; the great majority of the higher classes and most of the public journals, actuated by old antipathies and dreading the triumph of democratic ideas, were openly hostile to the cause of the North; the radical party, on the contrary, and all the working classes, manifested the liveliest sympathy for it. The attitude of the radicals and the workingmen prevented the English government from recognizing the independence of the new Confederacy, notwithstanding the solicitations of France, who, it is said, was even ready to propose to interfere conjointly with Great Britain in American affairs. But the latter power hastened to issue a proclamation of neutrality on the 13th of May, a few days before the arrival in London of the new representative of the United States; and as if to prevent any explanations which Mr. Adams might have wished to offer. The French government followed this example on the 11th of June. America, therefore, who had a right to rely upon the sympathies of abolitionist England in her struggle with slavery, and upon those of the land of Rochambeau and La Fayette, in her efforts to preserve the work of Washington, only found in the governments of those two countries doubting spectators, who like the friends of Job were ready to take advantage of her misfortunes in order to teach her a lesson. Russia, on the contrary, being more shrewd, hastened to tender her those assurances of deep interest to which, in the hour of great trial, nations are as sensitive as individuals, and showed thereby a political foresight in striking reproof of the other European powers.

The partisans of the insurgents, who under the name of Peace Democrats followed the lead of Mr. Breckenridge in the Senate, and of Mr. Vallandigham in the other house, formed only a small minority in Congress. Their efforts, therefore, to thwart the measures of the government in support of the war were to prove fruitless. The Senators from the rebel States, who, instead of repairing to Washington, had entered the service of the insurrection, were deprived of their seats; the extraordinary measures adopted by Mr. Lincoln were sanctioned; the increase of the regular army and navy and the necessary expenses for constructing railways and military telegraphs were approved; a loan of two hundred and fifty million dollars was authorized, pending the adoption of

more complete fiscal measures; and on the 13th of July, Congress began to discuss the most important of all the laws which the urgency of the situation required—that authorizing a large additional levy of volunteers. In the second volume we shall return to the legislative labors of this session and of those which followed. Setting aside for the present the discussion of the military law, which was to occupy Congress for some time, although the issue had never been doubtful, we shall now follow the military operations to which, since the early part of July, McClellan had given a fresh impulse in West Virginia.

This region is divided into two sections—on one side, an undulating plateau, fertile and well watered, extending between the Ohio and the mountains; on the other, the region of the Alleghanies, composed of long parallel ridges, enclosing deep valleys—a wild country, without roads and easy to defend.

As we have already stated, the troops sent by the State of Ohio had, after a few skirmishes, occupied all the northern part of the plateau, and covered the line of railways which crosses it. But the Confederates were preparing to dispute once more the possession of this region of country. They had massed troops along the lower course of the Great Kanawha, a river which, running from east to west, divides the plain into two parts, and General Garnett, while waiting for reinforcements from Richmond, had posted himself along the westernmost ridge of the mountain region; he thus faced to the west, occupying the passes whence he could descend upon his adversary, and resting his rear upon a country easily defended. This ridge, which extends from south to north, separates the large and rich valley of the upper Monongahela from two of the principal tributaries of its lower course—the Tygart Valley River and the Cheat River—and bears successively the names of Rich Mountain at the south and Laurel Hill at the north: the general direction of all these waters is from south to north. The great turnpike, which runs through the centre of Virginia and descends afterward into the valley of the Monongahela, passes behind the Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill ridge, first through the two villages of Beverly, and of Leedsville more to northward. This is the turnpike which Garnett undertook to cover, and he occupied the only two passes where roads

starting from these two villages cross Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill to descend into the plain. These passes were defended by *abatis* and earthworks furnished with artillery. Garnett had stationed Colonel Pegram with 2000 men in the first of these passes, and had himself taken a position in the second with the rest of his forces, amounting to about 3000 men. This position, naturally very strong, had the disadvantage of lying parallel with the road it had to cover; to pierce it at a single point, therefore, sufficed to cut off the retreat of the troops who occupied it. McClellan determined to do this as soon as he had a sufficient force to take the offensive.

Toward the end of June he found himself at the head of five brigades, composed, it is true, of entirely new troops, whose organization left much to be desired. It was, however, necessary to act; Cox's brigade was sent to the lower Kanawha to watch the enemy massed on that side, with whom it only had some trifling engagements; Hill's brigade remained to guard the railways and the posts which connected West Virginia with the troops stationed along the upper Potomac; finally, McClellan divided the forces with which he intended to attack Garnett and Pegram into two columns. The first, composed of Morris's brigade, occupied Philippi, on the road leading to Leedsville by way of Laurel Hill: it was determined that this column should make a demonstration against that position so as to draw Garnett's attention, while the other was to cut off his retreat by taking possession of Rich Mountain, where he had committed the error of not concentrating the bulk of his forces. McClellan intended to conduct this operation in person with the brigades of Schleich and Rosecrans; these brigades were posted at Buckannon, a village where the road running from Beverly through the defile of Rich Mountain crosses that branch of the Monongahela which lower down waters the town of Philippi. This small army, numbering about 10,000 men, took up its line of march on the 6th of July, and on the 10th, after some insignificant encounters, McClellan, whose troops were ranged along the slopes of Rich Mountain, found himself before the works occupied by Pegram. Not wishing to attack them in front with inexperienced soldiers, he detached Rosecrans upon his right, on the morning of the 11th, to turn their flank and take them in rear.

A path, only accessible to foot-soldiers, wound up the sides of Rich Mountain, south of the defile where the road from Beverly to Buckannon passes. Rosecrans, leaving his artillery behind him, was to follow this path—which the enemy would not probably dream of defending—with 2000 men, and, once on the summit of the ridge, was to proceed in a northerly direction to the defile in order to descend by the road and attack Pegram's positions in rear. As soon as the sound of musketry was heard, the troops stationed at the foot of those positions were to attack them in front, thus hemming in the enemy on all sides. After a very fatiguing march the young soldiers of Rosecrans reached the summit of the mountain without striking a blow; but before they had time to gain the defile, they were attacked by the enemy, to whom an intercepted dispatch had revealed their movement, and who had sent five or six hundred men to stop them. They fought this detachment, but, being exhausted by fatigue, they remained on the spot where the conflict had taken place, and allowed the whole day to pass without availing themselves of the advantage thus gained in order to complete the prescribed movement. McClellan, whom Rosecrans had neglected to inform of this delay, waited the whole day in vain for the signal agreed upon, and, on the following morning, all that he found before him were the deserted intrenchments. On finding himself taken in flank, Pegram had sought the means of escape from the danger that threatened him in a hasty retreat; but most of his soldiers disbanded, and he wandered about during two days with the remnants of his brigade, trying in vain to effect a junction with Garnett. Finally, McClellan, having preceded him to Beverly, on the Leedsville road, occupied the former village on the 12th of July, and on the following day Pegram and six hundred of his companions were compelled to lay down their arms.

While his lieutenant was being dislodged from Rich Mountain, Garnett allowed himself to be amused by Morris at Laurel Hill, little dreaming of the danger that threatened him. Fortunately for him, he was informed by Pegram of the evacuation of Rich Mountain on the very night it took place. Without losing a minute, he abandoned Laurel Hill in his turn before daybreak, and proceeded in great haste towards Beverly, where he hoped to

join Pegram and find the southern route still open to him. But McClellan had preceded him there by a few hours with a force which the Confederate general did not deem it prudent to attack. The position of the latter was critical in the extreme. He had become entangled in a narrow pass between the two impassable ridges of Rich Mountain and Cheat Mountain; he found its southern extremity, through which he might have reached the interior of Virginia, in possession of the enemy, while the troops who watched him at Laurel Hill had only to follow in his tracks in order to surround him completely. He could find no means of escape except to the northward, by descending the valley of Cheat River through difficult roads, and striking the frontier of Maryland in order to force his way into the upper gorges of the Alleghanies. Retracing his steps as soon as he was apprised of the presence of McClellan at Beverly, he had the good fortune to pass once more through Leedsville before Morris, who had not watched him sufficiently, had arrived there from Laurel Hill. But his troops, exhausted by the rapid countermarch, soon fell into disorder. Morris, who had reached Leedsville shortly after him, harassed his retreat, and finally overtook him at Carricksford, twelve kilometres below St. George, just as he was crossing Cheat River. The Confederates succeeded in placing the river between them and their assailants, but left in their hands all their artillery, their baggage, and about fifty prisoners.

Garnett himself was killed while bravely endeavoring to repair the disaster. This old regular officer was the first general who lost his life in the war. After his death his soldiers dispersed, thus baffling the efforts of the Federals, who were too much fatigued to continue long in pursuit; and at the end of an eight days' campaign, McClellan was able to announce to his government that the Federal authority was re-established in West Virginia, and that the Confederates had even abandoned the borders of the Great Kanawha.

This campaign had moreover delivered into his hands more than one thousand prisoners and all the war-material of the enemy, and had only cost him a few hundred men. His plan had been well conceived, vigorously executed, and a complete success had crowned this first essay in strategy. He had the good fortune to have a rather meagre army to manage, although supe-

rior in number to that of the enemy: its smallness enabled it to subsist in a very poor country, and he had the rare merit of leading inexperienced troops successfully through marches and countermarches. We have seen, however, that these troops, in consequence of their having halted too soon for rest, came near losing him all the fruits of the campaign.

The possession of West Virginia could have no important bearing upon the war, because that country, having neither water-courses nor railways, was inaccessible to large armies; but McClellan's successes had a great moral effect; they stimulated the ardor of the North, while contributing at the same time to create certain illusions in regard to the speedy termination of the war.

During this short campaign, Patterson, whom we have left in Maryland in front of the Shenandoah Valley, had resumed the offensive, in pursuance of instructions from Scott, and had thus detained the forces which the Confederates might have detached from Johnston's corps stationed at Winchester, to send them to Garnett's assistance.

The best portion of his small army, as we have already stated, having been ordered to Washington towards the middle of June, he was compelled to evacuate Harper's Ferry and recross the Potomac. But he was speedily rejoined by several newly-formed regiments, with the promise of additional reinforcements, which would increase his army to a total of 20,000 men. Although these troops were badly organized, poorly disciplined, and entirely inexperienced, their numerical superiority over the forces opposed to them enabled Patterson to retake possession of the important line of railway he had abandoned a short time before, together with the positions of Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg. On the 2d of July he forded the Potomac at Williamsport, and, eight kilometres beyond that point, on the borders of the stream of Falling Waters, his advance-guard met a brigade of the enemy's infantry commanded by General Jackson, who was subsequently to acquire such great celebrity, and the cavalry of Stuart, a friend of the latter, doomed to perish like him, while leaving a reputation almost equal to his own.

The first feats of arms of these two illustrious officers in behalf of the cause they had just espoused were not fortunate.

Cut up by the Federal artillery, which was better served than their own, they were obliged, on the arrival of Abercrombie's brigade, to beat a speedy retreat, only stopping at Bunker's Hill, between Martinsburg and Winchester, where they found reinforcements forwarded in haste by Johnston. Patterson, on his part, was satisfied with this advantage, and did not advance beyond Martinsburg. His forces, unprovided with means of transportation, were in no condition to continue the campaign. Some of his artillerymen openly declared it was their intention to leave him at the end of their term of service, which was about to expire in a few days. At length, on the 14th, having been apprised by Scott of McDowell's intended movement, he advanced, at the head of about 14,000 men, on Bunker's Hill and Charlestown. Not venturing to attack Johnston, who was intrenched at Winchester with forces outnumbering his own, he hoped at least to occupy the latter's attention, and so prevent him from joining Beauregard. In this he succeeded for a few days, until the 18th, which was the date fixed by Scott for the attack on Manassas; and, as the sequel will show, if that attack had not been postponed, the Southern generals would not have been able to effect their junction.

The combats we have hitherto described were evidently the mere preludes to those more serious conflicts which public opinion at the North was impatient to see commence. It had been exasperated at first by the check experienced at Big Bethel; then McClellan's campaign supervened to inspire it with overweening confidence; it believed that a single victory would suffice to bring back the repentant South into the bosom of the Union. This delusion regarding the possible duration of the war was shared, moreover, by the Confederates themselves, and the volunteers who were rushing from every quarter of the South to rally around the standard of Beauregard entertained no doubt but that one great effort would suffice to open to them the gates of Washington and secure the recognition of their new republic; they little foresaw the harassing campaigns that were in store for them, or the defeats that brought ruin to their cause, and which very few among them lived to witness.

The small armies of Butler, McClellan, and Patterson having already fought the enemy, the North could not understand the

inactivity of the much larger forces assembled at Washington under the command of McDowell. No one suspected then that, at no distant day, it would require 200,000 combatants to ensure the safety of the capital; and yet, in the estimation of some people, 35,000 men seemed already to constitute a considerable army. Confidence, which, when pushed to excess, does not allow the difficulties of an undertaking to be duly weighed, had contributed to the rapid formation of this army, and stimulated the ardor with which the North called her military forces into existence. This extreme confidence was certainly the cause of more than one reverse and many illusions to the American nation, and if it had not rested upon manly virtues, it would have been both ridiculous and fatal; but, sustained as it was in America by indomitable will and perseverance, it commands respect, for it creates great nations.

The troops gathered in haste around Washington were composed of most heterogeneous elements; they were volunteers some of whom had already been for two months and a half under drill with only fifteen days longer to serve; others who were enlisted for three years, but utterly ignorant of their trade; there were one battalion and three batteries belonging to the regular army, a certain number of batteries attached to volunteer regiments, with only a few squadrons of cavalry, mostly regulars. The five small divisions into which these troops had been apportioned were scarcely formed, notwithstanding the efforts of Generals Tyler and Runyon and Colonels Hunter, Heintzelman, and Miles, who had been placed in command of them; the administrative departments were being slowly organized, the chiefs having had no time to become acquainted with their subordinates; the staff, which was the more necessary because no reliance could be placed upon the personal experience of regimental officers, was scarcely in existence. The regular officers, who filled the most important positions, could not attend to all the details of the service nor correct the ignorance of an entire army. They fully understood, therefore, how little that army was able to undertake an offensive campaign, and no one felt this more keenly than McDowell himself, upon whom the responsibility of such an undertaking was about to rest. But public opinion was an inexorable

master who commanded him to march on to Richmond, and he had to obey.

Neither the good sense nor the experience of General Scott had any power to resist the impetuous current. The government of the White House, beset by impatient members of Congress, feared lest further temporizing should chill the military ardor of the North, and preferred the chances of a disaster to the political difficulties that inaction created. When McDowell alleged the *greenness* of his troops, as they say in English, the reply was, "You are green, undoubtedly, but the enemies are green also,—you are all green."* And when he assembled his troops for the purpose of manœuvring them, cries rose on every side against the general whom they accused of seeking to pave the way for a dictatorship. Unable to persuade his superiors that with troops incapable of regular marches, and without sufficient means of transportation, all the advantage would be on the side of the party that could wait for his adversary in a defensive position, he made up his mind to execute the orders given him with as much zeal as if he had counted on success.

No one was better able to render that success possible than himself, in spite of so many disadvantages. Partly educated in France and perfectly acquainted with our literature, he had thoroughly studied the military profession, and, since the Mexican campaign, had shown excellent administrative talents on General Scott's staff. Possessed of indefatigable energy, his creative mind made up, to a certain extent, for the inefficiency of the instruments he had to handle, and the plan he had formed for attacking the Confederates at Bull Run shows, despite the results of that disastrous campaign, the correctness of his military *coup-d'oeil*.

A few words are necessary in this place to describe the ground upon which the first pitched battle of the war was fought.

The parallel ridges of the Alleghanies, which extend from south-west to north-east, crossing the whole of Virginia and Maryland, are divided by two deep gaps, through which the waters from the mountains force a passage, forming two rivers, both of which empty into the large bay of the Chesapeake; northward, the Potomac waters the gorges of Harper's Ferry,

* Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. ii. p. 38.

in which we shall see more than one combat take place, and thence runs down to Washington; the James River, winding round the high mountains called Beaver Peaks, crosses Appomattox county, where Lee will capitulate, and after passing Richmond, falls into the Chesapeake, near Fortress Monroe. The Valley of Virginia, already frequently mentioned, an open and well-cultivated country, between two parallel chains of the Alleghanies, extends from the vicinity of the James to the banks of the Potomac. The eastern barrier of this valley, known by the name of the Blue Ridge, is intersected by deep defiles called *gaps*, situated at about equal distances from each other, and all traversed by good roads.

The country extending eastward, between the Blue Ridge and the Chesapeake, is undulating, covered with old forests or young pine trees, the only produce that a soil, exhausted by the cultivation of the tobacco-plant, is now able to bring forth; the population is thinly scattered; the soil, clayey and impermeable, is easily converted by the action of vehicles into mud, both soft and sticky, which was to be one of the most formidable enemies to the armies having to campaign in Virginia; a multitude of water-courses wind among the wooded ravines, between hillocks, the highest of which have been for the most part cleared; all these water-courses finally form two rivers, the Rappahannock and the York, which run in a parallel course towards the Potomac, and, like the latter, fall into Chesapeake Bay.

The nature of the ground, the absence of turnpikes, the small quantity of arable lands, and the very direction of the waters—everything, in short, renders an offensive campaign especially difficult in that country. There are very few railways. Two lines run from the shores of the Potomac to Richmond. One, starting from Aquia Creek, halfway between Washington and the mouth of the river, runs direct to the capital of Virginia, after crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. The other leaves Alexandria, opposite Washington, and running south-westerly reaches Gordonsville, where it forks. One branch, following the same direction along the foot of the Blue Ridge, connects with the great Tennessee line at Lynchburg by way of Charlottesville; the other branch, bending to the east and run-

ning parallel with the tributaries of York River, strikes the first line again near one of these tributaries, and without merging into it, never leaves it until Richmond is reached. Two branches of the Alexandria and Lynchburg line switch off to enter the Valley of Virginia; one at Charlottesville, which debouches at Staunton, near the sources of the Shenandoah, and breaks off a little beyond that point; the other, much more to the north, at about forty-five kilometres from Alexandria, which ascends the valley after crossing the Blue Ridge at Manassas Gap. Hence the name of Manassas Junction, which is applied to the little plateau where this junction occurs near the stream of Bull Run.

This plateau of Manassas had been selected as the concentrating point of the Confederate troops that were to cover Virginia and menace Washington. The importance of railways and their various points of intersection was thus being made manifest even before the armies had taken the field. At Manassas Junction, Beauregard had two lines of railway behind him, which brought him supplies and secured him two means of retreat in case of necessity, while the Manassas Gap Junction enabled him to establish rapid communications with Johnston and the troops stationed at Winchester in front of Patterson's army.

The stream called Bull Run covered the positions occupied by Beauregard on the plateau of Manassas. This plateau slopes gently down to the north-west, in a direction contrary to the course of Bull Run, so that this little river becomes gradually more deeply embanked in the ravine which borders the plateau to the north-west. In this lower part of its course we find, first, the railway bridge at Gordon Mills, and above only two fords—Mitchell's Ford and Blackburn's Ford, both difficult of access. Higher up, the declivities are less abrupt, the fords become more numerous, and the main road from Alexandria to Warrenton crosses the river over a stone bridge. Beyond this bridge, ascending the course of Bull Run, the country is flat, intersected with woods and small clearings; and in the vicinity of Sudeley Springs, this stream, fordable at every point, is no longer a serious obstacle.

The stone bridge is situated at a distance of eight kilometres from Manassas Junction; the space between those two points is rather open, and the waters that flow through it are not very

deep. The course of Bull Run, on the contrary, lies between thickly wooded banks, while the slopes which terminate the Manassas plateau on that side are more and more precipitous. This plateau is bounded on the north-west by a small stream, Young's Branch; beyond it stretch the flat lands of Sudeley Springs, and along this latter stream the main road follows a line as straight as a Roman causeway. On the opposite side of Bull Run, and almost to the north of Manassas, the ground rises in the shape of a circular mound, upon which stands the little village of Centreville, surrounded by cultivated fields and traversed by the high road; this place is seven kilometres from the stone bridge.

Such was the ground on which the first army organized by the Confederates had been posted; its camps occupied the Manassas plateau, where it had open spaces for drilling, and where it was covered by line of Bull Run. A few earthworks surrounded the railway station, and a portion of its artillery was in position at the various fords of Bull Run, forming batteries skilfully masked by the foliage. A detachment of considerable size was stationed at Centreville, another farther on at Fairfax Court-house, and Beauregard's cavalry pushed their pickets to within sight of Washington. It was in these positions that McDowell was to seek his adversary. The railway which starts from Alexandria, and on the line of which lies Manassas Junction, offered him little resource, for it passes through wooded ravines, far from any road, and is intersected by numerous wooden bridges that a retreating enemy could easily destroy. In order to follow this direction, therefore, there only remained to him, besides cross-roads, the turnpike from Alexandria to Warrenton, which, running from east to west, passes through the villages of Annandale and Fairfax Court-house before it reaches Centreville. It became necessary, therefore, to move the greatest portion of the army with its baggage on a single route, leaving the remainder to follow by diverging lines, so as to reduce the amount of incumbrances—a double difficulty added to those we have already mentioned.

On the 9th of July, McDowell was ordered to make preparations for assuming the offensive in eight days, and at the same

time General Scott gave him formal assurance that Patterson should keep Johnston so occupied in the Shenandoah Valley that he would find it impossible to go to the assistance of Beauregard ; that if he attempted to do so, the forces opposed to him would follow so close that they would reach the banks of Bull Run at the same time.

On the 16th, the day fixed for the movement, there was nothing ready to transport the necessary provisions for the army. McDowell was nevertheless obliged to begin his march. He had four divisions with him—the fifth, Runyon's, remaining behind to protect the positions that the army was about to leave. Tyler's division, four brigades strong, was ordered to incline to the right by the Leesburg road, and encamp at Vienna, in order to fall back, by a cross-movement, on Fairfax Court-house the following day ; Miles's division was to follow the turnpike as far as Annandale, then to turn to the left into an old road called Braddock Road, because it had been constructed, as was said, by the British general Braddock. Hunter followed Miles, Annandale being designated as his first halting-place. Heintzelman, with the strongest division, was directed to proceed by certain cross-roads which, passing south of the line of railway, led to the bank of a stream called Pohick Creek. The soldiers carried three days' rations in their haversacks. The supply-trains were to leave Alexandria on the following day, and join the army on the turnpike between Fairfax and Centreville.

McDowell's plan was to surprise Bonham's brigade of the enemy stationed at Fairfax by causing it to be attacked on the 17th at the same time by Miles in front and by Hunter in flank. He intended afterwards to make a demonstration by way of Centreville, and lead the bulk of his forces with Heintzelman along the course of Bull Run, below Union Mills, to pass the river at a dash and turn Beauregard's position by the right.

The troops started at the appointed time, but the heat was extreme ; covered with dust, little accustomed to march and to carry knapsack and musket, too poorly disciplined to remain in the ranks when they felt fatigued or came upon some fresh spring of water, the soldiers soon spread themselves upon the roads in long columns, in which the regiments were confounded,

and which were followed without order by rapidly increasing groups of stragglers. Most of them only reached the encampments which had been designated for them in the middle of the night; others stopped on the road, and only the heads of columns were able to resume their march on the morning of the 17th.

The remainder, already prostrated by fatigue, slowly followed in their tracks. Bonham's brigade was thus allowed time to fall back quietly by way of Centreville, and to take position at Mitchell's Ford, on the line of Bull Run, where Beauregard was posting his troops. On the evening of the 17th three divisions of the Federal army were in the neighborhood of Fairfax, while Heintzelman, with the fourth, occupied Sangster's Station on the railway.

They had marched about twenty-four kilometres in two days; but this march, too severe for a beginning, had proved very exhausting; the soldiers, improvident in their inexperience, had wasted the rations they carried; the supply-trains had not come up, and most of them lay down that night under the leafy cover of the forest without even a biscuit to eat.

The provisions, which only left Alexandria when they should already have arrived at Fairfax, required time to reach the army. Having ordered Tyler simply to occupy Centreville, which was only eight kilometers distant from the point where he had passed the night, McDowell proceeded to his left to prepare for the movement he had planned by way of Union Mills. On that side, while his troops were rallying, resting, and still waiting for supplies, Heintzelman was reconnoitring the course of Bull Run and trying to find a passage suitable for the attack. But none was found; the approaches to the river were almost everywhere impracticable; and, giving up his project, McDowell determined to try the enemy in another direction.

But the impatience and unreflecting confidence of a few chiefs, which were as much the natural result of inexperience as the slowness and disorder of the march on the part of the soldiers, were to compromise the success of the campaign from the outset. Having found Centreville evacuated, Tyler thought, no doubt, that the whole expedition would amount to nothing more than a mere military promenade, and was anxious to secure for himself, in the eyes of the public, the cheap merit of having been

the first to occupy the positions of Manassas. Having arrived at Centreville on the morning of the 18th, he proceeded with Richardson's brigade, a part of Sherman's, and a battery of artillery towards Blackburn's Ford, in the hope of being able to cross Bull Run with these forces.

Beauregard was waiting for him there with a large portion of his army, and everything was ready for a vigorous defence of the line of that river against the Federal attacks. Seven brigades were in position: Ewell at Union Mills, Jones a little higher up, Longstreet at Blackburn's Ford, Bonham at Mitchell's Ford, Cocke between that point and the stone bridge, and Evans near this bridge, while Early remained in reserve in rear of Jones and Longstreet; some few troops with artillery were posted on the left bank of Bull Run in advance of Mitchell's Ford. It was with the latter troops that the engagement commenced; but as they soon recrossed the river, Tyler merely tried to engage Bonham's attention by the fire of a few guns, and leaving Sherman in reserve, he proceeded with Richardson's four regiments in the direction of Blackburn's Ford. Longstreet held the skirts of a wood extending along the right bank of Bull Run; his sharpshooters were posted at the water's edge, his artillery was a little in the rear, and, as we have said, masked by trees. The left bank was higher than the other, and formed a crest terminating in a precipitous slope. The Confederates allowed their opponents to advance without molestation as far as the ridge, and when the 12th New York appeared among the thinly scattered trees which crowned the summit, it was received by a murderous fire of musketry and artillery. Staggered by this unexpected resistance, it was almost immediately thrown into confusion by a few sharpshooters of the enemy who crossed the water and took them in flank; the soldiers, becoming bewildered and thinking they were pursued, ran for more than half a league, firing in the air or upon each other. Richardson soon came into line with his other three regiments, but, at the same time, Early came to the assistance of Longstreet, thus giving the Confederates a great numerical superiority, and the combat was renewed with spirit. The Confederate batteries did great damage to the Federals, and the latter, after having manned the ridge, did not ven-

ture near the edge of the river. Tyler, having no desire to continue the engagement, which only exposed his troops unnecessarily, and being convinced of the error he had committed, brought them back in good order to Sherman's line, and the two brigades regained the neighborhood of Centreville in the evening.

The losses on each side only amounted to one hundred or one hundred and twenty men; but this encounter, which would have been a trifling affair in the midst of a regular campaign, was an unfortunate beginning for new troops; the sudden unmasking of batteries by the enemy, the unexpected firing of musketry in the woods, had produced a powerful impression upon them; the demoralization of the 12th New York was unfortunately a far more contagious example than the good behavior of the three other regiments. The *morale* of the army was deeply affected by it. This first encounter naturally stimulated the ardor of the Confederates, and a timely reinforcement increased their confidence still further. As early as the 17th, recognizing the importance of the movement that was being prepared against him, Beauregard had applied to Johnston for assistance. The latter started on the following day, and taking advantage of the neglect of Patterson, who had remained inactive at Martinsburg, he left Winchester quietly, and led his 8000 men by rapid marches to near Manassas Gap. As fast as they arrived there, he placed them on the cars, which landed them almost in the centre of the battle-field, where we shall soon see them make their appearance before an enemy who did not even suspect their departure. Beauregard had 21,833 men and 29 pieces of artillery: thus, including a few troops which had been forwarded in haste from Richmond, and which were expected to arrive during the night, the army of the Shenandoah augmented his numbers to 30,000 men.

McDowell, on the contrary, who had taken the field with 30,000 soldiers, had already seen their number reduced by the departure of one regiment and a battery of artillery, whose term of service had expired, and who shamefully left him at Centreville. On the 19th he found himself in the vicinity of this village with 28,000 men at the utmost; and although only ten leagues from Washington, he was in a strange country without maps or reliable guides to shape his course; before he could form his new plan of attack, he was obliged to spend two entire days in having the

ground studied by his topographical officers. These two days, which were moreover required to complete the organization of his army, gave the enemy time to concentrate his forces. Finally, the arrival, on the 20th, of the supply-trains so long expected allowed the issue of three days' rations, and the Federal army got in readiness for the movement it was about to undertake.

The right and centre of the Confederates being covered by formidable obstacles, McDowell determined to turn their extreme left, where Bull Run, fordable and badly guarded, no longer afforded them sufficient protection; and on the evening of the 20th he ordered an attack to be made the next morning. Miles remained at Centreville in order to draw the attention of the enemy towards Blackburn's Ford; Tyler was ordered to advance along the high road as far as the stone bridge, and to force a passage as soon as the left of its defenders had been turned. The flank attack was entrusted to Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions, forming a corps of 12,000 men, and the Sudeley fords, situated above the stone bridge in the centre of a wood extending along both sides of Bull Run, were designated as the points at which to cross.

In the mean time, Johnston's troops, numbering 8334 men, re-divided into five small brigades, had made a forced march; the infantry, passing the Blue Ridge at Ashby's Gap, had taken the cars a little to the east of Manassas Gap; the artillery and cavalry had continued their march along the main road. A portion of these forces, about 3000 men, had reached the Manassas plateau on the evening of the 20th; the remainder were to arrive on the morning of the 21st. Johnston himself had gone in advance of his army corps to consult with Beauregard in regard to their movements; and although he was Beauregard's senior in rank, he left him at full liberty to make the necessary preparations for the battle. The forces assembled at Manassas, before his arrival, were designated by the name of Army of the Potomac, and consisted of eight brigades of infantry, which were not formed into divisions. Six of them had occupied the line of Bull Run, since the 17th, in the positions we have indicated; the other two, those of Holmes and Ewell, were held in reserve. It was agreed that Johnston's troops should come to reinforce the former in these positions, and that all the brigades of the two armies should be

united two by two into temporary divisions. Johnston's army, as we have stated, gave the Confederate generals a numerical force at least equal to that of their opponents, but they might fear lest Patterson should in turn come to reinforce the latter.

The inaction of McDowell for the last two days seemed to justify this apprehension. The impression was that, having been informed of Johnston's movements, he had halted to wait in his turn for reinforcements from the upper Potomac, which would have restored to him the advantage in point of numbers. It was important to forestall him, and Beauregard determined to assume the offensive and proceed to attack him at Centreville. While McDowell was issuing orders for putting his troops in motion on the 21st, the Confederate army was preparing to cross Bull Run on the same day, and by an inverse movement to attack the extreme left of the Federals. This plan was perhaps a rash one, for if the latter had remained stationary, confining their operations to a defence of the positions they occupied, we may believe that the battle would have resulted to their advantage. McDowell, it is true, relying upon the assurances he had received, knew nothing of the arrival on the ground of Johnston's troops, and instead of remaining on the defensive he was hastening to operate on the enemy's left in order to take possession of the line of railway by which those troops might be brought over. But the arrangements made by Beauregard for an offensive movement gave the Federals, if they became the assailants, great chances of success. He had in fact weakened his left in order to concentrate his forces upon the opposite wing, and the tardy arrival of Johnston's last brigades, which had been delayed by the bad condition of the railroad, rendering it impossible for him to begin that movement at an early hour, the left of the Confederates, if McDowell's orders had been punctually executed, would have been crushed and their entire position turned, before the last soldiers from Winchester would have had time to spring out of the cars that brought them over, or the troops posted on the right could have been able to go to the assistance of the other extremity of the line. It will be seen how the chances of war, which have so much to do in deciding the fate of battles, favored Beauregard and prevented the disaster which the disposition of

his army seemed to have drawn upon it. He had posted the first division, consisting of Holmes's and Ewell's brigades, on his extreme right at Union Mills; the second, comprising those of Jones and Early, a little above, at the difficult ford called McLean's Ford; the brigades of Jackson, Bartow, and Elzey, brought over by Johnston, were to join those of Longstreet, Bonham, and Coker, to form the third, fourth, and fifth divisions; Evans's brigade remained alone at the stone bridge, which it had occupied for some days. The brigades of Bee and Wilcox, with Stuart's cavalry, the greatest portion of which was only expected to arrive during the 21st, were to be held in reserve. The fourth and fifth divisions, commanded by Johnston himself, were to cross Bull Run between Mitchell's Ford and the stone bridge, and masking their movements behind a dense forest, were to attack Centreville, while the right, by a flank movement, would come to their assistance or strike the enemy in the rear on the Fairfax road. It will be seen that Beauregard, being exclusively preoccupied with his plans for offensive operations, had made no arrangements for covering his left flank, which was, however, the most exposed.

The Federals had commenced their march before daylight; but Tyler, although he had an excellent road to follow, did not reach the stone bridge until half-past six, where he found Evans in position with 12,000 or 13,000 men. The exchange of a few cannon-shots across the river announced the commencement of the battle. This, however, was only a demonstration, its object being to conceal the flank movement of the main column formed by Hunter's and Heintzelman's forces, and intended for the principal attack. After having marched for some time in the rear of Tyler, these two generals struck into the narrow roads leading from Centreville to Sudeley Ford, which being much longer than they had anticipated, it was half-past nine when Hunter's division reached the ford it was to cross. Heintzelman had been ordered to cross the river a little below, at a point guarded by a detachment of the enemy, as soon as Hunter, taking the latter in flank, should have dislodged it.

Precious time had already been wasted, and McDowell must have bitterly regretted having yielded to the advice of some

of his generals, who had dissuaded him from beginning his movement on the evening of the previous day, as he had originally intended.

In the mean while, Beauregard had no suspicion of what was passing on his extreme left. Tyler's cannon had informed him that the Federals were in motion, but, deceived by this demonstration, he was led to suppose that the attack would be directed upon the stone bridge and the fords below, and he persisted in his design of menacing Centreville, thinking that he should thus check the Federals and throw their columns into disorder. He therefore sent only Cocke's brigade to the assistance of Evans, recommending the latter to confine himself to the task of stubbornly defending the passage of the stone bridge, upon which he believed the main efforts of the Federals would be directed. McDowell had more thoroughly fathomed the intentions of his opponent. Evans's artillery had not felt strong enough to reply to Tyler's heavy cannon, and his infantry, concealed in the woods, only exchanged a few musket-shots with the brigades of Sherman and Schenck posted in front of it both above and below the bridge. From the feebleness of this resistance the Federal general became at once convinced that Beauregard had weakened his left wing, and understood that he was preparing to make an attack upon Centreville with his right. He immediately took the necessary steps to repel it; Keyes' brigade was detached from Tyler's division and ordered to join Richardson, who was already posted opposite Blackburn's Ford, and to assist Miles in covering the fords of Bull Run below the stone bridge.

After remaining two or three hours in front of Tyler, Evans at last perceived that the stone bridge was not the real point of attack, and the movement of troops he had observed on the other side of the river, toward nine o'clock, made him suspect the danger that threatened his flank. A good road leads from Sudeley Ford to the Warrenton turnpike; the point at which the former connects with the latter is 2500 metres from the ford, and 2000 from the stone bridge. By reason of a deflection in Bull Run to the southward, in the direction of Sudeley, it hardly required more time for the Federals to reach the turnpike, in the rear of Evans, than it took the latter to reach it and to dispute its pos-

session. He had therefore not a moment to lose; he adopted his course with decision and acted promptly. Leaving only four companies near the stone bridge, he fell back, with about one thousand remaining men, as far as the intersection of the turnpike and the Sudeley road, making a change of front to the left, in order to form his line a little in advance of the road, along the slopes of a hill which is rounded at the north by the stream called Young's Branch, and rested his left upon the Sudeley-Springs road. By this movement he succeeded in forestalling the Federals. Hunter's first brigade, commanded by Burnside, being fatigued by seven hours' march, had rested near the fresh waters of Bull Run. McDowell, impatient at the delay of this brigade, proceeded in advance of it, and debouched into the fields which extend beyond Sudeley Springs, where his skirmishers exchanged the first shots with Evans's sharpshooters. The latter had found a position on the hill he occupied which compensated for his numerical inferiority.

It is nearly ten o'clock when the heads of Burnside's column appear on the opposite slopes, and they are immediately saluted by a well-sustained fire. In their inexperience they return the fire without taking time to form; being young troops, who had never manœuvred, they do not know how to deploy rapidly in face of the enemy, so that their first attack, which is merely a brisk discharge of musketry, is not successful in dislodging Evans. The combat lasts nearly three-quarters of an hour, during which time the other brigade of Hunter's division, under Andrew Porter, hastens to get into line. At last the Confederates, who, with only 1000 men, are defending the extreme left of their army, which a well-concerted movement might have crushed, are also about to receive reinforcements. Beauregard, still believing that the attack of the Federals was directed against the stone bridge, had sent the two small brigades of Bee and Bartow, numbering 2800 men, with a field-battery, to join the defenders of that point, while Jackson proceeded to take position upon Bull Run, between Cocke and Bonham. But, warned by the distant rattling of musketry and subsequently by Evans himself, Bee and Bartow change their direction, and arrive in time to assist the latter just when his soldiers are beginning to fall back before Burnside,

who was supported on his left by a battalion of regular troops from Porter's brigade, and on his right by Griffin's regular battery of artillery. Bee, forming his line with admirable judgment, soon changes the aspect of the combat and checks the Federals, who are already attacking Evans's positions.

The battle was at its height; there were many killed and wounded on both sides. Hunter was among the first to be struck down; and the loss of a considerable number of superior officers, who were obliged to expose themselves in order to urge their troops forward, caused trouble and hesitation in the Federal movements. If at this moment Tyler had shown some of that daring he had so uselessly displayed at Blackburn's Ford, he might have seized a fine opportunity for striking a blow at the enemy which might have proved decisive.

In fact, some spectators who had climbed the trees signalled to him the movements of Hunter and the combat that was going on at Young's Branch. He had four or five thousand men, and there were only two hundred riflemen of the enemy before him to dispute the passage of Bull Run. The military instinct of one of his lieutenants, who was destined for a glorious career, had discovered a ford. Colonel Sherman had seen in the morning a Confederate horseman plunge into the woods which skirt the left bank of Bull Run above the bridge, and shortly after had perceived him galloping across a field on the other side of the stream. There was, consequently, a practicable ford at that point; but Tyler, fearing that he could not cross with his artillery, did not dare to venture to pass the river.

Richardson's division and a portion of Miles's occupied the Confederate troops posted in the vicinity of Blackburn's Ford, while the Federal artillery, ably handled by Major Hunt, kept up a vigorous cannonade. It was half-past ten in the morning. The staff of the Confederate army, however, was so poorly organized that Beauregard, posted in person in the rear of his long army line along Bull Run, was not aware of the attack that had been made upon Evans; for the slopes of the Manassas plateau concealed it from sight, and did not allow him to distinguish whence came the sound of cannon that he heard on that side; moreover, the orders he had sent to his right wing had

either not reached their destination or been misconstrued; he had directed that wing to cross the river and attack Centreville, and Beauregard was still waiting for the moment when that attack should arrest the progress of McDowell, whom he still believed to be on the left bank of Bull Run; the failure to carry out these instructions proved the salvation of his army. When, towards eleven o'clock, he learned that his right was about to move at last, he issued a counter-order, for he had just learned the danger which threatened him and had become convinced that instead of taking the offensive he ought to detach from his right all available troops, in order to keep the victorious Federals in check. The latter, in fact, were rapidly gaining ground in spite of the obstinate resistance they encountered. Porter had deployed his brigade to the left of Burnside; Heintzelman, who, not having been able to find the ford indicated in his instructions, had been obliged to cross Sudeley Ford in the rear of Burnside, had in his turn got into line, while Tyler was pushing forward Sherman's brigade. The latter had crossed Bull Run at the ford he had discovered without striking a blow; leaving his artillery behind, he was advancing with that precision and method which already denoted the true man of war: as the curtain of trees did not permit him to follow the battle with his eyes, he directed his march by its sound; Keyes, who had been recalled by Tyler to take Sherman's place, was in readiness to follow.

The Confederates had taken position on an open height forming the first tier of the Manassas plateau, which commanded the course of Bull Run, by an elevation of from forty to fifty metres, and was surrounded from north-east to west by an elbow of Young's Branch. The chord of the semicircle described by this stream was the straight line of the Warrenton turnpike, which intersects it in two places, and the culminating point of which was indicated by the house of the negro Robinson. To the left, those heights terminated above the junction of the turnpike and the Sudeley-Springs road, and then extended to the south-eastward in a line parallel with this road towards Manassas. These slopes, commanded by the house of the widow Henry, mingled a little farther on with those of the main plateau, which rose like a second tier, separated from the first counterforts by a slight

depression in the ground and a thick coppice. Two small pine woods, one situated to the right of the Robinson house, the other on the left, extending to the other side of Young's Branch, connected by numerous enclosures, covered the position of the Confederates. But the new troops who were about to attack it were sufficiently numerous to surmount these obstacles.

Porter's troops, having taken the place of Burnside's soldiers, who had been severely tried, were advancing on the right against Evans's brigade, and Hampton's Legion which had arrived that very morning from Richmond. It was half-past twelve o'clock. At the same moment Sherman's first regiment, commanded by Corcoran, charged the left flank of the enemy's position, which was defended on that side by the brigades of Bee and Bartow.

This vigorous attack threw their ranks instantly into confusion, exhausted as they were by the too unequal struggle; the whole Federal line took advantage of this to advance at once against the Confederates, who gave way and were driven out of the woods and beyond the river and the road in great disorder. The remnants of the three brigades which had bravely sustained the combat during three hours were nothing more than a disorderly crowd. Hampton's Legion alone kept its ranks in the midst of the general stampede, but it could not check the advance of the Federals, who were already within reach of the Robinson house and rapidly becoming masters of the position, the acclivities of which they were scaling from every side. The Confederate artillery, which had suffered greatly, rallied near the Henry house, where it engaged in a combat with the Federal guns posted on the other side of the Sudeley-Springs road.

Fortune smiled upon McDowell. He had turned, surprised, and routed the left wing of his adversary before the latter could bring forward a sufficient force to check his progress or recall the troops concentrated along the line of Bull Run, which were no longer wanted in that direction. By this movement he had captured the defences of the stone bridge, while Tyler, clearing away the abatis which obstructed the road, was about to establish direct communications between the Federal army and Centreville. McDowell had already 18,000 men engaged on the right bank of Bull Run; in a few hours he could

be joined by all the rest of the available troops that had remained on the other side of the river.

It was at this moment that Beauregard, after ordering the brigades from his right to the field of battle, proceeded in person to the scene of action. He met on the road a multitude of fugitives, whose stories exaggerated the magnitude of the disaster. The left wing of the Confederates had lost all the positions along which it had ranged *en potence*; the turnpike was in the hands of the Federals. It was in vain that Beauregard sent Hampton to dispute the intersection of this turnpike and the Sudeley road; they quickly seized it, and, extending their lines on the right, they were already threatening the railway, the control of which would have been of so much importance to them, while on the left and centre they appeared ready to pursue the routed Confederates as far as the Manassas plateau. Once established on the crest of this plateau, they could easily have swept it with their artillery; and, meeting with no further serious obstacles on that open ground, they would have prevented a junction of the brigades which Beauregard had placed in *echelon* in the morning along the too extended line of Bull Run.

At half-past ten o'clock the Confederate general had ordered the brigades of Holmes and Early and half of Bonham's to reinforce Evans's, while the other troops posted along the river were to make demonstrations in order to conceal that movement. But some time was required before these reinforcements could reach the scene of conflict. Fortunately for the Confederates, Jackson, the man of prompt and energetic inspirations, had previously been sent to fill a gap in the line formed upon Bull Run, not far from the stone bridge, with his fine and large brigade of 2600 Virginians. While he was making this movement, the sound of cannon on his left revealed to him the gravity of the situation, and without waiting for orders he changed the direction of his column. He arrived a little in advance of Beauregard, just as the rout of the Confederates had commenced. Seeing that he was too late to save the positions occupied up to that time, he deployed in the rear of the Henry house, and waited quietly for the fugitives, who were coming

in from every direction. Bee, who was struggling in vain to stop the rout, exclaimed, it is said, on seeing him, "Look at Jackson, as solid as a stone wall!" and from that day dates the surname of *Stonewall*, which Jackson was to render immortal.

The well-sustained fire of these fresh troops at once arrested the pursuit of the Federals, and gave the Confederate officers time to rally their soldiers. Besides, McDowell's men were tired out by the very effort which had given them the advantage; they had been marching and fighting since daybreak; they had seen a large number of their comrades fall, a certain amount of disorder had crept into their ranks, and they no longer possessed the dash necessary to complete their success. At that decisive moment they lost much precious time in resting and re-forming. Johnston and Beauregard took advantage of this, and succeeded in restoring order among the fugitives.

The reinforcements they had called from the right wing came in slowly, regiment by regiment. Whilst Johnston returned to the rear to hasten their march, Beauregard posted them to the east beyond the Sudeley and Manassas road. A portion of Coker's and Bonham's brigades and the whole of Holmes's thus arrived successively, and increased the Confederate forces concentrated at that point to a total of about 10,000 men.

During this time the Federals, who had remained on the other side of Bull Run, were trying to keep as many of the enemy's troops in front of them as possible. Schenck kept up a brisk engagement with the remainder of Bonham's brigade, and for a long time prevented Beauregard from completely stripping that line in order to strengthen his left. At last, a little before two o'clock, McDowell, having succeeded in re-forming his line of battle, gave the signal for a general attack, which was chiefly directed against the Henry house. The three brigades of Heintzelman's division formed on the extreme right, and those of Porter and Sherman, which were nearer the centre, made a flank movement by way of the Sudeley and Manassas road in order to fall upon Beauregard's left; the cavalry and three batteries of artillery supported them. While they were deploying on both sides of the road and climbing the gentle acclivities where an

hour before Jackson had checked the pursuit, Keyes was directed to operate at the other extremity of the heights, and take possession of the Robinson house, which had been lying between the two parties without either of them having been able to hold it.

The greatest portion of the Confederate artillery, about fourteen or fifteen pieces, had been posted on the crest of a hill situated 500 metres in rear of the Henry house, which terminated the heights on that side, and defended the approaches of the second tier of the plateau, from which it was only separated by a wooded hollow. This crest commanded all the surrounding points, and was the position which the Federals proposed to seize. They advanced as far as the Henry house several times, but only to be promptly driven back. At the outset of the attack, the Fire Zouaves, having scattered upon the extreme right, only escaped the charge of Stuart's cavalry by the timely and vigorous intervention of two squadrons of regulars led by Captain Colburn. Heintzelman, arriving in his turn, posted his batteries on the extreme right so as to *enfilade* those of the enemy, but he was himself suddenly attacked by troops that had just emerged from a wood adjoining the Sudeley road, whom he had permitted to approach, believing them to be friends; his soldiers, thus taken by surprise, hesitated and fell back, leaving in the hands of the Confederates three field-pieces, the horses of which had been killed. Keyes, on his side, after taking possession of the Robinson house, had been compelled to abandon it by the heavy fire from a battery of the enemy; and was trying in vain to advance upon the summit of the heights which extended from that place to the Henry house. It was now about half-past two o'clock; Beauregard had just summoned to his assistance the greatest portion of the troops that were yet posted along the line of Bull Run—Ewell's and the remainder of Bonham's brigade—leaving only Longstreet's and Jones's to defend the river against Miles and half of Tyler's division, which was still on the other side. Having received, at the same time, reinforcements of some regiments that had been several hours on the march to join him, he availed himself of their arrival to resume the offensive, and the Confederate line, to which Jackson had imparted the stamina of his excellent brigade, for a time dislodged the Federals from all the positions

they had conquered since noon; but the latter soon returned to the charge. Jackson had found in Sherman, then a simple chief of brigade like himself, a foeman worthy of his steel; part of the Federal artillery had been captured—it was recaptured; that of the Confederates was next in jeopardy, and Sherman once more reached the Henry house; but he was unable to proceed farther, and found himself again checked in front of the positions where, three hours before, Jackson had so opportunely established himself. His soldiers, worn out by fatigue, oppressed by a burning sun, distracted by the excitement of the conflict, which was new to them, made only a feeble resistance; many of them left their ranks, and regiments were seen firing upon each other; at last, the discharges of musketry became less frequent, and presently ceased entirely. It was three o'clock; both parties felt that the decisive moment had arrived.

On the side of the Federals, the regiments which had been successively engaged without order or method had all suffered; their organization was affected, their last reserves had been in action, their ammunition was beginning to give out, and they had long since thrown away the three days' rations which they carried in their haversacks in the morning. They felt, moreover, that an interrupted success is almost invariably the prelude to a defeat. Still, nothing was yet lost; it only required a final effort to wrest the approaches of the Manassas plateau from the troops who had so persistently defended it. The effort could be made. Howard's brigade of Heintzelman's division, which had scarcely been in action, passed to the front on the right and reopened the fighting.

During this time, the turnpike having been cleared of all the obstacles which obstructed it as far as the stone bridge, McDowell ordered Schenck to cross Bull Run and strike the extreme right of the enemy in flank. This manœuvre might have secured the victory, and Burnside, who had not been in action since noon, was in a condition to support him and take part once more in the conflict.

Beauregard also fully appreciated the increasing danger of his position. Death was striking down one after another nearly all the chiefs whose example had until then stimulated his troops.

Bee and Bartow had been killed near the Henry house; Hampton was wounded; most of the colonels were disabled; Beauregard and Jackson had been both slightly wounded while putting themselves at the head of their soldiers to bring them back into line; the Confederate artillery had suffered cruelly; many of their guns had been dismounted, and the officers themselves were obliged to take the places of those who had served the other pieces. The general-in-chief had not a single fresh regiment at his disposal; Ewell and Bonham had not yet had time to arrive, while Early, whom he had summoned to the field of battle at eleven o'clock in the morning, had not yet made his appearance. At this moment Howard recommenced the attack. The Confederate general was watching him anxiously when he perceived in the prolongation of the Federal lines a great cloud of dust rising above the tree-tops. It was evidently a body of troops which, not having yet taken part in the conflict, was coming to decide, by its intervention, the issue of the battle. To which of the two armies did it belong? Its position led Beauregard to believe for an instant that they were the heads of Patterson's column coming from the Valley of Virginia, and he was already preparing to cover his retreat, which seemed inevitable, when he thought he recognized friendly colors in the flags that were floating in the breeze. A moment after, sudden discharges of musketry informed him that these troops brought him victory.

They were in fact the 3000 soldiers of the army of the Shenandoah for which he had been impatiently looking since morning, Bee's brigade of that army having alone arrived during the night. Johnston, who had gone to the rear of the army to hurry forward and organize the reinforcements, had joined those troops that had arrived, shortly after noon, at Manassas Junction, and leading them in person, had brought them into the woods which extend westward of the Sudeley road, on which the Federals confidently rested their extreme right. Without waiting for their comrades, 1700 men of the brigade, headed by Kirby Smith, one of the best officers in the Confederate army, fell suddenly upon this flank at the moment when Beauregard was watching their movements from a distance with so much uneasiness. Smith was wounded, but his fall did not check his soldiers, who were supported by a

battery of artillery, led on by Colonel Elzey, and the Federals, surprised and disconcerted, were thrown into confusion.

At the same time, Early, who had only received Beauregard's orders at noon, approached the field of battle; Johnston took advantage of his arrival to complete the success he had already achieved against the Federal right. In pursuance of his instructions, Early made a *détour* to the left, and, deploying beyond the line of Kirby Smith, took the enemy, already seriously shaken, in the rear. Under the fire of his three regiments the whole right wing of the Federals fell back in the greatest disorder upon the centre, which it carried along with it.

The nearer McDowell's army had been to victory the more irreparable was its defeat; its strength was all exhausted; it might have followed up a success, but it no longer possessed the physical and moral energy necessary to sustain a reverse; the bonds of discipline had gradually relaxed in the excitement of the battle, or rudely snapped through the death of chiefs who had not been replaced. The Sudeley road and the slopes adjoining the Henry house, where, a quarter of an hour before, a whole army was fighting so fiercely, were instantly covered with fugitives; the field-pieces were abandoned, and the whole first tier of the plateau was occupied by the Confederates, whose lines, though much thinned, advanced with the ardor that certain victory inspires. The battle was lost to the Federals. Schenck, who had not yet commenced his movement, Davies and Richardson, who had resisted many attempts on the part of the Confederates to cross Bull Run, could do nothing to change this result; Burnside, whose brigade was held in reserve, could not arrive in time to prevent the disintegration (*débandade*) from becoming general.

The Confederate regiments of Cocke and Bonham, which had remained until then upon the line of Bull Run, came up to complete the rout of the Federal left. Holmes pressed the centre. In the midst of this confusion, the battalion of regulars was almost the only one to preserve good order, thus showing what discipline can accomplish and of what importance it is under such circumstances. The combined efforts of McDowell and his generals succeeded at last in rallying around this battalion some

determined men and the nucleus of a few regiments which had been less under fire or better handled during the battle. A line was thus formed on the ground where the conflict had commenced, which temporarily overawed the enemy, while the rest of the army was flying everywhere, across roads and fields, in the direction of the fords it had crossed in the morning, between Sudeley Springs and the stone bridge.

Fortunately for McDowell, the Confederates were scarcely in a condition to follow up their success; their losses had been so heavy, their efforts so protracted, and they had seen themselves so near an irreparable defeat, that victory found them almost broken down. They halted on the field of battle which they had so dearly won, too well satisfied with their victory to seek to provoke an adversary of whose utter helplessness they had no knowledge. Consequently, the line formed by McDowell to cover his disaster was only molested by a few volleys of musketry fired at a distance; the battle ceased as soon as the Federals had disappeared behind the woods where Burnside had commenced the attack in the morning. When the Confederates bethought themselves at last of pursuit, the remnant of the Federal army had crossed Bull Run at the various fords that are to be found above the stone bridge, leaving behind them all the cannon posted upon the right bank, a large number of muskets, almost all their wounded, and a multitude of stragglers wandering in the woods.

The crossing of Bull Run, of which the approaches are difficult, entirely dissolved the few corps which had remained united until then. Fragments of regiments and isolated companies soon became broken up among the fugitives who encumbered the narrow roads followed in the morning by Hunter and Heintzelman on the other side of the river. Their columns, which a common impulse drove towards Centreville, successively emerged into the Warrenton turnpike, and, crowding on a single road, increased the disorder still more. During this time, the Confederates on the battle-field, following the main road, which Tyler had cleared a few hours before, got as far as the stone bridge, and not daring to venture on the other side, they sent a few cannonballs into the midst of that dense tide of fugitives. One of

these projectiles demolished a *caisson* on the bridge where the road crosses a little tributary of Bull Run, which threw additional confusion into the ranks of the vanquished. This road forms a long straight line, ascending by gentle acclivities from Bull Run to Centreville. It thus presented excellent points of view for observing what was passing on the other side of the river, and a crowd of curious spectators had gathered there since morning to enjoy the novel spectacle of a real battle. There had followed in the train of McDowell's army from Alexandria, members of Congress, men of all parties and professions, journalists from every country, photographers with their instruments—all assembled to witness the defeat of the rebels. Although out of reach of cannon-shot, and frequently prevented by the woods from seeing the battle, this crowd actually imagined that they were participating in it, and this thought long afforded them a foolish satisfaction. It finally moved off slowly in the direction of Alexandria, on receiving the first tidings of the check experienced by the Federals. But when the fugitives came crowding into the road they were following, and the balls began to whistle close to the ears of those men harassed by fatigue and fright, a wild panic seized both soldiers and spectators. The most fiery street-orators were seen leading the way in a rapid flight, and journalists who pretended to describe the battle from a distance outstripped the whole senseless crowd in swiftness.

Miles had done nothing to check the disaster which the appearance of the Confederates on the left bank of Bull Run had increased. Instead of occupying the crossings of that river, which he had been ordered to watch, he had hastened to summon all the troops under his command to Centreville, where he had himself remained. McDowell, who displayed great energy and self-possession in that terrible emergency, hastened to remedy the error. While the regulars and the cavalry were covering the flight of the army, and were the last to cross the little river which was to give its name to that fatal battle, Blenker's German brigade, which had not been in action, took a position on Cub Run, to the right and left of the road followed by the fugitives, whom it could not hope to arrest. Its excellent behavior succeeded, toward

twilight, in checking the parties of Confederate cavalry who were pursuing the retreating Federals, and picking up prisoners and trophies of every kind, which were abandoned to them without any attempt at resistance. When night came at last to the assistance of the vanquished, this brigade fell back upon Centreville, where the whole of Miles's division, and the brigades of Schenck and Richardson, which had not been in the fights on the right bank of Bull Run, had assembled in good order. The condition of the army, however, did not admit of its remaining in that position; there were only five brigades left in fighting order; all the troops who had participated in the combats on the Warrenton turnpike had dispersed, and were proceeding, without order or leaders, in isolated groups, toward the fortifications of Arlington and Alexandria, under the shelter of which they hoped to find some safety. It was necessary to follow and protect them. The troops left Centreville during the night with the greatest part of the supply-trains that had gathered there; Richardson was the last to leave. During the whole of the 22d, fugitives were constantly arriving upon the borders of the Potomac; fear doubling their strength, they had marched all night long. The five brigades which formed a sad escort to these returning parties arrived also in the course of the evening, and on the following morning; on the 23d the remnants of the army which seven days before had taken the field with such imprudent confidence, gathered around the forts behind which they were to be reorganized. The dissolution of this army, too newly organized to resist the shock it had encountered, was almost complete. Nothing could repress the crowds of soldiers collected upon the right bank of the Potomac; they inundated Washington, and many of them found means to go as far as New York. They could talk of nothing else but the masked batteries that had decimated them, and of the formidable obstacles which had stopped them; they muttered treasonable words and cursed their leaders.

The latter flung bitter reproaches at each other, and the excitement in Washington was at its height; the spectators, who had only witnessed the panic, forgot the brave struggle sustained by the army, and ended by persuading the public that

there had been no battle, but simply a rout. Finally, the government, more uneasy than it had been during the first days of its installation, expected to see the Confederate artillery come to bombard Washington.

These fears were vain. Beauregard had no idea of threatening the capital of the enemy. Mr. Davis, who had arrived on the field of battle just in time to be present at the victory, had returned to Richmond in order to communicate the news to his Congress, which had just assembled; and in spite of the representations of a few officers it had been decided that no offensive movement should take place for the present. This determination was severely criticised in the South. First, Johnston, and then Beauregard, was accused of having neglected the opportunity to carry the war into Pennsylvania, and of ending it perhaps by a single blow, at the same time installing the Confederate Congress in the Capitol of Washington. But this city was surrounded by works behind which the poorest troops could make a good fight; those of the Confederate general had not yet been tried in making attacks upon such positions; besides, the want of sufficient means of transportation rendered it almost impossible for him to undertake an offensive campaign.

This inaction, fatal to their cause, should only be attributed to the circumstances which surrounded the army; but its chiefs may be blamed for not having at least detached a few brigades to worry the Federals and harass them in Maryland by crossing the Potomac. We have also seen that this was not their only mistake, and that had it not been for some fortunate chances the disposition they had made of their troops along Bull Run, the length of time it took them to discover McDowell's movement, and their obstinacy in persisting to attack with their right, would inevitably have caused their defeat.

The only error of McDowell consisted in having relied too much on the perseverance of his soldiers and the promises of General Scott. He would, in fact, have achieved a certain victory if, as he believed, he had only had to contend with Beauregard's army. The Federal general-in-chief must have been perfectly well aware that Johnston, having a railroad at his service, could at any time slip away from Patterson and reach Manassas, with-

out Patterson's being able to pursue him to any serious purpose. While recommending the utmost caution to the latter; he never could have supposed that Patterson would have indefinitely detained forces whose presence was imperatively demanded elsewhere. Still, Johnston did not move until the 18th, the day on which, as Scott informed his lieutenant, the attack on Manassas was to take place. The Federal general-in-chief committed the twofold error of not notifying Patterson that McDowell's movement had been postponed, and of not transmitting to the latter the important despatch by which, on the 20th, Patterson informed him of Johnston's departure.* Public opinion, imperfectly enlightened, condemned both Patterson and Scott: the former retired to private life, whither Scott, who was no longer the brilliant general of the Mexican war, but an infirm old man, was to follow him a few months afterwards. McDowell also suffered for the faults of others by seeing himself reduced to the simple command of a division.

The battle of Bull Run was a misfortune, and not a disgrace, to the Federal arms; the reports of losses on both sides prove that it was bravely disputed. The Confederates acknowledged 378 killed and 1489 wounded; the Federals, 481 killed and 1011 wounded; the latter, moreover, left in the hands of the enemy 1216 prisoners, 28 pieces of cannon, and 10 flags; but the rout—or, in other words, the panic—in the midst of which that enemy picked up most of his trophies, was one of those accidents to which even victorious armies are sometimes liable, and against which old troops are not always able to guard. The importance of the battle of Bull Run cannot be measured by the amount of losses sustained by the two contending parties—losses almost insignificant, even with reference to the small number of combatants, when compared with those sustained in the great battles we shall yet have to describe.

Its immediate effect upon military operations was to produce a sudden change in the attitude of the belligerents. The possession of Virginia, with the exception of that portion which had been recaptured by McClellan, was secured to the Confederates. Rich-

* The reader is referred to an able pamphlet issued by General Patterson in vindication of his conduct in this campaign.—ED.

mond was beyond danger of any attack, and Washington was threatened anew. We shall see the Federal government organize a powerful army within its capital ; but its opponents, also taking advantage of the respite which the victory gave them, will increase their forces almost as rapidly, so as to keep those of the enemy constantly in check ; and they remained quiet during a period of nine months on the field of battle conquered on the 21st of July.

But it was chiefly through its moral effect that this first encounter was to exercise a powerful influence upon the war of which it was only the prelude. The South saw in this victory a kind of ratification of her claims. It was not only the Federal soldiers who were vanquished on that day, but with them all who had remained more or less openly loyal to the Union in the Southern States. They had protested against a simple insurrection ; but success imparted to the government of Mr. Davis, in their estimation, an authority before which they all bowed ; if a few secretly preserved their old attachment for the national flag, most of them fully submitted to the new power which had just achieved so complete a triumph. None of the enemies of the great Republic any longer feared to express their sympathies for a cause which seemed to prosper, or to give it moral and material aid. It required at this moment an unbounded faith in the energy of the American people to refute the arguments of those who believed that their ruin was already consummated ; most of the European governments, who should then have exacted from their citizens a strict observance of the duties of neutrality, allowed from that moment naval expeditions to be fitted out in their ports, which were to give such powerful aid to the Confederate cause. In short, this victory inspired the South with unlimited confidence in her own resources and the conviction that she could never be vanquished. At the outset this conviction was a great element of success ; it inspired her soldiers, already impressed with a sense of their superiority over their adversaries, with that daring which frequently determines the fate of battles. But at the same time it also rendered her improvident, and made her neglect many details the importance of which she felt too late ; it prevented her, at this critical hour, from availing herself of all her resources, from calling together all able-bodied men, from

organizing the interior defence of the States, which she thought could never be invaded; and, in this manner, it prepared the way for the disasters she met with in the West the following year. So that some of the military writers favorable to her cause have gone so far as to say that a defeat would have been more beneficial to her than the victory to which she was indebted for this dangerous assurance.

This disaster, which might have discouraged the North, proved, on the contrary, a salutary lesson. Far from dividing the States faithful to the Union, as the Confederate leaders had anticipated, it only had the effect of stimulating their patriotism and of rendering them more clear-sighted. At the news of the defeat, they appreciated at last the difficulty of the task they had undertaken, but they never shrank from it. They understood that in order to obtain success in a great war, it is not sufficient to have a great number of soldiers—it is necessary that they should be well trained; that armies are complicated machines which require as much science as care in their construction, and that if popular enthusiasm and personal courage supply its materials, it requires discipline to combine them. From that day the North submitted patiently and with determination of purpose to all that was required to organize her forces and to put them in a condition to undertake long and fatiguing campaigns. Although the soldiers composing the national armies still bear the name of volunteers, the aim of all their efforts will henceforth be to acquire that instruction and that experience which cause the superiority of regular troops.

The improvised generals will give place to those who are brought up in the military career; the officers who seriously try to learn their profession will be greatly encouraged by the confidence of the public and of the army. It is not, therefore, to this American democracy, which is essentially practical and profits by experience, that the partisans of levies *en masse* and improvised armies must look for confirmation of their theories.*

* See Appendix to this volume, Note E.

CHAPTER III.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE STRIFE.

IN the midst of the excitement that prevailed in Washington on the mournful day of July 22d, Congress set an example of courage to the American people. While the remnants of the army defeated on the previous day were beginning to crowd the streets of the capital, and everybody looked at Arlington Heights with a feeling of uneasiness, expecting to see the enemy's artillery make its appearance, and while the military chiefs were endeavoring to reorganize their respective forces, the two Houses assembled at the Capitol. Grief was portrayed on every countenance, but it had not destroyed the determination of those who supported the President's policy.

A few days before they had responded to his call for a levy of 400,000 volunteers and the issue of four hundred million dollars for their support, by a resolution increasing both these numbers and authorizing the enlistment of 500,000 volunteers and an expenditure of five hundred million dollars. This resolution was first presented in the Senate on the 10th of July, and on the 13th in the House of Representatives. But the amendments introduced by the partisans of peace-at-any-price, who were allowed a perfect freedom of speech, and who desired to prevent the President from employing these resources to put down the rebellion, had delayed the final vote on the resolution.

By a singular coincidence, this debate had been fixed for the 22d of July, when the impending disaster was scarcely contemplated. This disaster, so far from embarrassing the debate, only served to impart to it a peculiar solemnity, and the eagerness with which the resolution was passed showed that the representatives of the American people fully appreciated the duties devolved upon them by such grave circumstances.

The Federal Congress had often been the hot-bed of miserable

intrigues ; this is a reproach which attaches not only to all political assemblies, but to every human power. By their impatience and unseasonable interference in military matters, they sometimes jeopardized success ; but to make up for this they gave to the nation, at every critical period of the war, the example of perseverance, and manifested that true patriotism which is stimulated more by defeat than by victory, and which after each reverse resolutely imposes upon itself new and heavier sacrifices. If the check of Bull Run demonstrated the inexperience of the American soldiers, it also proved that the people to whom they belonged possessed that manly temperament which gathers strength from adversity, and that constancy which, after many delays and fruitless efforts, succeeded at last in rendering available resources ignored by their adversaries.

It is an error, we believe, to attribute the honor of this quality exclusively to the Anglo-Saxon race ; we should rather attribute it to the working of free institutions. A people living under such institutions do not prepare for war after the manner of conspirators ; hence the frequent checks that are experienced at the outset ; but they profit by experience, their courage increases in proportion to the magnitude of the struggle, they persevere in it because they have voluntarily assumed its responsibilities, and every citizen, making it a personal matter, sustains the common cause with a zeal which develops the national strength at the very moment when a despotic government would already have been struck powerless before a wearied and unsympathizing public.

Hence it is that the creation of those large armies which carried the national flag during a period of four years dates from the 22d of July. The imperfect organization which united the heterogeneous elements led by McDowell to the field of Manassas had not been able to withstand the first shock, and his army had melted away like a lump of ice before the fire of the battle. On that day all America understood that an army cannot subsist and move about like an individual ; that there should be, on the one hand, an active and educated staff to regulate its movements—on the other hand, an experienced administrative department to provide for its daily wants ; and that without these appliances it becomes an inert and lifeless body in the hands of the ablest

chief. The people learned that it was not sufficient to have placed 500,000 men at the disposal of the President, but that it was necessary to aid him in converting those men into soldiers; they cast aside all their prejudices and gave up all their illusions. "Drill and organize" was the watchword on every lip. Instead of casting a stone at the regular officers who had had the misfortune of being vanquished, but who had bravely performed their duty, justice was meted out to them, and they were entrusted with the task of repairing the disaster. Almost all the principal commands in the Federal army were bestowed upon them, and the States contended for the privilege of confiding the new regiments that were being organized to these officers. Nay more, their advice, when they asked the country to renounce that fatal impatience which had brought on the Bull Run campaign, was listened to, and public opinion accepted without a murmur the long inaction which was deemed necessary to organize the national forces.

This inaction, which lasted until the year 1862, was interrupted from time to time only by combats of little importance. The principal occupation of the chiefs of the Federal armies during the six months succeeding the battle of Bull Run was to prepare the instruments they were to use at a later period. The order of our narrative itself, therefore, leads us to say a few words in this place concerning the great task they had to accomplish before they could take the field in earnest.

The most important thing to be done was to reconstruct the army which had been beaten at Bull Run. General McClellan was summoned in great haste on the 22d of July by Mr. Lincoln, and entrusted with this duty. McDowell, who had been offered an independent command in the West, preferred to remain at the head of a simple division among the companions of his defeat. General McClellan had made himself known by the successful and rapid campaign which three weeks before had freed West Virginia, but he happily possessed also organizing talents which he had not been able to display in that small command. His laborious character, his precise, methodical mind, and his vast military knowledge peculiarly fitted him for the ungrateful and difficult work which had fallen to his lot. He was

the creator of the army of the Potomac—of that army placed at the most vulnerable point, which, although paralyzed by the necessity of covering the capital, served as the principal pivot of military operations; that army which, often unfortunate, was never discouraged, and was rewarded at the end of the struggle by attaining the honor of striking the decisive blow.

In the Western States, the war, which was only a continuation of the quarrel, already often a bloody one, between abolitionists and pro-slavery men, had been carried on until then from town to town, from farm to farm, and from man to man, according to the old-fashioned mode of fighting—a civil war *par excellence*, as indecisive as it was bitter. But, in order to obtain important results in those vast regions, it was necessary to undertake much longer campaigns than in the East, where the vicinity of hostile capitals placed the two opponents forcibly face to face. It was therefore still more important that the armies destined to operate in that quarter should receive the organization without which they could not move over great distances.

These armies, which the volunteers from the Western States swelled so rapidly, contained a large number of stalwart men, better inured to hardships than those of the East, but they were poorer in materials of war than the army of the Potomac, which was within reach of the principal arsenals and the industrial cities of the Union.

Before describing the slow organization of the Federal forces which preceded the serious resumption of hostilities, we hasten to remark that the Confederates were the unwilling accomplices in that inaction which enabled their adversaries to make their preparations at leisure. The opportunity of marching upon Washington the day following their first victory having once been suffered to slip, the commonest prudence compelled them to remain in the defensive attitude which had been the cause of their success. If the Federals had been confronted by an enemy better prepared to take the offensive, neither patriotism nor the number of their soldiers would have been of any avail. This is a consideration which Europeans, whose States are surrounded by powerfully armed neighbors, should never lose sight of when they study the manner in which America, after having been

taken unawares, was able to improvise her large armies of volunteers.

We may be permitted to recall here a personal reminiscence showing how different were the circumstances which alone favored the formation of these armies, from those presented in the wars of which our continent is too often the theatre.

The author arrived in Washington and had the honor to enter the army of the Potomac two months after the battle of Bull Run. Not a musket-shot had been exchanged during that time between the two hostile forces, which in the mean while watched each other a short distance apart between Arlington and Fairfax Court-house.

A balloon in the service of the army rose every evening to reconnoitre the surrounding country; an ascension was proposed and accepted; it was then the only means of seeing the enemy. Scarcely had we risen above the ancient trees which surround the former residence of General Lee, when the prospect was extended over an undulating yet uniform country covered with woods, spotted here and there with small clearings, and bounded on the west by the long chain of the Blue Ridge, which recalls to mind the first lines of the Jura. Thanks to the brilliant light which illumines the last hours of an autumn day in America, the observer can distinguish the smallest details of the country beneath him like a plan in relief. But his eye seeks in vain for apparent signs of war; peace and tranquillity seemed to reign everywhere. It requires all his attention to detect some recent clearings, at the edge of which a line of reddish earth indicates the new fortifications. Meanwhile, as the day sinks, he sees at the southward small fleeces of bluish smoke breaking gently above the trees; they are multiplied by groups in a vast semicircle. These are the Confederates cooking their soup. The number of their army can almost be counted, for each line of smoke betrays the kettle of a platoon.

Further in the distance the vapor of a locomotive rushing toward the mountains traces by its wake above the trees the line by which the enemy is provisioned. At the same moment a military band is heard directly under the balloon. All the clearings in which we have sought in vain to discover the Federal

camps are filled with a crowd issuing from the surrounding woods. This crowd falls into line and forms battalions, the band passing before the ranks with that peculiar gait which the English have denominated "goose-step." Each regiment has two flags—one being the national colors, the other bearing the device of the State to which it belongs, together with its regimental number. These flags are lowered; the officers salute; the colonel takes the command; and a moment after the soldiers all disperse, for it is neither a surprise nor the prelude of a forward march which has thus called them together, but the ordinary "evening parade."

It was in the midst of this absolute calm that General McClellan organized the army of the Potomac.

Congress on the 22d of July had correctly expressed the sentiments which animated the entire North at the news of McDowell's defeat. The loyal States understood at last the magnitude of the undertaking they had before them, and determined to neglect nothing that could compass its success. Everybody set to work; patriotic donations flowed in; subscription funds were opened for the benefit of the soldiers; women manifested as much zeal to induce men to enlist as in the South; the largest iron mills in the United States were turned into cannon foundries or into outfitting establishments; finally, enlistments became more and more numerous. The three months' volunteers raised on the first call of April 15th were discharged, but a great many of them re-enlisted. Those who had responded to the second call of May 4th, instead of the forty battalions asked for, already formed 208 battalions on the 21st of July. In order to complete the effective force of 250,000 men authorized by Congress, it was only necessary to encourage this movement and to receive into the service of the Union all the new battalions thus created. We have already described the manner in which they were recruited and organized in each State. As soon as they were received into the Federal service by the mustering-officer, who had charge of the recruiting, they were forwarded to the armies of the West or to the army of the Potomac, which were rather vast camps of instruction than armies in the field; and as soon as they were able to defile without too much confusion they were formed into brigades

of one or two battalions somewhat less inexperienced than themselves, whose example could be of use to them.

The interior organization of the armies thus formed was modelled precisely upon that of the old regular army, which we have described elsewhere in full. The duties pertaining to the various branches of the service were distributed in the same way, and this old army ceased to have a separate existence except in the annual Army Register. It saw its administrative departments, with their *personnel*, blended with those that had been created for the army of volunteers; it saw the majority of its officers enter that army with new rank, and its infantry and cavalry regiments, together with its batteries, were scattered among the various armies and formed into divisions with the volunteers.

The appointment of all generals, their aides-de-camp, and all the officers and employés of the administrative departments belonged to the President, subject to the confirmation of the Senate. But the rank thus conferred was merely temporary, and expired by limitation on the disbandment of the volunteer armies for whose special wants they had been created.

The first thing required was the appointment of a certain number of generals to assume the commands indispensable to such a large assemblage of troops; for the regular army only contained about a dozen, nearly all new, and yet two or three among them too much disabled to take the field. But none of those who could aspire to that rank possessed antecedents of sufficient importance to entitle them to the choice of the President, and the latter was reduced to the alternative either of encumbering the *cadres* with men whose incapacity might be found out too late, or of suffering the most important posts to remain unfilled. He had the merit of listening to the opinions expressed by the comrades of every old officer, and his first list of generals, composed almost entirely of West Pointers, furnished him, together with a few chiefs who were to play a distinguished part in the war, a considerable number of educated and industrious men, who contributed powerfully to the organization of the volunteers. Selections were unquestionably made which were dictated either by political influence or personal favor; and among the first major-generals appointed by Mr. Lincoln we find two—

Messrs. Banks and Butler—who are the two types of the class then styled political generals: Banks, a former workingman of Massachusetts, who through his intelligence had attained the highest civil positions, of a loyal character and universally esteemed, but totally ignorant of military matters—who, although fully aware of this fact, was nevertheless anxious to obtain a command, aggravating his first error in action by mistrust of himself and untoward hesitations, and who did not always succeed in staving off, by his great personal courage, the disastrous results of enterprises he had imprudently undertaken; Butler, a shrewd lawyer, a bold politician, without scruples, who had rendered a great service to his country by taking upon himself the responsibility of occupying Baltimore, but who was afterwards to injure his cause by resorting to unnecessary severities in New Orleans, found himself, by a singular coincidence, chief in command at Big Bethel and at the first attack on Fort Fisher, and was thus both the first and the last general beaten by the Confederates. But, on the other hand, the names of Grant, Sherman, Meade, Kearny, Hooker, Slocum, and Thomas, which were among the first promotions, show that Mr. Lincoln knew from the outset how to select men worthy of his entire confidence.

The personal aides-de-camp of the generals in command, from the rank of lieutenant to that of colonel, did not appertain to any contingent; they received their rank directly from the President, without any reference to the sanction of the Senate; but these grades, whether conferred on persons belonging to the regular army or to the volunteer staff, according as the general himself might belong to either of these corps, were merely temporary, and expired, by limitation, with the command of the general to whom they were attached.

In the staffs of the armies in the field the chiefs of the different services were regular officers, invested with a rank commensurate with the importance of their functions. Thus, at the general head-quarters of the army of the Potomac or of the armies of the West the chiefs of cavalry, of artillery, of engineers, of topographical engineers, and in the administrative departments the assistant adjutant-general and the quartermaster-general, ranked as brigadier-generals; others—such as the chief of ordnance, the com-

missary of subsistence, and the inspector-general—held the inferior and temporary rank appertaining to the title of aides-de-camp.

All the administrative branches of the service were reinforced, both in the war department and in the armies in the field, by large promotions of officers appointed by the President, like the generals of volunteers, to serve during the war. But, notwithstanding their number, the *personnel* of all these corps, like that of the staffs, was always found insufficient for the task imposed upon it by the necessity of providing for the support and management of an army of 500,000 men, which at the end of the war was to number nearly 1,000,000; most of these officers, besides, were utterly unaccustomed to the duties confided to them. A thousand examples might be cited of difficulties which their inexperience, aggravating that of the soldiers and officers of the line, threw in the way of the organization of the armies, their armament, their outfits, and even their subsistence in their cantonments. Thus, for instance, a regiment recently encamped received its rations in flour, and for want of cooking utensils found itself, in fact, without food, whilst biscuits were distributed to its neighbor, which, being provided with portable ovens, might have contributed through them to relieve the common wants to a considerable extent. The variety of firearms was so great that the cartridges first distributed scarcely ever suited the calibre of the muskets. It required months of assiduous labor to introduce order and method in this vast administrative machinery. There was constantly occasion to regret the absence of a general staff, such as is to be found in European armies, serving as a direct medium between the chief and all the subordinate agents placed under his command, and enabling him to enforce the execution of his wishes at all times.

When General McClellan commanded an army of 150,000 men, he had only about him, besides four topographical engineers especially detailed to study the ground, concerning which no map gave any precise information, eight aides-de-camp to carry his orders, to ascertain the position of the several army corps, to accompany important reconnoissances, to convey directions to a general on the day of battle, and to receive despatches during the night at general head-quarters and during the day, the generals,

civil functionaries, bearers of flags of truce from the enemy, and, finally, to question the inhabitants or prisoners of importance from whom information might be obtained.

An exception should be made in favor of the medical branch of the service; for, if officers were scarce, physicians before the war were numerous, America being the country which, in proportion to her population, possesses the greatest number of them. The spirit of personal independence and the absence of all control on the part of the state, so far from being detrimental to the cause of medical science in the New World, has given it an extraordinary impulse; and the Americans quote with just pride, besides such names as those of Jackson and Mott, the reports of their principal surgeons relative to the innumerable experiments which the war enabled them to make. The progress of medical science resulting from these reports may perhaps afford some compensation to humanity for all the blood shed during that cruel war. It may be said that there was no branch of the service in the whole army, unless it be that of the chaplains, which understood and performed its duties so well as the regimental surgeons—all physicians by profession.

The composition of the *personnel* of an army, notwithstanding its importance, is not, however, either the first element of military organizations or the most difficult to create: the most important is discipline, that moral force without which no army can exist. When it is established by tradition the new-comers submit to it without difficulty. But the Federal government had not only to introduce it among a vast multitude of men, all equally strangers to its severe requirements, but it did not possess any really effective means to enforce respect for it. In the first place, if the government had the right to deprive officers of their rank, it had not the power to replace them. It could only punish regimental officers by dismissing them, and had no rewards to offer them. The States, fearing lest the Federal government should possess too much influence, had, in refusing the right of appointment and promotion, deprived it of the best guarantee of good service.

On the other hand, there being no rule in force regulating the promotion of officers appointed by the States and enrolled

in the service of the Federal government, or in the general staff of the army of volunteers, and the latter being considered as a merely temporary organization, discipline could not find that support which the respect inspired by a strongly constituted hierarchy obtained for it in permanent armies.

We have already stated how the ranks were distributed among those who had mostly contributed to the recruiting of regiments. But among those who thus attained the summit of the ladder at the outset there were some who voluntarily descended it just as quickly. More than one subaltern officer of the regular army, placed in command of a regiment with the rank of colonel, became disgusted with that position and went to resume a modest place in his old company. There were others who, having held no previous rank in the standing army, had to undergo even greater trials; and we might mention a few instances of officers who, after leaving one regiment in order to assume the position of colonel in another, found themselves reduced to the ranks by the disbanding of the latter, and returned to take their places as common soldiers in their former regiment.

But the most serious obstacle against the maintenance of discipline was to be found in the law which, by an inexcusable anomaly in a democratic country, conferred upon the chiefs a discretionary authority over the soldiers for the punishment of simple military misdemeanors, and did not permit them to exercise the same in regard to officers. The latter had to be tried by court-martial for the slightest infringement of military rules, and they could not be subject to two days' confinement without a formal sentence. In consequence of this system, borrowed from the regular army, upon which it had been grafted in days when the executive power was mistrusted, the trial, the prosecution and the defence—in short, all the guarantees required by law in cases of grave offences—became a parody to secure immunity for the officers accused of insubordination towards their superiors. All these difficulties, however, did not discourage those who had undertaken the organization of the Federal armies, and they succeeded at last in introducing order and discipline among them.

The rules established for determining the right to a command

being as precise and as scrupulously observed in America as in Europe, served as a corrective to the accidents which converted the superior officer of to-day into a subordinate of to-morrow. These rules assigned the command among officers of the same grade to the senior of those who held their commissions from the President, whether they belonged to the regular army or to the volunteer staff, in preference to those who had been appointed by the governors of States, in special contingents.

With regard to the law instituting courts-martial to pronounce upon the slightest breaches of discipline, it met with the fate of all laws that are too bad to be applied; a thousand ways were found to evade it. The officer who neglected his duty was placed under arrest, as if to prepare for trial, and at the end of eight days he was released and told that the matter should not be pursued any further—a decision in which he naturally hastened to acquiesce. Or in more serious cases he was to be put in arrest for three or four weeks within his tent, and warned that if he made any complaints against such illegal proceeding the President would be requested to dismiss him.

Being thus relieved from matters of which they should never have taken cognizance, the courts-martial had yet another laborious duty to perform. Their functions were of a double character, according to the gravity of the charges brought before them. As simple courts they recommended the President to suspend or dismiss the party accused. As military tribunals, invested by the Constitution itself with judiciary power to try special cases, they imposed pecuniary fines and corporal penalties extending even to death, such sentences being subject to the revision of the President. In these courts-martial the volunteers were tried by volunteers, the regulars by regulars; but they were all subject to the same military code, the Articles of War, a small collection, rather vague, which, like nearly all Anglo-Saxon laws, leave a great deal to jurisprudence.

The establishment of examining commissions operated largely in favor of discipline, and raised the dignity of the epaulette in the estimation of the soldiers by purging the *personnel* of the list of officers. It was impossible to confer all the ranks upon educated officers, as there were very few such; but all the

others could be divided into two classes. The first, who were by far the most numerous, being conscious of their deficiencies, desired to improve themselves, and had all the intelligence necessary for learning their profession even in the midst of the difficulties of the war; such must be retained. The others, as presumptuous as they were incapable, set a fatal example in the positions they had courted only to gratify their cupidity or vanity; the examining commissions were directed to rid the army of them. They were instructed to subject all the officers of the various contingents to a rigid examination before they were finally accepted by the President. These examinations only took place several months after those contingents had been formed into divisions, so that the generals who had them under their respective commands were able to furnish the commissioners with suggestions in regard to the officers about to be examined, which more or less controlled their decisions.

The examiners always favored those who were known to be disposed to learn their profession, but those convicted of downright ignorance had no mercy shown to them. During the early stages of the war, those who found themselves thus deprived of their rank begged for favor, threw themselves at the feet of their judges; for, apart from the disgrace, it was a great pecuniary loss to them. They were told in reply to go and learn, and a few rigorous examples determined a large number of officers to avoid the disgrace of failure at a public examination in the presence of their comrades and their subordinates by a prompt resignation. This summary mode of proceeding may have caused some injustice, but the most cruel injustice would have been to expose the lives of soldiers by allowing the army to be filled with men incapable of commanding.

It was thus that discipline and respect for authority began to take root in the army, and their salutary influence was soon felt, although the observer, judging only from appearances, might not yet have been able to realize the fact. Indeed, what may be called the hierarchical sentiment has never existed in the United States, where the uncertain rounds of the social ladder offer to no one a pedestal so high but that a man may descend from it without ruin, where the citizen who has deserved well of his

country in a high position does not think it derogatory to his dignity to serve that country in a more modest capacity. Even in the regular army the rank which, acquired with difficulty, had been the aim and the reward of a whole career has never elicited the same respect as amongst us. The power it confers, the obedience it ought to secure within the limits of military command, lost nothing thereby, but it did not of itself create those social distinctions which are carefully kept up elsewhere, even by persons occupying inferior positions with the secret hope of being able at some future day to take the places of their superiors and to receive the same marks of respect. In the volunteer army, for stronger reasons, no prestige could attach to the mere *epaulette*, for the soldier was the more able to criticise the ignorance of his immediate chiefs because he almost always belonged to the same county or village and had long known them personally. The absence of that moral authority which is based upon length of service and superior experience was still more unfortunate among the non-commissioned officers, to whom it was even more indispensable in order to enforce obedience from the soldier.

But, on the other hand, the intelligence and education which lifted most of the privates to a level with their superiors inspired them with a natural respect for those among their chiefs in whom they recognized the necessary qualities for command, and induced them to accept, without a murmur, the obligations and restraints of military life when they were made to understand the necessity. Leaving the entire monopoly of insubordination to a few regiments, mostly composed of European adventurers, they exhibited none of that turbulence which is frequently associated with the name of volunteers. A few words of caution were sufficient to remind them that, having once taken the oath, there were no longer *amateurs* in the ranks of the army.

During the whole period of organization in the army of the Potomac, General McClellan had but once an occasion to rebuke any attempt to resist his authority. This occurred shortly after the battle of Bull Run, the memories of which had not yet been effaced. The soldiers of a volunteer regiment, considering themselves aggrieved in a matter affecting their pay and term of enlistment, refused to obey their officers. Their camp, situated

on one of the squares of Washington," was immediately surrounded by a detachment of regular troops, infantry and artillery, and this display of force sufficed to bring them to obedience. In granting them pardon the general-in-chief took away their flag, with the promise to return it to them on the field of battle; and the zeal which these troops displayed to atone for their error soon made them one of the best regiments in the army.

The acts of severity necessary for the maintenance of discipline were generally approved by public opinion, which was determined to sustain the authority of the chiefs from whom they expected the salvation of the country. But it was repugnant to the American people to shed, even by judicial process, the blood of a guilty man when that of a victim did not cry for vengeance; and to render possible the execution of deserters to the enemy it was necessary to bring forward material proof of the great danger to which the army was exposed if capital punishment, that indispensable penalty of the military code, was not inflicted upon traitors. The first execution took place in December, 1861; it was an event in the Federal army.

The best example that can be given of the docility with which the volunteers submitted to all the regulations, the necessity or advantages of which they understood, is to be found in the manner in which the absolute prohibition of fermented liquors was accepted by them. In a country where the use of ardent spirits is so universal, where the bar-room or drinking-shop plays so great a part, so severe a restriction could not have been imposed upon the soldiers if nearly all of them had not cheerfully recognized its necessity with a firmness of purpose more meritorious than many acts of heroism. The commissaries of subsistence alone had in store a detestable brandy distilled from grain, which they distributed parsimoniously to the sick and to the soldiers employed at hard labor, or to those encamped in malarious localities. It is true that during the early stages of the war the low drinking-shops of Washington and St. Louis were crowded with soldiers whose trembling hands brandished the terrible bowie-knife, or who staggered to the sidewalk to end their quarrels with the revolver. But it may be asserted that no drunken man was ever seen in camp; and even in the cities these disorders ceased as

soon as the military police, better organized, prevented soldiers from leaving their tents to visit the bar-rooms. The sutlers, licensed smugglers, were subjected to the supervision of the provost-marshal, and no strong liquor was tolerated at their stores. It was the Europeans who most strongly resisted this regulation—the Germans from pure loyalty to their *lager-bier*, the Southerners to drink in secret an alcoholic compound which in America is called brandy (whisky).

The *personnel* of staffs and administrative departments being once organized and that of the contingents purified, and the first principles of discipline established among the officers, as well as among the soldiers, the great task of drilling the army had yet hardly begun. Indeed, a great assemblage of men resembles a statue of clay, unable to move without breaking and having no vital breath. In order that it may acquire suppleness and agility the recruits must go through a series of exercises and evolutions equally irksome to the teachers and the taught—first singly, then by platoons, by battalions next, and finally by brigades. This task was the more difficult in the American army because instruction was as necessary for the officers as for the men, and because the latter, having no example to encourage them, did not understand the utility of so long an apprenticeship. Their intelligence, however, which rendered them submissive to the voice of chiefs really worthy to command them, soon made them undertake it with ardor. Full of confidence in themselves, they made up their minds, not that it was useless to learn, but that it would be very easy for them to learn anything they wished, the trade of war as well as any other; having enlisted voluntarily, they were determined to do everything in their power to become good soldiers capable of victory.

They were, therefore, of as much value as their chiefs, whose examples exercised an all-powerful influence over the collective spirit, if we may use such an expression, which animates a body of troops. A rapid change took place in those regiments in which the superior officers went assiduously to work and began by learning themselves what they desired to teach their inferiors. There were three of these superior officers to every regiment, or rather battalion, whose effective force numbered from eight to nine hun-

dred men at the utmost—one colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, and a major. This number would have been excessive in a standing army, but at a time when it was necessary to organize everything it offered great advantages; for there were many chances that among these three officers one would be found capable of assuming the management of affairs in the regiment, whatever his rank; his superiority over his two colleagues very soon placed the direction of affairs in his hands. Most of these officers applied themselves with zeal to the novel task they had accepted. Very often, after a day of drill and manœuvres, when the soldier was resting without care, the colonel would call all his officers together in his tent. There, by the light of an unsteady lamp, he would lecture them upon certain manœuvres, at first in the capacity of teacher, then freely discuss with them sundry points in tactics; and when the latter had retired, he would still continue to study, with his lieutenant-colonel and major, the French regulations (infantry tactics), translated by Scott, in order to expound them on the following day.

One of the most important duties in the organization of the army, and the most difficult to have well performed, was the management of regimental accounts. In the absence of an administrative staff the keeping of these accounts devolved entirely upon the colonel and captains of companies. For those who had not been engaged in mercantile affairs it was a labyrinth from which they could not extricate themselves without close application; and one should have inspected some of the American regiments in person in order to form an idea of the worriments entailed upon thousands of officers by the necessity of keeping four official account-books in order—the descriptive-book, the morning-return-book, the account-book, and the order-book.

In all the details we have given concerning the formation and organization of volunteer regiments we have said nothing of the measures taken to fill the gaps occasioned by sickness and the bullets of the enemy. The fact is that such measures had not been deemed necessary at the outset of a war which it was thought would only last ninety days. It was soon found that when a regiment had once set out to join the army, nobody any longer applied to the recruiting dépôts; the good places had been taken;

the men of influence who had contributed to the formation of the regiments were in camp; and if others appealed in their turn to the public, it was in behalf of new regiments. Under such a system it was impossible to establish *dépôts*; the numerical strength of the regiments was greatly diminished during their stay in camps, and it only required a single battle or a few nights passed in a malarious locality to reduce them to skeletons. In the mean while, the new levies which swelled the ranks of the armies brought no direct reinforcement to those regiments. In order to procure a rapid supply of men it was necessary constantly to create new regiments. These regiments brought with them all the inexperience which had cost so dear to their predecessors, without deriving any profit from the experience acquired by the latter, while the number of officers and soldiers belonging to the old regiments, whose example and teachings might have been so useful to the new comers if they had been thrown together under the same colonels, was too much reduced to play an important part unaided in the field.

It may be that in trying to remedy this evil the source itself had been exhausted from which the ranks of the Federal armies had been filled when they were so fearfully decimated. But this system was one of the principal causes of their weakness, and its consequences became more and more injurious until the day when, the conscription law having at last given the Federal government the means for securing enlistments, the formation of new regiments was prohibited, and General Grant infused new vigor into the army by the consolidation of two or three regiments into one.

Such was the general condition of affairs in the midst of which the organization of the Federal armies was being effected. Each branch of the service was naturally organized and perfected with more or less rapidity according to the particular difficulties that this labor expects to encounter.

In the infantry the soldiers were vigorous, but did not understand how to husband their strength for a long march. They did not know how to buckle on their knapsacks; they clumsily carried very light weights on their shoulders; they had no idea how to take care of their arms. Most of them were bad marksmen when they enlisted, and the first muskets which were put in their

hands were so defective that they could not at first practice at a target. The infantry regiments, modelled upon those of the regular army, were composed of ten companies, each having a nominal strength of ninety-six men, one captain, one first lieutenant, and one second lieutenant. It was upon these ten companies, formed in two ranks, that all the manœuvres by battalion were based. The artillery branch of the service was especially in favor with the American volunteers. It suited their taste for the mechanical arts, and they felt, moreover, like all new soldiers, a certain degree of confidence on finding themselves near those powerful weapons, with a longer range than musketry. In short, the regular artillery, having always been very numerous, supplied the volunteers with a proportionally larger number of able instructors than any other arm. Consequently, in the army of the Potomac, General McClellan was able to supply each division with a regular battery destined to serve as a model for the others, and the captain of which exercised a superior command over the latter. We shall speak presently of the material they had in their hands.

The volunteer artillery, furnished by the several States, was only organized into batteries, having no officer above the rank of captain. The superior officers of that arm of the service all belonged to the regular army, or had received from the President a temporary rank, with the title of aides-de-camp, on the staff of the general commanding the corps to which they were attached.

The cavalry was slower in acquiring the knowledge which alone could render it really useful. It required the experience of several campaigns to enable them to learn fully the special part which the nature of the country imposed upon them, and to exercise a serious influence upon the military operations. The strength of the volunteer regiments of cavalry varied according to the States which furnished them. Some of them, following the example of the new regular regiments, numbered as many as twelve hundred horses, and the three majors had each a command of four squadrons or companies. Most of them, however, formed upon the old model, were composed of ten companies, each about one hundred strong, without any intermediate field-officer between the colonel and the captains. These regiments, of one thousand horses each, presented a front too extended for the word of command,

thereby increasing the difficulties of drill. These difficulties were great and numerous. The men arrived on foot; it was the duty of the Federal government to equip and mount them. The duties of horsemen were new to them. The North American had lost some of the good traditions of horsemanship pertaining to the Anglo-Saxon race. In the eastern part of the Union the saddle-horse has been supplanted by the light vehicle called "buggy;" in the West the farmer is more of a husbandman than a stock-raiser; and the pioneer of the border States relies only upon his rifle to contend with mounted Indians. Nevertheless, these regiments were generally very popular among the volunteers. Forgetting that the mounted man has to be the slave of his horse, they thought that because they could perform a day's march on horseback less labor would be required. The number of cavalry regiments increased to such a degree that, in order to curtail the useless expense imposed upon the treasury, it was found necessary to leave a portion of the men dismounted. We shall show hereafter, when we shall have occasion to speak of the *matériel* of war, how fearfully horses were used up by the cavalry regiments during the early stages of the war. Owing to ignorance of the care necessary to preserve the animals, the soldiers found themselves dismounted after a few days' campaign, and even obliged to go into cantonments. This was the principal cause of the protracted inefficiency of the Federal cavalry. Besides, the difference between the regiments commanded by an experienced colonel and those whose chiefs were ignorant of their profession was, at first, even greater in the cavalry than in the infantry; and officers like Averell, Gregg, Buford, and Farnsworth in the army of the Potomac, and Sheridan, Kautz, and Kilpatrick in the West, who subsequently achieved so much distinction, became at first noted for the excellent condition of the cavalry troops placed under their respective commands.

The division formation of these various arms was effected in a nearly uniform manner. In the army of the Potomac four regiments, or battalions, constituted a brigade, with an effective force of from 3200 to 3500 men on taking the field. A division was composed of three brigades of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and four batteries of artillery, one of which belonged to the

regular service. The surplus of cavalry and artillery remained separate.

The special services found great resource in the aptitude of the American to pass from one trade to another. This is a great and valuable quality which the practice of true liberty engenders by protecting the individual against excesses in the pursuit of specialties which confine the faculties of man within a narrow prison.

The part of siege artillery in the army of the Potomac was entrusted to a Connecticut regiment not a soldier or officer of which, except the colonel, had ever before handled a cannon. They learned their new duties, escorted that heavy artillery throughout all the marches of the army, and served it with great ability during the most distressing retreats, while more than once, when their pieces were in safety and the din of battle was heard in the distance, they threw aside rammer and sponge to take part in the conflict with muskets as foot-soldiers.

In order to organize the engineer service it was also found necessary to appeal to the ardor of volunteers who had no military instruction. The officers of that arm scattered among the various corps were not sufficiently numerous to direct in person all the works required by the military operations, nor to instruct the soldiers employed in them. But there were found, on the one hand, useful auxiliaries among civil engineers, a large and educated class, composed of practical men accustomed to struggle with the difficulties of the virgin soil of America ; while, on the other hand, a rapid course of special instruction imparted to a few regiments sufficed to qualify them for the most important works of engineering art, while the rougher work was entrusted indiscriminately to the various regiments of volunteers, among whom some skilful artisans were always sure to be found. The construction of these works was never entirely new to them. Even the most populous States, which still possessed vast forests, all furnished a considerable contingent of woodmen or lumbermen and pioneers, inured from their infancy to the use of the axe, the pick, and the spade, and one regiment a thousand strong might be seen felling more than eighty acres (*quarantes hectares*) of tall forests in a single day.

Sometimes an unfair advantage was taken of the aptitude of the volunteers for this kind of work. They had scarcely been mus-

tered into service when a great portion of the time which should have been devoted to drilling was employed in the formation of artistically constructed *abattis* and in making large entrenched camps in all the positions which it was suspected the enemy intended to attack in the vicinity of Washington, Louisville, Paducah, and St. Louis. These works, at first, were only simple breastworks (*épaulements*), formed of trunks of trees and earth, on the skirts of clearings which had been made for the purpose of freeing the approaches of the positions to be defended, and were protected by *abattis* of from ten to forty feet in thickness, where all the branches, skilfully turned outward, sharpened at the points, and hardened by fire, were inextricably intertwined. It was soon rendered necessary to construct improved redoubts for field artillery on the strongest positions along the line; the very nature of the ground rendered it necessary to multiply their number, and in the end they became veritable citadels, intended for guns of the heaviest calibre. There were thus erected at every available point on the large Western rivers, especially along the Mississippi, either level or plunging batteries, intended to intercept navigation. When these works constituted regular systems of defence, it was deemed expedient to connect them by means of causeways constructed with trunks of trees placed close to each other, such as pioneers build in marshy forests, and which, under the name of *corduroy roads*, marked the passage of the Federal armies throughout the South. Logs of the same length, and placed crosswise alongside of each other over the miry soil of the forest, constituted the original corduroy, the pieces of which, having become disjointed by the passage of the first troops, fatigue the foot-soldiers, bruise the horses, and jar the wagons, but an entire army sometimes succeeded, nevertheless, in passing thus over many leagues of morass. In roads for permanent use the improved corduroy was composed of large trunks placed lengthwise, supporting logs laid crosswise; pieces of timber of smaller diameter filled up the interstices of these cross-logs, and the whole was covered by alternate layers of earth and branches.

The variety and simplicity which characterize the mechanic arts of the Americans were first manifested in the construction of the bridges thrown over the innumerable ravines in the vicin-

ity of Washington, forming a connection between all the army encampments. The piers of these bridges were constructed of unhewn logs placed against a slope and laid upon each other horizontally in cross directions, resembling those pyramids of three or four faces which may be seen in wood-yards. They supported a platform of trestle-work composed of the same materials, and the whole presented a timber-work of the greatest solidity, notwithstanding its fragile appearance. Skilful from the beginning in this kind of construction, the volunteers continued to improve during the war—so much so that in the Georgia campaign we shall see Sherman's soldiers throw over the Chattahoochee a bridge thirty metres high and two hundred and ninety long in less than five days. In the army of the Potomac two regiments were detailed for this kind of work, and the bridge-equipage was placed in their hands; they combined the duties of pontoniers with those of sappers. They commenced operations in the former capacity in the beginning of 1862; and in a single day they built a bridge across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry in spite of the obstacles presented by a rapid current, a water-depth of seven metres, and the width of the river, which is more than three hundred metres. Three years and a half after, at the passage of the James, they gave evidence of the progress they had made in the art of throwing with great rapidity a bridge of boats over a large river. In six hours a bridge six hundred and fifty metres long was made fast in the river in water twenty-eight metres deep, which sustained without accident the passage of an army of more than 100,000 men, 6000 wagons, and 3000 head of cattle.

The large number of mechanics found among the volunteers was on more than one occasion the means of repairing and running the locomotives which the enemy had left behind him after disabling them, until a special corps of engineers could be formed to put the military railways in working order. This corps, as we shall see presently, rendered the greatest service by introducing a methodical system in the management of railways which doubled their usefulness.

Among all the applications of modern science in the interest of war, the most valuable was the military telegraph, which was opportunely introduced to supply the insufficiency of general

staffs, and was the most active aide-de-camp to the American generals.

As soon as a marching army had gone into bivouac the telegraphic wires established a connection between all the general headquarters; the tent where Morse's battery was hastily set up became the rendezvous of all who under any pretext whatever could obtain access to procure the latest news. It is stated that some newspaper correspondents found means to possess themselves of important secrets by learning to distinguish the words through the clickings, more or less repeated, of the instrument while it was printing its lines and points upon a strip of paper. A corps of employés was organized for this service, selected with care and sworn to secrecy, for upon their discretion depended the fate of the armies. In the army of the Potomac it was placed under the direction of Major Eckert, who by his intelligence rendered the most important services.

The field-telegraph was composed of a few wagons loaded with wire and insulators, which weré set up during the march, sometimes upon a pole picked up on the road, sometimes on the trees themselves which bordered it; and the general's tent was hardly raised when the operator was seen to make his appearance, holding the extremity of that wire, more precious than that of Ariadne in the labyrinth of American forests. An apparatus still more portable was used for following the troops on the day of battle. This was a drum, carried on two wheels, around which was wound a very slender copper wire enveloped in gutta-percha. A horse attached to the drum unwound the wire, which, owing to its wrapper, could be fastened to the branches of a tree, trailed on the ground, or laid at the bottom of a stream. A way-station was established wherever the drum stopped, even in the centre of the battle-field, and placed the troops engaged in the conflict in direct communication with the general-in-chief. These field-telegraphs, established at the rate of three kilometres per hour, generally extended to a distance of from eight to ten, and sometimes even to thirty-two, kilometres.

A single example will show the importance of the military telegraph. Without counting the lines already in existence of which possession was taken, the employés of the government con-

structed five thousand two hundred kilometres during a single year of the war, and they forwarded nearly one million eight hundred thousand despatches; and sufferings and dangers were not spared those men whose merit was the greater in that it was less conspicuous.

More than one among them, shivering with fever in an unhealthy station, lay down with his ear against the instrument to write with a trembling hand under dictation some important despatches whose secret he would confide to no one. Many paid with their lives for their boldness in setting up their instruments under the very fire of the enemy; and one fact almost incredible bears testimony to the dangers to which they were thus exposed. During the siege of Charleston the wire which connected the besieging batteries ran so close to the rifle-pits of the Confederate skirmishers that it was frequently cut by their balls. The telegraph was, however, at times a perfidious messenger. Bodies of partisans would suddenly take possession of an intermediate station and throw the Federal staffs into confusion by sending false despatches destined to upset their plans. One day the guerilla Mosby, having performed an exploit of this kind, took an impudent advantage of it to send to the office of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, a despatch full of insults addressed to that high functionary. The Confederates, on their part, charged one of their employés with having by his disloyalty contributed to the loss of Fort Donelson by delaying instead of accelerating the arrival of the reinforcements which were to relieve that place. If this fact has not been positively proved, there is nothing improbable in it, and it shows that, with all its advantages, the use of the telegraph in war is not without its dangers.

In the American armies there was also organized an aerial telegraph by means of flags raised upon a long pole, which were waved to right and left over the stations in sight of each other. Sometimes perched on the top of a tree, sometimes sitting astride over the roof of a house, the employés of the signal corps, who performed this duty with untiring patience, transmitted the news to the general-in-chief and his orders to his subordinates. The coolness and promptitude with which they performed this task was often of great service to the armies at critical moments.

Two balloons were connected with the army of the Potomac; and during the long inaction which its organization around Washington caused, they only contributed to the amusement of those who were allowed the privilege of an ascension. When the army found itself in presence of the enemy, the latter honored the balloons with numerous cannon-shots, especially during the siege of Yorktown, but they never succeeded in hitting them; and the greatest danger that ever threatened the *aéronaut* was that which he incurred in the beginning, when, as he made his first ascensions above the Federal camps, some stupid sentinel, ignorant whether the *aërial* voyager was friend or enemy, would be sure to fire at the indiscreet individual who thus hovered over their heads. A gas generator, a heavy machine composed of ovens, retorts, and pipes, which it required twenty trucks to carry, followed the army at a distance, and the already inflated balloons, which a whole company controlled by means of strong ropes and strove to direct along the winding roads of Virginia. At the least puff of wind each of these monsters would give a sudden jerk, compelling those who held them captive to stand on tip-toe, and to perform, in spite of themselves, some of the strangest evolutions. Although expensive, difficult of transportation, and of doubtful service, this instrument was not without its usefulness, especially during a siege, when, elevated at leisure, it could communicate the most valuable information concerning the enemy's works. Thus, before Yorktown, Mr. Lowe, the operator, who carried an electric apparatus in the car and communicated by means of a wire with the Federal batteries, could indicate the result of their fire and enable them to correct their aim. At the same time he discerned the position of all the enemy's pieces with a precision which an inspection after the evacuation of the place fully confirmed. But it would be wrong to rely upon so capricious an auxiliary; for on the day of battle, when its assistance is needed to discover the enemy's reserves, a puff of wind will suffice to prevent its ascent, and the *aide-de-camp* sent in haste to make in that elevated observatory a reconnaissance, on which may depend the fate of a day's battle, is obliged to wait in vain for a favorable state of the atmosphere to render an ascension possible.

The electric and *aërial* telegraphs, the balloons, and other en-

gines of that description should certainly not be despised; but they are fatal boons to the general whom they keep inside of his tent at a moment when nothing can replace the *coup-d'œil* of the master and the presence of the chief among his soldiers.

In speaking of the organization of the American armies, we cannot omit to mention a few of the distinctive features of the volunteers who composed them.

These armies differed from ours in the large number of married men they contained. In America there are no military laws to interfere with marriage, and the American, who is but little addicted to domestic habits and is the artificer of his own fortune, does not enter into those calculations concerning family expenses which stifle the spirit of enterprise in a nation, and eventually impoverish its population both morally and numerically. The war acted as a stimulus to marriage—among the officers, in the hope of being cared for by female hands if wounded; among the soldiers, because the States had assured a certain indemnity to their wives and a liberal pension to their widows.

Excellent workmen wherever there was any engineering work required, the volunteers were to show themselves industrious in mitigating the rigors of camp and bivouac, as they had learned from infancy to improvise among the forests light shelters or solid dwellings. From the first day's halt the tents were replaced by roofs made of the boughs of trees, generally pitched on the skirts of a wood; for experience soon demonstrated how unhealthy it is to encamp under the thick foliage, which does not allow the air to circulate freely. When snow and ice came to surprise the army of the Potomac encamped around Washington, the soldiers did not wait for orders to go into winter quarters to provide against these new enemies—orders which a general never issued, except to deceive the enemy and when he has determined to break up the camp suddenly. As soon as the first cold weather made itself felt through the tents every one set his ingenuity to work to devise means of warmth. Only a few tents, conically shaped, with a hole at the top, like Indian huts, admitted the introduction of cast-iron stoves. In the others they constructed a hearth of hardened clay or of wood covered with mud; barrels placed one on the top of another served as chimneys; an excavation running the length of

the tent, covered over with large stones which retained the heat and communicated with a fire deeply set in the earth, warmed the whole interior. The tents, at first surrounded with boughs, were raised upon a wooden foundation, which resulted in forming real walls; the canvas which had done service for roof disappeared in turn, and the whole gave way to the classic log hut, with its walls of unhewn logs and its floor of rammed earth, that rustic edifice which designates the site of the future cities of the New World in the midst of the virgin forests. The soldiers of the two armies left everywhere where they passed the winter entire villages of these primitive dwellings; but these villages, not the fruits of civilization, but of war, being abandoned as suddenly as they had been constructed, were destined to disappear rapidly without being replaced by either brick or stone.

Vigor and skill among the volunteers did not exclude instruction. Active citizens in their respective counties and States, and identified with either of the political parties, they were fully acquainted with public affairs and could not dispense with newspapers. With scarcely any exception, they had all received that primary education which, without initiating the man into all the discoveries of science, teaches him to make use of his intelligence, which awakens a desire for knowledge, and which, when it pervades a whole population, imparts to it as much power as a simple unit placed before any number of zeros. It is owing to this general system of education that the New World may be called the country of progress, and that its institutions are founded upon the regular and conscientious practice of universal suffrage. The New England States are entirely exempt from those twin scourges inseparable from our old social systems, ignorance and pauperism. The illiterate minority of the army was almost exclusively composed of European emigrants.

On opening the knapsack of the American soldier one was almost sure to find in it a few books, and generally a Bible, which he read in the evening without hiding from his comrades. An inkstand, a piece of blotting-paper, some envelopes ornamented with monograms, badges, and portraits completed the assortment. He made, in fact, abundant use of the liberality of the government, which transported all his letters postage-free.

A large carpet-bag, hung up against the tent of the adjutant of each regiment, served as a letter-box ; and a few hours of rest sufficing to fill it, it was often necessary to empty it twice a day. The 11th Massachusetts, numbering only eight hundred and sixty-three officers and men, has been cited as having sent off from its camp near Washington an average of four thousand five hundred letters weekly—that is to say, each soldier wrote from five to six letters in seven days. Consequently, the arrival and departure of the mail played a great part in camp-life. Together with the correspondence, the mail brought enormous packages of newspapers, which ragged boys, both on foot and on horseback, distributed in great haste, even to the remotest corners of the camp. They were frequently seen crying their papers on the very field of battle, and selling them to the wounded scarcely able to rise. In every tent the latest news brought by the *Herald* or the *Tribune* was read in the evening and eagerly discussed, while the soldier on duty, if he thought himself unobserved, walked up and down with his musket in one hand and his newspaper in the other.

It may not be irrelevant in this place to say a few words as to the means employed by journals to render them interesting to their numerous readers in the towns and in the camps, and to maintain constant communication between the people of the Northern States and the armies in the field.

Greatly in demand, less on account of their abstract opinions than for the news they promulgated, and aiming at no political propagandism except through the manner they represented facts, the principal object of each was to gather as much information as possible and to be the first to place it before the public. No efforts were spared to attain this object ; and their correspondents, who were to be found in all the armies, formed a *staff* (this was the acknowledged name), entitled to a place alongside of the regularly organized corps of which we have spoken.

The great journals were represented in each army corps by an accredited correspondent, whose duty it was to see everything, to take part in every expedition, and to allow no incident of the war to pass without reporting it. This staff comprised the greatest variety of characters and peculiarities of life. In its ranks were

writers of positive merit and men who, animated by a real passion for war, ended by exchanging the pen for the sword. The life which circumstances compelled these correspondents to lead exacted special qualities—tact, daring, and a great deal of assurance, a still greater amount of patience and robust health. When a secret was divulged, the first suspicions fell upon them. In consequence of a few lamentable indiscretions, the government exacted a promise from all those engaged in writing for the newspapers not to publish what it was important to conceal from the enemy. They were therefore obliged to distinguish, among all interesting facts they were the first to learn, such as could lawfully be communicated to the public. More than once they had to resort to stratagem in order to evade the order of some incensed general who had forbidden their stay among his troops. One day Sherman drove off all the correspondents from his army. They all left, for his orders could not be defied with impunity, but at the end of one month they were all back. Another general, while preserving a friendly aspect toward them, found means to prevent them from seeing anything, and confined them to the simple task of reporting stenographically the prearranged statement which he gave them. Under such circumstances, to become a close observer and an agreeable reporter, to be tolerated by the generals and welcomed by the subordinates, to know how to repay each item of information with a kind and flattering word, and in case of necessity to enforce respect through the redoubtable influence which is derived from the support of a great journal,—certainly required, to say nothing of mental qualifications, a character at once sprightly and tempered. A private individual in the midst of a large army, having neither the shoulder-straps of the officer nor the musket of the soldier with which to influence others, or even to justify his presence there; obliged to share the dinner of one man or to ask a ration of forage for his horse from another; always on the watch not to miss the hour of departure, which the jealous mistrust of the chief of staff carefully kept from his knowledge; always ready to throw his wallet upon his horse—a wallet oftener empty than full; sleeping wherever he could, behind a tent, in a wagon, or under a tree,—the correspondent, worn out with fatigue, was obliged every night, whilst all

around were reposing near the expiring camp-fires, to take out his pen and compose upon his knees, by the light of a wretched lantern, a letter capable of entertaining a public difficult to please and greedy for sensations. Real dangers frequently caused these hardy pioneers of the press to share the glory of the soldiers.

The New York *Herald* had in its service, with the fleets and armies, as many as sixty-three correspondents at once. One of them was killed on the field of battle, another was present in twenty-seven combats and was six times wounded, five others were wounded, and two died of exhaustion, while seven or eight fell into the hands of the enemy. The latter were rather mildly treated in consequence of the opinion of the journal they represented, but the Confederates deemed no severity too great for those who happened to be connected with abolition papers; and the picture drawn by Mr. Richardson, a correspondent of the *Tribune*, of his sufferings in Southern prisons is one of the most affecting narratives that one can read.

Before concluding this chapter we must devote a few pages to the regular army, which was being reorganized at the same time that the volunteer regiments were forming. This reorganization, which was rendered indispensable by the defection of a portion of the officers, by the high positions to which others had been promoted, and by the loss of soldiers who had capitulated in Texas, was decreed by the joint resolution of May 4, 1861, and which Congress had passed on the 29th of July. To the five regiments of cavalry which received a uniform designation a sixth was added; the number of artillery regiments was increased from four to five, and that of the infantry regiments from ten to nineteen. These eleven new regiments were much stronger numerically than the old ones: the Sixth Cavalry, raised to twelve squadrons, numbered 1189 officers and men; the Fifth Artillery, also divided into twelve batteries of six field-pieces each, commanded by twelve captains and three majors, comprised a total force of 1919 men. Finally, instead of a single battalion of ten companies, the new infantry regiments were composed of three battalions of eight companies each, and their effective force, as regulated by law, was 2452 men.

These new regiments, having once received their full comple-

ment, added 25,000 men to the regular army, and thus made up the total of 42,000 men fixed by the law of July 29th. But it was so difficult to obtain recruits that in December, 1861, when the enlistment of volunteers had reached the figure of 640,637 men, this army had not yet enrolled under its banners more than 20,334 men, not quite one-half the number prescribed by law. The small number of enlistments in the regular army was due, first of all, to the fact that these enlistments were for a definite period, while the volunteers were to be discharged at the end of the war, and everybody believed that it could not last three years; then to the retention of two dollars per month from the pay of the regular soldier, while the volunteer drew his compensation in full, and the States granted him additional bounties and secured a pension to his family; and, finally, to the spirit of comradeship which influenced the organization of volunteer companies, whilst the reputation for severe discipline which the regular army had gained kept many young men aloof from it.

This army was not only compelled to play an insignificant part in the new forces of the republic, but the elements of which it was composed were another cause of weakness. Out of its 20,000 soldiers more than half, collected with so much difficulty, were entirely raw, and their instruction was the more difficult because the most intelligent, the strongest, and the most disinterested men were immediately prevented from joining their ranks. In consequence of the prejudices above mentioned, the proportion of new comers was even larger among the officers than among the soldiers. The drafts which the volunteers had made upon the *personnel* of the regular army had diminished their number even more than this defection. Twenty-two superior officers had thus left their respective commands to become generals, and officers of inferior grade had likewise been called to fill positions of trust elsewhere—so that out of the eleven new regiments there were eight whose nominal colonels exercised other commands as generals of volunteers, while the greatest part of their officers had received no military education whatever. In fact, the vacancies had been so numerous that the West Point Academy, already reduced by the withdrawal of the Southern cadets, was not able to fill them, and it was found necessary to distribute the lower

grades among young men fresh from civil life, who filled the subaltern positions in the new regiments. Nevertheless, the *esprit de corps*, that moral influence which attaches to a word, a number, or a sign, which has the power of transforming men, soon imparted habits of steadiness and discipline to the new comers, who, after the first combats, rivalled their older brethren in courage and sustained the credit of the regular troops.

It was especially the regular infantry which, in consequence of its reduced strength, had to play an insignificant part among the divisions of the volunteer infantry. Yet in the army of Kentucky, where it was only represented by a single battalion belonging to the Eighteenth Regiment, that detachment distinguished itself in the first battle fought by that army at Mill Springs. In the army of the Potomac it was represented by eight battalions, or a little over five thousand men; these were not enough for a reserve destined to strike a decisive blow, but this corps, under able command, served as a model to the others and constantly encouraged them by its example, whereas, if it had been scattered, its traditions would have been destroyed and its efficiency neutralized. Formed into a single brigade, these eight battalions were at first entrusted with the delicate duty of protecting the city of Washington; we shall find them again among the volunteers, suffering themselves to be cut to pieces rather than fall back on the battle-fields of Virginia. The regular cavalry had a more important part to play at the beginning than the infantry, for it was proportionally more numerous, and the inexperience of the mounted volunteers compelled it to perform during a certain period of time all the duties pertaining to that arm. In order to accomplish this and to recover its *morale*, which had been affected by the capitulations in Texas, the defection of four colonels out of five, and the changes of regimental numbers, General McClellan hastened to annex two-thirds of them to the army of the Potomac, which only contained seven squadrons when he assumed the command. From that time they found themselves sufficiently strong to teach the volunteers their business by fighting in front of them and making them gradually participate in the work, the burden of which they had hitherto borne alone. We shall frequently meet them in the course of our narrative; but in

proportion as the volunteers who fought by their side acquired experience, the particular importance of the regulars will diminish, and will disappear altogether when, after the reorganization of the Federal cavalry, the regulars will be distributed among the various corps whose long expeditions we shall have occasion to relate.

The artillery force was increased by the creation of the fifth regiment, and the garrisons required by the armament of fortification, to a total of fifty-two batteries. Although the effective force of these batteries was far from being complete, their number gave them a preponderance in the new armies, because either the regular artillery was kept united for the purpose of forming powerful reserves, or it was divided among the various corps to instruct the volunteers. This twofold duty was assigned to them in the army of the Potomac. Out of seventy-three batteries or four hundred and seven pieces which that army had at the beginning of 1862, there were twenty-nine regular batteries, comprising one hundred and sixty-six pieces; eighteen batteries formed a corps of reserve, and one of the remaining batteries was attached to each division of the army.

As we have stated, the eleven captains who commanded these last batteries had in addition three volunteer batteries under their orders; and thanks to their instructions, the new artillery after one or two campaigns equalled the regulars who had been given them as models. The formation of a strong reserve of artillery was a wise precaution in an army composed entirely of young soldiers. In the army of the Potomac it was organized by the brave Colonel Hunt, under the supervision of General Barry, and comprised three divisions, one of heavy artillery, another of light batteries on foot, and a third of horse-batteries. The latter, four in number, armed with three-inch cannon, solid and light, well provided with horses, and perfectly handled, accompanied the cavalry, which they frequently assisted in an effective manner without ever impeding its movements.

These are the last lines we shall devote, by way of special mention, to the little regular army which we have followed since its formation; for after having preserved its military traditions and supported, in the hour of danger, the tottering edifice of the


Federal Constitution, it was absorbed into the improvised armies to the creation of which we have just referred. But if it ceased to have a separate existence, its spirit still survived and continued to control the action of the new comers; the influence and the importance of the regular officers will increase in proportion as the volunteers acquire more military experience; and when at the end of the struggle the regular army shall once emerge to view, we shall find five hundred and fifty of its officers detached among the volunteers, one hundred and fifteen of whom were generals and sixty commanders of regiments. Let us add, however, that this regular army, such as we shall then see it reappear, will no longer be the same we have known before the war, constituting a kind of isolated corporation, and the jealous guardian of its traditions; it will, in fact, have opened its doors to all merit displayed on the field of battle; and numbering in its ranks all those who after achieving distinction have desired to continue in the military career, it will have the rare good fortune to combine the best qualities of the volunteers with the noble attributes of the old regulars.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MATÉRIEL OF WAR.

BEFORE we resume the narrative of military operations we must close our inquiry into the organization of the two contending armies with a few words regarding the manner in which they were equipped; the creation of the *matériel*, so varied, so extensive, and so indispensable to both parties, was as difficult a problem for their chiefs as the reunion of the *personnel* of which they were composed.

The almost inexhaustible industrial resources of the North gave her a great advantage in this respect, but it required time to bring this *matériel* together, to transport and distribute it. It required time, above all, to introduce order and method into those operations, and to teach the armies the practical value of the instruments placed in their hands. In the Federal army the duty of organizing this *matériel*, as we have said before, was divided among three branches of the administration—the departments of the quartermaster, the commissary of subsistence, and the ordnance; the first charged with equipment and transportation, the second with the provision of food, and the third with arming troops.

 As soon as the volunteers were called out the quartermaster's department entered into contracts with home manufacturers and a few foreign merchants, which enabled it to clothe the soldiers as fast as they presented themselves, and to supply them with all the necessities of personal outfit. Notwithstanding some defective lots and a few very exorbitant bargains, this mercantile operation was successfully carried out. No one was troubled at the thought of spending a few millions more than was strictly necessary in order to induce persons engaged in private business to change their operations at once, so as to meet the new demands made upon the industry of the country. This transformation was effected in a remarkable manner. Thus nearly all the accoutrements for the cavalry of

the army of the Potomac were supplied by a firm largely engaged in the manufacture of trimming-laces (*passementerie*) in Philadelphia, which in a few days threw aside their bobbins to engage in the manufacture of leather belts and sabres. During the first fourteen months of the war the administrative department furnished the army with three million coats and nearly two million five hundred thousand blankets. It supplied two hundred and forty thousand tents for the first winter's encampments. When the armies took the field, they were naturally obliged to leave all these tents behind them, with the exception of a certain number for the officers. The quartermaster's department then substituted shelter-tents, of which they distributed more than three hundred thousand in one year. These were soon improved by the use of india-rubber cloth; and the advantages of this system to the health of the soldiers in the marshy forests of America were so great that by degrees all the coverlets of the army were replaced by the waterproof *poncho*, a square piece of cloth with a hole in the centre for the head, worn over the shoulders when it rained, and in the evening spread out upon the damp ground, over which the shelter-tent was pitched. Consequently, the number of these india-rubber garments, which in 1861 was forty thousand, rose to one million five hundred thousand in 1864; and it has been estimated that, placed alongside of each other, they would have presented a surface of one mile and a quarter square—that is to say, four times as large as the gardens of the Tuileries.

The uniforms furnished to the volunteers of various arms were nearly all alike, and this similarity increased in proportion as the outfits which the first regiments had brought from their respective States were replaced by the issues of the government departments. Their color of deep blue distinguished them from the gray coats of the Confederates. The felt hats and the regulation coat of the regular army, which the generals and their staffs adopted almost everywhere, were replaced by the *képi* and the blouse, a sack which had the inconvenience of being too loose to fit well about the shoulders. A canvas haversack, a belt to which was fastened the cartridge-box and the bayonet, completed the accoutrement of the foot-soldier.

The equipment of the mounted men was also copied from that

of the regular cavalry, although they had to wage war in a country very different from the Western plains. The regulation saddle, called the McClellan saddle, was light and comfortable, and did not hurt the withers of the animal, but the wooden stirrups with leather coverings to protect the feet against the tall grass of the prairie were heavy and inconvenient. The cavalry soldier carried a revolver at his belt; the regulations required that he should also attach his sabre to it, but by degrees he acquired the habit of suspending it to the pommel—an excellent idea; for if the soldier, when dismounted, should never be separated from his pistol, the side-arm, on the contrary, only embarrasses his movements the moment he quits the saddle. The mounted men were moreover provided with a short musket, or even an infantry carbine, which greatly increased the weight of the burden of their horses, but of which they made frequent use in those engagements where they were obliged to fight on foot.

All the personal effects of the soldiers, coats, linen, shoes, and boots, were furnished directly by the administrative departments. No reduction was made from their pay to constitute a regimental fund. The system of making clothing in the regiments, which has enabled certain armies to practice economy, has never existed in America. It was looked upon as calculated to greatly increase the number of non-combatants in the *personnel* of a regiment, and it was deemed best to adopt the system of general contracts, more in harmony with the process of modern industry, even at the risk of furnishing the soldiers with uniforms not as well fitting as might be desired. By this means the functions of the administrative departments and the system of regimental accounts were simplified, whereas it would have been often difficult to discriminate between proper economy and illegal profits. It was the enterprise of private individuals, under the supervision of special officers of the administrative departments, which furnished the soldiers with everything.

Of all the operations entrusted to the quartermaster's department the most important, as well as the most difficult, was that of supplying fresh horses for the cavalry, the artillery, and the transportation departments. The consumption of draught animals by the armies was to affect seriously the agricultural

interests of the country. The breeds of American horses are generally small. The fatal habit of putting them too soon under the saddle interferes with their growth. The regulations which forbade their being accepted into the service under five years of age and less than fifteen hands high (five feet at the withers) could not be complied with, for it was necessary to take all that could be found; and the sorrier the horses the greater the consumption, and consequently the larger the amount of fresh horses required to replace them. During the first year of the war the number of horses procured for the cavalry and the artillery alone was one hundred and ten thousand.

Immense *corrals* were established among the vacant lots in the neighborhood of Washington and of the Western cities to receive droves of animals emaciated by long journeys which the horse-contractors brought from Vermont and Kentucky. Taken a few days previously from the farm upon which they were grazing at liberty, never having been broken, these horses were crowded in a too narrow space, carelessly picketed, badly fed, seldom groomed, and without any shelter. Their power of endurance under so many trials showed what robust constitutions they possessed in spite of their appearance, and the impunity with which the contractors, horse-dealers, inspectors, and the officers authorized to make their own selections moved about among them was the best proof of their docility.

Occasionally, however, some unforeseen accident would create disorder at the dépôt. Thus, for instance, one evening the principal stable in Washington caught fire, and six hundred horses maddened with terror rushed through the badly-lighted streets of the capital, upsetting pedestrians and carriages on their way and spreading trouble and confusion everywhere.

Notwithstanding the enormous supply of fresh horses, the government could hardly replace the lame and foundered animals which filled the large infirmaries established specially for their reception. During the first year of the war there were no less than fifty-seven thousand cured; in the course of those twelve months more than one regiment used up three horses to every man; and it was only through the severest discipline that the mounted men were taught at last to take care of their horses.

Thus it happened that one of them was killed in the streets of Washington by a sentinel who had in vain ordered him to slacken his pace, in order to prevent them from madly galloping about the capital.

We have already shown by a few figures the importance of the transportation service; this importance will become more and more apparent as we proceed with the narrative of the campaigns in which this branch of the service exercised a decided influence. It will suffice to say in this place that during the first year, which alone occupies our present attention, the government was obliged to furnish more than twenty thousand wagons and eighty-four thousand mules, without counting the wagons brought by the soldiers themselves from their respective States. The military transportation was effected exclusively by means of wagons, pack-horses being seldom employed in the United States. The officers who had made use of them in Mexico, while recognizing the advantages of their employment in certain cases, did not deem it expedient to recommend their adoption in a country where wagon-roads are so easily constructed. This system would be attended by the very great inconvenience of making each animal carry a lighter load than if in harness; moreover, it would have been impossible to find experienced drivers to manage these pack-animals. A large establishment was established at Perryville, on the Susquehanna, where mules were trained to work in teams of six, driven by word of command with the aid of a single loose rein.

The construction of bridge-equipages, which, once collected, were placed under the care of volunteer troops specially selected for that service, belonged also to the quartermaster's department. The *matériel* of these equipages varied frequently. One experiment was made, and then abandoned as too complicated, with iron pontons, which in the water served as boats, and on land were placed on wheels to form trucks to bear the roadway. In the armies of the West large bags of gutta-percha or india-rubber were substituted for boats, but were rejected by the army of the Potomac, as they were too easily torn. The materials most generally in use were either simple wooden barges that could easily be

repaired or tubular pontoons of sheet iron, which had the advantage of being much lighter.

It will be enough to mention the regulation ration of the American soldier to convey an idea of the importance of the subsistence department, whose duty it was to provide food for the armies, which on the 1st of December, 1861, numbered six hundred thousand men. To the commissary of subsistence there were no "dead-heads" (non-valeurs). All those who were prevented by special assignment from appearing on the field of battle, and whom the general must deduct from his fighting force, seated themselves in the evening with the rest around the mess-table, which the commissary had to supply. One pound of biscuit or twenty-two ounces of bread or flour, one pound and a quarter of fresh or salt beef or three-quarters of a pound of bacon—a favorite food with soldiers—constituted the bulk of the ration; but to this was added for every division of one hundred men by the regulations eight gallons of beans, ten pounds of rice or of hominy, an American dish made from the grains of corn,* ten pounds of coffee, fifteen of sugar, four gallons of vinegar and two of salt, one pound and a quarter of candles, and four pounds of soap. Consequently, notwithstanding the appetite of the American soldier and his want of economy in cooking, it would have been no easy matter for him to consume such a ration; and the forty-seven or forty-eight men composing a company would form a mess which enabled them to get along without drawing their full quantity of rations from the commissary. The difference was paid to them in money, and generally formed a common fund for the company, controlled by it without the interposition of their superior officers. Occasionally a regiment would undertake a similar economy in regard to the supply of flour. A considerable number of those encamped around Washington constructed earthen ovens similar to those in use among Western settlers and made their own bread, thereby realizing the double advantage of substituting fresh bread for biscuit and realizing the profits accruing from the economy of their flour rations. One regiment alone, the

* Hominy is made of dried corn, but green corn played a great part as food during the war.—Ed.

third of Sickles' brigade, was thus enabled to save thirteen hundred dollars in less than two months.

The task of supplying the Federal troops with arms and ammunition, which devolved upon the ordnance department, was the most difficult of all. In fact, both the government armories and private manufactories were insufficient to meet the demand, and it required time to establish additional ones. The wonderful machines by which the most complicated rifles now in use throughout Europe are constructed almost without the aid of man are of American invention, and have given a well-deserved reputation to the expansion rifles manufactured at the government armory in Springfield. But this establishment had only capacity for producing from ten to twelve thousand yearly, and the supply could not be increased except by constructing new machines. The private workshops were equally insufficient; the Federal factory at Harper's Ferry had been destroyed by fire, and the dépôts were empty. It was important, however, to supply the most pressing of all the wants of the soldier, that of having a weapon in his hands.

During the first year of the war the ordnance department succeeded in furnishing the various armies in the field, not counting what was left at the dépôts, one million two hundred and seventy-six thousand six hundred and eighty-six portable firearms (muskets, carbines, and pistols), one thousand nine hundred and twenty-six field- or siege-guns, twelve hundred pieces for batteries in position, and two hundred and fourteen million cartridges for small-arms and for cannon. But it was obliged to apply to Europe for muskets and ammunition; this was the only war commodity that America procured in considerable quantities from the Old World, and it was this supply which proved to be the most defective. Agents without either experience or credit, and sometimes unscrupulous, bought in every part of Europe, on account of the Federal government, all the muskets they could pick up, without any regard to their quality or price. The English and Belgian manufactories not being able to satisfy their demands fast enough, they procured from the little German states all their old-fashioned arms, which those states hastened to get rid of at a price which enabled them to replace them with needle-

guns. In short, the refuse of all Europe passed into the hands of the American volunteers.

A portion of the muskets being unfit for use, the few that were serviceable had to be kept for the soldiers doing guard duty in each company. The calibres were all mixed up; conical balls were issued for the large German smooth-bore muskets, while the old American cartridge, containing one ball and four buckshot, was given to those who had the good fortune to possess a minie rifle. The defective armament of the infantry would have been sufficient to delay the opening of the campaign for several months. In order to remedy this it was found necessary, in the first instance, to classify the calibres of the muskets by regiments, then gradually to throw aside the most worthless. After a while the American factories, both national and private, were able to furnish a sufficient quantity of new arms to justify this process.

While willing to encourage private enterprise to a great extent, the Federal government determined to control it; and in order to avoid being at its mercy, it largely extended its own establishments. Thus, in 1862, the Springfield manufactory delivered two hundred thousand rifles, while in the year 1863, during which there were manufactured two hundred and fifty thousand there, the importation of arms from Europe by the Northern States ceased altogether. The rifle which bore the name of the Federal manufactory had the advantage of not requiring heavy charges, of giving a great precision of aim at a distance of from six to seven hundred metres, and of being easily loaded and managed. It was therefore introduced throughout the army as fast as the ordnance department was able to meet the demands that were made for that arm from every quarter. But, at the same time, a great number of new inventions were tried upon a scale which enabled the authorities to test their merits. Some were even adopted by whole regiments of cavalry; and the practice of breech-loading, which was common to all the systems, contributed greatly to their efficiency in the numerous engagements in which those regiments had to fight on foot. With the exception of this mode of loading, they differed greatly in their construction; it would be impossible for us to describe all, for there were no less than eleven of the first class. We shall only mention two

belonging to the class called repeating-rifles—that is to say, arms which fire a certain number of shots without being reloaded. The Colt rifle is a long-barrelled revolver with five or six chambers, and the ball is forced into seven grooves forming a spiral which grows more and more contracted. This heavy weapon was formidable in practiced hands, but it required considerable time to reload it. The second was the Spencer rifle, an excellent arm, the use of which became more and more extended in the Federal army. The butt is pierced, in the direction of the length, by a tube containing seven cartridges, which are deposited successively, after each fire, in the chamber, replacing in turn those which, when discharged, are thrown out by a very simple mechanism. This magazine, entirely protected, is very easily recharged. Many extraordinary instances have been cited of successful personal defence due to the rapidity with which this arm can be fired, and some Federal regiments of infantry which made a trial of it were highly pleased with the result. Most of these rifles were of two models—one for the use of the infantry, the other, lighter and shorter, for the cavalry.

The *matériel* of the artillery, which had to be created, was as extensive as the armament of the infantry, and its construction was also new to American manufactories. Nevertheless, the great workshops for smelting iron and steel were so rapidly transformed into cannon foundries that the ordnance department was not obliged to depend on Europe for a supply.

At the time when the war broke out none of the systems of rifle cannon invented a few years before had ever been adopted, or even seriously experimented upon, by the officers of the regular army. But the latter, while adhering to the brass smooth-bore cannon, had studied these different inventions, and did not conceal their preference for the rifled system, by which the ball, like the minie bullet, inserted through the mouth of the cannon, is driven into the grooves under the pressure of the gases which propel it forward. The impression obtained from these inquiries in common was never forgotten by the officers who were placed in positions of command in the two hostile armies; and notwithstanding the diversity of details, the guns of those two armies always bore a strong family resemblance. But nothing could limit the

fertility of inventors stimulated by the war. A few among them were men of real ability and skill, but those who indulged in chimerical speculations were more numerous. Some of them were visionary and ridiculous, and there were a few to whom their inventions brought disaster, as, for example, Mr. James and Major Hunt, the former of whom was killed by the explosion of his gun and the latter asphyxiated by his submarine battery.*

None of these inventions were subjected to the polygon proof. There was no time for that kind of experiments which alone enabled the expert fully to ascertain the real value of an arm before it is exposed to all the vicissitudes of war. The *matériel* of the army was thus suddenly encumbered with a mass of different models, all equally new to those who had to handle them on the field of battle. In fact, every inventor who had any patronage could easily manage to have a few of his guns recommended to the principal of some foundry, who was generally his partner. A few shots fired in the neighborhood of the factory were deemed sufficient to determine the strength of the guns; and if chance favored them, the piece was immediately received and added to the diversified assortment which already existed in the Federal artillery. This very variety, however, was at times the means of procuring the opportunity for remarkable inventions to obtain a striking confirmation of their merits on the field of battle.

American genius, quick to turn everything to account, understood at once that, at a time when any delay might prove fatal, it was not expedient to look for a weapon too frail and difficult to repair. It studied, above all, simplicity in regard to the four essential parts in the manufacture of artillery—the founding, the system of rifling, the mode of propelling balls and shells. There were wanting field-pieces that could be rapidly constructed at a moderate cost, easily loaded, so as to be handled by inexperienced hands, and projectiles that could be carried to great distances without injury to the parts intended to be forced into the grooves.

Two guns were adopted which amply satisfied these requirements—the Parrott gun, made of cast iron, secured with iron-plated bands at the breech, and one gun constructed at the iron-works of Phoenixville, designated by its calibre, from three to

* Major E. B. Hunt, of the Engineers.—Ed.

four and a half inches in diameter, and made of wrought-iron bars.

The problem regarding the construction of guns of large calibre was solved by Captain Rodman, whose process imparted such strength to those guns, although made of cast iron, that it only required the application of the Parrott system of plate bands to enable them to discharge conical projectiles of the greatest weight. Up to that time the guns had been cast solid, and bored afterwards; thus the exterior of the piece, touching the sides of the mould, was the first to solidify, and the interior, still half liquid, not able to contract regularly, became crystallized, leaving here and there in the mass hollows or flaws which caused the metal to lose its uniformity. Rodman reversed the operation, and caused the piece to cool from the interior. A hollow cylinder, containing a spiral tube through which a current of cold water was kept passing, surrounded with cords and with sand to protect it from the metal in fusion, was placed in the mould to designate the bore; the gases escaped by means of longitudinal flutings in the cylinder and through the spaces left by the cords, which were constantly consumed. Whilst the interior was the first portion solidified, through contact with the cylinder so constantly kept cool, the furnaces burning under the mould kept up the heat on the outside. The intensity of this heat was then gradually diminished until the entire mass had lost its redness—an operation which, for the largest guns, lasted several weeks. The metal, by contracting without interference, possessed a greater density, a finer and more uniform grain; and crystallizing thus, its fibre offered the greatest possible resistance to pressure upon the bore. A long experience has fully confirmed the principles upon which Captain Rodman had based his new process, which is now applied on a large scale in America. The depth and the number of the riflegrooves varied according to the calibres, but the relation between these three elements was constant, and the same system of grooves, deep and few in number, was applied to guns of different constructions. In the Parrott guns the spiral of the grooves was closer near the muzzle than at the bottom of the bore; it was hoped that by this means the ball would have an increased rotary motion; but this was the cause of numerous accidents and of great

irregularity in the fire, as the projectile frequently refused to follow the last turn of the groove. At the beginning of the war the precipitate haste with which it was necessary to manufacture guns was especially felt in its effects on the system of rifling, which was very defective; thus at the siege of Yorktown a hundred-pounder Parrott gun, which had attracted attention by the irregularity of its fire, was examined after some time, when it was discovered that those in charge had forgotten to clean the rifle-grooves, the roughness of which disturbed the course of the projectiles.

The form and the mode of impulsion both gave rise to a great number of different systems. Mr. Parrott placed upon the base of the ball a sort of reversed cup of soft iron, in which the expansion of the gases determined the impulsion. For large calibres he substituted for this cup a copper ring enveloping the base of the projectile, which under the pressure of the same gases took form as a packing (*bourrelet*) in the grooves; this process being found insufficient, projections were cut on the ring to facilitate the impulsion, a sort of medium between the system of expansion and that of flanges (*ailettes*).

Mr. Schenkl gave to the base of his projectile the form of a fluted cone and covered it with a piece of papier-maché, which stretched in slipping upon the cone, and was forced thus very exactly into the grooves. This papier-maché, having more tenacity than lead, gave to the projectile its rotary movement, after which it might fall to the ground without danger to those near the gun, or it remained attached to the projectile without affecting its equilibrium. Owing to the conical form of its base, the centre of gravity of the projectile was in front of the centre of the long axis, which secured the steady and exact flight of a well-feathered arrow. The only fault of the papier-maché was that it swelled with dampness, but an envelope of zinc remedied that completely; and the Schenkl projectile is the one to which the experience of the war was most favorable. Many systems were tried to use lead in the form of an envelope, ring, or *ailette*, but they all failed from the impossibility of making the metal adhere uniformly to the surface of the ball.

During the first stages of the war it was difficult to distinguish

between the relative merits of different projectiles, the defects in the construction of most of them not allowing any satisfactory experiment to be made. Thus, in the army of the Potomac, when after several months of campaigning an inspection was made of the shells which had been furnished in enormous quantities by private establishments, it was found that the inside of a large portion of them was defective; the cavity containing the powder not being in the middle, the centre of gravity was displaced and imparted an irregularity of motion to the projectile which deprived the gun of all precision of aim.

This carelessness, which should not be severely criticised when it is considered what efforts it required to create such vast materials within a few months, and which was moreover soon remedied, was especially felt in the construction of the fuse, the most delicate of all the engines of war. The importance of the fuse has increased with that of the shell; it imparts to this projectile all its effectiveness; if the fuse is defective, the shell becomes powerless. The solid ball is of but little importance on a battlefield, and in our thin order of ranks makes no more victims than a simple rifle bullet. The case is very different with hollow projectiles, especially the formidable Shrapnell shell, which was universally adopted by both Federals and Confederates. There is no doubt that at a short distance nothing is more effective than the grape-shot, but its field of operation is too limited to be often of decided importance in a battle.

The Shrapnell shell, when it bursts at the right time, propelling all the bullets it contains in the shape of a fan before it, is the most terrible instrument of war that modern artillery possesses, and will always secure a great advantage to those who know best how to handle it; for it produces all the effects of grape-shot at the extreme range of ordinary projectiles. But all its effectiveness depends upon the precision with which the fuse is regulated, so as to cause it to burst in the air at the distance of a few metres in front of the line of the troops to be reached.

In fact, the percussion fuse, which takes fire on coming in contact with a hard substance and is easily constructed, cannot be advantageously used with the Shrapnell; for if those projectiles

only burst on touching the ground, most of the shot they contain would bury itself in the earth instead of opening upon the enemy's lines like a sheaf. The graduated fuse, the only effective one in such a case, must be both sufficiently delicate to burn regularly during the desired number of seconds, and yet simple enough to be regulated amid the excitement of the battle.

When spherical projectiles are employed, or conical shells with flanges (*ailettes*), which have a certain play in the bore of the piece, the flame of the powder itself, enveloping the ball, lights the end of the fuse graduated according to the distance. But this cannot be for projectiles which exactly fill all the grooves and do not permit the flame to reach the head of the fuse. It was tried in vain to envelop them in collodion to carry the flame to that part of the shell: this preparation was stripped off before it could be set on fire. Recourse was then had to the English system, called the concussion system: the shock caused by the departure of the projectile detaches a small piece of metal, which, slipping into a tube placed within the fuse, strikes and fires a fulminating primer. The fuse is thus completely closed on the outside; but it must be seen how difficult it is to make, in improvised factories, millions of such complicated instruments, and how defective, before some experience is gained in making them, they must be as to precision.

Besides practical inventions, there were also seen some fantastical machines, such as the cannon-revolver, which will probably figure one of these days in our own armies, but which at that time was only dangerous to those who served it. There were seen some ridiculous specimens, as, for instance, a gun lighter than its own ball, made out of an enormous ingot, whose recoil was consequently greater than the motion of the projectile itself. We will mention, finally, a new engine of destruction, which received the nickname of coffee-mill, and which may be regarded as the first attempt at making *mitrailleuses*. This was a large rampart-gun, whose open breech was surmounted by a funnel, which was filled with cartridges; these cartridges were composed of solid steel tubes containing the charge, which were successively dropped into the open space of the breech by means of a crank; a hammer, moved by this crank, struck a percussion-cap placed at the bottom

of the cartridge, and caused the discharge ; after this discharge the tube fell into a box, from which it was taken to reload. This machine fired one hundred shots per minute, and threw ounce balls, with great precision, to a distance of seven or eight hundred metres ; it was drawn with its caisson by a single horse. By means of a pivot like a pump-handle the gun was aimed without interrupting the continuous stream of balls ; and this arm, handled by two cool-headed men, might have proved very effective in defending a breach or defile. But although Mr. Lincoln recommended its adoption, and had even made a trial of it with his own hands, it was never used during the war ; and the *coffee-mills*, which, with a few alterations, might have taken the place of our *mitrailleuses*, were sold after the peace as old iron, for eight dollars each.

We have only spoken of rifle cannon ; they were the only guns in fashion, like the zouaves' uniforms for infantry. The imagination of the volunteers exaggerated their importance, and their very novelty inspired the inexperienced soldiers of the American armies with confidence. Fortunately, the artillery officers did not share this excessive infatuation, and they retained for the service of the army a certain number of brass field howitzers, smooth bore, which rendered the utmost service during the entire war. In fact, as the wooded country, where the fighting had to be done, rendered it almost impossible for the artillery to become engaged at long distances, the rifle cannon was frequently deprived of its advantages. On the battle-fields of America the gun easiest to handle, the strongest, and the most readily loaded, which, at a moment's notice, could substitute grape-shot for the shell, was also the most effective. An experience differing from that of European wars, where armies can ordinarily fight at a distance, showed that smooth-bore guns satisfied all these conditions ; a large number of them were cast, and no general ever had occasion to regret having secured them for his artillery.

The field *matériel* was thus found to be composed of smooth-bore twelve-pounders, of three-inch wrought-iron guns, and of bar-guns three to four and a half inches in diameter. The greatest variety was to be found in guns of heavy calibre. Besides the old mortars, forty-eight pounders, and large cast-iron

howitzers, called columbiads, or Dahlgren guns, there were seen rifled cannons constructed in the manner we have already stated. These were wrought-iron guns, four inches and a half in diameter of bore, much heavier than the hooped guns of the same diameter, and throwing forty-pound balls. There were Parrott guns, one hundred and two hundred pounders; and, finally, some enormous cast-iron guns, intended for forts and for the navy, cast on the Rodman plan, with a diameter of fifteen, and even of twenty, inches. By means of iron carriages running over inclined planes, controlled by brakes and a strong pivot fastened to the platform, these gigantic machines could easily be managed by five or six men. We shall indicate the effect they produced in telling of the numerous sieges which characterized that war. It will be sufficient to state here that in calculating the relations existing between the calibre of their heaviest guns, the weight of the ball, and that of the charge of powder, the Americans departed from the principles adopted in Europe, and particularly in England. Having neither the time nor the means to give their heavy rifled guns the strength of those of Armstrong or of Krupp, but being able to construct them of as large a calibre as they desired, they reduced the charges of powder to an eighth, and even a tenth, of the weight of the ball. Owing to the large dimensions of their guns, they were able to produce results then entirely new, although they have been surpassed since. Thus, with a gun not able to bear more than one-fourth of the charge of an Armstrong gun, and throwing the same ball, they obtained for this ball a velocity only one-half less than that which the latter piece would have given; and to batter a wall in breach, they succeeded, by means of very large projectiles impressed with a less initial velocity, in bringing to the work of destruction a force equal to that of a ball of smaller calibre impressed with a greater velocity.

In this chapter it has been our purpose to show the material resources which the two armies were going to put in operation. We have now seen those of the Federal army. The Confederate government could not count upon the industry and commerce of the rebel States to supply its troops with provisions, equipments, and arms to the same extent as its adversary. But at the outset

of the war they possessed a very great advantage. As we have stated elsewhere, Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War under President Buchanan, had taken care to send to the South one hundred and fifteen thousand muskets, which, being added to the one hundred and twenty thousand already in the arsenals of Charleston, Fayetteville, Augusta, Mount Vernon, and Baton Rouge, secured a complete armament for the first Confederate armies sufficient both in quantity and quality.* If the mobilization of the first levies was sometimes delayed, this was caused either by impediments arising in an administration as yet deficient in experience, or by the rival claims of the States to the distribution of the arms, and also by the want of certain details, especially percussion-caps, the manufacture of which had not as yet been organized. But the war once begun, the Confederate government—thanks to the activity of its administrative departments, the zeal of private individuals, and the supplies of materials it received from Europe, notwithstanding the blockade—never found itself short either of muskets, cannons, ammunition, or military accoutrements. The North, which always cherished the hope that this indispensable material would not reach her adversary, and that the want of it would prevent him from continuing the struggle, became convinced of her error when the latter had laid down his arms.

We have stated that in the South every man who had the means was in possession of a gun or a revolver. On their enlistment the volunteers brought their arms with them; those who did not join the army either gave or sold them to the government; everything was turned to account, and even double barrelled shot-guns were provided with bayonets. There were no private establishments for manufacturing arms in the South; the industry of the North had hitherto supplied the whole Union; the Federal government, which possessed two establishments of this kind, had conformed to the constant traditions by placing one at Springfield, in the North, and the other at Harper's Ferry,

* The conduct of Secretary Floyd is referred to at the close of General J. E. Johnston's "Narrative," with a view to exonerate him from these charges. See pp. 426 and 427 of that work.—ED.

in the South. The latter establishment was, therefore, the only one to be found in the insurgent States, which gave it a great importance in the estimation of the Confederate leaders, and which accounts for the haste with which they sought to seize it at the moment when Virginia seceded. We know how it was snatched from them by fire. The destruction of that fine establishment was a great loss to the government of Washington, but a still greater loss to the Confederates, who had expected to find there considerable supplies, and especially all the necessary implements for the manufacture of muskets. A few machines only were saved from the fire and forwarded to Richmond, where they were soon put in use. The Confederates set to work without delay to establish such factories as they stood in need of. Nearly all the States erected some at their own expense, which, although at first simply under the general control of the central government, were eventually placed under its exclusive direction. Workshops for the remodelling of old guns and the manufacture of minie rifles were soon established in Memphis, New Orleans, Nashville, Gallatin, and finally at Richmond and in many other south-eastern cities.

The Southern States obtained, moreover, supplies of arms and ammunition from Europe. During the first months of the war they were enabled to accomplish this without any great difficulty, notwithstanding the blockade of their coasts which had been ordered by Mr. Lincoln. By degrees this blockade became more effective, but the extent of the Southern coasts, their numerous ports, and the facilities afforded by steam to blockade-runners of light draught, which took advantage of a dark night to slip between the Federal cruisers, never allowed it to become absolute. The enormous difference in value between the cotton accumulated in the dépôts of the South and the small quantities which reached the Liverpool market on the one hand, and between ordinary commodities in Europe and in the Confederate ports on the other, is a conclusive proof of the efficacy of that blockade; but as the high protective tariff favored the growth of smuggling, so in the same manner the difference above mentioned was the most powerful incentive to the hazardous traffic which was carried on in spite of the blockade. In reserving to

itself the monopoly of cotton the Confederate government had secured the means of regulating and entirely controlling the contraband trade thus established with England. It compelled all the blockade-runners to supply it with arms by refusing cotton to those who did not bring over a quantity of that material proportionate to their tonnage, cotton being the only article that could assure them considerable profit in their perilous return trips. These arms, purchased with the money obtained through the loan negotiated in England, and for which this very cotton was a guarantee, were entrusted to them by the agents of the Confederate government in Europe. The exact amount of these importations will never be known, for the transactions were conducted with great secrecy; but it was currently reported in the South that during the first year of the war three hundred thousand muskets were brought over from Europe, with one thousand charges for each musket, and that one single ship, the *Bermuda*, had a cargo of sixty-five thousand. Those muskets manufactured either at Liege or at Birmingham were selected with much more care than the arms destined for the Federals, for in the struggle between the agents of the two parties to secure the best materials the Confederates had generally the advantage.

The *matériel* of the artillery was obtained in the same manner. Mr. Floyd had not forgotten the armament of the Federal forts situated in the South, while leaving garrisons in them too weak for their defence. Different cities furnished cannon which had been in their possession since the Mexican war. In short, a few months sufficed to enable the State governments to organize foundries, the management of which was entrusted to foremen of Northern birth, a certain number of whom had not left the workshops of the South at the time of secession, native mechanics not having the requisite skill for that task. Among these foremen some had adopted the prejudices of the slaveholders or yielded to the temptation of enormous wages; others were kept in the places they were doomed to occupy by fearful threats. In the mean time, spies were sent to visit the manufactories of the North for the purpose of making drawings of the machines used in the construction of cannon, so as to set up similar ones in the establishments which had just been erected. A certain number of

machines were also brought from England ; and one of the principal manufacturers of that country actually presented to the Confederacy on one occasion a complete cargo of those precious implements. Unfortunately for his *protégés*, that cargo fell into the hands of the Federals, who used it for their own profit. New Orleans had its own foundry of brass guns. Messrs. Street & Hungerford of Memphis manufactured Parrott guns of every calibre. At Nashville the iron-mills of Brannan & Co., constructed on the plan of those of Fort Pitt in the North, manufactured field-pieces of cast iron. The large and costly machines of this establishment followed the Confederate armies in their successive retreats, accompanied by the printing-presses of the secession journals, and were stationed first at Chattanooga, then at Atlanta, and finally at Augusta. The most important iron-mills in the South were the Tredegar works, near Richmond ; at this establishment cannon and projectiles of every calibre were manufactured. Brass guns were rare and greatly in demand ; cities and churches contributed their bells ; private houses were stripped of every article of copper they possessed, from a boiling-pot to a brass candlestick. Cannon from England were also imported to a considerable extent. A few Armstrong guns which had run the blockade were used in arming the batteries along the coast ; and Mr. Whitworth manufactured a large number of his beautiful hexagonal guns of cast steel for the Confederates, pretending that he was executing an order for the emperor of China, so as not to excite the suspicions of the Federal cruisers.

The greatest part of the artillery which the Confederates received from Europe, however, issued from the workshops of Captain Blakeley, of whom we shall speak presently. Some time after, at the conclusion of the war, there were still to be seen in those establishments immense piles of projectiles, of which, during the prosperous period of blockade-running, every vessel sailing for Southern ports carried a number as ballast. This establishment had become one of the principal dépôts and the best arsenal of the Confederates.

The cannon used in the Southern armies were generally constructed on the same model as those of the Federal artillery. The Confederates displayed the same preference for the expan-

sion system as their adversaries. But their most experienced officers also adhered to the brass twelve-pounder howitzer with smooth bore; these cannon, taken from the arsenals or cast since the breaking out of the rebellion, formed an important part of their field artillery. The remainder, with the exception of a few Whitworth guns, was composed of pieces constructed on the Parrott model. The *matériel* of heavy calibre was more varied; there were to be found all the old smooth-bore brass guns, the Dahlgren howitzers, and the rifled cannon of Brooke and Blakeley.

The Brooke guns, so called after their inventor, only differed in one single particular from the Parrott gun: the wrought-iron jacket which enveloped it extended to the muzzle instead of stopping at the trunnions. These guns were rapidly and easily constructed and very cheap. The combination of two metals, one ductile and the other brittle, sometimes caused them to explode, but this defect was not sufficient to cause their condemnation, because, in view of the extraordinary difficulties which surrounded the Confederacy, it was important above all to create an immense armament. The entire coast bristled with fortifications; batteries were erected at the entrance of the smallest creeks and all along the line of the large rivers; in short, strong earth-works, entrenched camps, and defensive lines of every description sprang up wherever the two armies found themselves in presence of each other; each detachment surrounded its positions with works; every town needed its fortified enclosure, and new points requiring to be defended were daily discovered. As fast as these works were completed it was necessary to find heavy guns with which to arm them.

The South possessed no-metallurgical department of industry like the North to meet such a demand. Out of 841,550 tons of iron produced by the United States in 1856, the slave States only contributed about 80,000 tons, and nearly one-half of this portion, or 36,563 tons, were produced by Kentucky, which the Confederates never occupied in peace for a sufficient length of time to turn her mineral wealth to account. The portion of iron produced by the insurgent States, therefore, only amounted to 42,952 tons, or the twentieth part of the total production of the Union. But this iron, smelted with wood, was of a superior quality,

which, fortunately for the Confederate artillery, compensated for the carelessness in the manufacture of cannon and the inexperience of those who directed the operations.

The Blakeley guns, on the contrary, which had come from England, were not only constructed of superior materials, but with the greatest care, and were held in high repute, even in England, for their excellent qualities. Before landing at Charleston they had passed through many hands. The metal was prepared at Sheffield, where the Swedish iron, after having been melted in the furnace and then run into troughs (*creusets*), was then cast into rings, which were forged by the immense trip-hammers of Firth. Then taken to London, in the Blakeley shops these rings were put together, carefully fitted, turned, bored, and finally rifled; they thus combined the strength of a homogeneous metal like soft steel with the perfection of construction of cannon composed of several pieces. Those of large calibre were loaded at the muzzle, and their grooves were adapted to various kinds of projectiles. These grooves had only a slight twist and a medium depth; their number, varying according to the calibre, did not exceed twelve in pieces seven inches and a half in diameter. In some of the Brooke guns the grooves were cut in inclined planes. The variety of the projectiles used with these guns was very great. A single Federal regiment—the First Connecticut Artillery—picked up, among the batteries in which it served in 1864 near Richmond, thirty-six different kinds of balls fired by the Confederates. During the long siege of Charleston the defenders of that place loaded their old smooth-bore brass pieces with projectiles of an elongated shape. Although the precision of aim of these enormous cylindrical missiles was not remarkable, yet, at short distances, their initial velocity gave them considerable force of penetration, and at times they did great harm to the iron-clad vessels of the Federals. But these cannon could not always bear the strain required to throw off such heavy balls, and in the long run many of them burst.

The projectiles manufactured in the South for rifled guns resembled those of the Parrott model; the Confederates also frequently used Parrott projectiles, obtained from some captured ammunition train or park of artillery carried off after a victory.

The Blakeley projectile, which greatly resembled them in its construction, produced the best results. It has at its base a plate of copper, fastened by three screws, the sides of which, bent inward, give way, and are crushed into the grooves by the expansive force of the gases. In spite of the small surface which the parts thus forced present, it is sufficient to give the rotary motion to the entire mass. This projectile can thus adapt itself to different kinds of grooves, is easily introduced into the gun, and can bear the jolting of transportation with impunity. Its excellent qualities were demonstrated from the beginning of the war, at the siege of Yorktown, where an old cast-iron sixty-four pounder rifled, and placed in *barbette* upon one of the bastions, was used in firing Blakeley shells weighing one hundred and fifty pounds to a distance of more than three thousand metres, upon the Federal line of batteries. Those who serve as a target to the fire of the enemy have ample opportunities to judge of the precision of his aim. As soon as Yorktown was evacuated the besiegers went to look at the cannon whose power they had tested, but which had been silent for two days. It was found lying on the ground broken to pieces; it had ended its career by an explosion, after demonstrating how skilful mechanics and resolute soldiers can utilize old pieces which would otherwise have been condemned as unfit for service. The rest of the military *matériel* of the Confederates, ammunition, equipments, etc., was, like their cannon, partly produced at the South and partly imported from Europe.

The chief thing required was powder. Charcoal was not wanting; the caves of the Alleghanies abounded in saltpetre; the refineries of Louisiana furnished sulphur, which they used in refining sugar, and of which they had large stores. With these materials the government was able to manufacture an article of powder somewhat coarse, but of a sufficiently good quality. Its principal powder-mill was at Dahlonaga, in Georgia; its manufacturing of percussion-caps in Richmond; its cartridge-factory first in Memphis and then at Grenada. Thanks to the activity of these establishments, the Confederate armies were never in want of ammunition. The government never thought of making use of the cotton which it controlled for war purposes. It could not procure the different materials necessary for the manufacture

of gun-cotton (*pyroxylye*), and especially of nitric acid; nor had it time to make experiments upon that powerful but dangerous agent.

Nor were the means wanting for clothing the soldiers. Texas furnished leather. Foreign cloth being scarce, its absence was amply supplied by a coarse but strong stuff called *homespun*, made on the plantations and exclusively worn by the blacks. This cloth, of gray verging on brown, was the color of the Confederate uniform, and was the origin of the name *gray-backs*, which distinguished the Southern soldiers from the *blue-bellies* who followed the Federal flag. The more elegant among the Confederate officers knew how to set off the simplicity of their gray frock-coats by extreme neatness, but at best they could not disguise the livery of slavery which chance compelled them to wear. May we not see in this a mockery of fate, or rather the decree of unerring justice which compelled the proud planters to wear on the field of battle and to stain with their own blood that very garment, the symbol of servitude, which had never reddened save under the lash of the overseer?

After having assembled, organized, and equipped the Confederate armies, the next thing was to feed them. Furthermore, it was important to secure the means of subsistence for the entire population of the South, which was then in the condition of a besieged city. The feeding of the civil population became an essentially military question. It was the more serious because until then the South, devoted to special agricultural pursuits, had drawn from the North the greatest portion of the flour and meat necessary for her consumption; but she possessed a soil adapted to every kind of agricultural produce, and in the negro race the necessary hands to continue its cultivation while the whites went to the war. The cotton-plant soon gave place to wheat and corn, more through the natural effect of the law of economy than in consequence of Mr. Davis's ordinances; for the blockade having caused a depreciation in the value of cotton, and increased the price of provisions, self-interest suggested to the planters the expediency of substituting the cultivation of cereals and the raising of cattle for their former productions. If this interest had been different, no decree of the Richmond government could have ef-

fecting such an agricultural revolution in the South. This revolution soon secured, to a certain extent, the means of subsistence to the whole Southern population, and belied the predictions according to which the blockade, by starving them out, would bring them to terms. But the very abundance of these new productions of the soil, which subsisted the Confederate armies during four years, facilitated, on the other hand, the operations which were to render their adversaries victorious in the end. In fact, as we have already stated, it was owing to the provisions which Sherman found in Georgia that he was able to pass rapidly through that vast region and make the decisive campaign which would have been impossible in a country destitute of all resources. A remedy, therefore, sometimes brings with it an evil greater than that which it is intended to remove; and the Confederacy, which seemed at first in danger of perishing from want, found itself, on the contrary, delivered up to the invasion of its enemies by the very abundance of its resources.

These details, dry but important, having been a necessary preliminary to our history, we shall now resume the narrative of military events.

BOOK IV.—THE FIRST AUTUMN.

CHAPTER I.

LEXINGTON.

WE have already seen the strenuous efforts made by the North to create armies as soon as the defeat of Bull Run had enlightened her people regarding the difficulties of the struggle she had undertaken. The South derived great moral and material strength from her victory; she gained eight months' time to organize in Virginia; the *prestige* of success gave to her government unlimited power, and to its agents the necessary credit to borrow and to encourage the traffic in arms; her soldiers considered themselves for some time invincible. But this triumph brought many illusions in its train; it was generally believed that the Yankees were unable to make another effort; the Southern people became convinced that their despised adversaries were about to give up the game, that the recognition of the new Confederacy, both by Europe and the Northern States, was at hand, and that it was useless, therefore, to make any further sacrifices in view of a struggle which could not be prolonged. The number of enlistments diminished at once in a striking manner at the very moment when it was most important to place the armies in a condition to assume the offensive. The activity of the administration was relaxed likewise, and the equipment of troops was altogether neglected. A few creatures of Mr. Davis, occupying important positions, embarrassed the commissary department by their incapacity. The army of Virginia was in want of horses and means of transportation; these indispensable resources for a campaign were only furnished in a dilatory and incomplete manner. The operations which it might have attempted either on the line of the Potomac or in West Virginia, while the Federal army was yet unable to move quickly, were thus paralyzed, and Mr. Pollard, the historian of the Confederates, a writer equally earnest and

sincere in behalf of the South, has not hesitated to say that the victory of Bull Run was a great misfortune for her cause.

Along the immense line which separated the hostile parties, from the Atlantic to the prairies of the far West, however, the effect produced by the conflict of July 21st was less felt in proportion to the distance from the spot which had witnessed it. The State of Missouri especially, situated beyond the Mississippi, was a kind of enclosed battle-field, where the struggle, embittered by old animosities, was carried on with scarcely any knowledge of the vicissitudes of the fighting in the neighboring States.

In this portion of the narrative, where we propose to relate the military events which occurred during the period intervening between the first defeat of the army of the Potomac and its new entrance in the field in the spring of 1862, we shall begin by speaking of the war of which the distant plains of Missouri were the theatre during the latter half of the year 1861. The inveterate animosity of the Abolitionists and the pro-slavery men was to impart to that war an altogether peculiar character. The settlers from the North and from the South were scattered over the whole surface of the State. The former were in the majority in the northern part and along the borders of the Mississippi, which separates Missouri from Illinois, and which the inhabitants of the latter free State cross yearly, in large numbers, on their way to the West to seek their fortunes. The latter predominated along the fertile borders of the Missouri River, which flows from west to east through the country to which it gives its name; but they were so completely commingled everywhere that not a town, village, or hamlet could be found which was not divided into two hostile camps. To the westward, along the boundary of the great desert, was the new State of Kansas, where, after many bloody strifes and cruel persecutions, the Abolitionists had finally come off triumphant. To the southward extended the long frontier of Arkansas, which was exclusively occupied by pro-slavery men devotedly attached to the Confederate cause. The pioneers, adventurers, and outlaws who had gone to seek their fortune by means more or less legitimate in those two States, yet scarcely under cultivation, did not fail to challenge each other, weapon in hand, in

Missouri ; some to promulgate their political convictions, others to gratify their passions for strife or plunder.

Hostilities, therefore, broke out everywhere at once. At nearly every point of the territory isolated individuals, small groups, or numerous bands began to make war on their own account, seeking only to satisfy personal hatred. There was no longer safety to be found anywhere. Blood flowed in every spot, and it became impossible to discriminate between an act of war and assassination. Missouri, however, notwithstanding her isolation, was not neglected by the belligerents. They had little cause to trouble themselves about what was taking place in the western part of that State, but all that portion of it adjacent to the Mississippi was to play a great part in the military operations of which the line of that river was about to be the theatre. The Federals could undertake no expedition, either into Kentucky, by ascending the Tennessee, or against Memphis and the heart of the Confederacy, unless they were masters of the confluence of the Missouri and the Ohio with the Mississippi—that is to say, of St. Louis, of Cairo, and of that portion of the river which separates those two points. The left bank was secured to them, for it belonged to Illinois ; to control the right bank, generally flat and marshy, it was necessary, in the first place, to occupy strongly the large city of St. Louis, the base of operation of all water expeditions into the centre of the continent ; then to prevent the enemy from taking possession of the cliffs of Cape Girardeau, whence he could have intercepted the navigation of the river, and from occupying the positions of Bird's Point which command the tongue of land upon which Cairo stands. General Lyon, as we have seen, had preserved the city of St. Louis to the Union, and Cairo had been garrisoned by Federal troops before the Confederates had made any attempt to seize it. But the secessionists, on seeing the best portion of the State slipping away from them, no longer contented themselves with waging a partisan war. At the call of Sterling Price all those who had made the long Mexican campaigns with him or with Doniphan, or who had many times listened to the exaggerated descriptions given of them, hastened to form themselves into an army, intended to recapture the State from the Federal troops, under the name of "Missouri Guards."

We have seen how Lyon, on the 18th of June, dispersed those first assemblages which had gathered at Booneville, on the upper Missouri, where the pro-slavery element predominated. That success was by no means decisive. Price had an immense country before him, into which he could fall back in perfect safety in order to rally his followers, and whence he could emerge suddenly to attack the point at which he was least expected. The task of Lyon was not only to protect the great strategic points situated upon the Mississippi, but also to keep, as far as possible, the State of Missouri under Federal sway, so as to prevent the Confederates from drawing any resources from it, either of men, cattle, grain, materials of any kind, or even of money, which that State could furnish. With the small number of men at his disposal, this was a singularly difficult task.

The northern part of the State, lying along the left bank of the Missouri, is less extensive, and could give him no serious uneasiness. Although the secessionists were there in large numbers and the partisan war was raging with all its horrors, it was too remote from the Confederate States to receive any efficient support, and the Federals felt sure of being able to sustain themselves there so long as they retained possession of St. Louis. The principal artery of that region is the railway which connects Hannibal, on the Mississippi, with St. Joseph, on the Missouri, where it then terminated in the vicinity of the yet uncultivated lands where the emigrant settled until the progress of civilization compelled him to proceed one stage farther towards the interior. The southern part of the State is bounded on the south and west by the frontiers of Arkansas and Kansas, on the east by the Mississippi, on the north by the Missouri. Near the last-mentioned river the country is fertile, well cultivated, and has considerable population; the remainder is traversed by the only river of any importance, the Osage, which comes from the south-west to empty into the Missouri a little below Jefferson City; there are numerous tributaries with wooded banks which give a great extension to the Osage valley. The Missouri basin is bounded at the south by a succession of *plateaux*, very undulating and intersected with ravines, which connect towards the south-west with the large Arkansas hills known by the name of *Ozark Moun-*

tains. These undulations, covered here and there with brushwood, intersected by ravines where the water does not abound in summer, but the soil of which readily responds to the cultivation of cereals, extend in a north-easterly direction, traversing nearly the whole State, and culminating in the heights of Pilot Knob, in the midst of the lower plains which border the Mississippi. Beyond this point the waters run southwardly into the White River. This vast region only possessed three trunk lines of railway, all starting from St. Louis. The first followed a westerly direction along the line of the Missouri, passing through Jefferson City, and stopped at the village of Sedalia before reaching Kansas. The second followed the great post-road south-westwardly which passes by Rolla, Springfield, and Cassville, and terminates at Fort Smith, in Arkansas; before the war it carried the Texas mail. This line did not extend beyond Rolla, about two hundred and forty kilometres from St. Louis. The third, of about equal length, ran southwardly as far as the mines in the vicinity of Pilot Knob. Sedalia, Rolla, and Pilot Knob were therefore the three heads of lines beyond which the armies could only sustain themselves by living upon the country or by employing immense trains to convey their provisions.

After the combat at Booneville, Lyon had freed the whole of the Missouri valley and prevented Price from making it the base of his operations. The State legislature and Governor Jackson had fled in haste from Lexington, forgetting in their hurry the government seal, together with a considerable amount of money. Price himself fell back towards the southern part of the State, but he was not the man to be daunted by a first reverse, and his name alone sufficed to rally around him all the secessionists of Missouri, who had been for a moment discouraged by his retreat. Choosing his own time to make sudden attacks upon isolated Unionist detachments, and retreating whenever he had cause to apprehend a check, he trained his men to the habits of partisan warfare, and procured, at the expense of the enemy, all the arms, ammunition, wagons, and provisions of which he was entirely destitute. So that when he reached the town of Neosho, at the south-western angle of the State, after a long and fatiguing retreat, he had a body of troops around him more numerous and better

equipped than that with which he had left the banks of the Missouri. In drawing near to the Arkansas frontier he knew that he should find important reinforcements there. In fact, General McCulloch was organizing a body of Confederate troops in Arkansas, while a brigade of soldiers from that State was forming under General Pearce; all these, assembled in the neighborhood of the Ozark Mountains, were to enter Missouri to support Price. The troops of the latter were considerably scattered; he was himself encamped at Pools Prairie, between Sarcoxie and Neosho; Governor Jackson, with a brigade commanded by General Parsons, was at Lamar, much more to the northward, while another brigade, under General Rains, which had been left behind near Papinsville, on the upper Osage, was on the march to join him.

Lyon, on his part, was preparing to follow the Confederates into the remote districts whither they had retired, by marching from Booneville in a direct line toward the south; but although his little army did not number more than twenty-seven hundred men, the difficulty in obtaining provisions necessarily caused delays, and he was obliged to have an enormous supply train following him. One of the detached bodies of troops, which he had organized for the purpose of preventing incursions and the depredations of partisans, was in a better position to strike the enemy, whose forces were still scattered; and the enterprising chief who commanded it could not allow such an opportunity to escape him. Colonel Sigel, a German officer, with two regiments and two batteries of four field-pieces each—about fifteen hundred men in all—had left Rolla nearly at the same time that Lyon was marching upon Booneville. He reached Springfield on the 23d of June; and on learning that the Confederates had gone southward, he pushed immediately forward in the hope of surprising some isolated detachment. He arrived at Sarcoxie with one of his regiments on the 28th, but Price, having abandoned the camp of Pools Prairie, had retired beyond Neosho. After occupying this town, Sigel determined to go and attack the troops under Parsons and Rains, who were at the northward. As soon as he had formed his column he took the line of march, imprudently leaving a company of infantry at Neosho with a view of protecting the inhabitants in the event of the return of the Confederates, but their pres-

ence was in reality only an additional inducement to the latter to return thither in force.

On the 4th of July Sigel encamped near Carthage, and learned that the enemy, numbering from four to five thousand men, most of whom were mounted, occupied a position on the Lamar road, about fifteen kilometres to the northward. Notwithstanding the disproportion of numbers, he determined to attack them; and on the morning of the 5th he set out, followed at a distance by his supply-train. After crossing the stream called Dry Creek he met the combined forces of Parsons and Rains; who had taken their position upon the summit of an elevated piece of ground overlooking the Carthage and Lamar road, and were waiting for him. The first line of the Confederates consisted of about twenty-five hundred men, the infantry in the centre, the cavalry on the wings, and a strong reserve in the rear. The combat began at once. The Federals were very inferior in numbers and had no cavalry, but their soldiers were properly handled, better armed than their opponents, and their artillery was far superior to that of the enemy, which consisted of three old guns loaded with pieces of scrap-iron by way of projectiles. The fire of musketry and artillery continued for some time without either of the parties gaining ground; the most serious losses, however, were on the Confederate side. The latter decided at last to avail themselves of the advantages which their numerous cavalry gave them. This cavalry threatened, by a flank movement, to seize the supply-train of the Federals, and to cut them off from the road to Carthage. Sigel, being obliged to order a retreat, fell back upon the train and covered it, and recrossed Dry Creek, where the enemy's cavalry tried in vain to disturb him. Without allowing his lines to be broken or too closely pressed, he finally reached Carthage, where he defended himself for a sufficient length of time to enable his artillery to occupy the heights which were to protect his march beyond that village. In spite of the Confederate cavalry, to which he could offer no opposition, and which harassed him on every side, he succeeded toward evening in reaching some woods, which afforded him shelter, and by a night march he arrived at Sarcoxie, fortunate in having been able thus to escape, without great losses, from an enemy more numerous and more vigilant

than himself. He had only thirteen men killed and thirty-one wounded; but on the following day the company which he had left at Neosho was surrounded by a superior force, and, as might have been easily foreseen, captured to a man. In organizing this expedition the Federals committed an error which was frequently repeated afterwards—that of neglecting the cavalry. In a region like Missouri, where one has to travel long distances before encountering a village, and where the country is generally open and rich in forage, the principal part in a campaign belongs to mounted men, who, like the conquerors of California and of New Mexico, can, in case of necessity, dismount and fight on foot, musket in hand. We shall see, therefore, that among the Confederate armies of the far West the cavalry almost invariably formed one-half of their effective force.

In the mean time, Lyon had taken up his march on the 3d of July. He was trying, like Price, to increase his numbers on the way, and he counted especially upon Kansas for reinforcements. That State, in fact, could not fail to furnish a considerable contingent to the Federal cause, inasmuch as all the pioneers who had settled there were accustomed to exchange the pick for the musket. The most turbulent among them gathered in irregular bands around Jim Lane, their most celebrated leader, who had represented them at Washington, and who now bore the title of general. Elsewhere, Major Sturgis, taking the field at the head of a better organized corps, numbering about three thousand men, had joined Lyon on the 7th on the banks of Grand River, a tributary of the Osage. Notwithstanding this reinforcement, the Federals found the difficulties of the route to increase in proportion as they advanced, the whole army being compelled to cross Grand River on a single ferry-boat, no other conveyance being within reach. Finally, on the 9th, they reached the banks of the Osage, not far from Osceola, where they received tidings of Sigel's fight at Carthage, five days before. Had the small Federal band commanded by the latter succeeded in extricating itself from the dangerous position in which it was placed? Had it been able to reach Springfield, or had it been cut off and surrounded by the numerous cavalry of the enemy? Lyon could not tell. Extremely uneasy concerning the fate of his lieutenant,

he changed his route and proceeded as rapidly as he could to his assistance. He followed directly the road leading to Springfield—a point which he could make the base of all the operations he might have to undertake. But roads are scarce in Missouri. With the exception of a few lines kept more or less in order, like the post-road which passes through Springfield, they are traced out at random across the prairie by the wheel-ruts of wagons which carry grain to the villages where markets are held. In the districts covered with forests these road-tracks only consist in clearings rudely cut through thick woods, which wind in zigzag shape from farm to farm, without ever following the same direction. It was in the midst of one of these forests that Lyon's soldiers took up their line of march on the morning of the 10th, during the prevalence of a most oppressive heat. The tortuous roads they met with proved to be an impediment rather than an assistance. They had to open a direct passage through thickets, swamps, scarped ravines, rocks, and streams, but the thought of going to the assistance of comrades who were in danger sustained the strength of that small band; and when it came to a halt, toward three o'clock, to take a little rest, it had already marched forty-four kilometres. Toward evening it started again with renewed courage, and did not stop until the following morning at break of day, eighty kilometres from the point where it had crossed the Osage. The men were completely worn out by this extraordinary march, but the good news of Sigel's return to Springfield soon made them forget all their hardships. Two short days' journey took them to that town, where the Federal forces were assembled.

Lyon arrived in Springfield on the 13th of July, where he stopped. His bold movements had driven the Confederates back into the south-western angle of Missouri; but they were there in force, and the little Federal army could not think of pursuing them. This army was, in fact, much weakened by the fatigues of the campaign it had just gone through; and the term of service of the volunteers who had enlisted for three months, after the fall of Fort Sumter, was beginning to expire. Every day a certain number from among this class left their respective regiments to return home, while others impatiently counted the few days which yet

remained before they could be liberated. Their pay was in arrear; their worn-out garments had not been replaced; their rations were not plentiful; so that they were unwilling to re-enlist, and no reinforcements came to fill up the gaps which were daily made in the ranks of the army. It was useless for Lyon to remonstrate; he could effect nothing. He had lately been placed under the orders of McClellan; but the latter, being entirely absorbed by the campaign he had undertaken in West Virginia, could not aid him in any way. Lyon finally learned at Springfield that the department of the West had just been placed under the immediate command of a new chief, General Fremont.

We have already mentioned Fremont in connection with the conquest of California, where, through his daring, intelligence, and good fortune, he played a responsible part. Since that time he had been the candidate of the Abolitionists for the presidency of the republic. Subsequently, in 1861, Mr. Lincoln conferred upon him the highest rank, that of major-general in the regular army, from which he had been removed in consequence of a severe decision. This appointment had prejudiced the largest portion of the old regular officers against him; they were disposed to criticise the actions of a chief who undertook to perform a task so new to him. Those who were about to be placed under his immediate command dreaded above all the influence of a certain set of men by whom the conqueror of California had been surrounded in the official positions he had occupied, as well as in the business enterprises he had been engaged, and who had the reputation of not being over-scrupulous in matters of an administrative character.

Fremont had lingered a considerable time in New York after his appointment, deaf to all the solicitations of Lyon, who kept asking constantly for assistance. At last he took his departure after the battle of Bull Run, and arrived in St. Louis on the 26th of July.

Notwithstanding the reproaches of certain persons, he was very popular in the West among all those settlers to whom he had opened new paths across the Rocky Mountains, and who were indebted to him for the magnificent domain of California. He

was known to be brave, bold, devoted to the abolition cause, and therefore much was expected from him.

But the task he had to accomplish in no way resembled the adventurous expeditions in which his companions and himself had been successful by daily staking their lives without a care for the morrow. The commander of the department of the West had to create and organize an entire army, with its administration and its *matériel*, without having at his disposal any of the resources which seemed indispensable for such labor. He had to embrace a vast territory at a single glance, to watch over at once all the points which it was deemed important to guard; he was not to allow himself to be surprised from any quarter, and he had to make up for the insufficiency of his forces by the promptness of his movements and the correctness of his calculations. These were matters entirely new to General Fremont.

The difficulties against which he had to struggle were immense. The greatest portion of the troops of which he could dispose in Missouri were, like those of Lyon, three months' volunteers, the last of whom were to be discharged within a fortnight. The latter, not having received their regular pay, refused everywhere to re-enter the service. It is true that a certain number of soldiers, enlisted for three years, were beginning to come forward, but they were utterly without instruction. Arms were wanting to equip and drill them; all the muskets which came from the Eastern factories or which arrived at Atlantic ports from Europe were kept in Washington by the government, whose absorbing care was to protect the capital. It was with the greatest difficulty that Fremont succeeded in procuring some poor Austrian muskets for his troops. He was subsequently blamed for this purchase, and most unjustly, although the price paid was undoubtedly exorbitant; but he was justified by necessity. Illinois, being placed under his jurisdiction, sent him a few regiments, but they were badly organized, and the men who, after proper drilling, might have made good soldiers, were only an additional encumbrance, owing to the bad quality and scarcity of arms. The system of accounts was in the greatest disorder, and the intervention of Fremont, who was but little accustomed to administrative formalities, only served to increase the confusion. The Federal cof-

fers were nearly empty; and while at headquarters everybody signed orders for expenses without authority, the disbursing officers refused to make any transfers of funds. Hence the perpetual conflicts which embarrassed the service and delayed the supplies of which the army stood in need. To all these difficulties were added the demands of the central government, which interfered with the measures adopted by Fremont. Thus, for instance, a few days after his arrival, he was ordered by Scott to send immediately to Washington five thousand men, formed into regiments, armed, and equipped. This would rob him of the only organized forces at his disposal; consequently, this order, prompted by the disquietude which followed the battle of Bull Run, was soon revoked, but it nevertheless caused the suspension for several days of all the movements of troops in the department of the West.

In the mean time, the defeat of the Federals in Virginia had revived the confidence and daring of the secessionists throughout the State of Missouri. The Confederate leaders saw the number of their adherents increase in every direction. In the northern section numerous bands were organizing, persecuting the Unionists, and extending their incursions into the State of Iowa. Along the borders of the Missouri a few partisan bands kept the Federal garrisons of Jefferson City, Booneville, and Lexington in constant alarm. In the south-west McCulloch and Pearce had crossed from Arkansas into Missouri; they were ready to sustain Price, and rendered the situation of Lyon at Springfield very precarious, while the positions occupied by the Federals in the south-east were also seriously threatened. Confederate bands of partisans, gathered and organized by Jefferson Thompson, showed themselves sometimes in the vicinity of Pilot Knob, trying to cut the railway, and sometimes in the neighborhood of Cape Girardeau or Bird's Point. At the same time considerable forces were assembling in East Tennessee, and a small army under General Pillow had already passed over from Tennessee to New Madrid, in Missouri, on the other side of the Mississippi, where it was preparing to take the field. The positions commanding the large navigable streams of the centre of the continent seemed to be in danger. Cairo, the most important, was indeed strongly defended, and its fortifications well supplied with cannon; but

with the exception of twelve hundred men, its garrison was to be discharged on the 7th of August, and it was stated the gunboats constructed at Memphis by the Confederates would soon come to attack that place. It was important, above all, to ensure its safety. In order to accomplish this object, Fremont himself started from St. Louis on the 2d of August with nearly four thousand men, intended for the occupation of Cairo and Bird's Point—a reinforcement amply sufficient, and which he besides took care to magnify in the eyes of the inhabitants of St. Louis by embarking them on a larger number of steamers than was necessary.

But this operation once accomplished, the most important thing to do was to extricate Lyon from the difficult position in which he was placed by sending him reinforcements. There were two fine regiments at Rolla which might have been moved towards Springfield, and replaced by newer troops taken from St. Louis to guard the line of railways. He might also have diminished the garrisons placed along the Missouri, have limited himself to the occupation of Jefferson City, have employed fewer troops in pursuit of bands which could not be taken, and have sent to Springfield the forces thus rendered available. But Fremont seemed incapable of changing; he maintained all the posts stationed along the line of the Missouri. The Confederate corps of Green having pushed as far as Athens, in Northern Missouri, where it had a bloody encounter with the Unionists on the 5th of August, he sent General Pope with the troops then in Illinois into that section of the State. When he ordered the regiments stationed at Rolla to proceed to Springfield, he failed to send them the necessary *matériel* with which to make that march; and while he took no effective step to support Lyon, he could not make up his mind to recall him to the rear, but left him at Springfield without instructions.

The position of this general, in the mean time, was becoming more and more painful. The resources of the country were exhausted, provisions were beginning to fail, the equipments of the men were worn out, and many among them had no shoes. The wagons he had sent to Rolla to bring supplies had by a fatal mistake been despatched to St. Louis, so that, in order to obtain

provisions, he was obliged to send for the supply-trains of Kansas to come to him with an escort. The movements of the enemy, however, determined him to take the offensive in order to forestall them if possible; he was in hopes of surprising the several Confederate bands who were preparing to operate against him, before they could have time to unite. These corps, composed of Price's Missourians, McCulloch's Confederate division, and some Arkansas brigades under Pearce and McBride, had selected Cassville as their rendezvous. Price, leaving the south-western angle of the State, where he had taken refuge, reached that town on the 28th of July, where on the following day all the Confederate forces were assembled, to the number of more than twelve thousand men, half of whom were mounted, with about fifteen pieces of cannon. On the 1st and 2d of August the whole army moved in the direction of Springfield, following the post-road. Four hundred mounted Missourians under Rains cleared the road. McCulloch followed with great precaution, fearing to venture beyond the reach of the other corps of the army.

Lyon had left Springfield exactly on the 1st of August with all the forces at his disposal, amounting to about five thousand men. After two days' march, which the extreme heat made very fatiguing, he met in the valley of Dug Springs, thirty miles from Springfield, Rains's Missourians, accompanied by a few reinforcements which the latter had procured in haste. A company of regular infantry, one hundred and fifty mounted men belonging to the 4th Cavalry, and two pieces of a regular battery formed the advance of the small Federal army, and alone took part in the engagement. The conflict was short. While the infantry were firing upon the troops that confronted them, the cavalry perceived a detachment preparing to make a flank movement. The men immediately seized their carbines and opened fire upon it. But a subaltern officer, tired of remaining inactive, ordered a charge. A portion of the mounted men dashed forward at once; the rest followed, and the enemy were thrown into confusion. In the mean time, the shells of the two Federal field-pieces routed the Confederate cavalry, which was thinking to repeat the flank movement it had executed during the fight at Carthage.

The Federals remained masters of the field. This skirmish

had only cost a few killed and wounded on both sides. Rains had been thrown back upon McCulloch's division at Cave Springs. The latter remained inactive, believing Lyon to be infinitely stronger than he really was, and not daring to go out to meet him. The Federal general, on his part, after proceeding as far as Curran, on the 3d of August, twelve kilometres beyond Dug Springs, also came to a halt. His army, exhausted by the heat, was in want of food; the term of service of several regiments was about to expire, and he hoped to find reinforcements at Springfield. He had also ascertained that the enemy had formed a junction of their detachments, and that he could no longer expect to surprise them separately. On the 6th of August he re-entered Springfield.

Lyon's movements disconcerted McCulloch, who, fancying that he was confronted by a superior force, was desirous to fall back. Price, on the contrary, insisted upon continuing the march, and requested McCulloch, if he was going to forsake him thus, to give him at least his muskets, so that he might arm the volunteers who were joining him from all parts, and whom he was obliged to leave behind for want of equipments. Pending this controversy, a despatch arrived from General Polk, their superior officer, ordering McCulloch to invade Missouri. The latter then consented to accompany Price, on condition that that general should place himself under his orders.

The effective force of the Confederate army was five thousand three hundred infantry, six thousand cavalry, a portion of which was poorly equipped, with fifteen pieces of artillery—about twelve thousand men in all. On the 4th of August this army, forming three columns under McCulloch, Pearce, and Price, put itself once more *en route*, and made a night march in the hope of yet surprising Lyon near Dug Springs. But in spite of all their speed the Confederates could not come up to him, and on the following day, the 5th, McCulloch was obliged to halt his wearied soldiers on the banks of Wilson's Creek, about sixteen kilometres from Springfield, near to the post-road. The supply-trains did not arrive until two days after, and for twenty-four hours the soldiers had nothing to eat; for the last ten days they had only received half rations; they had neither salt nor meat, and were compelled for bare subsistence to go into the fields and gather the ears of

corn; they had no blankets, their clothes were in rags and their shoes worn out. It was necessary to give them some rest. Finally, on the 9th, McCulloch ordered another night march, by means of which he expected to arrive before Springfield on the following morning before Lyon could be apprised of his approach. But he had to deal with a bold and vigilant adversary. While McCulloch was induced by the rain and darkness to defer his movement, the Federal general was preparing to surprise him in turn.

Lyon had already once before made every preparation to go and seek in his own camp the adversary who pressed him so close, and had subsequently abandoned the idea. But his position was becoming every day more critical. The time had passed when he could have retired to Rolla or fallen back upon the Osage without being molested. The enemy was close upon him, and had at last become conscious of his numerical superiority. He had a powerful cavalry, to which Lyon could only oppose a few squadrons; and that cavalry would have rendered the retreat of the feeble column impossible, encumbered as it was by an enormous supply-train. Besides falling back without fighting, the Federals would thereby give the signal for the uprising of the secessionists all along the road over which they had to pass. There was only one course to adopt in this emergency; it was at once wise and bold: this was to strike suddenly a vigorous blow to cover the movement in rear toward Rolla. Without even fighting the enemy, sufficient losses might be inflicted upon him to prevent him from disturbing that movement, and there was only needed a fortunate chance to paralyze him by destroying his supply-train. After much hesitation a council of war was convened, at which General Sweeny alone advised the offensive. Lyon gave orders for the march on the evening of the 9th. He left at Springfield only non-combatants, and took with him a force of about five thousand, only two hundred and fifty of whom were mounted, and twelve cannon.* The brigade of Sigel, with

* The total force of his army consisted of the following troops: The 1st brigade, Major Sturgis, 5 regular squadrons, 4 regular companies, 2 Missouri companies, 1 battery, 884 men; the 2d brigade, Sigel, 3d and 4th Missouri, 2 batteries, 1420 men; the 3d brigade, Andrews, 1st Missouri, 4 companies of regular infantry, 1 battery, 1264 men; the 4th brigade, Deitzer, 2 Kansas regiments, 1st Iowa, 2300 men; total, 5868 men.

a single battery, was ordered to proceed in a southerly direction ; then, after crossing Wilson's Creek considerably below the enemy's positions, to turn sharply to the right, and having performed that movement during the night to fall by daybreak upon the rear of the Confederate camps, the long line of which extended into the valley, following the sinuosities of the stream. Lyon, with the three other brigades, numbering about four thousand men, intended to approach Wilson's Creek near the post-road, and as soon as day dawned to attack the enemy in front, and, without giving him time to form, to throw all his camps into confusion. This double manœuvre was extremely well executed.

On the morning of the 10th, notwithstanding the still prevailing darkness, Lyon on one side and Sigel on the other found themselves in sight of the Confederate encampments. The latter kept a very poor watch ; the orders and counter-orders of the previous evening had worn them out, and after drawing in the outposts they had neglected to replace them. Lyon, therefore, who was the first to make the attack, was able to reach the advance fires around which the enemy had passed the night, without a shot. The stream of Wilson's Creek, occupied in that part of its flow by McCulloch, runs nearly from south to north, and on approaching the road it makes an angle and follows a southeasterly direction. The valley watered by this stream is bounded on the right by abrupt declivities, and on the left by hills sloping gradually down and intersected by various transversal ravines. It was upon these hills that those of the Confederates who were not encamped in the valley had taken position. Lyon's column, formed of Captain Plummer's regular battalion, the First Kansas, and the First Missouri regiments, reached Wilson's Creek by descending these hills. Plummer crossed the stream at once in order to protect the left of the Federals, who, on forming a line of battle upon the right, found themselves in front of a ravine where the second brigade of Rains's division had just encamped. That general, surprised by the volleys of musketry, had barely had time to follow the precipitate retreat of his soldiers, and to inform Price and McCulloch of this unexpected attack. There was great flurry in the Confederate army and among its chiefs. While Rains was re-forming his line on the heights to the left of Wilson's Creek,

Price hastened to set the rest of his troops occupying positions in the neighborhood, under arms, and rushed with about twenty-five hundred men and one battery to the aid of the combatants, whom the Federals were beginning to dislodge from their positions. During this time Plummer's regulars crossed the stream and advanced, deploying in the fields on the right; but two regiments of Arkansas cavalry, who had dismounted, supported by a Louisiana regiment, soon came rushing upon them. The small body of regular troops was obliged to fall back before so large a force, and it would have been annihilated if two guns posted on the heights to the left of the river had not arrived in time to check the aggressive movement of the Confederates in the valley.

The battle is fought with ardor on both sides; Price and McCulloch rally the soldiers who have not yet been able to join their ranks. Lyon leads successively into action all the regiments composing his little band; his soldiers fight bravely, while his artillery displays a great superiority over that of the enemy, which is badly served, and the fire of which is very irregular. As we have just seen, this artillery has already saved the regular troops compromised in the valley. A section of Totten's battery replies with great effect to a few guns posted by the enemy on the heights commanding the right bank of Wilson's Creek, for the purpose of enfilading the Federal line. The rest of the Union artillery supports the attack of the infantry. The point at issue is to carry the crest of a hill from which Lyon's troops are separated by a bend, where the brigade they had surprised was encamped, and beyond which lay the undulating plateau which the Missourians had occupied for some days. The ground, covered with brushwood and scattered trees, renders manœuvring difficult. The Confederates, recovered from their first confusion, are superior in numbers, and they cleverly avail themselves of the advantages which the nature of the ground gives to the defensive. The First Missouri has suffered cruelly. The Federal troops are several times driven back in disorder, but the artillery still supports them. The Confederates try to surprise them by displaying a Federal flag under cover of which to advance; but Totten, who has allowed them to approach, discovers the disloyal trick in time, and a few rounds of grape severely punish the authors of it for their

temerity. The Federals take advantage of this new confusion thrown into the ranks of their adversaries to make another effort upon the right, and the Second Kansas carries a portion of the crest. The Confederates, with their lines thus broken, are no longer able to defend the rest of that position, and fall back upon a few hillocks situated in rear. The fight slackens ; it is now about eight o'clock in the morning.

During this time Sigel had strictly followed out the instructions of his chief. At break of day he was approaching the southernmost side of the Confederate encampments, occupied by the Texas troops, and came suddenly upon a large party of soldiers who had separated themselves from their companions to go in search of a few ears of corn in the neighboring fields ; then, falling suddenly upon the Texan camps, he took possession of them, and at the same time planted his battery upon a height whence he could sweep all the interior positions of the enemy. This attack increased the disorder which Lyon had thrown into the ranks of the Confederates and facilitated the success of his movement. A portion of the supply-train of McCulloch was already on fire, its guard having begun to destroy it lest it should fall into the hands of the Federals. Sigel was still advancing, meeting with but little resistance, and had reached the point where the cross-road he was pursuing connected with the road which follows the course of Wilson's Creek. But his soldiers, on finding themselves in the midst of the enemy's camps, quickly disbanded. They were three months' volunteers, whose term of service had expired several days before, and who had been induced by the solicitations of their chiefs to remain another week under their banners, but they had lost all their zeal, and only fought *en amateurs*, sparing themselves in order to be able to return at once to their homes. On the other hand, the Confederates were gathering their forces for the purpose of resisting this new attack. One of their batteries had already turned its fire upon Sigel's troops and caused considerable disorder in their ranks. Then McCulloch placed himself at the head of a Louisiana regiment and marched against them. It appears that this regiment hoisted the Federal colors, and that the Union troops, deceived by that stratagem, did not fire upon them, under the impression that it

was a detachment from Lyon's corps coming to their assistance. When the mistake was discovered, it was too late; the Confederates, coming up to the charge, routed Sigel's first line; the Texans, who had formed again, and a Missouri regiment of cavalry followed close in the wake of McCulloch, and completely dispersed the Federals. Sigel's artillery was abandoned by the troops whose duty it was to support it, and only one piece could be saved, the other five, with their caissons, falling into the hands of the enemy. Sigel's disaster was irreparable; his cavalry only bethought them to regain Springfield, and he was barely able to retain three hundred men about him, with whom he rapidly fell back by the road he had followed in the morning. His losses, however, had not been heavy: he only left behind him fifteen killed and twenty wounded, with two hundred and thirty-one prisoners; but the remainder of his column was dispersed, each man following to the best of his knowledge the direction of Springfield. It was half-past eight o'clock in the morning. Lyon had committed the error of dividing his forces in front of an enemy superior in numbers, and of making Sigel perform so eccentric a movement that the two columns could not afford each other mutual support.

While Sigel was thus crushed, the Confederates returned with renewed vigor to attack the positions conquered by Lyon. It was a terrible assault for the small Federal army, which had no longer any reserves. The artillery was in the greatest danger. For nearly an hour the two hostile lines oscillated, without being able to gain on each other; they fired upon each other at a distance of forty paces among the brushwood. Fortunately, the men who served the Federal artillery were not disconcerted for an instant. They only stopped firing grape into the enemy's ranks for the purpose of dispersing a body of cavalry which threatened the right flank and rear of the army. The Federal line, however, was at last compelled to fall back, and seemed about to break. The Second Kansas came up to its support; but the colonel of this regiment, while he was leading it to the charge, fell, seriously wounded. Lyon, who had already been wounded twice, seeing the soldiers hesitate, rushed, sword in hand, to place himself at their head, but he was in turn struck dead. This

event did not discourage his followers, who succeeded in maintaining their positions, and the Confederates gave a moment's respite to their adversaries.

While Major Sturgis, who found himself in command, was consulting with the other officers as to what course to pursue, a body of troops was seen advancing with the Federal flag flying in the centre. Deceived for the third time by the same stratagem, the Unionists mistook the new comers for Sigel's column and hailed them with triumphant shouts; the latter replied by opening a murderous fire upon them, while their artillery poured canister into the Federal lines. All doubt was at an end; these were the forces who had just fought Sigel, and those guns had been captured from his column, for the enemy's artillery had no grape or canister. Attacked by McCulloch's troops with all the vigor that a recent success could inspire, the Federals did not, however, lose ground. The enemy came once more within a few yards of their cannon's mouths, but failed to break their lines; and when he returned furiously to the charge, it was only to be again repulsed. At last, when he was on the point of capturing Totten's battery on the right, three regiments from the left wing, which was not so hard pressed, rushed upon the assailants and threw them into disorder.

It was near eleven o'clock; the Confederates, who believed their adversaries to be numerically much stronger than they really were, had exhausted all their ammunition; and being themselves worn out, they ceased fighting altogether, confining their operations to watching the enemy from a distance and to securing defensive positions, in case the latter should renew the combat. But the Union army was far from being able to resume the offensive. Its general had been killed, its losses were considerable, and the regiments had become the more disorganized because nearly all the superior officers were disabled; and as no tidings of Sigel had been received, all the indications were that he had been defeated. A retreat, therefore, was determined upon. The Confederates did not dream of offering any opposition; and the little Federal army, falling back slowly and in good order, arrived at Springfield in the evening, where it was informed of Sigel's disaster and found the sad remnants of his brigade.

The battle of Wilson's Creek was the most obstinately contested of any that had yet been fought during that war; it had cost the Federals two hundred and twenty-three killed, seven hundred and twenty-one wounded, and two hundred and ninety-two prisoners. Deducting Sigel's troops, which had fought very badly, out of the four thousand men that Lyon had with him, the losses were nine hundred and nine in killed and wounded—that is to say, one-fourth of their effective force—leaving thirty-one prisoners only in the hands of the enemy. The avowed losses of the Confederates were somewhat heavier, the reports of their officers acknowledging two hundred and sixty-five killed, eight hundred wounded, and thirty prisoners; other accounts received at a later period figured these losses at one thousand seven hundred and twenty-eight in killed and wounded.

Two or three additional regiments would perhaps have given the victory to the Federals; but if they did not achieve it, that bloody conflict was not without its advantages to them, for the Confederates, paralyzed by the destruction of a portion of their wagons and the want of ammunition, and astonished at such a daring attack, did not venture to pursue them. McCulloch began again to vacillate, and allowed the Federals to reach Rolla unmolested, which they could not have done but for the daring action which cost the life of their leader. While the Confederate army was slowly following in their wake, the news of the battle, of the Federals' retreat, and of the trophies left by Sigel in the hands of the enemy, spread rapidly throughout the country, and re-kindled the fires of insurrection everywhere.

At St. Louis a new revolt appeared so imminent that Fremont was obliged to proclaim martial law in the city (*état de siege*). In the north-eastern part of Missouri the Confederate Harris was roaming about with a brigade of nearly three thousand men, unmolested by the Federal detachments who were feebly pursuing him. In the south-east the Confederates were assembling considerable forces. Hardee and Pillow, each with a small division, had been sent by Polk to operate on the right bank of the Mississippi. Taking New Madrid as the base of their operations, they could have joined hands with J. Thompson in attacking either Cape Girardeau or Pilot Knob, or even Rolla. The small army

of Sturgis had arrived in that city on the 19th, and had halted there; since then his ranks had been thinned daily by the departure of all the men whose term of service had expired, and could not have resisted a vigorous attack. But the various Confederate generals, jealous of each other, could not come to an agreement in order to seize the opportunity which presented itself. All their movements only ended in a mere skirmish, which took place on the 19th near Charleston, where a few of J. Thompson's troops were surprised and put to flight by a detachment of Federal cavalry sent from Cape Girardeau. McCulloch, on his part, did not dare to advance beyond Springfield; and after remaining in that place for some time, he even withdrew toward the south-west, restoring to Price at last entire freedom of action, which that active old man knew so well how to turn to good account.

In the midst of all this agitation, the State convention of Missouri, which was in session at Jefferson City, the political capital of the State, had adjourned, after conferring full powers upon the provisional governor, Mr. Gamble, appointed in place of Jackson, who had gone over to the enemy. But as this functionary belonged to the Democratic party, he could not agree with Fremont; and his proclamations, which were intended to reassure and encourage the owners of slaves who had remained loyal, soon involved him in difficulties with the military commander of the department. In fact, Fremont, seeing the insurrection spreading more and more every day, and not knowing how to suppress it, resorted to measures of intimidation; he assumed dictatorial power which had never been conferred upon him, and on the 30th of August he issued a proclamation which threw the whole West into a state of excitement. He declared all slaves belonging to parties in arms against the Federal government to be free, and threatened to have all persons upon whom a weapon of any kind should be found, within the imaginary circle which he indicated as occupied by his troops, to be shot on the spot. As to the first point, it was in direct violation of existing laws, inasmuch as the act of Congress of August 16th declared those slaves only to be free who were employed in military works against the national government. By the second part of the order he subjected the life of

every citizen to the caprices of a military authority, and exposed the Union men to cruel reprisals on the part of the Confederates. Mr. Lincoln, who could be firm when it was necessary to enforce respect for the law, of which he was the principal guardian, publicly repudiated this arbitrary act, and compelled Fremont to revoke it. This was the origin of a quarrel, which became more and more embittered, between the authorities at Washington and those of St. Louis. The irregularities of the administrative branches of the service, which increased from day to day, the contracts awarded by favor to those around him, the abuse of power in the distribution of grades among his personal friends, constituted just causes of complaint against Fremont. Others were added which had no foundation: for instance, he was blamed for having erected fortifications around St. Louis at such a critical moment, at the very time when immense works of the same character were being built around Washington. The principal fault of Fremont was in scattering his troops in such a manner as to impair their usefulness, and in exposing them to be everywhere attacked by an enemy who was active, well informed, superior in numbers, and whose designs the Federal general had never been able to fathom. Since the death of Lyon, Price had not been confronted by an adversary capable of coping with him.

While McCulloch was making his way back into Arkansas, Price was proceeding in a north-westerly direction, recruiting volunteers in every county through which he passed, and on the 7th of September he met at Drywood Creek, near the Kansas frontier, the troops of General Lane, who had some time since entered Missouri, where his soldiers were committing all sorts of depredations. Lane was driven back into Kansas, and Price occupied Fort Scott, which he found abandoned. Sturgis, on his side, had quitted Rolla with his brigade, and was skirmishing in the north of Missouri, where, in concert with Pope, he gave chase to the subtle bands of secessionists devastating that country. There were many affairs among the outposts at the South, but the only one of the kind which deserves notice was the encounter at Bennight's Mills on the 30th of August, where a party of Confederates attempted to surprise a Federal post, and were repulsed,

leaving eighteen prisoners behind them. The safety of the large rivers, which were to aid the future operations of the army, obliged Fremont to increase the number of posts stationed along their courses. A portion of the right bank of the Mississippi—not very extensive, it is true, but along which there were various points easily defended and of great use for closing the navigation of the river—had been kept hitherto out of the field of war by the neutrality of Kentucky. On the 4th of September the Confederates determined to violate that neutrality by occupying Hickman and Columbus. They, moreover, sent reinforcements to Buckner, who was organizing the rebel militia of the State, and preparing to occupy all the most important positions. Among these positions there was one of great importance to the Federals in the river-war they were already contemplating: it was Paducah, at the confluence of the Tennessee and the Ohio. It was, in fact, the key of the first of those two rivers whose deep waters were to permit the Federal flotillas to penetrate into the very heart of the Confederacy. Buckner was trying to forestall them. His militia were only within a few kilometres of the city, which was already making preparations to welcome their arrival, when, on the 6th of September, there were landed two regiments, which General Grant had sent by water from Cairo, and which fortified that position so as to protect it from any sudden attack.

Meanwhile, since the battle of Wilson's Creek, Fremont had persuaded himself that the occupation of Springfield ought to be the paramount object of all his efforts, and that the possession of Missouri depended upon it. He had forwarded considerable reinforcements to the troops who had fallen back upon Rolla. One month earlier they would have ensured the victory to Lyon; but when Fremont undertook an expedition against Springfield, he did not find a single enemy there, and Price was trying to reach the borders of the Missouri by forced marches. His attention being completely engrossed by this fatal project, he thought neither of reinforcing the garrisons stationed along the course of the Missouri, nor of organizing an active corps which might have been transported by steamers to any point that was threatened, nor of withdrawing in time the garrisons of such posts as were too weak to defend themselves. Orders from Washington still further in-

creased his uncertainty. He had, for instance, been again directed to send five thousand men fully equipped for the defence of the capital, which had already a garrison of seventy thousand men; he protested, but was obliged to send two Illinois regiments to the army of Kentucky. He had, however, fifty-five thousand men left, out of which he could easily have disposed of a sufficient force to keep Price in check. The garrisons which occupied Cairo, Paducah, and the two points adjacent to Bird's Point, in Missouri, and Fort Holt, in Kentucky, did not number less than twenty thousand men.*

After driving Lane back into Kansas, Price marched against Lexington. This little city, situated four hundred and eighty kilometres above St. Louis, commanded the whole upper course of the Missouri and secured communication with Fort Leavenworth. It had already been the object of a sudden attack a short time before. One of the rebel bands which were arming everywhere at the news of Price's approach, and travelled far and wide to serve him in the capacity of scouts, had suddenly burst upon Lexington, where there was only a small garrison, and did not withdraw until they had committed great havoc. The Federals then determined to send fresh troops into that town, and Colonel Mulligan was detached from Jefferson City and ordered to occupy it with his Irish brigade and some other troops. He arrived on the 9th of September, having proceeded as far as Sedalia by rail, and marched thence by way of Warrensburg to the post to which

* The strength and disposition of Fremont's army, including the home-guards, were as follows:

At St. Louis.....	6,899 men.
Under Pope.....	5,488 "
At Lexington.....	2,400 "
At Jefferson City.....	9,677 "
At Rolla.....	4,700 "
At Benton.....	3,059 "
At Cape Girardeau.....	650 "
At Bird's Point and Norfolk.....	3,510 "
At Cairo.....	4,826 "
At Fort Holt.....	3,595 "
At Paducah.....	7,791 "
Under Lane.....	2,200 "
At Monroe and near Cairo.....	900 "
Total ..	55,695 "

he had been assigned. Including one regiment left at Warrensburg, he found himself at the head of two thousand seven hundred men, among whom was one regiment of cavalry, with a portion of the home-guards—a kind of militia very little accustomed to war. These forces would have been sufficient to repulse mere bands of marauders; but being sent to the neighborhood of Price's army, they afforded him an opportunity for a success without being able to offer him any serious resistance. Mulligan found no resources nor any means of defence at Lexington. His soldiers had only forty rounds of cartridge, and he brought but six small brass cannon and two howitzers with him, with no ammunition whatever for the latter, while the town was unprotected by any fortifications. He at once set himself to the task of throwing up a few strong works upon a hill which commanded Lexington, and on which the college was situated. But the configuration of the ground obliged him to give these works too much development, which prevented him from completing them, imposing at the same time an increase of labor upon their not very numerous defenders.

In the mean time, Price was advancing by forced marches, and on the morning of the 11th of September he reached Warrensburg with his cavalry; but the Federal regiment which had been left there, and which he had hoped to surprise, had quitted the place a few hours before. His infantry followed it with all possible speed, leaving baggage, provisions, and stragglers far behind, and subsisting upon whatever they could obtain from the inhabitants of the country. On the 12th he appeared before Lexington with his cavalry. On the afternoon of the 13th his army was drawn up in the vicinity of that town, and he at once invested all the positions in which Mulligan had entrenched himself. A lively fire was kept up on both sides. The Confederates occupied the city; but being worn out by their marches, and soon finding themselves short of ammunition, they did not press the Federals very close; they took up their position for the night at a certain distance, but yet in sight of their works.

The siege of Lexington had commenced. Mulligan still remained in communication with the river, where he had a steamer. He could have used this vessel to evacuate his positions and cross

to the other bank, where he would have been in safety, but he was without instructions, and he deemed it his duty to defend Lexington, General J. C. Davis being at Jefferson City with ten thousand men, whence he could easily send him sufficient reinforcements by water. Price neglected nothing that could contribute to the success of his enterprise and at the same time divert the attention of his adversary. He sent a detachment westward to Blue Mills Landing, near the Kansas frontier, with orders to cross to the left bank of the Missouri and to intercept any reinforcements which might come to the assistance of the Federals from that side. From another quarter he summoned Green, the principal leader of the bands from Northern Missouri, to cross the river with more than three thousand men, who were immediately directed against Booneville. On the 13th Green made a vigorous attack upon the small garrison of that town; and although he did not succeed in capturing it, the chief object of his demonstration was accomplished, for it deceived the Federals and made them believe that Price's intentions were to attack Booneville and Jefferson City. During this time the Confederate general was quietly waiting in front of Lexington for the opportune moment to strike a decisive blow. His position and his purposes were known throughout Missouri; Fremont alone continued obstinately blind. On every side old men as well as young, mounting their horses and throwing their guns over their shoulders, rushed to the rendezvous at Lexington to take part in the victory to which Price invited them. He thus saw his army swelled to the number of twenty-two thousand or twenty-three thousand men in a few days. Mulligan had written to his chief stating that he should defend himself to the last extremity; he had the right to expect succor; he had incessantly asked for it, and was expecting it from day to day. Not a man was sent to him, nor any instructions, although he remained in his positions until the 17th without being molested by the enemy, and although his dangerous situation was the theme of common conversation in St. Louis and throughout the Union. After many days of hesitancy, Fremont became at last convinced that something must be done to extricate Mulligan, but the measures adopted by him could not prevent the disaster, which he still persisted in not foreseeing.

He should have embarked the best part of the garrison of Jefferson City and ordered it to occupy some favorable point on the right bank of the Missouri about a day's march from Lexington; and in like manner he should have brought to that point troops from St. Louis, which could have been replaced by detaching two regiments from Cairo; and finally, he should have summoned both Pope and Sturgis to his assistance. At the head of these forces, thus united, he could have marched against Price, always resting upon the river. He did nothing of the kind, but simply ordered J. C. Davis on the 14th to send two regiments by rail to Lexington, which he again posted immediately at Jefferson City. Sturgis, detached from Pope's division and deprived of his cavalry, was ordered to proceed by rail from Mexico, where he then was, to Utica, whence he was to gain the bank of the Missouri by land in front of Lexington. He waited until the 18th to order J. C. Davis to go to Mulligan's assistance with the greatest portion of his troops, and directed him to follow the railway to Sedalia. This road having been cut nearly in the middle by the Confederate partisans, he thereby imposed a march of five or six days upon troops whose means of transportation were altogether insufficient. In the mean time, the Confederates had gained advantages which were to secure their success.

In fact, the number of Price's soldiers was increasing daily. The detachment he had sent to the west had rallied all the partisans who occupied the borders of the upper Missouri as far as St. Joseph, and had thus collected together a body of nearly four thousand men, which was directed upon Lexington. On the 17th, while approaching the Blue Mills Landing, where he intended to cross the river, these troops were attacked by one of Sturgis's regiments detached on that side; but after a short engagement he drove back the Federals, inflicting serious losses upon them, and continued his route without further molestation.

On the following day, the 18th, Lexington itself became the scene of a conflict which was to decide the fate of the garrison. Price saw himself at last surrounded by a numerous army, badly organized for a regular campaign, it is true, but full of ardor and capable of making a brave fight in an enclosed field such as it occupied. He had received all his ammunition, and his artillery

was well supplied. On the morning of the 18th he ordered a general attack. All the heights which overlooked the Federal works were crowned with batteries. Owing to his numerical strength, Price was enabled to invest the place completely. The division of Rains took position eastward of the town, that of Parsons on the south and south-west, while Slack's division, supported by the brigades of McBride and Harris, penetrated into the town and established itself strongly in the buildings which the Federals had abandoned several days before. The battle began at once all along the line. The Confederate artillery did great damage to the besieged, who replied but feebly; but being posted behind the entrenchments which they had raised by incessant labor, they kept up a heavy fire of musketry against Price's soldiers. Every time that the latter attempted to carry any of the works they were repulsed with loss. The Confederates, however, discovered the weak point of the defence, and hastened to take advantage of it. The troops who had penetrated into the town extended their lines to the edge of the river, thus occupying the intervening space between it and the Federal entrenchments. A steamer laden with provisions lay moored at the wharf; it was the only means of communication with the outside world left to Mulligan. The Confederates took possession of her. A heavy fire was immediately opened upon them from a few houses situated in a commanding position between the fortifications and the Missouri. Among these houses there was a hospital. The Federals have asserted since, that their adversaries began to riddle it with balls; the latter, on the other hand, have insisted that the first shots were fired from that building. Be that as it may, the Confederates made an assault upon it, and carried it after a brief engagement. The Federals did not acknowledge themselves beaten. Eighty soldiers returned to the charge, recaptured the hospital, and drove those who had made a lodgment back toward the river. But this success was not of long duration. McBride and Harris, having considerable forces at their disposal, arrived in large numbers, sweeping before them the handful of men who had for a moment disputed the possession of the hospital, and established themselves securely in that position. It was a fatal blow to the defenders, for it cut them off from the river, from all hopes of

relief and every chance of escape, and, what was still worse, from the only point where they could procure water. There was, in deed, neither spring nor cistern on the hill where Mulligan had taken up his position. Thus, in spite of the check experienced by the Confederates wherever they had attempted to carry the entrenchments by main force, the night, which finally put an end to that bloody strife, found the Federal chiefs full of the gravest anxiety. The heat was intense; the supply of water could only last one day longer; a large number of horses belonging to the regiment of cavalry had been killed, and their carcasses would infect the air; provisions were beginning to give out, and the ammunition was nearly exhausted. Mulligan had set an example of the most heroic courage. Wherever there was any danger to be encountered he was seen on the spot, and his zeal alone sustained his men in that emergency. His only hope was in the arrival of reinforcements, so often asked and so impatiently looked for.

This wish was about to be fulfilled; but so far from ameliorating his condition, it was only to render it the more galling by condemning him to suffer the torments of Tantalus. Sturgis had indeed arrived with his troops on the 19th on the opposite side of the Missouri, as Fremont had directed him; but being without cavalry, he had not been able to scout, and instead of the transport-boats he had counted upon, he found the shore where he should have landed lined with the enemy's skirmishers. Having no means of crossing, he was compelled to fall back and give up all hope of revictualling the besieged. At the same time, a steamer with a battalion of troops from Jefferson City stopped on the way, and landed that reinforcement out of reach of the besieged town. The forces of J. C. Davis, stretching along the line of the Sedalia Railway and around Warrensburg, could no longer arrive in time to save Mulligan. The latter still kept up the fight during the whole of the 19th, the following night, and the morning of the 20th. The numerical superiority of the Confederates enabled them to relieve each other frequently, so as to give no rest to their adversaries. The amateurs, who, without wearing any uniform or belonging to any regiment, came there with their rifles to fire upon the unfortunate men who occupied the summit

of the hill, were still numerous and extremely dextrous. The fire of the artillery was scarcely ever slackened. The situation of the Federals was becoming intolerable; some of them were only armed with pistols; water began to fail; the heat increased, and their strength was giving way. On the 20th, the Confederates, having resolved to make an end, piled up large packages of wet hemp, which they pushed in front of them against the entrenchments, like gabions at the head of a sap, to protect themselves against the balls of the enemy. In this manner they quickly approached the works, behind which stood men too much exhausted to offer any serious resistance. The home-guards took to flight and hoisted the white flag, without waiting for orders from Mulligan. The latter, seeing that it was useless to struggle any longer, determined at last to send a flag of truce to the Confederates, who suspended operations in order to settle the terms of capitulation; and he laid down his arms, with two thousand seven hundred men. It was a great triumph for Price. He did not abuse his power, but paid full homage to the valor of his opponents. The soldiers, whom he had no means of subsisting, were released on parole; the officers remained prisoners. The losses of the Federals amounted to twenty-five killed and seventy-five wounded, according to report. Those of the Confederates were never precisely known, in consequence of the number of volunteers who were not enrolled in any regiment. Price only acknowledged twenty-five killed and seventy-two wounded.

Ill fortune seemed determined to pursue the Federal arms. The news of this disaster caused a great sensation in the North; but instead of discouraging her people, it only served to strengthen the manly resolves adopted two months before. In Missouri, on the contrary, it caused great consternation among the Unionists. It called forth everywhere severe criticisms against Fremont. The latter concluded at last that it was time for him to do something. He collected his forces from all parts, and on the 27th of September he started by rail from St. Louis, with an army of twenty thousand men, composed of five divisions under the respective commands of Generals Hunter, Pope, Sigel, McKinsty, and Asboth, and accompanied by eighty-six pieces of artillery. On the following day he arrived at Jefferson City, which

he thought was threatened by Price, and the garrison of which was still further to increase the number of his forces. If, instead of waiting for the fall of Lexington, he had assembled this army ten days sooner, he would have prevented the capitulation; and the rapidity of his movements after that misfortune shows the error he committed in not succoring the besieged place in time.

Price was not so imprudent as to give him an opportunity to rectify that mistake. His object had been accomplished; he had rallied together all the bands from Northern Missouri and achieved a brilliant success. But he did not expect to be able to maintain himself long on the borders of the river, and he had just learned that Hardee, in the south-east, instead of advancing, had fallen back upon Madrid. Not being able to obtain provisions for all the soldiers gathered around him, he discharged a portion of them, directing them to meet him in the south-western part of the State, which was his usual rallying-point. In thus keeping close to the Arkansas frontier he secured the co-operation of McCulloch, who was still in that State. It was necessary to act with promptness, for the Federals threatened to press him closely. While Fremont was gathering his forces and Sturgis was preparing to cross the Missouri, Lane sent some mounted troops to harass Price's rear. Consequently, on the 24th of September, a Confederate detachment which occupied the pass of the Osage at Osceola was surprised and put to flight by a party of four hundred Federal mounted men from Kansas, and the dépôt which they were guarding was given up to plunder. But Price deceived his adversaries by sending his cavalry to threaten several points at once, and by means of forced marches he succeeded in escaping them with the troops he had retained about him. He started on the 27th, the very day on which Fremont began his march, and quickly gained the borders of the Osage, which his soldiers crossed in boats constructed by their own hands. Thence he proceeded towards Neosho, where McCulloch was awaiting him with five thousand men. It was in this town, situated on the frontier of the Indian Territory, that the legislature, faithful to the cause of the South, had assembled and proclaimed the secession of a State over which it no longer exercised any authority.

Price having escaped, Fremont determined to pursue him, but this was not an easy matter, for the Federal army, which had been able to move by rail or steamboats, did not possess the necessary means of transportation for a long march across the State of Missouri. It was ill supplied with provisions, the *matériel* was entirely wanting, and Fremont, who had no knowledge of this state of things, was constantly ordering his generals to make movements which the latter were not in a condition to execute. Consequently, his army continued in a state of inactivity, along the line of railways between Sedalia and Tipton, until the middle of October, and the disorder of administration was such that provisions could hardly be obtained even in a locality so favorable for procuring them. In the mean while, the army had increased to a total of sixty thousand men,* nearly forty thousand of whom were combatants.

While the two principal armies were thus at a distance from each other, detached corps were endeavoring to effect reciprocal surprises, and their encounters caused numerous skirmishes, which at times assumed the proportions of more serious engagements. Two squadrons of Federal cavalry, which had been sent on a reconnaissance south-west from Rolla, in the direction of Lebanon, fell upon a party of mounted men of the enemy, thirty kilometres from that town, and charging them sabres in hand put them to flight after killing a certain number and taking thirty prisoners. On the day following they surprised a whole platoon of mounted Confederates in the village of Linn Creek. A column of infantry which was to re-establish communication between Rolla and Springfield, as soon as Fremont should reach the latter point, was advancing behind them.

The Confederates, on their side, were trying to worry their opponents by threatening the Pilot Knob line of railway. J. Thomp-

* The active portion of this army was thus divided, according to their respective localities, on the 14th of October:

1st division, Hunter, at Tipton	9,750 men.
2d " Pope, at Georgetown	9,220 "
3d " Sigel, at Sedalia	7,980 "
4th " Asboth, at Tipton	6,451 "
5th " McKinstry, at Syracuse	5,388 "
		<hr/>
		38,789 "

son, who had never left the south-eastern part of the State, gathered all his troops for the purpose of attacking the three regiments guarding the extremity of the line, under Colonel Carlin; on the 15th of October he captured a post of fifty men stationed at Big River bridge, and burned the bridge, which was the largest along the line. The garrison of Pilot Knob found itself thus isolated from St. Louis. Colonel Carlin immediately sent a regiment after him, which attacked him while he was retreating south-eastward, and vigorously harassed his rear-guard. But the Federals soon encountered the principal corps firmly established at Fredericktown, and, being unable to dislodge, it withdrew after a brisk discharge of musketry. The position of Carlin was becoming perilous. Fremont, who had quitted the Sedalia Railway to place himself at the head of his columns, was far from any telegraphic station, and could not be consulted. Fortunately, his assistant adjutant-general, Captain McKeever, had remained at St. Louis in the exercise of all his powers. He immediately adopted effective measures for keeping Thompson in check. Two regiments of infantry, with a battery of artillery, under Major Schofield, were sent to the relief of Carlin; notwithstanding the destruction of the bridge, these reinforcements soon joined him, and he was enabled to place himself at their head and attack Thompson at once. In the mean time, Grant was increasing the garrison at Cape Girardeau, and Colonel Plummer, with a brigade of fifteen hundred men, was sent from that point to assist Carlin in cutting off Thompson's retreat. Two separate columns thus marched upon Fredericktown; but a despatch from Plummer having fallen into Thompson's hands, the latter, thus apprised of the danger he was incurring, had stolen away by a rapid march; and when the Federals met in that city on the morning of the 21st, they found no enemy there. In the mean while, Thompson's brigade, which had adopted the nickname of its chief, who was called the *Swamp Fox*, far from wishing to avoid a fight, had gone to take position at a short distance from Fredericktown, where it awaited the Federals. That brigade was scarcely two thousand men strong; some were armed with fowling-pieces, others with muskets of very poor quality, but all were broken to the rough trade they were following, inured to privations, and

resolved to fight the superior forces opposed to them. Immediately upon his arrival, Plummer, with his brigade and the largest portion of Carlin's, marched against them. The combat begins at once. Plummer deploys his infantry, and Schofield soon appears upon the field with part of his artillery, which has an immense advantage over the four small pieces of the Confederates. The latter, crushed by the fire, fall back along the line. The Federals press them vigorously, the cavalry makes a charge, and their retreat is soon turned into a complete rout. Eighty prisoners remain in the hands of Plummer, who continues the pursuit until evening. Having only a sufficient quantity of provisions left to return to Cape Girardeau, he retraces his steps to that post, while Carlin returns to Pilot Knob, where the brigade of the Swamp Fox could never again come to molest him.

Fremont had at last succeeded in putting his columns in motion; and while a detachment of his troops once more took possession of Lexington, setting free a certain number of Union prisoners left there and capturing seventy of the enemy's men, the Federal forces pursued their toilsome march towards the Osage. On the 16th of October Fremont reached that river in the vicinity of Warsaw, but its swollen waters rendered the ford impracticable and made it necessary to construct hastily a trestle-bridge. This work occupied five days, and on the 21st the whole army crossed the Osage. The transport train had by this time been organized, and it followed the Bolivar road on its way to Springfield. On the 24th Fremont reached the borders of Pomme de Terre River, eighty kilometres from that city; and he sent Major Zagonyi, an old Hungarian officer, at the head of two squadrons called body-guards, with one hundred and fifty skirmishers, to make a reconnaissance. On the afternoon of the 25th Zagonyi came in sight of Springfield. Up to this time he had only met a few isolated partisans, and expected to find that city garrisoned by a few hundred men, whom he hoped to surprise, when he learned that it was occupied by nearly two thousand of the Confederates. Although his force only consists of the two squadrons of body-guards, numbering about one hundred and fifty men, the other troops having abandoned him, this brave officer prepares to attack the enemy's posts outside of the city, which have already noticed his

approach. He orders his little troop to draw their sabres, and then rushes into a narrow road which it is necessary to traverse in order to reach the enemy. He is received by a well-sustained fire; a large number of his followers are left on the spot; a log fence is demolished under the fire, and the Federals are at last able to deploy. Some charge the infantry, who, astonished at such an attack, take refuge in disorder in an adjoining wood. The remainder, supported by about fifty skirmishers who have now rejoined their chief, attack the enemy's cavalry, which was preparing, according to the custom of the country, to fight with the rifle. They are not allowed time to execute their intentions, and the onset of the little Federal band disperses them in an instant. Zagonyi pursues them into the town, which the Confederates abandon in haste; he halts to free a certain number of Union soldiers whom he found there; but fearing lest he might be surrounded as soon as the enemy has discovered his weakness, he retires during the night, carrying twenty-seven prisoners with him, and leaving about fifty wounded and a few stragglers behind. The losses of the Confederates amounted to more than one hundred men killed. The affair of Springfield was the more brilliant for the Federal arms because it was the first time during the war that a charge *au fond*, with drawn sabres, had been made.

Two days after, the heads of columns of the Federal army arrived at Springfield, and three divisions of that army were soon united in the neighborhood of the town. This time Fremont had succeeded in putting his troops in motion and in surmounting the difficulties in the way of transportation which had hitherto caused all his operations to miscarry. He aimed at nothing less than to invade Arkansas, and to descend with his army as far as New Orleans; so little value was then placed upon the capacity of the Confederacy for resistance. But a single march to the southern frontier of the State of Missouri was a laborious enterprise for that army, whose provisions were nearly exhausted and whose administrative service was yet so very defective. Its greatest difficulty was to overtake an enemy who knew how to disperse, and who, certain of finding means of subsistence in the midst of a sympathizing population, could always elude him. Moreover, Price and McCulloch had not considered themselves safe at

Neosho. They had at first retired to Pineville, only a few miles from Arkansas ; but the Missourians having refused to leave their own State, Price had brought them back to Cassville, from which place he watched the movements of the Federals at a distance. Deceived by exaggerated rumors, Fremont had thought himself menaced by this force, and had sent in great haste for Pope's division, which had been kept back by the difficulties of the route, as well as that of Hunter. At the same time, he had ordered Grant to make some strong demonstrations in front of Cairo, on the left bank of the Ohio, for the purpose of preventing the Confederate general Polk from sending reinforcements to Price from Columbus across the Mississippi.

Pope having at last arrived, Fremont resolved, on the 3d of November, to march upon Wilson's Creek, and give battle to Price, whom he had expected to find on the very ground where Lyon had perished three months before. This was a serious mistake, for the Missouri general was then quietly established at Cassville. In the midst of these preparations he received intelligence that the President had recalled him and appointed General Hunter in his place. Being too imaginative to make a good administrative officer, he had allowed malpractices to be committed by those around him, which justified this severe measure. Foreseeing the chance of his displacement, threats had been uttered against the government by those about his person, which the chief magistrate of a free and faithful people could not tolerate. On the other hand, nearly all his lieutenants were in open hostility against him. In short, he had on many occasions usurped political powers. The disavowal of his proclamation by Mr. Lincoln had been no lesson to him, and he had again overstepped his prerogatives by a strange convention negotiated with Price. He had agreed with the general against whom he was waging war to sign a proclamation binding both contracting parties to prohibit the formation of partisan bands, and promising to all those who might be willing to return to their homes that they should not be disturbed for any part they had taken in the war. Fremont thus fell into the opposite extreme of the error he had committed in his proclamation of August 30th, which had called forth Mr. Lincoln's condemnation. This arrangement was altogether to the

advantage of Price, who, being on the point of quitting Missouri, thus secured to his soldiers the means of quietly returning to their homes to wait for a better opportunity. It is needless to say that Hunter promptly repudiated that instrument.

Fremont was popular among his soldiers. The conqueror of California, by his good qualities, as well as his defects, pleased those rugged and adventurous men of the West, and was a fair representative of their ardent views in all political matters. Consequently, the news of his recall created much excitement among the encampments which surrounded Springfield. But no one ventured to call into question the supreme authority of the President. Among the many expressions of deep regret, not a disloyal word was uttered either by the chief or his soldiers. Those American armies were the offspring of a people too law-abiding for sentiments of that description to find vent.

On the evening of the 3d, Hunter not having yet rejoined the army, Fremont, at the request of several officers, made all his arrangements for the battle which, he persisted in thinking, was to be fought on the following day. But his successor having arrived during the night, he left for St. Louis, carrying with him the sympathies of the largest portion of the troops. By an order which may seem to have been too severe, his body-guards were disbanded; that ridiculous appellation proved a misfortune to them, and made people forget their brilliant charge at Springfield. On the morning of the 4th Hunter sent out reconnoitring parties, who failed to meet the enemy, and on the day following he went himself to visit the battle-field of Wilson's Creek in person. Price had never gone beyond Cassville. Although Fremont had enjoined his soldiers to obey his successor as himself, Hunter did not fail to perceive that there was much feeling among the troops, and less confidence; he did not think, moreover, that the army supplies were sufficient to begin a new campaign against an enemy who appeared determined not to be overtaken. Not being able any longer to procure means of subsistence for all his soldiers at Springfield, he fell back upon Rolla, followed at a distance by Price, who halted at the first of the former towns.

In the mean time, Grant prepared to execute the orders of Fremont, notwithstanding the recall of this chief, to whom it is

but just to attribute a portion of the responsibility for the reverse which was the consequence of his last instructions. Fremont, as we have stated, desired to prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements from Kentucky and Tennessee into Missouri by way of Columbus. The Confederates had surrounded the latter place with vast fortifications, in order to render themselves absolute masters of that locality, and to close the navigation of the Mississippi against the Federals; batteries armed with a powerful artillery were erected at every point which commanded the course of the river, and the defenders of that place, considering it impregnable, had called it the Gibraltar of the West. Supplies and ammunition of every kind had been accumulated there, and the troops who had assembled there since the beginning of November had formed at last a veritable army. The opposite bank was absolutely commanded by the batteries of Columbus. In order to intercept any reinforcements on their way to join Price, it required a large number of troops to operate upon both banks of the Mississippi. On the Missouri side a force could proceed a long distance from the river, and attack all the troops which might be on the march to effect a junction with Price; on the Kentucky side it was sufficient to make a serious demonstration against Columbus, to oblige the enemy to hold all his forces there. On the 2d of November, Grant was ordered by Fremont to send a few troops in pursuit, of a detachment of three thousand men, who, it was reported, were on their way to Cassville and had reached the St. Francis River, in Missouri. Grant despatched Colonel Oglesby with four regiments, also numbering about three thousand men, to look for it in that direction. But on the 5th, he received new instructions, directing him to make a demonstration against Belmont, a landing-place situated opposite Columbus, in order to prevent the garrison of the latter place from crossing the river to go to Price's assistance.

Grant hastened to obey these instructions. But before describing the battle of Belmont we must say a few words concerning the two generals who were about to be brought in contact, and the condition of the two armies placed under their respective commands. The name of General Grant, who had been in command at Cairo and the neighboring posts since the 1st of September,

was then as unknown in America as in Europe. Laborious, persevering, and reticent, he had displayed great personal bravery during the Mexican war. After attaining the rank of captain of infantry, he had left the army, and when the war broke out was engaged in the leather trade. Without personal ambition, but convinced that it was the imperative duty of those who had received a military education at the expense of the State to rally around the national flag, he entered a regiment from Illinois, his native State, and soon became a colonel. He was to have the good fortune of not attaining the highest positions too soon, but he exercised from the beginning of the war commands almost independent. He was thus able to profit by the experience of those who were at first his superiors; and when he attained the highest rank, he had already acquired a profound knowledge of the war which he was to be called upon to conduct.


Almost in front of him, at Columbus, were the headquarters of the ranking commander of all the Confederate forces in the West. The person who exercised these high functions would have been more at home at the head of some feudal bands of the Middle Ages, than as commander of an American army in the nineteenth century. This was the Right Reverend Doctor Leonidas Polk, Protestant Episcopal bishop of Louisiana. Educated at West Point, Polk had left the army after serving two years, and had entered the Church. But when the South took up arms, he remembered his military education; and after having refused the rank of brigadier-general, he could not resist the offer of a major-general's epaulettes. Nevertheless, in donning the uniform, the warlike prelate took care to declare that he did not renounce either his holy calling or his episcopal functions, and he informed his flock that he should return to his diocese as soon as he had performed what he called his duties as a citizen. But he was destined to die as a soldier, and not as a bishop. He was killed by a cannon-ball on one of the battle-fields of Georgia in 1864, at the very moment when fortune was declaring in favor of his enemies.

At the time of which we are speaking, Grant had been invested with a command altogether distinct from that of the Missouri—one which placed the rivers that unite near Cairo under his special

charge. He occupied Cape Girardeau, Commerce, and Bird's Point, on the right bank of the Mississippi. His base of operations was at Cairo, in Illinois. After the neutrality of Kentucky had been violated he had taken possession of the following points in that State: Fort Holt, opposite Cairo, at the confluence of the Ohio and the Mississippi; Paducah, at the confluence of the Tennessee and the Ohio; and Smithland, at the confluence of the last-named river and the Cumberland. He thus commanded the mouths of the three river lines which penetrated into the South. A certain number of wooden gunboats, old merchant-vessels armed in haste, and some large steamers, with several decks, turned into transports, constituted a flotilla which connected these different posts with each other. The Confederates, on their side, had closed the three navigable routes, which their adversaries had not yet any serious intention of disputing, by means of well-armed works, of which Columbus was then the most important.

On receiving the last instructions from Fremont, Grant immediately sent an additional regiment to Oglesby, with orders to fall back upon New Madrid, a little below Belmont, so as to threaten that position, against which he was himself preparing to operate directly. The attack was fixed for the 7th of November. On the 6th, Grant embarked upon three transport-ships, with five regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a section of artillery, three thousand one hundred and fourteen men in all, forming two small brigades, under General McClernand and Colonel Dougherty. In the mean while, demonstrations were made upon both sides of the river, one from Bird's Point and the other from Fort Holt, but they were undertaken by such small parties, obliged to stop at a distance so remote from the enemy, that they were without results.

Pursuing his course on the Mississippi, Grant left his adversaries in a state of uncertainty as to which side of the river he would select for landing. In order to deceive them a little longer, he stopped, the evening of the 6th, on the left bank; and on the morning of the 7th, his transport-ships were moored to the right bank at a place called Hunter's Landing, situated above Columbus, eight kilometres by water, but only five in a direct line, for between these two points the river makes an elbow to eastward,



which makes the distance greater. The woods surrounding Belmont were so situated as to keep the point which Grant had selected for landing out of sight of the batteries of Columbus. Around this point there were a few cultivated fields; then, on nearing Belmont, there is found a marshy forest, interspersed with pools of water. This forest extends to the borders of the river, leaving only a small clearing, where rise the three houses constituting the hamlet of Belmont. The Confederates had enlarged the clearing and surrounded it with *abattis* and breastworks. This post was guarded by a single regiment of infantry and a battery of six pieces; but the Confederate scouts having given timely signal of the landing of the Federals, which was effected very slowly, Polk immediately sent General Pillow from Columbus with three regiments to reinforce the garrison of Belmont before the battle could begin. He had, indeed, a number of steamboats, which enabled him to transport his troops from one side of the Mississippi to the other with great rapidity.

Once landed, the small forces of Grant deploy and march upon Belmont. The fire of the skirmishers becomes more animated as the troops advance through the forest; and the Confederates having come out of their entrenchments for the purpose of meeting the assailants, the combat soon becomes general. Most of the Federals have never been under fire, but they bear themselves bravely, owing to the example set to them by their chief. Grant, McClelland, who, although a general, is making his first essay in war, Colonels Logan and Buford, who were afterwards to achieve so much distinction, are all in the thickest of the fight. The Confederates, closely pressed, are soon driven out of the woods, but they gain courage behind their *abattis* and defend themselves resolutely. The Federals, on their side, find shelter in the forest, which is sufficiently near to the enemy's positions to enable them to direct a well-sustained fire upon him; then, rushing to the assault, they carry everything before them. Buford is the first to enter the entrenchments and drive out the Confederates, who fly in great disorder. They are pursued from all directions through their camp, and their six guns fall into the hands of the assailants. The latter, elated with their success, think the battle at an end; and while the Confederates are squatting close to the river

banks, whence they can regain the woods, where they can hide and rally, the conquerors begin to pillage the camp, of which they have taken possession, and give themselves up to the most boisterous demonstrations of joy. The bands play national airs, hurrahs for the Union are shouted, and at last the officers themselves, as little experienced as their men, stop to make them patriotic speeches. The troops have become completely disbanded, while Grant, with a few of his most confidential associates, who have noticed the preparations of the enemy for resuming the offensive, is vainly endeavoring to restore order and re-form the ranks. Two powerful auxiliaries soon come to their aid; on one hand, Grant, with a view of putting an end to the pillage, orders the camp to be fired, and the flames drive back towards him the men who had turned a deaf ear to his commands; on the other hand, the cannoneers of Columbus, seeing that Belmont is entirely occupied by the assailants, direct upon them the fire of their heavy guns, which had remained silent as long as friends and foes were mingled in the fight. Those heavy projectiles, although not sufficient in numbers to inflict serious losses upon the Federals, convince them that their occupation of Belmont is an impossible thing, and that it behooves them to hasten back to their boats. But much precious time has been lost; and while they are rallying and preparing to retrace their steps towards Hunter's Landing with the trophies they have taken, they perceive that the enemy has returned in force and is manœuvring to cut them off.

Pillow's soldiers, after their crushing defeat, seeing that they were no longer pursued, had gathered in the woods adjoining the river above Belmont. Polk, on his part, was fully determined not to allow Grant to enjoy his success in peace, and sent, at two different times, six regiments, numbering about four thousand men, under General Cheatham, to attack him. These troops were landed above Belmont, out of sight of the Federal gunboats, which the Columbus batteries held in check, and just as the Federals were beginning their march they had already deployed, so as to intercept their retreat towards Hunter's Landing. It was a severe trial for Grant's young soldiers to see their passage barred by the enemy; but again the example of their leaders urged them on. The Confederate line which sought to interrupt their return was

yet very weak and badly supported. It was at once broken, and the Federals opened for themselves a passage, not, however, without leaving many of their comrades on the ground. But the impetus which had enabled them to break down this barrier increased, whereas it should have been checked, and the retreating troops have fallen back slowly, in order to prevent confusion and keep the adversary in check. Four of the pieces of cannon captured from the Confederates are soon abandoned. The articles picked up in the camp at Belmont, and then the personal effects of the soldiers, their knapsacks and canteens, strew the road. It is in vain that the Federal gunners, with the two remaining guns, try to halt for the purpose of firing upon the enemy, who presses them closer and closer; they can find nobody to support them. In the mean time, Polk arrives in person on the field of battle with two fresh regiments, which increase the forces engaged on his side to at least six or seven thousand men. While a portion of his soldiers are harassing the rear of the Federals, he attacks the column which is hastening towards Hunter's Landing in flank. Fortunately for it, this movement is executed too late; and the Federals are able to form in an open field, near which they had landed in the morning. The embarkation is effected in the greatest hurry and confusion. Several officers of superior rank have been killed or wounded during the retreat; most of the regiments are disintegrated, and a disorderly mass crowds the decks of the transport-ships. They hoist on board, with great difficulty, the two pieces of cannon captured from the enemy, together with two others which had accompanied the expedition, but are obliged to abandon the caissons belonging to the latter. The battalion left there in the morning, to protect the approaches to the landing, had abandoned its post without orders to return on board the boat, and many detachments which had been sent to pick up the wounded were captured by the enemy. Grant himself, who was among the last to remain on shore, came very near being left behind; the last steamer had already unmoored under the fire of the Confederates, who were rapidly approaching, when he appeared at the water's edge. A simple plank was thrown to him in haste, over which he passed on horseback, with a few officers who accompanied him. Colonel Dougherty, while endeavoring to

rally the Seventh Iowa, whose officers were nearly all disabled, was seriously wounded and taken prisoner. As the steamers were getting under way they were riddled with balls by the enemy, who was only fifty metres from the bank, but, strange to say, only one man was killed; and soon the two vessels, firing grape into the Confederate ranks, compelled them to seek shelter in the woods. While slowly ascending the river the steamers picked up many soldiers, either single or marching in squads, who had gone astray and had reached the river bank. Finally, very late in the evening, the flotilla came to anchor in front of Cairo. Grant immediately sent an order to Oglesby to leave New Madrid and return to the point whence he had started—an order which that officer promptly and successfully executed. The two demonstrations which had been ordered for the day previous had been made, but without discovering any enemy.

The battle of Belmont cost Grant, it is said, thirty-four killed, two hundred and eighty-eight wounded, and two hundred and thirty-five prisoners. The loss which he inflicted upon the enemy was much greater: he captured about one hundred and fifty men and two pieces of cannon; the retreat, however, was too precipitate for the result of the expedition to be regarded as a success. If, as the public believed, Grant had intended to take up his position at Belmont, the affair was a complete failure. The fact of Oglesby's column being sent to New Madrid, to the south of Belmont, would seem to justify that assumption. Such an intention, however, should not be attributed to him, as it would imply that he was ignorant of the strength of Polk's army and of the configuration of the ground, which placed Belmont at the mercy of the guns of Columbus. It appears in reality that Grant's project was to make a simple demonstration, without carrying the attack to a conclusion, but he was afraid of discouraging his troops by stopping them before they had been seriously engaged. At all events, even after the capture of the camp, if, instead of dispersing, they had pursued Pillow's soldiers and fallen back immediately afterwards, they would have been satisfied with their success, and he could have led them back without loss. The fight at Belmont was nothing more than an isolated incident which could have no serious consequences. The

North was much troubled, regarding it as a defeat, while in the South it was glorified as a victory; but the Federal troops derived from it reliance upon their own courage, and their generals acquired a little of that experience which they needed. They began to understand that it was not by disjointed and insignificant efforts that they could accomplish a task of such magnitude as that of conquering the whole course of the Mississippi.

Important changes among superior officers paved the way for the beginning of a new era in the war. On the 1st of November McClellan had succeeded Scott in the supreme command of the armies, and he had entrusted the department of the West to General Halleck, an educated and methodical officer, whose name will henceforth be frequently mentioned in these pages.

The new chief, who arrived in St. Louis on the 16th of November, set to work at once to collect the necessary means for undertaking a serious campaign by water; in order to do this, it required more troops than Grant was able to furnish, numerous steamers for transportation, and gun-boats able to cope with the heavy artillery of the Confederate forts. The preparations for this campaign continued until the year 1862.

In the mean time, Halleck was occupied in reorganizing the army of the Missouri, which Hunter had left him after a few days' command, exchanging the department of the West for that of Kansas. He introduced into it a severe discipline, and finally succeeded in establishing order and method in the administrative service. As we have already stated, Hunter's retreat to Rolla had surrendered a great portion of Missouri to Price. The latter had taken advantage of the liberty thus granted him to return northward towards those rich river regions of the Missouri where he was always sure of finding recruits, horses, provisions, and even money, and had taken up a position on the banks of the Osage. There he was in constant communication with all the secessionists of that section of the State; he increased and provisioned his army and addressed earnest appeals to his partisans. The latter, it is true, did not flock to his standard so rapidly as he desired, but, on the other hand, they persecuted those Unionists who had the misfortune of being among them more bitterly than ever. Bands of refugees, stripped of everything, in a fright-

ful state of distress and suffering, arrived daily in St. Louis, imploring the pity of the Federals. Halleck took energetic measures to put an end to these annoyances. After having again declared martial law in the city of St. Louis, he compelled that portion of the inhabitants whom he suspected of being in secret communication with the enemy to feed the refugees—a measure which the odious persecutions of which the latter had been the victims alone could justify. In short, contrary to the system adopted by Fremont, Halleck, who belonged to the Democratic party, prohibited fugitive negroes from approaching his encampments; this interdiction gave rise to discussions of which we shall speak hereafter.

He could not, however, allow Price to remain in quiet possession of the country he had invaded; and towards the middle of December he directed Pope, who occupied Sedalia, at the extremity of the railway, to advance westward—not to attack the main body of the Confederate army on the borders of the Osage, but to intercept parties which were bringing reinforcements from the banks of the Missouri. Those parties were, in fact, becoming more and more numerous, and the Federals of Kansas had already had a slight engagement with them at Little Blue on the 10th of November, before the arrival of the Missouri general in that region. Pope performed his mission successfully. On the 15th of December he caused his cavalry to make a demonstration in the direction of Warsaw and Osceola, as if he had intended to attack Price. The day following, the whole of his column, amounting to about four thousand men, made a forced march, and taking position to the south of Warrensburg, placed mounted sentinels along the road, followed by supply-trains and the detachments which were on the way to join Price from the North. One of these detachments, numbering about one thousand men, was signalled at some distance to the westward; a regiment of cavalry and a battery of artillery were sent against it, and after having pursued it for two days compelled it to disperse. In the mean while, Pope received information that another detachment, of from twelve to fifteen hundred men, had crossed the Missouri and was directing its march towards Warrensburg. He immediately made his dispositions to surround it.

He posted himself with one brigade to the southward of the point where the Confederates had purposed to encamp. Colonel Marshall was expected to approach from the west, and Colonel J. C. Davis with the cavalry of his brigade was to cut off their retreat on the north-east. Davis was the first to encounter the enemy, on the 19th of December, separated from him by the Black Water River, near the mouth of Clear Creek. A narrow bridge defended by Confederate skirmishers spans the Black Water at that point. A platoon of regular cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Gordon, dismounted at once and carried the bridge by assault. The remainder of the troop followed him, and after exchanging a few shots with the Confederates, most of whom were inexperienced recruits and poorly armed, drove them back between the river and a swamp which cut off their retreat. Being now aware that a considerable force was rapidly approaching for the purpose of surrounding them, and doubting his ability to induce his men to make a vigorous effort to escape, Colonel Robinson, who commanded the Confederate detachment, was obliged to surrender. Thirteen hundred prisoners and a large supply-train fell into the hands of the Federals, who after this success returned to Sedalia. Price, deprived of the resources he had come in quest of on this side, fell back again upon Springfield, where his army, from eight to ten thousand men strong, went into winter quarters. At the same period the marching column of General Prentiss also restored the Federal authority throughout the whole of Northern Missouri, and at the end of the year only one-half of the southern section of that State remained in the hands of the Confederates.

The rigors of winter came to put an end to military operations for some time. When these were resumed in 1862, they were conducted with more concert of action. Those we have just narrated present a series of unimportant events which seem to be entirely disconnected, and which the reader may have considered somewhat too long and quite monotonous. Their recital was, nevertheless, indispensable in order to show how the war was carried on in those distant regions—a war which, from many points of view, calls to mind those of the Middle Ages, in which small armies ceaselessly advance or retreat, are often lost to

view, to meet again on the day of conflict, and frequently dispersed on the morrow for want of the means of subsistence; a war waged not only by volunteers, but by real *amateurs*, who preserve all their personal independence; a war in which the whole population, divided by hostile passions, takes an active part, and which consequently offers a larger field than any other for violence, pillage, and crime.

CHAPTER II.

BALL'S BLUFF.

IN the preceding chapter we have described the military events which took place along the course of the Mississippi and in the region west of the great river during the latter part of the year 1861. Winter, by interrupting hostilities, left the Federals in possession of two-thirds of the State of Missouri and their adversaries firmly established on the Mississippi at Columbus and Belmont.

In this chapter we shall bring the history of the year 1861 to a close, with the exception of what concerns naval operations, the description of which is reserved for a later portion of the history. Our narrative will comprise at first the battles fought in Kentucky and in West Virginia—the intermediate battle-field between the armies of the East and those of the West—together with the various incidents which relieved the monotony of camp-life among the troops of both parties stationed upon the banks of the Potomac.

We have already spoken of the policy pursued by the State of Kentucky when the civil war broke out around her. That section was greatly divided, but the majority of its inhabitants knew that they would be the first to bear the burden of the struggle, and after having vainly endeavored to conciliate both parties, they had tried to maintain an attitude of neutrality between them to avoid that misfortune. But among the population inclined towards peace there was a party loyal to the Union and ready to fight for it, and another not less devoted to the interests of slavery. Governor Magoffin, who belonged to the latter, was making strong efforts to drive Kentucky into the Confederacy of the insurgent States. The legislature was opposed to his course; and the August elections for Congressmen having given a large majority to the Union party, Magoffin was obliged to dissemble his purposes and

to make a show of adhesion to the programme of neutrality. After refusing to respond to Mr. Lincoln's call for volunteers, he advocated the organization of regiments recruited exclusively among secessionists, and commanded by the most zealous men among them, who were ready to avail themselves of the first opportunity to join the Confederates. The Unionists were at last aroused on seeing an insurgent army thus being organized in their very midst, under the name of State militia, and they spontaneously made preparations to take up arms on the day when their opponents should throw off the mask. Kentucky, being far richer, better cultivated, and with a larger population than Missouri, found herself, like the latter State, divided into two hostile and armed factions. The Union camps at Louisville, on the borders of the Ohio, and at Dick Robinson's, in East Kentucky, soon collected a sufficiently large number of volunteers to alarm Governor Magoffin and his accomplices. Wishing to make people believe in his impartiality, he addressed a communication, about the middle of August, to the authorities at Washington, and at Richmond, protesting against any schemes which might jeopardize the neutrality of Kentucky. But this neutrality was already nothing more than an idle phrase. It was known that the legislature, which was to meet at Frankfort on the 2d of September, would loyally sustain the Federal cause and take proper steps to prevent such an important State from falling into the hands of her enemies. Consequently, the latter determined to act before the meeting of the legislature; and on the 4th of September, at the very time when Mr. Davis was giving assurances that he should respect the neutrality of Kentucky, General Polk took possession of Columbus by surprise. The prompt action of Grant, as we have stated, alone prevented him from reaching Paducah in time. For a while a real comedy was enacted between the governors of Kentucky and Tennessee, the former protesting against the invasion of his State and the latter declaring that he was not responsible for it, whereas they had both prepared and favored that movement of the Confederate troops. But the signal had been given. Kentucky was henceforth given up to all the horrors of a double invasion, and she was the more exposed to be so treated because, having from the first excluded both parties from her soil, she could not expect

protection from either. New battle-fields, extending from the Mississippi to the Alleghanies, were to form a line of operation connecting the armies of the West with those of the East. Before proceeding to give an account of the battles which marked the first encounters between the belligerents in Kentucky, we must enter into a few details regarding that country and the positions they were to occupy.

There is no necessity for any particular mention of Western Kentucky—a very small district, watered by the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Mississippi—where the military operations were subservient to those of which the last-mentioned river was the theatre. The region of which we are to speak is divided into three sections. To the westward Central Kentucky, a rich country, thickly settled, and intersected by several lines of railways, which connect with the left bank of the Ohio, its northern boundary; Louisville at the west, Frankfort and Lexington in the centre, and Covington at the north, opposite to Cincinnati, are its principal cities. The second section consists of Eastern Kentucky, poor in water-courses, without railways, and lying between the ridge of the Cumberland Mountains, a branch of the Alleghanies, and the Ohio. The third, still more to the east, is only a continuation of that region. It possesses the same features and presents the same obstacles to the operations of armies. This is West Virginia, divided into two districts, one to the south and the other to the north of the Great Kanawha. McClellan's first campaign has already made the reader acquainted with the last-mentioned district. We left both Federals and Confederates there, reduced in numbers, and since the defeat of Garnett at Laurel Hill engaged in trifling skirmishes.

In Kentucky, as has been above stated, both parties are preparing for the conflict. The State militia, formed under the auspices of the governor and of the entire *personnel* of his administration, is destined to be soon incorporated with the Confederate army, and occupies positions which will acquire a special importance during the war. General Buckner, who is in command, has taken position at the railroad junction at Bowling Green, the chief centre of the system in Southern Kentucky, from which he commands all the western districts of that State. The Unionists,

on their part, under the name of home-guards, have formed, as we have also stated, two camps, where all their forces are concentrated, one, near Louisville, deriving all its needed equipments from the neighboring State of Ohio; the other, called Camp "Dick Robinson," situated in Garrard county, south of Frankfort and Lexington. This central location serves as a rallying-point for the partisans of the Federal cause, more numerous in the east than in the west, and at the same time commands the road from Cumberland Gap and East Tennessee.

This last district is formed of several valleys lying between parallel ridges, like the mountainous region of West Virginia, of which it is the continuation to the southward. Like the latter section of country, it was settled by emigrants from the North, who, leaving Pennsylvania, have invariably followed the long and elevated valleys through which flow first the Potomac and then the Tennessee. These settlers, although surrounded east and west by populations whose prosperity depended entirely upon slave labor, and notwithstanding the sanction and the encouragement which the institution received from the laws, had always been opposed in practice to slavery. Consequently, they had remained devotedly attached to the Union. Their loyalty was a source of great embarrassment to the Confederates, for it belied the pretended unanimity of the South. As soon as hostilities had commenced the Federals turned their attention toward these natural allies, who had been separated from them by violence and threats. In going to their assistance they hoped to regain possession of one of the principal railroads of the Confederacy, and by this means to cut the entire line of defence of their adversaries. They could not reach Knoxville, the capital of that district, except by following one of the principal United States roads, which, crossing the Alleghanies, connects Kentucky with North Carolina. The culminating point of this road lies upon an eminence easy of defence, which bears the name of Cumberland Gap, and marks the point of contact of the three States, Kentucky, Virginia, and Tennessee.

General Zollicoffer had been sent to Knoxville by the Confederate government to maintain its authority at that point. As soon as he learned that the neutrality of Kentucky no longer ex-

isted even in name, and that Polk occupied Columbus, he made his own preparations to seize Cumberland Gap and to descend the opposite slope. But before we follow him we shall be obliged to preserve the chronological order of the narrative—to speak first of the new campaign, of which West Virginia was the theatre.

As we have seen, Buckner, in the west, was stationed around Bowling Green with the Kentucky militia, resting upon the State of Tennessee, whence he could easily receive the reinforcements assembled on the frontier, and where he was ready to come forward as soon as the opportunity offered. In the centre, Zollicoffer only occupied East Tennessee, but was preparing to invade Kentucky by Cumberland Gap, while at the east, in West Virginia, the remnant of the army beaten by McClellan was reorganizing and preparing for a new campaign.

To oppose these forces the Federals had, first, the home-guards enlisted in the State itself, collected principally at Louisville and Camp Dick Robinson; secondly, the national troops assembled under General Anderson on the right bank of the Ohio, in the States of Indiana and Ohio, and the remainder forming the small army commanded by Rosecrans in West Virginia. McClellan's campaign, described in a former chapter, has only made us acquainted with the northern section of that country. It is necessary, therefore, that we should add a few words to describe the whole of it.

Comprised between the principal range of the Alleghanies and the course of the Ohio, it may be divided into two parts in the direction of its length: one, mountainous, lying eastward; the other, in which the undulations of the ground slope away gradually to the bank of the river which forms its boundary, at the west. Magnificent forests, springs gushing in every direction, mines as yet but little explored, constitute the riches of that picturesque region, combining with the grand features of American scenery a variety of sites seldom to be met with even in the New World. In a military point of view, the Ohio affords an easy base of operations for an army raised in the free States. Two secondary lines of communication give to such an army an easy access to the interior: one, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at the north; the other, the Great Kanawha River at the south.

Small steamers can ascend this river nearly to the point where it is formed, by the junction of Gauley River and New River, on the boundaries of the mountain region. An army resting upon the other portions of Virginia would, on the contrary, encounter great obstacles among the successive ridges of the Alleghanies, across which it would be difficult to carry provisions. On this side, therefore, the Federals had a great advantage over their adversaries.

The crest of the Alleghanies forms a line somewhat sinuous in its details, but generally following a uniform direction, which separates the Atlantic basin from that of the Mexican gulf. The secondary chains detached from the main ridge are nearly all parallel to the general direction, and enclose long valleys, the waters of which escape through gaps occurring at long intervals. The longest range extends from Carricksford, at the north, to the gorges of New River, at the south, and at nearly an equal distance from these two points an elevated cone called High Knob rises from the crest of the ridge, marking an important elevation, the centre of a sort of cross in that system of mountains. North of High Knob the chain bears the name of Greenbrier Mountain; at the south it is called Cheat Mountain, as far as the point where it slopes down abruptly to the westward to form the mass called Sewell's Mountain, which flanks the remainder of the chain like a bastion. A perpendicular branch connects with the ridge of the Alleghenies to the eastward, separating the waters of Cheat River, an affluent of the Monongahela, from those of Greenbrier River, a tributary of New River. Lastly, at the west a small spur called Rich Mountain detaches itself, and soon takes the same direction as the other chains to enclose the elevated valley of the Tygart.

McClellan's campaign has already familiarized the reader with some of these names. He will remember that Garnett, driven southward by the Federals, who had crossed Rich Mountain, was unable to find any practicable road at Cheat Mountain by which to escape to the east, and was obliged to follow that impassable barrier by descending in a northerly direction as far as Carricksford. The road which McClellan had thus barred against him to the south is the most important in all that region. Reascend-

ing the valley by way of Huttonsville, it forks at a point called Great Pass; the branch which turns to the east crosses Cheat Mountain at the defile of Cheat Summit, descends into the valley of Cheat River, then rises upon the perpendicular ridge which, under the name of Great Greenbrier, connects the High Knob with the crest of the Alleghanies, and proceeds towards the source of Greenbrier River, near a tavern celebrated in that wild region by the name of Travellers' Repose. The road branches off once more at this point to enclose on both sides an important counterfort called Buffalo Hill; and, crossing the Alleghany by two adjoining passes, it descends into the high valleys containing the sources of the principal tributaries of the James and the Potomac. The other branch, continuing in a southerly direction from Great Pass, reascends the whole valley of the Tygart, and passes Elk Water at the foot of the High Knob, where it forks to cross the mountain to the right and left of that elevation, through the passes called Cloverlick and Staunton Pike; thence it descends into the valley of Greenbrier River. South of the three passes of Cheat Mountain, Staunton Pike, and Cloverlick, all three very near each other, there is not another practicable road to be found across Greenbrier Ridge before reaching Sewell's Mountain, the slopes of which, being less precipitous, are crossed by two or three roads which gradually descend from east to west into the valley of the Great Kanawha. This valley, as we have already stated, is the principal artery of all the surrounding country, and the small town of Charleston is its centre. The other water-courses which descend from the Alleghanies into the Ohio basin are only so many obstacles, and afford no facilities for navigation. We may mention the most important among them: the Monongahela and its tributaries at the north; then the Little Kanawha, running from east to west; the Elk River, which passes Suttonville and empties into the Great Kanawha at Charleston; and finally, the Gauley River and the New River, which unite to form the Great Kanawha after crossing a singularly broken region.

There were consequently only three points at which armies could penetrate the barrier which intersects Western Virginia throughout its whole extent: to the northward, the space intervening between Carricksford and the Baltimore and Ohio Rail-

road ; in the centre, the elevated defiles which are reached by way of Great Pass and Elk Water ; and to the southward, the passes of Sewell's Mountain. The first point was in the hands of the Federals stationed in Pennsylvania and in Maryland, where they occupied the two slopes of the Alleghanies. The second had been conquered by McClellan, and the troops he had posted at the defiles rendered them inaccessible to the Confederates. The passes of Sewell's Mountain and the valley of the Great Kanawha alone remained, and there the struggle was to recommence.

We have followed the movements of the Confederate general Wise, who had gone into that country for the purpose of raising troops to defend the cause of secession, down to about the 20th of July. The population of that district manifested more sympathy with his views than the rest of Western Virginia, but not sufficient, however, to take up arms and enlist under his banner. Consequently, after having occupied without hindrance the greater portion of the course of the Great Kanawha, he found himself in a dangerous position from the moment that Garnett was conquered by McClellan in the north, and was soon compelled to fall back before the forces of the Federal general Cox. The latter, in fact, supported by a few steamers, was operating upon the right bank of that river, and threatened to cut off the retreat of the Confederates towards the mountains. After a cavalry affair at Cissonville, Wise evacuated Charleston, burning the Elk River bridge behind him. On the same day Cox, with the aid of a light-draught steamer which had been abandoned by the enemy, entered that town, established his headquarters in it, and despatched a few troops in pursuit of Wise. This general had hastened to cross the Gauley River, and also to burn the bridge situated near the point of its confluence with New River, to withdraw to Lewisburg, on the Greenbrier River, beyond Sewell's Mountain. The Confederates thus found themselves at the end of July driven back everywhere into the mountain region.

They resolved to make a desperate effort to get out of it. General Floyd, who has already been mentioned in our narrative as Mr. Buchanan's Secretary of War, was sent from Richmond with a few troops, to reinforce Wise and assume command in the valley of the Kanawha. Unfortunately for their cause, Floyd and Wise

were two characters not very well calculated to harmonize. The former, proud of the services he had rendered to the pro-slavery faction by disorganizing the Federal army during his administration of the War Department, made Wise feel the weight of his authority, while the latter resisted him, believing that he was better acquainted with the country, with its inhabitants and the mode of making war there. The remnants of Pegram's and Garnett's forces, as we have stated above, had been reinforced and placed under command of General Lee, who was destined at a later period to play so conspicuous a part in the war. As he had no intention of disputing the northern part of Western Virginia with his adversaries, he fell back towards the south, leaving only a few detachments around Romney, and took a position in front of the central passes of the great ridge occupied by the Federals. His small army, collected in the valley of the Greenbrier, was in August about sixteen thousand strong.

The Federals had, in front of Floyd and Wise, the independent brigade of Cox, from two to three thousand strong. The latter, following the retreat of Wise at a distance, had occupied the whole valley of the Kanawha as far as the summits of Sewell's Mountain. More to the north, the forces commanded by McClellan until the end of July were now under the orders of Rosecrans, an officer whom we shall see invested with important commands in the course of the war. Although he may have been to blame for his dilatory movements at Rich Mountain, he was a distinguished soldier, who knew what he could exact from his troops, and was beloved by them. If he was not gifted with great quickness of perception, he possessed the art of combining his operations judiciously, and his adversaries rendered justice both to his talents and to his humanity towards the vanquished. The greater part of his forces had been brought back to Clarksburg, upon the Baltimore Railroad; and thanks to the reinforcements he had received in the month of August, he had now about ten thousand men at his disposal, forming three brigades, under the orders of General Benham and Colonels McCook and Scammon. A few troops were watching the Confederate partisans near the sources of the Potomac, while Reynolds's brigade occupied Cheat Summit and Elk Water, in front of Lee's advanced posts.

Both belligerent parties passed the first half of the month of August in perfect quiet. At last Floyd resolved to take the offensive and to re-enter the valley of the Kanawha; Cox was now too weak to be able to dispute its possession with him. Taking the Sewell Mountain road, he easily drove back the line of the Federal outposts, and compelled Cox to fall back to the southwest, upon New River. Leaving Wise in front of the latter to watch him, he proceeded in a north-westerly direction towards Gauley River, in order to cross that stream at Carnifex Ferry, near its confluence with Meadow River, and thus cut off Cox entirely from any reinforcements which Rosecrans might have sent him. In the region between Gauley and Elk River there was but a single Federal regiment, whose colonel, named Tyler, had formerly travelled that same district as a dealer in furs; his present mission was to pursue the numerous bands of Confederate guerrillas. On Floyd's arrival at Carnifex Ferry, Tyler, not considering himself sufficiently strong to dispute his passage, had fallen back towards the south, in the direction of Gauley Bridge, near the point of confluence of the Gauley and New Rivers. But on hearing of an accident which had befallen Floyd, he immediately retraced his steps. At Carnifex Ferry the Confederates had only found one barge and a ferry-boat with which to cross the river, which was nowhere fordable; and, in the midst of this long and tedious operation, the boat, after capsizing, had been dashed to pieces against the rocks. Floyd found himself on the right bank of the river with his infantry and two guns, separated from his cavalry by a deep and rapid current. Having been made acquainted with this fact, Tyler sought to take advantage of his perilous situation to attack him, but he was not quick enough. In twenty-four hours a new boat was constructed; and on the 25th of August Floyd had all his troops united on the right bank of the Gauley. He immediately took up his line of march with a view of forestalling Tyler, who had halted at Cross Lanes, situated a short distance from that place. The Federals had failed to adopt even the simplest precautions customary under such circumstances; they had sent out no scouts, and had settled down in their bivouac as if they had no enemy to fear. This culpable neglect was to cost them dear. On the morning of the 26th

Floyd fell upon them suddenly, killing a few and capturing about fifty, before they had time to recover themselves. The remainder were dispersed in the woods, where many of them lost their way, and finally fell into the hands of the enemy. After this success Floyd took up a strong position at Carnifex Ferry, on the right bank of the Gauley, waiting for Wise to join him, in order to penetrate still farther into the region occupied by the Federals. He surrounded with entrenchments a steep hill which a turn in the river enveloped on two sides; this hill was separated from its neighboring heights to the north-east and north-west by a deep and wooded ravine; the Confederate artillery, well protected, commanded all the approaches, especially the Summerville road, which passed through the centre of the position.

These skirmishes were only the prelude to more serious conflicts. Rosecrans and Lee were both preparing for a new campaign, and it was expected that they would soon come in collision. The former was quicker than his adversary. About the 3d of September he left Clarksburg with his three brigades and proceeded towards Weston; having reached that place, instead of turning eastward, along the Beverly road, to march against Lee, as the latter had expected, he took a southerly direction, and soon arrived at Suttonville. Then, crossing Elk River, he entered the scarped passes of Gauley Mountain, which separate that stream from Gauley River. The roads were difficult and the gorges narrow. Finding no ground for a camp on the road, a portion of the troops had to cross the most dangerous passes during the night among forests which greatly increased the obscurity. Summerville was reached at last; and, as soon as his soldiers had obtained some rest, Rosecrans set out to descend the course of the Gauley River in search of Floyd, whose exact position he had not been able to ascertain, so great was the difficulty of obtaining information in a region so little inhabited.

On the evening of September 9th, he encamped at the foot of Gauley Mountain, sixteen kilometres from Summerville and twenty-eight from Carnifex Ferry, after having driven back the scouts whom Floyd had sent to watch the Suttonville Road. The latter, in fact, ignorant of the approach of the enemy's army, was preparing to make a forward movement. On the 10th the whole

Federal army, starting before daylight, reached Summerville during the morning, and, without halting, continued to follow the course of the Gauley. Rosecrans's soldiers were mostly recruits without any experience of warfare. Nevertheless, they bore the fatigues of that long march well, and at three o'clock they reached the point where the road which leads to Carnifex Ferry leaves the main road from Gauley Bridge. Informed at last of the enemy's position, Rosecrans decided to take advantage of the last hours of daylight to make a reconnaissance, notwithstanding the fatigue of his men and the thickness of the forest, which did not allow him either to see the dispositions of the Confederates or to direct a concerted movement.

The redoubts with which Floyd had surrounded the heights of Carnifex Ferry were mounted with a dozen guns and connected by means of strong breastworks constructed of logs. He had with him eighteen hundred men; and as soon as his pickets had announced the approach of the Federals he sent for Wise, who, as we have seen, had remained in the vicinity of New River.

The brigade of Benham, composed of the Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Ohio regiments, commanded by Colonels Lytle, Smith, and Lowe, was at the head of the Federal column. Lytle is the first to descend into the wooded ravine which extends to the foot of the enemy's positions. He is hardly in sight of these when he is received by a well-sustained fire. After a few shots he emerges from the wood, and climbs the opposite acclivities, to reach the entrenchments on the heights. But he fails to reach them. He is himself severely wounded, and his soldiers fall back to the skirt of the wood, behind which they shelter themselves, to continue the fight. Two field-pieces soon come to their assistance.

In the mean time, the remainder of Benham's brigade was deploying as well as the nature of the ground permitted. Smith, who, deceived by the report of musketry, had at first moved toward the right, now bore to the left, and engaged the extreme right of the Confederate line near the river. He might have carried that position, which was more accessible than the others, if he had been supported; but his small band, which had been sent on a simple reconnaissance, was not sufficiently strong to attack it

alone. In the mean time, the generals being prevented by the intervention of the forest from seeing all the movements, the troops engaged renewed the fight of their own accord, and the reconnoissance assumed the proportions of a regular battle. The Twelfth Ohio became separated in the wood, and the largest portion of that regiment proceeded to take a position on the right of the Tenth. Lowe led it to the assault, a little to the left of the road, but was himself killed at the first fire, and his command was driven back in disorder.

Although it was getting dark, Rosecrans determined to make one last effort. Part of McCook's brigade deployed to the right of the road to attack the enemy on that side. Four guns were sent to the centre, and two of McCook's regiments were ordered to join Smith, who, gathering around him his own regiment and part of the Twelfth, formed a new column of attack. But at the moment when McCook appeared in front of the Confederate entrenchments a counter order came which put a stop to his movements, and the darkness overtook Smith's column before it could deploy on the other side of the ravine which it had entered. Convinced of the impossibility of proceeding farther, Smith brought back his column, not without some confusion. During that movement his soldiers, little accustomed to fighting at night, shot at each other, thereby adding about thirty wounded to the day's losses.

The Federals had fought bravely and many officers had fallen, but they had been badly handled; their movements had been disconnected, and scarcely two thousand soldiers, with six pieces of artillery, had taken part in the conflict, in which they had lost about one hundred and fifty men. They prepared to renew the attack on the following day with all their forces. But Floyd did not give them a chance: he had been wounded himself. Wise had formally refused to respond to his summons, and his little army, although it had only lost from fifteen to twenty men, was too much shaken to sustain another shock. He evacuated his camp during the night, leaving behind him the Federal wounded he had captured a few days before from Tyler, and crossed the Gauley to fall back on Sewell's Mountain, justly accusing Wise of having abandoned him at the decisive moment

in a position which a timely reinforcement would have enabled him to defend.

During this time a portion of Wise's troops had engaged in an encounter of no importance, on the left bank of New River, with some of Cox's detachments. The condition of the roads and the fatigue of his soldiers did not allow Rosecrans to follow the enemy. He had, moreover, accomplished the paramount object of his operations in driving the Confederates back into the mountain, and he was master of Gauley River and the Great Kanawha, where he was in easy communication with Cox.

In the mean time, Lee had commenced a movement with a view of getting out of the deep and narrow valleys where he was shut up in consequence of the occupation of the Cheat and Greenbrier Mountain defiles by his adversaries. The news of Rosecrans's march southward emboldened him, and he thought that he might be able by skilful manœuvring to wrest from General Reynolds's brigade, which had remained alone in front of him, the formidable positions it occupied. That general, with only two thousand men, was with the greatest portion of his troops at Elk Water, where he commanded the entrance to the Tygart valley and the junction of the two roads which cross Greenbrier Mountain. He had only been able to place a few pickets in the defiles of this mountain. A strong detachment occupied the junction of the Elk Water and Cheat Summit roads at Great Pass, while Colonel Kimball was strongly entrenched at the latter point with six hundred men. He held communication with Elk Water by the Great Pass road, a circuitous route twenty-eight kilometres in length, and by a path which, following the crest of the mountain in a direct line, reduced the distance to twelve kilometres.

On the 11th of September Lee left Huntersville with about nine thousand men. He had an enormous numerical superiority over the Federals, but his troops were raw, his officers without experience, the ground on which he had to operate extremely difficult, and he had committed the error of adopting a plan of attack which was too complicated to be carried out in all its details under such circumstances. He sent General H. R. Jackson (who must not be confounded with the celebrated Stonewall Jackson) with two thousand men to invest Cheat Summit by way

of Travellers' Repose, and to turn that position so as to cut it off from Great Pass. A second detachment was directed upon the latter point, with orders to cross the defile of Staunton Pike, in order to proceed afterwards by the route between Cheat Summit and Elk Water. Lee himself proposed to attack this position both in front and by his right, with five or six thousand men, joining hands with the detachment which had been directed upon Great Pass, and cutting off the retreat of the Federals on that side. Jackson's demonstration in the direction of Cheat Summit was to be the signal of this attack, which was designed to be the most important. The Confederates, being obliged to follow narrow mountain paths, took neither cavalry nor artillery with them.

On the morning of September 12th, their movement extended all along the line. Lee drove before him without difficulty the weak posts which guarded the defiles of Greenbrier, and descended towards Elk Water, where Reynolds was preparing to defend himself as well as he could; the detachment which had been sent in the direction of Great Pass reached, without meeting the enemy, the Elk Water road, and thus cut off all communication between Reynolds's troops and those of Kimball. Jackson, after a very fatiguing march, had succeeded, on his part, in investing the positions of the latter, and in placing himself between them and Great Pass, while a detachment attacked their outposts in front along the eastern slope of Cheat Mountain. It seemed as if the Confederates had only to make one more effort to annihilate their opponents, isolated as they were and surrounded on every side. But Lee did not exhibit on that occasion those great military talents which he was to display subsequently on a wider field, and that effort was not made. He was deceived by the determined attitude of the Federals as to their numerical strength, and did not dare to attack them in the strong positions they occupied. After a few skirmishes, in which his young soldiers showed but little firmness, Jackson confined himself to watching Kimball's encampments; after which, on the following day, the 13th, he withdrew, almost without striking a blow. The detachment which had been sent against Great Pass did the same; and Lee, who was still waiting for Jackson to begin the

action, that he might assault the positions of Elk Water, did not venture to risk that attack, although the chances were greatly in his favor. Indeed, Kimball's small detachment could have been of no assistance to Reynolds, who was already surrounded by forces three times as numerous as his own. A last attempt, which was but faintly made, on the 15th, against Cheat Summit, was frustrated by the stubborn resistance of the Federals, who had reopened communication over the mountain between Summit and Elk Water; and Lee brought back his fatigued and discouraged troops into the valley of the Greenbrier.

Unable to extricate himself by way of Cheat Mountain from the blind alley in which he found himself, he determined to look elsewhere for a more suitable battle-field, and to follow up along the Great Kanawha that army of Rosecrans the left flank of which Reynolds had so well protected. A few days after his return to Huntersville he took up his line of march towards the South with the greatest portion of his forces, and strongly reinforced Floyd and Wise, whom he found occupying the crests of Sewell's Mountain. He left Jackson with his brigade of two thousand five hundred men behind him, to guard the passes of the Alleghanies which led into Eastern Virginia. Jackson, being too weak to occupy the whole of Greenbrier valley, left the defile of Travellers' Repose, to take position on the heights of Buffalo Hill, a natural terrace, easily fortified, from which he could command the most important road crossing the Alleghanies.

Reynolds, having received reinforcements, and knowing that the only enemy left in front of him was Jackson's small force, resolved to assume the offensive, and started with about six thousand men and thirteen field-pieces for the purpose of attacking him at Buffalo Hill. On the morning of October 3d he arrived in sight of that hill, where the Confederates had constructed several tiers of redoubts, behind which they waited for their adversary, full of confidence in the strength of their position. After Reynolds's infantry had compelled the enemy to retire into his entrenchments the Federal artillery, which was posted in an open plain extending to the foot of Buffalo Hill, opened fire upon the Confederate camp. The superiority both in the number and in the calibre of these field-pieces made up for the disadvantages

of the ground ; and after a few hours the fire of the Confederates ceased almost entirely. At the request of his colonels, Reynolds then gave the signal for an infantry attack upon Jackson's positions. Three Federal regiments gained the heights which are a continuation of Buffalo Hill on the left, and afterwards advanced for the purpose of charging the enemy's entrenchments in flank ; but being received by a vigorous discharge of musketry, the regiment heading the column immediately turned round, fell back in great disorder upon the other two regiments, and stopped their progress. After this first check, Reynolds, being convinced that he could not dislodge Jackson by main force, ordered a retreat and returned to Cheat Mountain ; his loss amounted to only eight killed and ten wounded.

After this affair more than one month elapsed without any encounter taking place between the two parties, except in the extreme north of Virginia, near the sources of the Potomac. We have stated that on this side the Federals, being masters of Pennsylvania and of Maryland, occupied the two slopes of the Alleghanies ; General Kelley's brigade covered the line of the Baltimore Railway, which follows the windings of the Potomac across the eastern ridges of that chain as far as the neighborhood of Hancock, the northernmost point reached by the river.

So extensive a line was always exposed to incursions from the enemy, who found an easy shelter among the long valleys perpendicular to the Potomac. In the month of October the small town of Romney, situated in one of these valleys, had become the rendezvous of a Confederate force sufficiently numerous to seriously threaten the line of railway which Kelley had been instructed to guard. That general determined to disperse it. Leaving New Creek valley with two regiments of infantry, three pieces of artillery, and a few squadrons of cavalry, he proceeded eastward towards Romney, while an infantry regiment, starting from Cumberland, in Maryland, was to arrive at the same time with himself before that town, passing through Frankfort and Springfield. This combined movement was effected on the 26th of October. The detachment from Cumberland reached the river, which south of the Potomac is called the Branch, a few kilometres below Romney ; the bridge which crosses that water-course had been de-

stroyed, and the passage was guarded by three hundred Confederates and one piece of artillery. After a fruitless attempt to force a passage the Federals withdrew. But in the mean while, Kelley's column had been more fortunate. It had met the enemy on the summit of Middle Ridge, and had easily driven him back into the valley of the Southern Potomac. The little town of Romney stands on the right side of that river. When the Federals appeared on the other side, a vigorous cannonade commenced, during which they sustained a few losses; but their cavalry crossed the Potomac, easily fordable at that season of the year, and charged the Confederates, while the infantry, carrying the bridge of the main road, followed closely. The defenders of Romney, staggered by the first shock, fled in the greatest disorder towards Winchester, abandoning a considerable number of prisoners, all their *matériel*, and two pieces of artillery.

We left Lee effecting a junction with Floyd and Wise along the crests of Sewell's Mountain. The army thus formed, of which he took command, numbered more than twenty thousand men. In the mean time, Rosecrans, after crossing the Gauley, had advanced eastward as far as the foot of the Confederates' position. He shut them up once more within the mountainous region, although he had only the three brigades brought from Clarksburg and that of Cox, all together about twelve thousand men. Lee, notwithstanding his numerical superiority, did not deem it proper to disturb him, and confined himself to sending a few troops upon the left bank of the Great Kanawha. These troops were surprised, on the 25th of September, in an entrenched camp near Chapmansville, by a regiment of Federal infantry, which routed them completely, after killing and wounding about forty men.

Dissensions prevailed in the Confederate camp. Lee had found Floyd posted on a lower ridge situated north of Sewell's Mountain, called Meadow Bluff, while Wise, unwilling to join him there, remained inactive along the principal ridge. In approving the course of the latter, he gave dissatisfaction to the late Secretary of War, who reluctantly joined the rest of the Confederate army on Sewell's Mountain. Lee strengthened his position with great care, so that Rosecrans did not feel sufficiently strong to attack it, but he had no idea of assuming the offensive himself; and the

Federal general, after remaining a few weeks in front of him, was enabled to fall back, and quietly take a position between the Gauley and New Rivers. Shortly after this Lee was recalled and sent into South Carolina. Wise, who could not agree with Floyd, was deprived of his command, and a portion of the army under General Loring went into the valley of Virginia to swell the forces of Stonewall Jackson.

In the mean while, notwithstanding the diminution of his troops, Floyd was not willing to give up the game. He crossed New River, marched down the left bank, and on the 30th of October took up a position on the heights of Cotton Hill. These hills overlook the confluence of the Gauley and New River, and command the road from Charleston to Lewisburg, by which Rosecrans was obtaining supplies for his army. In place of Gauley Bridge, which had been destroyed, the Federals had established a ferry-boat, the trips of which were soon interrupted by Floyd's artillery, which had been dragged with great difficulty to the summit of Cotton Hill. The Confederate skirmishers, at the same time, rendered the use of the road extremely dangerous. Rosecrans was obliged to bring the greatest portion of his artillery, with large escorts, to protect the communications indispensable to the existence of his men. At last, about the 7th of November, the Confederates decided to leave Cotton Hill, and took a position a little higher up, on Laurel Creek. Rosecrans determined, in turn, to hunt them up on the other side of New River. On the 6th of November, he sent the brigade of Benham to take a position a little below the confluence of that stream and the Kanawha on the left bank, and near the mouth of Loop Creek; on the 11th he took up his march for the purpose of striking Floyd's camp in the rear; while a brigade lately placed under General Schenck's command was preparing to cross the Kanawha opposite Fayetteville, in order to cut off his retreat on that side. The brigade of Benham was divided into two columns: one, a thousand strong, turning to the right, marched upon Cassidy's Mill, south of the enemy's camp, while Benham with five hundred men and six guns proceeded to the same point by way of Cotton Hill. Benham met the enemy in the afternoon of the 12th at Laurel Creek. Floyd had struck his camp, and only defended the passage of the stream

long enough to cover his retreat. Schenck not having been able to cross New River, which was swollen by the rain, that retreat was effected without difficulty ; and Benham's two columns, worn out by a long march, only arrived at Fayetteville to find that the Confederates were already far away from that town. Nevertheless, on the morning of the 13th the Federal general went in pursuit of them along the Beckley (or Raleigh Court-house) road, and came up with them a short distance from that place at the Maiboy farm. Floyd's small army was retreating in great disorder and with much difficulty through roads entirely broken up by the rain. The Confederate cavalry, commanded by Colonel Croghan, anxious to protect the retreat, dismounted to defend a height upon which the road followed by the Federals ascended. But at the first fire Croghan was killed, and his startled soldiers dispersed into the woods. Benham had to content himself with picking up a few prisoners, and very soon halted his exhausted infantry. He had scarcely rejoined Rosecrans when a heavy fall of snow came to render military operations impossible in that wild country. The Confederates were definitively banished into the mountainous region.

Two unimportant engagements, one in the vicinity of the Ohio and the other near Cheat Mountain, alone disturbed the quiet which winter imposed upon the belligerents in Western Virginia. The first took place on the 9th of November at Guyandotte, a large village situated at the mouth of the river of that name in Ohio. That portion of Western Virginia lying south of the Great Kanawha had always been abandoned to small hostile bands, who carried on a real guerilla warfare. One of these bands, commanded by the Confederate Jenkins, surprised a camp of instruction at Guyandotte, occupied by about one hundred and fifty Federals. The latter had kept guard with the carelessness of inexperienced soldiers ; the secessionists, who were numerous at Guyandotte, gave Jenkins all the information he required, and in an instant the Federals were surrounded and nearly all captured or killed. On the day following, some troops from the State of Ohio arrived on a steamer for the purpose of avenging them ; but finding no longer any trace of the enemy, they committed an act of barbarity of which the American war fortunately

presents but few examples: Guyandotte was given up to the flames.

The other battle was fought on the 13th of December by General Milroy, who had succeeded Reynolds in command of the troops posted on Cheat Mountain. He resolved to renew the attack of his predecessor upon the entrenched camp of Buffalo Hill, which was occupied by Colonel E. Johnson with two thousand Confederates. Milroy had only three thousand men under his command. At daybreak on the 13th he arrived with two columns in front of Johnson's works. The first column was to attack them in front, and the second to prepare for this assault by carrying one of the enemy's batteries by a flank movement. The obstacles presented by the configuration of the ground retarded this manœuvre; and the attack of the first column, which had not waited for the preconcerted movement on the battery, was repulsed. It, however, succeeded in checking an offensive return movement on the part of the Confederates, who had come out of their entrenchments to take advantage of the check sustained by the Federals.

The second column, which had at last arrived in position, immediately renewed the fight, but without any better success. The front ranks gave way; the rest continued firing, without daring to advance; and soon Milroy, giving up his project, retraced his steps towards Cheat Mountain. This battle was a bloody one, each party having had about two hundred men disabled. An expedition which proceeded as far as Huntersville, where it destroyed some Confederate dépôts, compensated the Federals to a small extent for their double failure at Buffalo Hill.

The campaign was at an end; and Rosecrans, leaving only a few detachments behind to guard the advanced positions, brought back his main forces into the more populous region, where he found it less difficult to subsist them. This disconnected campaign—marked by accidental encounters and incomplete manœuvres, in which generals who, at a later period, were to display remarkable activity, remained for weeks in presence of each other without exchanging a shot—presents a striking example of the difficulties which paralyzed the ablest chiefs at the beginning of that war, which was so new to all. We shall find similar charac-

teristics in the operations of which Kentucky was the scene at the same period.

On the 7th of September the legislature of that State was apprised of the Confederate invasion by a message from the governor. That functionary, true to the cause of the South, instead of protesting against such violence, solicited authority to break up all assemblages of Union troops. But the two chambers answered him on the 12th by requesting the Federal government to protect Kentucky against the invaders, and by conferring the command of the home-guards upon General Anderson. That officer immediately took up his quarters at Louisville, to organize the militia assembled at Camp Joe Holt, in the neighborhood of that city, and which General Rousseau had already begun to drill. The conflict had commenced in Kentucky. One of the chiefs of the secession party, Mr. Morehead, was arrested in Louisville and sent to Fort Lafayette; the rest took refuge with the Confederate armies. Among them might be seen Mr. Breckinridge, Vice-President of the republic under Mr. Buchanan, a skilful and bold politician, but who, under the Confederate uniform, made but a poor general; Humphrey Marshall, the brilliant cavalry colonel of the Mexican war; finally, John Morgan, who was soon to make himself known as the bravest and most daring of guerilla chiefs.

While Anderson was assuming command of the troops entrusted to him, Buckner was preparing to inaugurate the campaign by a bold stroke. This was nothing less than to traverse the whole State of Kentucky by rail, so as to reach Louisville with a sufficient number of troops to take possession of that city and to hoist the Confederate flag on the banks of the Ohio. Such an attempt could only have been made amid the confusion created by late events and the uncertainty which still prevailed in all minds. It failed of success. Buckner's troops were put on several trains and proceeded northward, taking care to cut the telegraph as they advanced, and to stop every supply-train which they met. The railway employés, being without news, and finding the regular service interrupted, sent a locomotive on a reconnaissance, but it also fell into the hands of the Confederates. Fortunately, the fireman was able to escape, and, finding a hand-

car, returned to Louisville to announce the approach of the enemy. At the same time, a Bowling Green Unionist, seeing the trains arrive loaded with rebel troops, took up one of the rails from the track, thereby causing an accident which involved the loss of much precious time. General W. T. Sherman, whom we have already noticed in the Bull Run campaign, was sent by Anderson, with all the forces it was possible to collect, to meet the advance of the Confederates. Learning that his movements were known and that the enemy was on the watch for him, Buckner, who had already reached the suburbs of Elizabethtown, not far from the Ohio, halted and fell back upon Bowling Green, the garrison and fortifications of which he strengthened. Sherman, on his part, selected the neighborhood of Elizabethtown as a place of rendezvous for all the scattered elements which were soon to form the army of the Cumberland.

During this time, as we have stated, Zollicoffer was preparing to defend Eastern Tennessee by assuming the offensive, and invading Kentucky. On the 14th of September he occupied Cumberland Gap. At its foot lay the deep and extensive valley of the Cumberland River, which flows from east to west, and waters the whole of the south-eastern section of the State. Beyond it a chain of strong hills separates this valley from the numerous water-courses which run northward through a country which becomes gradually more and more level, and meet to form the Kentucky River, one of the tributaries of the Ohio. Zollicoffer, descending from Cumberland Gap on the 19th of September, dispersed a gathering of Union recruits at Barbourville, a large village situated at a point where the high road from Lexington crosses the Cumberland. He took up his quarters there, and occupied the whole upper valley of that river. In spite of his proclamations, his soldiers committed acts of depredation, which rendered them very unpopular in those districts which they pretended to free from Federal rule.

The Unionists therefore determined to dispute the possession of the country with them. Gathering around Colonel Garrard, a highly-esteemed chief, in Eastern Kentucky, they hastened to arm and organize. They had selected as their rallying-point a strong position in the centre of the disturbed district, which separates the

valley of the Cumberland from the vast and rich plain known by the name of the "blue-grass" region. The camp of Garrard, to which he had given the name of Wild Cat, was situated a little to the north of London, the first village to be met on the Lexington road after crossing the Cumberland at Barbourville. On leaving London the road forks; one branch, following the valley, runs westward towards Crab Orchard, Camp Dickson, and Frankfort; the other branch, which leads to Richmond and Lexington, rises upon the hills which skirt the valley, crosses Rockcastle Creek, and penetrates into another jumble of rocks (*massif*) called Big Hill. In the pass between London and Rockcastle Creek Wild Cat Camp was situated, surrounded by forests, flanked by scarpd rocks, and only approachable by narrow and tortuous roads, easy to defend, but surrounded by positions which must be occupied, and which required a numerous garrison. A ridge which commanded the camp to the east, at the south-east a mound (*mamelon*) called Round Hill, and two cliffs jutting out on the south like two bastions to the right and left of the London road, constituted the main features of these positions, which were separated from each other by deep ravines.

After one month of inactivity, Zollicoffer made an attempt to surprise the Federal camp, where no one ever expected to see him again. Garrard's force, consisting of the skeletons of three regiments, only numbered six hundred effective men, three hundred of them being in the hospital. Starting on the 12th or 13th of October with seven regiments and one battery, about three thousand men in all, Zollicoffer only arrived in front of the Federal positions on the 21st. Through his want of activity he lost the opportunity of taking Garrard unawares. The latter, having resolved to defend himself, even without reinforcements, was waiting with his small band for the arrival of a few regiments stationed in the "blue-grass" region, whom he had apprised of the approach of the enemy. If Zollicoffer had attacked him on the 20th, he would probably have obtained an easy victory; but General Schöpf, hastening during the night to respond to Garrard's call, arrived with two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry. The positions, which had previously only been guarded by advanced sentinels, were now strongly occupied; and when, on the

morning of the 21st, two Tennessee regiments advanced, full of confidence, to attack Round Hill, they met with a resistance they had not expected. Bravely advancing under fire, they made the defenders waver for an instant, but they were immediately rallied and soon recovered their advantage, driving the enemy back into the valley. A few hours after this first encounter the Federals received new reinforcements. They placed their artillery in position, and thus felt perfectly prepared. Towards two o'clock Zollicoffer renewed the attack on their right, and the fighting soon became general. The assailants were repulsed on every side, and their defeat cost them the more dear in proportion to the greater audacity they had displayed. On that very evening they retraced their steps towards the south.

But, shortly after, the Federals lost, through their own fault, all the advantages they had first obtained. In the first fortnight of November it was reported that a strong detachment had left Bowling Green and was proceeding eastward; General Schöpf, being under the impression that he was about to be turned, abandoned the positions he had lately so well defended, before an imaginary foe. While Zollicoffer was quietly resting in the valley of the Cumberland, and no Confederate troops were approaching Wild Cat Camp, the Federals were hastening away from that place by the Lexington road; and their retreat was so disorderly that if there had been an enemy in sight it might have been called a rout. In consequence of this panic a portion of the "blue-grass" region was abandoned to the guerillas of both camps.

In the mean while, from the early part of October the Federal authorities were preparing, east of Lexington, an expedition which was to penetrate into Western Virginia from Kentucky. The Confederates, although not sufficiently numerous to occupy the whole country, watched their adversaries closely, making up in activity for their want of numerical strength. But these hazardous tactics did not always prove successful; thus, on the 8th of October, three hundred of them were surprised at Hillsborough, Fleming county, by a small Federal detachment, which put them to flight, killing eleven, wounding twenty-nine, and capturing twenty-two men. The expedition, commanded by General Nelson, was to go up the Licking River, pass through Prestonburg

and Piketon (or Pikeville), to cross the Cumberland Mountains, and finally descend upon Lebanon in the valley of Clinch River, whence it could cut off the communications between Virginia and Tennessee. On the 24th of October its advance column, after a brief skirmish, took possession of the village of West Liberty, and on the 6th of November a column of about three thousand Federals occupied Prestonburg, on the Big Sandy. This tributary of the Ohio is navigable above Piketon, and thus afforded Nelson great facilities for revictualling his army. The Confederates had collected in haste about one thousand men, under Colonel Williams, for the purpose of covering Piketon, and especially the defile of Pound Gap in the Cumberland Mountains, a pass of the highest importance to them, for it was the entrance into a district of West Virginia whence they drew large supplies of salt and lead. Nelson was trying to surround Williams, so as to capture him, with all his troops, at Piketon. This very difficult manœuvre was then very popular with the American generals; and a newspaper correspondent who accompanied Nelson, affirming in advance the success of the movement, had the audacity to telegraph to the North that Williams had laid down his arms and surrendered with all his men. The public, still full of illusions, believed the report of this imaginary victory for two days. Nelson's expedition was to have more modest results. On the 7th of November he had sent one half of his forces northward, by way of John's Creek valley, lying parallel to that of Big Sandy, with instructions to fall back upon the latter, so as to take Pike-ton in rear. He set out himself on the 9th by the direct road which follows the Big Sandy; he had a march of forty kilometres to perform. But Williams was on his guard; carrying all his *matériel* and his *dépôts* towards Pound Gap, and sending a few skirmishers to detain the Federals upon John's Creek, he went, with seven hundred men, to meet Nelson, and waited for him at the Ivy Creek pass. The road, constructed like a cornice along the side of a steep mountain, made an abrupt turn at this point. Just as the head of the Federal column passed this turning, it received a murderous fire in front, while some troops posted on the other side of the river directed a heavy discharge of musketry upon its flank. Nelson's soldiers drew back in confusion before

this unexpected attack ; then, rallying, they carried the position where the Confederates were lying in ambush, at the cost of five killed and twenty-five wounded, but they were unable to reach Piketon until the morning of the 10th ; Williams, passing through that village after the fight at Ivy Creek, had evacuated it towards night, just in time to escape the Federal column, which was coming up by way of John's Creek to cut off his retreat. He left scarcely anything behind him, and went to take position at Pound Gap. His little band would not have been able to defend that position for any length of time ; but Nelson never came to attack it, and allowed himself to be overtaken by winter in Eastern Kentucky, without having done anything to continue the campaign. The Unionists of Eastern Tennessee, who were waiting for him and had been preparing to assist him, were unable to attempt any serious operations, and confined themselves to the task of destroying several railway bridges between Knoxville and Lynchburg. They thus exposed themselves to be severely dealt with by the Confederate government ; but they rendered at least an indirect service to their cause by keeping a certain number of rebel troops far away from the fields of battle.

The military events which occupied the end of the year 1861 in Central Kentucky are neither more important nor more decisive than those we have just related. Anderson had been replaced in his command by General Sherman. The comprehensive mind of this true soldier enabled him to understand at a glance how greatly above the resources at his disposal was the task imposed upon him, and he refused to undertake a partisan warfare (*petite guerre*) which could be productive of no results. He expressed his convictions with his usual precision, and without any regard for those illusions in which he did not participate. General L. Thomas having been sent by the Secretary of War to inspect his troops, he told that officer in positive terms that it would require sixty thousand men to subdue Kentucky, and two hundred thousand to conquer the Confederate armies between the Mississippi and the Alleghaues. Nobody would believe him, while many persons pronounced him crazy ; and shortly after, he was deprived of a command of which he was deemed unworthy. Before long he was to be gloriously avenged for this temporary injustice.

The troops which he had been constantly drilling and exercising had but a trifling encounter with the enemy. Several Federal detachments advanced by a forced march as far as the borders of Green River, below Bowling Green, and on the 29th of October they surprised the Confederate posts established there. One of these small bodies of troops entered Morgantown, almost without striking a blow, and destroyed the enemy's dépôts; another, crossing the river at Woodbury, put the garrison to flight after a brisk engagement fought among the houses of that village.

In the mean time, McClellan had succeeded Scott in the supreme command. One of his first acts was to send General Buell on the 4th of November to replace Sherman in Kentucky. Buell, who had previously commanded one of the new divisions of the army of the Potomac, was a strict and methodical officer, admirably fitted for training young soldiers, but too slow to handle them successfully in an active campaign. The resources which had been refused to Sherman were placed at his disposal. The number of regiments which the Western States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois furnished the Federal government increased every day. Most of these troops were forwarded to Buell, who soon found himself at the head of a considerable army. He resolved at last to take the offensive.

The Confederates, on their side, had not been inactive. General Sidney Johnston, already known by his campaign against the Mormons, had embraced their cause. He was invested with the supreme command over all the country extending from the Mississippi to the Alleghanies; he received numerous reinforcements from the West under Hardee, from Virginia under Floyd, and he set to work to occupy the whole southern section of Kentucky. General Hardee proceeded with all the disposable troops to occupy Bowling Green, which had become a vast entrenched camp. In that position he covered Zollicoffer to the eastward, who had taken position in the valley of the Cumberland, and to the westward Polk; who had just repulsed Grant's attack upon Belmont. Under the protection of this army the secessionists of Kentucky organized a new legislature, which was this time subservient to the wishes of Governor Magoffin, and voted for the annexation of their State to the Southern Confederacy.

Buell had massed at Elizabethtown an army of forty thousand men under the immediate command of General McCook, an officer of great energy and brother to the one we have seen serving under Rosecrans. At the same time, he sent General Mitchell to make a threatening demonstration against Zollicoffer on the borders of the Cumberland. McCook, following the railway, proceeded as far as Munfordsville, on Green River, after a trifling engagement with the outposts of the Confederate general Hindman, on the 4th of December, at Whippoorwill Bridge. The passage of the river delayed him for some time, but on the 16th the Union general, having at last constructed a bridge of boats, sent a German regiment to make a reconnaissance on the left bank. This force was attacked on the 17th by a party of mounted Texans, who rushed upon them with great impetuosity. The Federals kept their ground. They came to close fighting; and the Texans seemed on the point of gaining the victory, when their commander, Colonel Terry, was killed. Seeing that their adversaries were receiving reinforcements, the Texans withdrew, destroying the railway behind them. This battle, which closed the campaign, cost each belligerent about thirty men. Buell did not deem it advisable to go beyond Green River, and waited along its borders for a more favorable season. He was hesitating as to an attack on Bowling Green; we shall find that Grant, a few weeks later, by piercing the Confederate line along the Tennessee, spared him that trouble.

Before closing this chapter it behooves us to cast a glance along the banks of the Potomac, where the two principal hostile armies have been in presence of each other since the battle of Bull Run.

In a preceding chapter we have shown what efforts the North had made to repair that disaster by raising an army which was already formidable in point of numbers. We have pointed out the modes of proceeding resorted to in all the loyal States to raise regiments. A portion of these troops was destined to swell the armies of Missouri, Kentucky, and Western Virginia, but the necessity of covering the Federal capital concentrated around Washington the greatest portion of the men and *matériel* that the patriotic impulse of the Northern States had placed at Mr. Lin-

coln's disposal. General McClellan had undertaken to organize and shape the elements thus hastily collected, and to form them into an army capable of sustaining unbroken all the trials of an offensive campaign. No man in America was better able to accomplish this difficult task than he. His first care was to ensure the safety of Washington, and then to prepare the army of the Potomac for the part allotted to it by the drilling of recruits, forming regiments into divisions, the development of all the special services, and the creation of a sufficient *matériel*. From the day on which he assumed the command, immense labors were undertaken in order to convert the informal redoubts which had been erected on the right bank of the Potomac, into regular works. These labors had a double object. It was important, in the first place, to guard effectually against any sudden attack on the part of the Confederates, who might be able either to surprise one of these redoubts, or to slip between them under cover of the woods and spread confusion in the capital itself. It was necessary, above all, to inspire with confidence the remnants of McDowell's army and the new troops, whose imagination had been excited by fanciful descriptions of the battle of Bull Run. The sight of the fortifications which rose around Washington restored the equanimity which they so much needed in order to serve their apprenticeship before taking the field.

Seated on the left bank of the Potomac, at a point where the river is transformed into a broad estuary, the capital of the Union possesses the best surroundings for a vast entrenched camp. Its long avenues, traced in a straight line across immense spaces, which have been cleared to no purpose, are lined by a few houses; but the sandy wastes which the Capitol in its majestic isolation commands offered excellent grounds for encampments, dépôts, and military manœuvres. Elsewhere nature has done everything to beautify the valley of the Potomac. The river is skirted by two chains of hills, one to the north of Washington, at a short distance from the city; the other on the right bank, sloping gradually as it nears the little city of Alexandria. This range is composed of a succession of unconnected hillocks, covered with magnificent forests, and intersected by ravines, in which never-failing waters preserve a perpetual freshness. The clay soil is a little

hard under the pick, but may be formed into embankments which are almost indestructible, and the abundance of wood furnishes all the necessary materials for the rapid construction of powerful entrenchments. The only drawback is that the positions susceptible of being fortified are too numerous, and the space commanded by each is too restricted—circumstances which favor a great multiplication of defensive works.

During the months of August and September General McClellan was exclusively occupied with the construction of works, indispensable as a protection for his young troops, in case the enemy should come to give them battle in sight of Washington. It was necessary, on one hand, to protect the three bridges which connect the two banks of the Potomac in the vicinity of Washington—the suspension bridge above Georgetown, the canal bridge, situated a little lower down, and the Long Bridge, on piles, thrown across the estuary of the Potomac just in front of the capital. On the other hand, it was expedient to cover, more to the south, the little city of Alexandria, which derived great importance in consequence of its wharves built in deep water, and as the terminus of the Orange and Manassas Railway. It was a line thirty kilometres in length which he had to defend. Earthworks, some open and some closed at the gorge, were constructed along the prominent points of that line, and arranged to admit the field-pieces belonging to the troops encamped in the neighborhood. Vast *abattis* extended their field of fire and increased their defensive strength; breastworks for infantry were thrown up in the positions of secondary importance. All these works were executed by the soldiers, who showed themselves excellent trenchers, and directed by officers who, in the absence of special instructions, displayed considerable knowledge of civil engineering. A similar line of fortifications extended along the other side of the Potomac. The capital, thus protected on all sides, could defy any sudden attacks, and no longer feared to see its communications with Baltimore cut by hostile parties. At the end of one month these works were sufficiently advanced to ensure the safety of the seat of government. Three months after the battle of Bull Run they were nearly finished.

During this time General McClellan taxed his activity and his

methodical mind in organizing the army, whose strength increased daily. He began by restoring order in the streets of Washington, where were a disorderly crowd of recruits who had not rejoined their regiments, soldiers who had left theirs, and wagons of every description, which indifferently performed the service of supply-trains. Almost alone at the beginning to superintend everything, he sought everywhere for special officers capable of assisting him; his zeal was imparted to all his subordinates, and a fruitful diligence succeeded the fruitless agitation which had prevailed before his coming.

The instruction of recruits is nearly the same in every country. In America it was the more difficult because the ignorance of the officers equalled that of the soldiers. The new regiments on their arrival were encamped in the immediate vicinity of the city, and they were only formed into brigades after a certain period of preparation. The general-in-chief took care to assign them, as much as possible, to corps where the new comers found comrades already better instructed than themselves. The brigades, consisting of four regiments or battalions averaging eight hundred men each, were about three thousand two hundred strong. They were united, by threes, to form divisions of ten thousand men, to each of which was added a regiment of cavalry, three batteries of volunteer artillery, and one from the regular army. All the branches of the administrative service were reorganized, and so constituted as to meet the wants of the large army which was thus being formed of all three parts. The *matériel* which reached Washington from the ports and manufacturing cities of the Union was so classified as to simplify matters more and more. Constant inspections by the general himself and his aides-de-camp ensured a strict performance of his orders and hastened the completion of the work he had imposed upon each individual.

Three months were thus spent. The active operations which took place during that period were so trifling that a few words will suffice to describe them, but the country which was their theatre plays so important a part in the course of this history, that it is proper to give once for all a description of it. The confluence of the Shenandoah and the Potomac at Harper's Ferry doubles the volume of the latter river, whose deep and rapid waters form, in a

strategic point of view, a considerable obstacle. Its course is obstructed by various falls, but a canal along the right bank affords facilities to navigation which the river itself does not offer. In approaching Washington the Potomac widens and feels the effects of the tide; it is transformed into a long and deep estuary, to which it gives its name. The navigation of this branch of the sea, called the Lower Potomac, begins at Alexandria. While the river pursues a south-eastwardly course, the estuary runs due south from Washington to a point called Aquia Creek. Turning abruptly to the north-east to cover the lower promontory, called Mathias Point, it afterwards resumes the original south-eastwardly direction, and finally empties into the inland sea called Chesapeake Bay. The Potomac crosses the chain of the Blue Ridge at Harper's Ferry, which on the Virginia side is called Loudoun Heights, and which extends into Pennsylvania under the name of Maryland Heights and South Mountain. A little more to the eastward there is a chain of hills running parallel to the Blue Ridge, but much less elevated, known by the names of Bull Run and Catoctin Mountains. All the country through which the Potomac flows beyond the gorges formed by this latter chain resembles the neighborhood of Washington; small hills, lying close to each other, of equal height, separated by deep and often marshy ravines, unimportant water-courses, immense woods intersected by clearings where corn and tobacco are cultivated, valleys of moderate breadth affording rich pasture-grounds, very few villages, and a large number of isolated farms,—impart to this country an agreeable but monotonous aspect. Below Washington, the tributaries of the Lower Potomac, each forming a small estuary at its mouth, separate both sides of the river from this arm of the sea. The Federal capital, situated at a distance of eighty kilometres in a direct line from Harper's Ferry and sixty-five from Aquia Creek, thus stands at the summit of an obtuse angle, of which the river and the estuary form the containing sides. The districts situated below Aquia Creek are so intersected with creeks and swamps that a large army could not operate there, while beyond Mathias Point the Lower Potomac increases so much in width that its navigation cannot be intercepted.

At Manassas the Confederates occupied a central position,

which placed them about fifteen kilometres nearer to Harper's Ferry on one side, and to Aquia Creek on the other, than the Federal troops quartered at Washington. This was an advantage both in an offensive and defensive point of view. They thought of nothing, however, but fortifying themselves. The Richmond government, which, to arouse the enthusiasm of its adherents, announced the early invasion of the free States, was well aware that the army of Beauregard, notwithstanding the reinforcements it had received, was not in a condition to attempt such an enterprise. It concealed this inability under the pretext of strong political reasons. Not being able to assist the secessionists of Maryland, it accused them of lukewarmness. While the pickets alone were pushed forward in sight of Washington, the main body of the Confederate army remained at Manassas, where it could easily obtain supplies, and at Centreville, the solitary hillock of which had been encircled by earthworks of considerable strength.

On the right it was covered by the Occoquan River, of which Bull Run is one of the tributaries, and further on small posts placed *en echelon* along the Lower Potomac were to prevent all attempts at landing. At Aquia Creek a brigade was in direct communication with Richmond by way of Fredericksburg. Between the mouth of the Occoquan and Alexandria, on a hill which overlooks the course of the Potomac, and from which the dome of the Capitol may be seen, stands Mount Vernon, a dwelling at once modest and famous, where Washington lived and died. By a strange coincidence, the residence of the great citizen whose name both parties were invoking, and whose memory each was anxious to appropriate, was situated precisely between the two lines of outposts, as if he had hesitated between them, or was still endeavoring to reconcile them. To the left, the Confederate scouts showed themselves on the bank of the Potomac, from the vicinity of the suspension bridge to the defiles of the Katocktin Mountains. On the eastern slope of these hills, at a distance of ten or twelve kilometres from the Potomac, they occupied the little city of Leesburg, situated at the extremity of the main road, for which the suspension bridge was constructed. Finally, the troops which Johnston had left in the valley of Virginia, rein-

forced by new levies, were now under the command of Jackson, who had just given proofs of his military abilities at Bull Run. They occupied Winchester, and pushed their outposts as far as the border of the Potomac, near Martinsburg, and the half-burnt village of Harper's Ferry. Great activity prevailed both at Richmond and at Manassas.

In the capital of the new Confederacy, Mr. Davis and his associates were busy in organizing all the parts of the central administration for the conduct of the war, in establishing vast manufactories, in collecting the necessary *matériel* for the armies, in assembling and drilling recruits, and in forwarding to Manassas all they had available in men, arms, horses, and provisions. Notwithstanding these efforts, they could not increase their army as rapidly as Mr. Lincoln could; but they succeeded for a long time in concealing this growing inferiority from their adversaries—an unnecessary trouble, however, for the latter had no intention of attacking them.

The fatal impatience of the North, which had caused the disaster of the 21st of July, had been succeeded by a settled determination to submit to every sacrifice necessary to ensure success. Men were not only sent by hundreds of thousands, and money by hundreds of millions, but the young general who was then in the full enjoyment of public confidence was no longer begrudged the expenditure of time—that auxiliary, the value of which the Americans understand so well. During three months the great nation which looked to him for safety thought of nothing but to aid him in his efforts, and to place in his hands the most powerful means of action, without embarrassing, by a single criticism or a solitary word of impatience, the work of organization to which he had entirely devoted himself. Never, perhaps, was a citizen of a free State entrusted with such a complete *carte-blanche*. No co-operation was refused him. President Lincoln delighted in those days in going to talk strategy with him. His superior officer, General Scott, who regarded him as his pupil, thwarted him in nothing. His inferiors unanimously submitted to his authority without a murmur, while McDowell considered it an honor to serve under his orders.

The strength of the army was quintupled without extending

the circle of the positions it occupied around Washington more than a few kilometres. In proportion as the brigades and divisions were formed, they were posted closely upon the right bank of the river, and all the hills around were soon covered with encampments, picturesquely laid out under the lofty trees of the forest, or among the clearings. Patterson having been deprived of his command in consequence of his inaction in July, the defence of the Upper Potomac was entrusted by McClellan to General Banks, and the troops remaining in that district formed a division under his orders. Well aware that if the Confederates debouched from the valley of Virginia into Maryland and Pennsylvania, they could not advance so long as he was on their flank, McClellan gave up the idea of defending the Potomac above the point of its confluence with the Shenandoah. He had, therefore, brought back Banks's division into the valley of the Monocacy, a tributary of the right bank of the Potomac, which runs along the eastern slope of the Catoctin. The main body of that division occupied the central point of Frederick, and by means of extended posts, watched a part of the Potomac in the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry and the crest of the Blue Ridge. It was thus able to defend the mountain passes against any enemy who should venture to make a descent upon Baltimore and Washington, or threaten its rear if it advanced towards Pennsylvania. Shortly afterwards, Stone's division, lately organized, made a connection with Banks at Washington, by taking a position at Poolesville, on the road leading from the capital to the mouth of the Monocacy. On the left, to watch the Lower Potomac, a division, also new, was sent under General Hooker to take position among the almost impenetrable forests which border that arm of the sea on the Maryland side. This division was encamped on some high hills, from which it could see the bivouac fires of the enemy, from which it was separated by an insurmountable obstacle.

The two armies, thus situated, could only be disturbed in their inaction by accidents or by insignificant encounters. Banks's advanced posts, taking advantage of low water in the month of August, frequently crossed the Potomac to reconnoitre the Virginia side below Harper's Ferry. They exchanged a few shots

with the enemy on the 5th and 12th of August, in the vicinity of the Catoctin River and the village of Lovettsville, and each time brought back a few prisoners. One month later, September 11th, one of the new brigades of the army of the Potomac, commanded by General Smith, who was encamped on the right side of the river near the suspension bridge, was sent to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Lewinsville, a village situated between the two hostile lines of outposts. The object of this movement was to teach the inexperienced soldiers of General Smith to march and scout in presence of the enemy, to make topographical drawings of a district of which there was no correct map in existence, and to prevent the enemy from obtaining supplies in it. Having been informed of this movement, the Confederate general Stuart, who was then in command of the outposts on that side, started with a regiment of infantry, a detachment of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, for the purpose of surprising the Federals, whose force consisted of two thousand men and six guns. He deemed it more prudent, however, to attack them from a distance, and the fire of his artillery threw at first some confusion into their ranks. But the Federal guns soon obtained the advantage, and without coming to closer quarters both parties retired, each on his own side, with trifling losses.

Sometimes it was the Confederates who assumed the offensive; as, for instance, on the 15th of September a detachment of their cavalry, numbering about four hundred and fifty horses, boldly crossed the Potomac and came in turn to attack the Federal posts near Darnestown, between Poolesville and Rockville; but it was repulsed, and left about a dozen wounded behind.

Two months had elapsed since the battle of Bull Run. The Confederate chiefs, in view of the increase of the Federal forces at Washington, could no longer entertain the idea of an offensive campaign. The ardor with which they had fired the South, by pushing their outposts in sight of the capital, had swelled the number of their soldiers; the result which they had sought was accomplished. These outposts, having ventured very far from the main army, were then drawn back. On the 27th of September they evacuated a small work situated on an isolated height called Munson's Hill, which soldiers in the Union army were in the

habit of pointing out from a distance to visitors and journalists, who came from the North to say that they had seen the enemy. The Federals entered the work on the following day, and afterwards successively took possession of the villages of Lewinsville, Vienna, and even Fairfax Court-house, on the 9th, 16th, and 17th of October. In the absence of more important military events, this movement, which had not cost a drop of blood, was made the subject of comment in the North, both by the press and the public, for several weeks. McClellan contented himself, nevertheless, with extending his positions, and laying out a plan for a new line of works two or three kilometres in advance of the old one. He thus left a space between the two armies which was to render their encounters still rarer than before.

The inaction which fortified his position above and around Washington was soon, however, the means of causing him a great deal of trouble on the Lower Potomac. The line of railway not being sufficient to transport all the supplies intended for Washington, part of that service was performed by water. From the time that a large army had begun to collect in that city the Lower Potomac was ploughed by a considerable number of sailing-vessels coming from Baltimore, Havre-de-Grace, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, carrying, at reduced prices, the *matériel* of war and the necessary provisions for the military and civil population of the capital. The Confederates, being masters of all the right bank, resolved to balk their operations. The wooded hills which rise along the borders of the Lower Potomac afforded excellent positions for intercepting the navigation of that arm of the sea. They erected earthworks, in some of which they placed navy guns, whilst others were prepared to receive field-pieces. Towards the middle of September they began by firing a few shells upon the vessels that were coming up the Potomac, and a fortnight after, their batteries were so well posted between the mouth of the Occoquan and Mathias Point, that merchant-vessels dared no longer to brave them, and navigation was almost entirely suspended. It was not long before the capital began to suffer for want of provisions; the trains engaged in the transportation service of the government encumbered the railroad, and the price of all commodities was immediately raised. The material damage

was not great, but this partial blockade of the capital was regarded in the North as a new humiliation, and for the first time General McClellan was taken to task. These reproaches were unjust. It was impossible to prevent the Confederates from erecting batteries along a coast eighty kilometres in length, of which they were absolute masters. The war flotilla, stationed on the waters of the Potomac, could act as a police force, intercept all communications between the two banks, protect merchant-vessels against sudden attacks, throw shells into one and another of the enemy's works, but it could not entirely silence batteries the armament of which it was always easy for the Confederates to renew. In order to break up the blockade it would have been necessary to effect the military occupation of the right bank of the Lower Potomac; but such an operation could not be undertaken with an arm of the sea in the rear and the whole of the enemy's army encamped at Manassas in front. To break the blockade of the Potomac, therefore, depended upon the retreat of that army, and could only be an incident in the new campaign which was being prepared.

Everything seemed to indicate to the Federals that the moment for undertaking this campaign had at last arrived. We have stated that by the end of September the Confederates were concentrated around Centreville and Manassas. Their outposts, wherever they had been maintained, appeared ready to fall back, and the lukewarmness they exhibited on the occasion of a trifling engagement at Harper's Ferry encouraged McClellan to draw his lines closer upon his adversaries. A detachment of Geary's brigade, which guarded the Potomac in front of Harper's Ferry, had crossed the river on the 8th of October a little above that village, and taken possession of a few mills from which the enemy had procured considerable supplies. The Confederate general Eyans, who was at Leesburg with his brigade, having sent a few troops to worry that detachment, Geary crossed the Potomac and posted himself, with six hundred men and a few pieces of artillery, at Harper's Ferry, to cover the retreat of the soldiers who were carrying back the flour taken from the mill. On the 16th he was preparing to recross the river, when the Confederates attacked him. At a distance of four kilometres from Harper's Ferry his outposts

were stationed along a ridge called Bolivar Heights, which commands the approaches to that village, and extends from the Potomac to the Shenandoah. The Confederates took possession of it without any difficulty, and began to cannonade the Federals posted on a plateau extending from the foot of the hill to a point above Harper's Ferry, while one of their batteries, placed on Loudoun Heights, on the other side of the Shenandoah, took them in flank. Geary's soldiers made a brave resistance. At last the detachment which had left the mill in the morning, and recrossed the Potomac, came to their assistance, and, following the line of the Shenandoah, turned the extreme right of the Confederates. Geary, who until then had contented himself with repulsing the charges of Ashby's cavalry, took the offensive in turn, and ascending the hill under the fire of the enemy, drove him back in disorder to the other side. The Confederates were not able to rally, and they left in the hands of the Federals a few prisoners, a large amount of arms and ammunition, and a gun of heavy calibre. Geary, satisfied with a success which had only cost him about a dozen men, returned to the left bank of the river in the evening.

It was now the middle of October; the oppressive heat of summer had been succeeded by those lovely autumnal days in which a peculiar haze like a thin smoke marks the early hours—days calm and balmy, followed by nights marvellously bright and clear. At that season, known by the name of Indian summer, the dryness renders the worst roads passable, and reduces the streams to their smallest volume. Three months of labor had brought forth their fruits; a line of fortifications, all capable of sustaining a siege and connected by great military roads, surrounded Washington, affording an efficient protection to the capital. The forts on the right side of the river were nearly all armed, and their garrisons had been designated. General McClellan had at last seven strong divisions on the right bank of the Potomac and four on the left. The former, commanded respectively by Generals McCall, Smith, Fitz John Porter, McDowell, Blenker, Franklin, and Heintzelmann, were encamped, in the order in which we have enumerated them, along the line of defence from the suspension bridge to Alexandria. The others, under Generals Banks, Stone, Keyes, and Hooker, were stationed *en echelon* in the valley of the Monoc-

acy at Poolesville, near Georgetown, and along the Lower Potomac. The regular infantry, several regiments not formed into brigades and several brigades not formed into divisions, occupied Washington. On the 15th of October, these troops, including the garrisons of Baltimore and Annapolis, presented a total force of one hundred and fifty-two thousand fifty-four men, of whom, after deducting nine thousand sick, one thousand unfit for service, and eight thousand absentees, there remained one hundred and thirty-three thousand two hundred and one, ready for active service, together with two hundred and twenty-eight field-pieces. General McClellan deemed it expedient to leave thirty-five thousand men and forty cannon in Washington, ten thousand men and twelve cannon in Baltimore and Annapolis, five thousand men and twelve cannon on the Upper Potomac, and eight thousand men with twenty-four cannon on the Lower Potomac. He found himself, therefore, at the head of a perfectly available force of seventy-five thousand men and one hundred and forty guns. These troops were thoroughly equipped, well armed, and provided with sufficient means of transportation. There was doubtless something in their bearing which struck the practiced eye unfavorably; doubtless also they did not present that compactness and precision of movement which long practice in manœuvring can alone impart to an army, but it seemed as if henceforth they only required some practical experience in warfare to improve greatly. The people of the North were waiting with great anxiety, and a degree of impatience difficult to control, for the first movement of that army to which such vast interests had been entrusted.

Unfortunately, General McClellan, besides the very natural anxiety he felt on account of the inexperience of his troops, singularly overrated the strength and discipline of those of Johnston, who had superseded Beauregard in the command of the Confederate army—the army of Northern Virginia. He had given to that army a total force of one hundred and fifty thousand men, whereas, in reality, on the 31st of October it only numbered sixty-six thousand two hundred and forty-three men in all, of whom only forty-four thousand one hundred and thirty-one were present in the field. One-third of this army was composed of non-combatants, sick men disabled by change of climate,

and especially absentees without leave. The number of these last mentioned was sufficient to show that the Federal general was equally mistaken in regard to the discipline of his adversaries, who, while full of ardor on the battle-field, submitted with great reluctance to the regular life and monotonous duties of the camp. Nevertheless, the movement in retreat indicated by the enemy decided him to feel the ground upon which he was probably about to undertake a fall campaign.

On the 19th of October he placed the three divisions forming his right wing on the other side of the Potomac under arms, and made them reconnoitre the whole line in front of them. Only some cavalry pickets were found, and it was ascertained that the enemy was nowhere in force in front of Centreville. McCall, who was at the extreme right, advanced along the road parallel to the river; and placing two of his brigades *en echelon*, in order to cover his communications, he passed through the village of Drainesville with the third, proceeding as far as within fifteen miles of Leesburg, while his staff officers were engaged in making a sketch of the country. McClellan justly thought that he had gone too far, and fearing lest he should expose his flank to an attack on the part of the Confederates posted at Centreville, ordered him to fall back as far as Drainesville. But struck with the absence of the enemy in that direction, and deceived by a false report from Banks, he concluded that the Confederates had no intention of defending Leesburg. He wished to assure himself of the fact, without, however, bringing on a battle for the possession of that eccentric point, or placing McCall's column in a dangerous position between the enemy and a deep river. With this object in view, on the evening of the 19th he ordered Stone, who was guarding the Potomac in front of Leesburg, to watch the movements of the Confederates on the opposite bank, and, if necessary, to accelerate their retreat by a slight demonstration. In the same despatch he informed him that McCall had gone beyond Drainesville without seeing the enemy, and that strong reconnaissances would be made all along the line.

Stone's skirmishers occupied a long island on the Potomac called Harrison's Island, situated as far up as Leesburg. This island lies under the south bank of the river, which rises and

forms the cliffs of Ball's Bluff, the precipitous acclivities of which are nearly twenty metres high. At the upper extremity of the island there is a crossing called Conrad's Ferry, and a few kilometres below the lower extremity, fronting the mouth of Goose Creek, the crossing called Edward's Ferry. Conformably to the instructions he had received, Stone made some feints to induce the enemy to show his strength. Six regiments, under General Gorman, were sent to Edward's Ferry, and the greatest portion of a brigade, temporarily commanded by Colonel Baker, was collected at Conrad's Ferry. In the afternoon of the 20th Gorman made a show of embarking, and in the evening he sent a few mounted men across the river, while a party of skirmishers, crossing the stream in front of Harrison's Island, climbed up the acclivities of Ball's Bluff. The latter proceeded as far as the outskirts of Leesburg without finding any trace of the enemy; but, deceived by the reflection of moonlight upon an orchard, they mistook the surrounding objects for an encampment, and reported back that the imaginary enemy was very carelessly guarded.

This report, trifling in itself, was the origin of a succession of blunders, which were eventually the cause of a serious disaster to the Federals. Stone, convinced that the enemy was not in force at Leesburg, thought he might make a demonstration in that direction corresponding with those which McClellan had mentioned in his despatch, and thus take possession of that town without involving himself in a serious engagement. He ordered Colonel Devens, who occupied Harrison's Island with the Fifteenth Massachusetts, to cross the river above Ball's Bluff, to proceed as far as Leesburg and surprise the enemy's camp, while the Twentieth of the same State, under Colonel Lee, should take its place on the island, and he authorized Baker either to support Devens with the rest of his brigade or to recall him, abandoning Ball's Bluff, according to circumstances. At the same time, a few companies of the Gorman brigade crossed the Potomac at Edward's Ferry to make a similar reconnaissance on the banks of Goose Creek. Stone thereby transcended the instructions of McClellan. His imprudence was aggravated by the evident insufficiency of his means for crossing the river. The waters, which had risen very high during the last week, rendered that operation extremely dif-

ficult. In order to cross the two arms of the Potomac at Harrison's Island the Federals had only one flat-boat, capable of carrying about forty men, two barges, each of which would hold about thirty, and a small iron launch. Nor were they better provided at Edward's Ferry, whither Stone had repaired in person, leaving the entire control of the movements at Conrad's Ferry to Baker.

Devens, having crossed the Potomac with a portion of his regiment during the night, advanced, early in the morning of October 21st, upon Leesburg, at the head of four or five hundred men, and reached the point which had been reconnoitred on the previous day without meeting a single adversary. He had, however, before him a powerful and vigilant enemy, who was watching his every step, and who was preparing to punish him for his rashness. Evans, who had already given evidence of his military skill at the battle of Bull Run, had been on his guard since the occupation of Drainesville by McCall. Having transferred all his *matériel* into the woods, he had concealed himself, with his three thousand men, in the village of Leesburg; and when at last Devens approached, he sallied out to meet him. But being ignorant of the strength of the Federals, he attacked them very cautiously, and after a brief engagement allowed them to fall back upon Ball's Bluff without harassing them. The reconnaissance was finished even before the skirmish had revealed the presence of the enemy, and all the Federal detachments should immediately after have been brought back from the other side of the river. But at that moment General Stone, who had just witnessed the passage of a portion of Gorman's brigade at Edward's Ferry, full of confidence in the success of his manœuvre, sent the Twentieth Massachusetts to Ball's Bluff, together with the detachment of the Fifteenth which had remained at Harrison's Island. At the same time he gave the fatal order to Devens to wait on the right side of the river for these reinforcements. It was eight o'clock in the morning. Evans, not supposing that the Federals could have committed the imprudence of throwing a few hundred men on the Virginia shore without the means of reinforcing them or of promptly withdrawing them, was advancing cautiously. In the mean time, Colonel Baker had arrived with

his regiment at Conrad's Ferry, and had assumed the command conferred upon him by the instructions of Stone. A senator from Oregon and a personal friend of Mr. Lincoln, an orator of talent and respected by all for his nobility of character, Baker was an officer as brave as he was inexperienced. Learning that Devens had exchanged a few shots with the enemy, his only thought was to renew the fight and to mass as many men as possible on the right bank of the river, without troubling himself about the means of retreat in case of a reverse.

On the top of the cliff of Ball's Bluff there is a clearing a little less than a kilometre in length, following the course of the river, and from four to five hundred metres in width. It is surrounded on three sides by thick woods; the fourth, overlooking the Potomac, is formed by the crest of the steep acclivity which slopes down to the shore. Nothing intervenes between the foot of this acclivity, which is thickly covered with copse-wood, and the rapid waters of the stream below, but a kind of *banquette* twenty metres wide. It was impossible to select a worse place for landing. The troops, having reached the clearing after a perilous ascent, found themselves without protection and surrounded by woods which concealed the approach of the enemy. The precipitous character of the acclivity did not admit of falling back in good order as far as the river, while the impossibility of effecting a rapid embarkation would doom those detained on its banks to certain disaster.

To establish himself without danger in that position, Baker should at least have possessed a sufficient number of boats and been able to convey with rapidity all his forces from one side of the river to the other. But as we have stated, he had only three boats at his disposal for this important service. Stone, in allowing him entire freedom of action, had not troubled himself about the matter, and had even aggravated that fault by his inconsiderate zeal. The crossing of three guns, which he sent to Ball's Bluff, with their horses, also occasioned much loss of time, and diminished by several hundreds the number of combatants whom he might have massed in season on the right side of the river.

In the mean while, Evans, who had been advancing with great caution, at last reached the line occupied by Devens's five com-

panies in advance of the clearing at Ball's Bluff about two o'clock. His brigade, numbering about three thousand two hundred men, consisted of the Eighth Virginia and the Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Mississippi. This last regiment was directed upon the extreme right in order to attack the Federals in flank. The first two regiments charged Devens and drove his little band back upon the rest of the Federals, who were posted in the clearing. At the sound of cannon Baker crossed the river without leaving any officer to superintend the embarkation of his soldiers, which was, therefore, effected amid the greatest confusion. At Ball's Bluff he found about one thousand nine hundred men crowded in a narrow space, without any means of deploying, and forming an irregular line, having behind it almost everywhere the abrupt edge of the cliff. The combat was vigorously engaged along the centre and right of his troops when he arrived, about three o'clock in the afternoon. The Confederates were superior in numbers, full of ardor, well handled, and protected by the woods, which concealed their movements and kept their reserves out of sight. The Federals, however, made at first a good resistance, and their artillery, which was well served, inflicted some losses upon the assailants. But these inexperienced soldiers, who had never been under fire with their officers, began to feel disconcerted on beholding the ravages caused in their ranks by the fire of the Confederates. Most of the cannoneers had been wounded, and the guns were silent for want of men to serve them. A few officers made an effort to manœuvre them. Baker himself, who sought the post of danger, and who, not knowing how to command, could at least risk his person fearlessly, joined them in the attempt; but it soon became necessary to drag the guns by hand back to the edge of the acclivity. After an hour's fight, disorder began to show itself among the Federals. The many wounded were joined by a still larger number of fugitives, who accompanied them to the river, and tried to get on board the boats which were to convey them back to the island. The officers, who had been obliged to expose themselves rashly in order to set an example to their soldiers, fell in great numbers. Baker was killed almost at the cannon's mouth (*à bout portant*) just as he was endeavoring to hold a portion of his line which

was on the point of breaking. On the Confederate right the Eighteenth Mississippi had commenced the action, and threatened the left flank of the Federals. The latter had found some shelter in a narrow edge of wood, which, skirting the forest to the southward, prolonged it for a distance of about one hundred metres; the open space between them also separated the combatants.

Baker was killed at four o'clock; the Federals were evidently beaten. Colonel Cogswell, upon whom the command devolved, tried to extricate them by falling back with his left upon Edward's Ferry along the river, where he would have found reinforcements. But just as he was stripping his right for the purpose of effecting this movement the soldiers who occupied the piece of wood on the left imprudently came out; a well-sustained fire threw them into confusion, and the Confederates took advantage of their disorderly condition to seize the position they vacated. All retreat was now cut off on that side. Only a handful of men continued to offer any resistance at the top of the acclivity, which their comrades were descending in great haste. A final charge of the Eighth Virginia drove them, in turn, into that abyss, where further struggle was impossible. One of the cannon, which was flung from the summit of the cliff, rolled down to the water's edge and was broken in pieces. The battle was ended. The Confederates had nothing to do but to complete their victory by firing upon opponents who were no longer able to retaliate. The crowd of fugitives clung to the brushwood which covered the acclivities of Ball's Bluff, and, finding no shelter, sought their last chance of safety in the only boat which remained moored to the shore. The other two, which were filled with wounded men, were already far off, and being overloaded, as is always the case under such circumstances, soon sank with all those who were congratulating themselves upon having been able to get on board. A large number of officers and soldiers threw themselves into the river to cross by swimming. Most of these were drowned, and a few were killed by the balls of the enemy, who pursued them without mercy. Some, however, succeeded in reaching Harrison's Island and even the other side of the Potomac; among the latter was Colonel Devens. At last darkness came to put an end to that scene of horror; it enabled some of the fugitives to hide

near the shore or to slip into the woods out of reach of the victors. The disaster was complete; out of one thousand nine hundred Federals who had landed at Ball's Bluff, scarcely eight hundred recrossed the Potomac; they left behind them two hundred and twenty-three dead, two hundred and fifty wounded, more than five hundred prisoners, and their three guns. Their commander and most of the officers were either killed or in the hands of the enemy.

The Confederates, proud of their success, but astonished at its importance, encamped on the heights they had so bravely won; their loss amounted to about three hundred men, one hundred and fifty-three of whom were killed; among the latter was the colonel of the Eighteenth Mississippi. In the mean while, great confusion prevailed among the Federals, who expected to be attacked at Harrison's Island and at Edward's Ferry. Part of the Gorman brigade occupied the right bank of the Potomac at the last-mentioned point; on being apprised of Baker's defeat, Stone made preparations for bringing his troops back to the left bank. But in the middle of the night the movement was countermanded by McClellan, and the whole brigade crossed into Virginia. Towards four o'clock in the afternoon of the 22d, this brigade, numbering about four thousand men, was attacked by a portion of Evans's forces. The latter had proceeded as far as Goose Creek, in the hope of meeting with some isolated detachments which he could still crush; but having discovered that he had to deal with an adversary superior in numbers, he lost no time in retiring. On the 23d McClellan went to visit Stone's troops, which had been so cruelly tried, and gave them the encouragement of which they stood in need. But being convinced that he could not undertake any serious operation in that part of his line, he brought back into Maryland all the troops which still occupied the right bank of the Potomac.

The simple narrative of the Ball's Bluff disaster has demonstrated its causes—the point selected for the landing of troops, the imprudence which ventured two thousand men beyond a river without any possible means of retreat, the tardiness which enabled the enemy to reconnoitre its movements and to strike a vigorous blow. The discussion of these causes gave rise to bitter and end-

less recriminations; indeed, everybody concerned was deserving of blame. In his instructions McClellan had allowed too great a latitude to Stone, by directing him to keep a watch over Leesburg, which could not have been done without crossing the Potomac; he should perhaps have more thoroughly impressed on his mind the isolation in which any troops sent to operate on the right borders of the river would find themselves. The errors committed by Stone were more serious; putting too much faith in the reports of his scouts, he persuaded himself that a demonstration would be sufficient to cause the evacuation of Leesburg, and he combined all the movements of his troops as if he were sure of being able to occupy that town. After having given Baker the option of either withdrawing his detachments from Ball's Bluff or of following them with the rest of his brigade, he formally approved his action in adopting the latter course. On being informed that there were nearly four thousand Confederates between Leesburg and the two thousand men of Baker, he gave himself no uneasiness on account of the latter, but merely pointed out to them the means of pursuing the enemy, instead of guarding against his attack, as he should have done. The despatch of Stone in which he approved of the crossing of the river only became known some time after Baker's death, and by a chance which was truly providential. That unfortunate officer had placed the despatch inside of his cap; one of his officers, who picked up Baker's body, found the despatch; it was stained with blood, Baker having been shot in the head. He made a copy of the despatch, which he sent to Baker's family, before transmitting the original to the War Department, where it was buried in oblivion. The publication of the copy of the despatch so fortunately recovered for Baker's memory put a stop to most of the severe criticisms which had been the more readily made against him because he was not able to reply to them; it could not, however, entirely exonerate him. Indeed, he executed, without having received formal instructions, an operation contrary to all the principles of war, the dangers attending which, had he been more experienced, he ought to have been better able to appreciate than any one else; anxious to distinguish himself in behalf of a cause he had espoused with the zeal of a martyr, he atoned by a glorious

death for the error he had committed, but he could not repair it. There are few men capable of such devotion ; and one who blames them for a technical error must at the same time pay due homage to their valor. Baker's subordinates were also themselves to blame for not having made a more thorough reconnaissance, and for having allowed the enemy to come upon them without even suspecting his approach ; they thus lost the last chance of recrossing the river in good order.

We have dwelt upon the causes which brought on the defeat of the Federals because the effect of that disaster was deeply felt among them. The soldiers of the army of the Potomac understood that their comrades had been the victims of misunderstandings among their commanders ; the latter no longer possessed that entire confidence in their management of the army which is everywhere the first element of success ; and General McClellan, for his part, caught the first glimpse of many difficulties which he had not suspected before. It was the first time that he had put his hand to the tiller, and the cumbrous vessel had not obeyed the helm as the pilot had expected.

Congress itself was affected by the rout of Ball's Bluff. A committee formed for the purpose of watching the military operations, and of which we shall have to speak hereafter, made it the subject of a long investigation, which resulted in the sacrifice of General Stone to appease the dissatisfied public. This officer, who had shown great determination of purpose during the early stages of the rebellion, when he found himself alone in Washington with his company of regulars, was accused of being in communication with the enemy. His tolerance, perhaps exaggerated, for the rebel inhabitants of Maryland, was charged against him before the committee, and on a certain day he was arrested by order of the Secretary of War, and secretly confined in Fort Lafayette. He was kept there like a forgotten man for six months ; the committee pretended to be ignorant of his arrest, which was not justified by any conclusive evidence ; no written order of the Secretary of War concerning him has been discovered ; and General McClellan, being absorbed by other cares, or thinking probably that this subordinate, against whom he had himself signed the order of arrest, deserved such severe

punishment, did not deem it proper to interest himself in his behalf.

The check of Ball's Bluff cut short all the projects for the campaign which the organization of the army, the season, and the condition of the ground seemed to impose on General McClellan. That incident satisfied his mind as to the false estimate he had formed of the strength of his adversary; notwithstanding the reports of all the reconnoitring parties he had sent out on the 20th, who had not seen the enemy in force anywhere, he did not dare to put his army in motion, and thus lost the best opportunity he ever had of beginning a successful and decisive campaign.

Other duties were soon added to those appertaining to the command of the army of the Potomac, which, by absorbing his whole activity, diverted his attention for a time from those plans of campaign for the execution of which the public was waiting so impatiently. On the 31st of October General Scott, urged by numerous solicitations, and himself convinced that he had arrived at an age which required rest, tendered his resignation; and on the following day General McClellan, without, however, receiving a new grade, was invested by the President with the chief command of all the armies of the republic. From that moment he applied himself to the task of combining the movements of those armies, and determined not to put that of the Potomac in motion until the organization of all the forces entrusted to his care should be sufficiently advanced to enable him to undertake offensive operations on all points at once.

Halleck was sent to St. Louis to prepare for the campaign on the banks of the Missouri, and Sherman was set aside to give place to General Buell, in whom his friend McClellan placed entire confidence. The fine weather, which that year continued for an extraordinary length of time, in vain seemed to invite the Federals to emerge from their long inaction on the borders of the Potomac. The end of the year on that side was only marked by insignificant encounters. The Confederates having once more taken possession of Fairfax Court-house after the affair of Ball's Bluff, a patrol of cavalry crossed swords with them, on the 17th of November, in the neighborhood of that village; both sides came out of the encounter with only a few wounded, and

on the 26th another party had a similar engagement at Drainsville.

A month later this village was the scene of a more serious fight, in which the advantage was on the side of the Federals. During a considerable period of time the village had been abandoned by both Federals and Confederates. At last, towards the middle of December, the latter having again established their outposts in that locality, General McCall, who, as we have stated, was encamped on the Leesburg road, in the vicinity of the suspension bridge, was ordered to disperse them, and to seize the supplies of forage they had collected.

On the morning of the 20th McCall set in motion the brigade of Ord, with a battery of artillery. Notwithstanding the season of the year, the weather was beautiful, and the roads, hardened by a long dry spell, were in a better condition than in the middle of summer. By a singular coincidence, General Stuart left his camp in the neighborhood of Centreville on the evening of the preceding day, and also took the road to Drainesville with a brigade composed of about two thousand five hundred men, six pieces of artillery, and two hundred wagons, intended for the conveyance of the forage which he expected to procure between the lines of outposts. These two bodies, about to encounter at Drainesville, each being under the impression that they should only meet with small detachments during their expedition, proceeded at a rapid rate, with very little order and without scouting to any great distance. The Federals were the first to reach the village with one regiment, and drove off the few skirmishers found there. They had scarcely taken up their quarters when, towards two o'clock, the Confederates made their appearance. The Centreville road falls off at a right angle into the main road from Washington to Leesburg about one hundred feet to the eastward of Drainesville. Two other roads, to the right and left of the first, converge towards that same point of intersection, and all three, before reaching it, pass through two woods separated by a clearing where a few houses stand. The junction of all these roads is in the northernmost wood. The other concealed the movements of the Confederates from view. The latter, deploying their line under the trees, rested upon the three roads, while

their artillery followed the middle one. Having reached the edge of the plain, they found themselves facing one of the Federal regiments, which had been placed in advance of the junction of the roads in order to guard their approaches. The others were drawn up *en echelon* a little further off around Drainesville. The first attack of Stuart's troops throws some disorder into the ranks of the Federals, and they take advantage of it to occupy the houses in the clearing. But the presence of General Ord soon retrieves the fortunes of the day. He forms three of his regiments into line, availing himself of all the irregularities of the ground to cover them, and disposing them in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from cutting off his retreat by turning his left. Then he places his cannon on the Centreville road, where the enemy's artillery is posted; and pointing the first piece himself, he fires a shell into the midst of the Confederate battery. The firing is thus kept up at a distance for three-quarters of an hour. Stuart, in spite of two or three fruitless attempts, fails to carry the positions of the Federals. Two of his regiments, meeting in the woods, fire upon each other; and this accident throws his whole line into confusion. His artillery is soon silenced; one of the caissons explodes, killing nearly all the horses; he extricates his guns with difficulty, closely followed by the Federals, who have assumed the offensive, and capture several prisoners. This check cost him forty-three killed, one hundred and forty-three wounded, and forty-three prisoners. The Federals had only six killed and sixty wounded. Although the success thus obtained was insignificant in itself, in a battle where the two adversaries were of equal strength, it raised the courage of the soldiers and restored to their commanders a little of that confidence which they had lost since the affair of Ball's Bluff. This was, however, only an incident of little importance, which afforded no criterion for estimating the difficulties which awaited the army of the Potomac when the whole of it should be put in motion.

The inaction which followed the battle of Ball's Bluff had not only had the effect of tiring out the patience of the public, and of depriving General McClellan of a portion of that moral influence which his success at Cheat Mountain had given him over all his subordinates; it had also enabled the Confederates to render the

blockade of the Lower Potomac more stringent. They multiplied their batteries, and finally rendered the navigation of that arm of the sea almost impossible for merchant-vessels. The Federal fleet made several unsuccessful attempts to dislodge them. Every time that the Federals, landing in force, destroyed a battery which had been abandoned on their approach, another would immediately spring up in its vicinity, and take up the scarcely interrupted fire upon Northern vessels. Thus an expedition to Mathias Point on the 11th of November, and a vigorous cannonade between the Federal flotilla and the batteries of Shipping Point on the 9th of December, produced no serious results. The Potomac remained closed, and the humiliation of seeing the capital thus blockaded towards the sea was deeply felt in the North.

Cold and foggy weather, however, succeeded at last to the mildness of the Indian summer. Then winter spread her snowy mantle over all that section of the continent which was the theatre of the war, and towards the last days of the year 1861, that season, so severe in that part of America, rendered any great movement of troops absolutely impossible. The drilling of the soldiers was likewise interrupted. Although they were told from day to day that they were about to take the field, they prepared of their own accord to go into winter quarters. In the place of tents, which afforded them no protection either against the snow or the blast, there rose up throughout all the encampments huts rudely constructed with unhewn logs from the neighboring forest, but warm and solid.

The Confederates imitated them; and being thenceforth protected against all attacks, they settled down as well as they could into their winter cantonments around Centreville. The two months which had thus elapsed had been of more profit to them than to their adversaries; notwithstanding the numerous maladies engendered among them by a climate whose rigors they had never before experienced, they had seen, thanks to the activity of the central government and of their military leaders, the army then commanded by Johnston increased by one-third, and raised from sixty-six thousand two hundred and forty-three men, forty-four thousand one hundred and thirty-one of whom were under arms, to a total of ninety-eight thousand and eighty-eight, of whom

sixty-two thousand one hundred and twelve were present for action. The instruction of these soldiers had made great progress, and a severe discipline had been introduced among them, through their energetic commanders. But the first months of 1862 were not of equal advantage to them. Inaction, depression, and sickness thinned off their ranks and impaired the *morale* of those soldiers of ardent temperament; moreover, the term of a large number of enlistments expired before the return of pleasant weather; and notwithstanding the rigorous measures which, as we shall see, were adopted in order to fill up the ranks of the Confederate armies, we shall find that of Johnston reduced, on the 1st of March, to forty-seven thousand six hundred and seventeen combatants, out of a total force of eighty-four thousand two hundred and twenty-five men.

Both sides are now going to prepare for the new campaign. To bring the year 1861 to a close, it only remains for us to speak of the naval operations, or the combined operations of the fleet and the army, of which the extensive coast of the Confederate States was the theatre.

CHAPTER III.

PORT ROYAL.

THE navy of the United States, improvised at the time of the war of independence, had not experienced during the long period of peace which followed that war the same vicissitudes as the regular army. Its maintenance had been necessary to enforce respect for the star-spangled banner on every sea; and the immense development of American commerce had given it an importance which screened it from the economical or political measures which had affected the land forces.

The crews were obtained by voluntary enlistments, and were liberally paid. The officers were all pupils of the Naval Academy at Annapolis; being admitted, as at West Point, upon the presentation of members of Congress, or by appointment of the President, they received at that institution a thorough scientific and practical education;* they thus formed an educated, distinguished, almost aristocratic body, quite exclusive, and ardently devoted to the flag whose honor they worthily sustained. The extreme neatness and strict discipline which prevailed on board American vessels had long been observed in all the ports of Europe; there had also been occasion to admire frequently in these ships the new models the appearance of which had produced a real revolution in the art of naval construction. The Americans had early abandoned high-decked ships and substituted frigates, which, in dimensions and sailing qualities, were superior to any found in Europe. When steam was adopted as the chief motor in the navy, they persevered in that direction until their large

* The Naval Academy was established by the Hon. George Bancroft, Secretary of the Navy, in 1845. It had long been a desideratum, but before that time midshipmen were only instructed on board ship on regular cruises. The reader might be misled by the author's language into thinking that the school was as old as the navy.—Ed.

screw frigates, like the Merrimack, presented one of the most perfect models of a war-vessel of the time.

After having secured superiority in speed for their ships, nothing was neglected that could contribute to the perfection of their armament. They early appropriated the invention of General Paixhans. The substitution of the shell for the solid ball imparted to the naval artillery a destructive power unknown until then, which soon required the construction of iron-clad vessels. They applied themselves to manufacturing guns of heavier calibre and longer range than those in use on European ships. They succeeded ; and the howitzer to which Captain Dahlgren gave his name was in 1861 the most powerful arm afloat. Thanks to the invention of Rodman, the Americans had been able to cast iron guns which, notwithstanding a calibre of twenty-eight or thirty-one centimetres, had a remarkable power of resistance. They could throw without effort, and by means of very light charges of powder in proportion to their calibre, a heavy weight of iron in the form of hollow projectiles of enormous size, whereas no cast-iron gun could have overcome the inertia of a solid ball of the same weight without the risk of bursting. The Dahlgren shell possessed an ordinary initial velocity and a trajectory but slightly curved ; it nevertheless fired to a great distance and penetrated the thickest planking of vessels.

When Mr. Lincoln came into power, he found the Federal navy scattered over all parts of the globe. The occupation or destruction by the Confederates of all the arsenals situated in the Southern States, with their dépôts, their dock-yards, and their *matériel*, and finally the burning of the vessels collected at Norfolk, deprived it of its principal resources. But the defection of two hundred and fifty-nine officers, natives of the rebel States, was even a more fatal blow, which, for some time at least, rendered it absolutely powerless. Everything, therefore, had to be created and improvised, in order that the navy might be able to render effective service in the great struggle which was about to take place. Promotion was not sufficient to fill up the disorganized *cadres* ; they were thrown open to merchant-captains, who received temporary appointments. Generally speaking, these were excellent sea-officers ; but having none of the traditions of the military

marine, they were unable to maintain that strict discipline on board their vessels without which commanders soon lose a part of their authority. As to the crews, they continued to be recruited, like the land troops, by voluntary enlistments. High pay and constantly increasing bounties succeeded in attracting them in nearly sufficient numbers; more than one vessel, however, ready to sail, remained for weeks in port in consequence of not having been able to obtain a full complement of men.

In the same manner that improvised officers had been obtained from the merchant service, vessels were also procured and fitted out for war purposes, pending the completion of the ships which had been placed upon the stocks. All the large establishments of the North had received orders and had gone actively to work, but none of the new vessels could be equipped before the early part of 1862. Fortunately, among her numerous steam-vessels America possessed vessels perfectly adapted to the service which the navy was at first required to perform—the maintenance of the blockade. Indeed, to give chase to smugglers required vessels of rapid speed, and capable of holding their place in all weathers upon a difficult coast, but two or three guns of long range were sufficient for their armament. The conversion of steam-packets into war vessels was therefore easy. Some were hired, others were bought; a few even were given to the government as patriotic offerings: among the latter the finest and fastest of all was *The Vanderbilt*, presented to the government by the wealthy merchant whose name it bore. Besides this fleet of fast vessels, there was collected by the same process a fleet of transports consisting of vessels of less speed, river steamboats whose hulls had been more or less strengthened to enable them to live in a heavy sea, and finally sailing vessels intended for the subsistence department. At the end of the year the Secretary of the Navy had bought and equipped one hundred and thirty-seven vessels of all kinds, carrying five hundred and eighteen guns and representing seventy-one thousand two hundred and ninety-seven tons. Fifty-two new vessels, with an armament of two hundred and fifty-six guns and registering forty-one thousand four hundred and forty-eight tons, were either in process of construction or already completed.

The war was about to impose a triple task upon the Federal

navy—the protection of merchant-vessels against privateers, the maintenance of the blockade, and a share in the operations of the land forces on the enemy's coast. We proceed to show how it performed these three divisions of its task in the course of the year 1861.

As we have stated elsewhere, Mr. Davis had encouraged the equipment of privateers, immediately after the capture of Fort Sumter, on April 17th, and had offered letters of marque to those who were willing to cruise under the Confederate flag. The Congress at Montgomery, on its part, had promised to the crews of privateers a premium of twenty-five dollars for every prisoner, and for every Federal vessel which should be destroyed in a naval combat a sum equal to as many times one hundred francs as the vessel had men on board. At the same time, the Southern government set to work to fit out vessels destined to cruise under its war-flag against the commerce of the Northern States.

The Confederates had no merchant fleet in their ports that could supply them with the large vessels required for cruising on the high seas. They did not lack materials for their construction, but they needed experienced mechanics. They confined themselves, therefore, to arming vessels of which surprise or treason had given them possession. These consisted at first of six cutters belonging to the Federal revenue service, which happened to be in Southern ports at the time when the rebellion broke out. To these were added about a dozen small steamers purchased by the government. In short, during the six weeks following the proclamation of Mr. Davis, private individuals responded to that call by equipping as privateers about twenty vessels of the same pattern, nearly all of which had previously been employed in the coasting trade or as pilot-boats along the Southern coasts.

The merchant-vessels of the North, overtaken in Southern ports by the ordinances of secession, or sailing peaceably in the neighboring seas without any suspicion of danger, offered a rich prize to the privateers, which captured a large number of them. The time came, however, when the boldest among them learned to their cost that they could not pursue with impunity the adventurous career which exceptional circumstances had favored during a few weeks. At the end of May a small schooner of fifty-four

tons, called *The Savannah*, formerly a pilot-boat, armed with an eighteen pounder, went out of the port of Charleston under the Confederate flag; on the 3d of June, after securing a few prizes, the privateer, deceived by appearances, approached the brig-of-war *Perry*, and discovering her mistake too late was obliged to strike her colors after having vainly attempted to effect her escape. Her crew of twenty men were landed at New York to be tried for the crime of piracy.

This trial, which was to last for a considerable time, gave rise to questions of the gravest importance regarding public law. The Federal government, never having recognized the insurgents of the South as belligerents, could not, strictly speaking, consider them in any other light than that of malefactors. Every Confederate soldier who killed a Federal was in its estimation simply a murderer; every privateer which captured a merchant-vessel carrying the Federal flag was nothing but a robber and a pirate. But it was indispensable that there should be complete assimilation between the acts committed on the sea and on the land. As the government of the United States had declined in 1856 to participate in the declarations of the congress of Paris, it could not have questioned the right of its adversaries to cruise against its commerce, if it had recognized them in the capacity of belligerents; and having denied that character, it could not prosecute the sailors of the *Savannah* as pirates except by instituting similar criminal proceedings against every prisoner taken on land. It was sufficient to enunciate such a proposition to show its absurdity; the magnitude of the rebellion, the fear of inevitable reprisals, humanity, policy—in fine, good sense—forbade the Federal government from pursuing such a course; nor was the idea even contemplated. From the moment that Confederate soldiers captured on land were considered as prisoners of war, the same immunity from all personal prosecution had to be extended to the crews of Southern privateers. The government at Washington, bound by Mr. Lincoln's proclamations and pressed by public opinion, did not at first understand this. But the battle of Bull Run soon gave Mr. Davis the means of enabling his opponents to form a more correct estimate of the situation, by delivering a large number of Federal officers into his hands. He had Colonel

Corcoran and some of his companions in captivity put in irons, and declared that their lives should answer for those of the sailors of the *Savannah*. The proceedings against the latter were immediately suspended; no sentence was pronounced, and the privateers-men were finally included in the cartels for the exchange of prisoners.

A few days after the battle of Bull Run another vessel, called the *Petrel*, was getting ready for sea; two whole months had elapsed since the *Savannah* had left Charleston, so great was the inability of the Confederates to create a navy. The career of the new privateer, which got under way on the 28th of July, was to be of even shorter duration than that of her predecessor. She had scarcely left the port when she was discovered by the Federal frigate the *St. Lawrence*, which was stationed on the coast; the crew of the latter vessel concealed themselves between-decks; the yard-arms and rigging were reduced, so that the *Petrel* thought she had to deal with a large three-masted merchant-vessel, and gave her chase. The frigate, running with calculated slowness, enticed her imprudent pursuer away from the coast; and when the latter was within good range, the Federals suddenly opened three port-holes. Three projectiles, one of which was a shell of twenty centimetres, struck the privateer, and that frail vessel sank instantly. All her crew, with the exception of four men, were taken on board the *St. Lawrence*.

In the mean while, a far more formidable adversary, and one destined to inflict cruel losses on American commerce, had just put to sea from another quarter. The *Marques de la Habana* was a screw steamer of about six hundred tons, an excellent sailer and staunch sea-boat. She was plying between Havana and New Orleans, and happened to be at the latter port when secession was proclaimed; the Confederate government purchased her, put a few guns of heavy calibre on board, gave her, with the name of *Sumter*, a crew composed of adventurers from every part of the world, and placed her under the command of Raphael Semmes. This person, formerly an officer of the Federal navy, a bold and energetic sailor, was well chosen for the task imposed upon him, and during the four years of his privateer life he acquired, if not glory and honor, one of those European celebri-

ties which form the highest reward of certain ambitious men. On the 30th of June the *Sumter* left the Mississippi by way of the *Passe-à-Loutre*, eluding the Federal blockader, the *Brooklyn*, a sailing sloop-of-war, who gave her chase without effect. Once on the high sea, the privateer had certain advantages over her adversaries of which she cleverly availed herself. Owing to her great speed, every sailing-vessel was at her mercy, and she could easily avoid nearly all the Federal men-of-war that were sent in pursuit of her. The immensity of the sea was her safest refuge; just heard of in one port, all she had to do was to resume her cruise, to hide in the midst of the ocean, and reappear suddenly at the point where she was least expected. All the vessels sailing under the Federal flag from the Bermudas to the mouth of the Amazon might fear to become her prey. Every time that a light smoke was descried in the horizon everybody tried to guess by the slightest indications the character of the vessel that was rapidly approaching, for the loss of a few minutes might deprive the heavy three-master laden with a rich cargo of her last chance to escape from the terrible privateer.

Conformably to international regulations, the first vessels captured by Semmes were sent to New Orleans in charge of some of his men. But these prizes having again fallen into the hands of the Federals, he soon threw aside all consideration of the rules prescribed by the law of nations; and instead of being everywhere treated as a pirate on that account, he was sustained and encouraged through the connivance of the authorities in almost all European colonies, and in some of the American States. International law, such as it has been established for more than two centuries by treaties and usages, in sanctioning the capture on the high seas, by a belligerent, of the merchant-vessels sailing under the flag of his adversary, has subjected this right of capture to restrictions which are a strong guarantee against the abuse of a power so excessive. The commander of the vessel effecting the capture cannot himself determine the validity of the prize; he is obliged to send her to one of the ports of his country, before a prize court, which, if proper, adjudges the vessel to him and declares the validity of her capture. The adjudications of this special tribunal are precisely what distinguish lawful captures from acts of piracy. But when

Semmes saw that the blockade interfered with the observance of these protective formalities, he took upon himself to institute a prize court on board his own vessel; and as he had no other object than to injure and intimidate the commerce of the North, he adopted the barbarous system of destroying every vessel which fell into his hands, after having himself decided upon the validity of the prize. As soon as captured the vessel was set on fire, the crew was landed, without resources, at the nearest port, Semmes only retaining as a *souvenir* the chronometers of his victims; he made a collection of them; they were his trophies. He was even accused, although he always denied the charge, of having refused, at times, to examine the bills of lading of American vessels with neutral cargoes on board, in order to prevent their escape. Notwithstanding the just indignation caused by such acts among those who regarded international law as one of the most precious acquisitions of a civilized age, in spite of the protests of the Federal authorities, the *Sumter*, far from being treated as a pirate, met with such a reception in most of the neutral ports she visited as no belligerent man-of-war could have expected. Contrary to all usages, he was allowed to take all such prizes as were too precious to be burnt, although not legally adjudicated, into neutral ports on the coasts of New Grenada. In the English and French colonies he was permitted, still contrary to international regulations, to provide himself with supplies of coal far beyond what was absolutely necessary to enable him to reach a Confederate port, and he thus found all the resources he needed to continue his depredations. The authorities of Cuba were more scrupulous, it is true, and restored all the prizes, illegally brought into Spanish waters, to their legitimate owners.

Many Federal vessels were sent in pursuit of the *Sumter*, but they rarely met with her, and she always succeeded in getting away from them. Sometimes sailing under one flag, sometimes under another, which, for a vessel of war, was a violation of the rights of those powers whose ensign she borrowed, Semmes employed all the autumn of 1861 in scouring the Atlantic, carrying everywhere terror and distress to American commerce. After taking seventeen prizes he arrived at last, in the early part of 1862, at Gibraltar, where he intended to establish the base of his

operations in European seas, but where his exploits, contrary to his expectations, were suddenly interrupted, as we shall show in our narrative of the maritime events of that new year.

The other war-vessels equipped by the Confederates, not possessing the same nautical qualities as the *Sumter*, did not meet with the same success. All those who ventured upon any daring enterprise were soon punished by the Federal navy, which, in the fall of 1861, had finally succeeded in collecting a sufficient number of fast vessels to scour the seas and protect the commerce of the nation.

The brig *Jefferson Davis*, fitted out as a privateer in the Gulf of Mexico by private individuals, had put to sea in the beginning of August. After having made several prizes, which she burnt, after the fashion of the *Sumter*, she was obliged, in order to escape from the Federal cruisers, to seek refuge at St. Augustine, in Florida, where she ran aground at the entrance of the port, and was lost.

The *Nashville*, a side-wheel steamer and packet belonging to the New York and Charleston line, had been converted into a war-vessel by the Confederate government in the latter port. On the 26th of October she went to sea under the command of Captain Pegram, formerly an officer of the Federal navy, who, even before cruising in the Atlantic, repaired to the English station at the Bermudas, where he procured fresh provisions and obtained, still in violation of international law, a sufficient supply of coal to take him into European waters. He arrived there, after having burnt a merchant-vessel on his way, but did not leave English ports again, where the *Nashville* had undergone repairs, until the following year, to return to the American coast, where, as we shall presently see, his ship was destroyed, not long after, by a Federal cruiser.

Finally, on the 12th of November a schooner of a hundred tons, called the *Beauregard*, which had been fitted out for privateering purposes and had taken a few prizes in the Bahama waters, was captured by the *Anderson*, a sailing-vessel, which had been fitted out by the Washington government and was employed in cruising on the coast of Florida.

The efforts of the Federal navy had therefore partially suc-

ceeded in freeing American commerce from the dangers which had beset it during the first months of the war. But this danger was soon to reappear, thanks to the assistance which the Confederates found in England. Having become convinced of the impossibility of creating a naval force at home able to cruise in every sea without risk of becoming the prey of Federal cruisers, the Confederate authorities had sent several agents to Europe about the middle of the year 1861, with instructions to fit out vessels of war, which, by fraudulently hoisting the Southern flag, should resume the work of destruction which they were unable to continue themselves. The cotton which the secessionists possessed enabled them to obtain the required amount of money to purchase these vessels. Those agents had found in England a favorable reception. Captain Bullock, foremost among them, an able officer, full of resources, assisted by the firm of Fraser & Trenholm, who represented the financial interests of the Richmond government, knew well how to avail himself of these dispositions, and by the end of the year several privateers were preparing to put to sea. We shall speak hereafter of the war they waged against American commerce.

The maintenance of the blockade was another and a no less difficult part of the task so suddenly imposed upon the Federal navy. As we have stated above, the blockade, which was proclaimed on the 19th of April, after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, against all the maritime States which had just entered into confederacy at Montgomery, was shortly after extended to the coasts of Virginia and North Carolina. This proclamation of the President gave rise to questions of international law of the gravest character.

In the first place, had a government the right of blockading, as a mere measure of policy, a portion of its own coasts, and of seizing all neutral vessels which should attempt to violate it? or did not an act of so grave a character imply a formal recognition of the quality of belligerents in the insurgents, against whom the Federal government was obliged to employ such measures? The latter interpretation was the most rational, yet the Federal government could sustain the former by alleging that, in the President's proclamation itself, the blockade was represented as a

means for collecting custom-house duties, which the insurgent States sought to get rid of. Indeed, the question was never thoroughly discussed. The English government, with a malevolent haste which the American people regarded as a cruel wrong, took advantage of the first news of the blockade proclamation to recognize the belligerent rights of the insurgents, and to publish in its turn a declaration of neutrality. In performing an act of so much importance it did not even wait for the full text of the proclamation, which the despatches had abbreviated, so that the Washington government was justified in stating that the blockade was only a pretext by which England sought to disguise a pre-conceived purpose, prompted by the first success of the rebellion in the harbor of Charleston. The Federals, on their part, without ever recognizing in plain words all the belligerent rights of their opponents, had never disputed them, in fact, except in the case of the crew of the *Savannah*, above mentioned.

The second question raised by Mr. Lincoln's proclamation was yet more serious; it concerned the efficiency of the blockade itself. Paper blockades, against which neutrals so justly and so energetically protested during the wars in the beginning of the present century, are no longer countenanced by international usage. The right in virtue of which a belligerent can confiscate all neutral vessels who shall attempt to enter a blockaded port becomes, in the hands of a great naval power, an instrument of tyranny and oppression unless it be limited by the strictest rule. This rule does not admit of fictitious blockades, and requires that the cruisers of a belligerent, to enable them to exercise the right of capture, shall be sufficiently numerous to keep a constant and effective watch over the port, or over the whole extent of the coast under blockade. If the blockade is not maintained in conformity with these conditions—if it can be proved that it is easy to elude it—then neutrals are justified in not respecting it.

When Mr. Lincoln proclaimed the blockade of the coasts of the Confederate States, the Federal navy was not in a condition to exercise a *surveillance* over their whole extent. Those coasts, in fact, from the mouth of the Potomac to that of the Rio Grande, extended to a distance of more than four thousand five hundred kilometres. Deeply indented with bays, arms of the sea, and estuaries, they

afforded innumerable places of refuge to vessels arriving from the open sea, and an excellent shelter to those who desired to fit out their vessels without being observed. The Atlantic coasts, low and difficult to watch, were swept by terrible tempests; those of the Gulf of Mexico bristled with reefs and rocks. England possessed two naval stations admirably situated for revictualling and outfitting vessels intended for the contraband trade with Southern ports; these were the Bermudas, in the Atlantic, and the Bahama Islands, opposite Florida, at the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico.

No maritime power had ever yet attempted to effectively blockade a coast of such extent. Consequently, it would have been more prudent on the part of Mr. Lincoln to have limited his declarations to the measure of his resources, and to have only blockaded at first a few of the principal ports, such as Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans, before which it was easy to station a line of cruisers. He could not justify a fictitious blockade of the Southern States by invoking the rights of the Federal sovereignty over those States; for an analogous case had occurred in 1822, and on that occasion the Washington government had refused to recognize the right of Spain to declare a paper blockade of her own American colonies, then engaged in the war of independence. But these theoretical difficulties were avoided in practice. The American government, which contented itself at first with the effective blockade of a few ports, prevented any misunderstanding, by only making prizes off those ports, and every time that its action was extended to some new point, it granted the same delays to neutrals, in regard to such point, as it had accorded at the time of the proclamation of the blockade.

At last, after months of incessant efforts, the Federal navy succeeded, as we have seen, in reconstructing both its *personnel* and *matériel*. As the season advanced, and the inclement weather rendered it more difficult and troublesome to maintain the blockade, the number of vessels employed in that service was increased. Consequently, at the end of a year, at the period when the Atlantic coast is incessantly lashed by a raging sea and the northern gales sweep the Gulf of Mexico, the blockade was effectually established from the vicinity of Washington to the mouth of the

Rio Grande. Two squadrons, which were each to be subdivided at the commencement of 1862, had been formed in the month of July, 1861. One, called the Atlantic blockading squadron, consisted of twenty-two vessels, carrying two hundred and ninety-six guns and three thousand three hundred men, and was commanded by Commodore Stringham. The other, under Commodore Merwine, known as the blockading squadron of the Gulf of Mexico, was composed of twenty-one ships, with an armament of two hundred and eighty-two guns and a force of three thousand five hundred men.

We cannot enter into a detailed account of the incidents which marked the last six months of the year as regards the Federal sailors. Their task was the more onerous on account of its extreme monotony. To the watches and fatigues of every kind which the duties of the blockade service involved there were added difficulties of another character. It was necessary to instruct the newly-recruited crews, to train officers who had been taken from the merchant navy, and to ascertain, under the worst possible circumstances, the good and bad qualities of merchant-vessels too quickly converted into men-of-war. In these junctures the Federal navy displayed a perseverance, a devotion, and a knowledge of its profession, which reflect as much honor upon it as its more brilliant feats of arms. A few days after the disaster of Bull Run these fleets, then scarcely organized, began to make the victorious Confederates feel the dangers to which their maritime inferiority exposed them. Numerous prizes soon taught the commerce of neutrals that the blockade, thenceforth effective, must be respected. The rapid rise in the prices of all imported commodities in the insurgent States presented the exact measure of the efficiency of that blockade, and furnished an irrefutable proof against those who disputed its legality. The almost absolute commercial isolation of so vast a country as the Confederate States is an extraordinary fact which it is interesting to study in its various phases.

It took a considerable time to establish this isolation on land along the line which separated the two belligerents from east to west. In spite of the war, relations were not abruptly suspended; the importation of manufactured goods and of pork, together

with the exportation of cotton, continued for some time, even in the vicinity of battle-fields, notwithstanding all the prohibitions of the combatants. In the West the Confederacy was surrounded by immense deserts, which presented an impassable barrier against commerce from the borders of the Arkansas to the mouth of the Rio Grande, where the frontier of Texas and Mexico comes down to the sea. It was only at this point that the neighborhood of a neutral State could offer an always open breach in the blockade. At the entrance of the river, on the Mexican side, is the small port of Matamoras, where foreign vessels could land their merchandise under the very eyes of American cruisers. These goods, for their better safety, were then taken up the Rio Grande, or crossing the river directly were accumulated in the little American town of Brownsville. But inasmuch as, before the war, all the carrying trade in Texas was effected by coasting-vessels, that State had remained entirely without roads, and the journey from Brownsville to the Mississippi, being too difficult for any extensive trade, reduced the breach to the proportions of a mere fissure. The maritime blockade from Matamoras to the Potomac completed that immense circumvallation. Its first object, leaving out of consideration the obstacle it placed to the egress of Confederate privateers, was to prevent the exportation of cotton in the interest of the Richmond government, and on the other hand the introduction of arms and war *matériel*, which were brought over in exchange. Cotton was the element of wealth which the Confederates sought to turn to advantage, and which their adversaries determined either to render useless in their hands or to appropriate to themselves. Every blockade-runner leaving Southern ports had her hold filled with that precious commodity, while on land, whenever the hostile armies found an opportunity, they contended for the possession of the dépôts where it was stored. The Federal government confiscated the cotton to sell it and cause the price to be lowered in the European markets; the Confederates destroyed it rather than see it fall into the hands of their adversaries; they wanted to compel neutrals to apply to them alone for supplies of that article, and, if need be, to interfere in their behalf. In proportion as the blockade is prolonged the cultivation of the soil will undergo a change, and cotton will

give place to cereals, which will secure sufficient means of subsistence to the blockaded populations; but, on the other hand, all manufactured goods will become more and more scarce, and attain prices as fabulous as those paid in Europe for colonial commodities during the continental blockade.

This commercial isolation of the insurgent States did not produce all the results which had been anticipated in the North: the people of the South were not starved, nor did the want of arms and ammunition put an end to the struggle; but the blockade caused incalculable injury to the Confederates by depriving them of all the resources which they might have derived from Europe, and by preventing them from waging war on the sea, which would have ruined the commerce of the North. If this blockade had not been rigidly maintained, the Federals would probably never have been able to subdue their adversaries.

The Confederates, notwithstanding the feeble means at their disposal, naturally made every effort to break through the restraints of the blockade. We shall briefly indicate here, following the chronological order, these various attempts, the measures adopted by the Federals to baffle them, and the principal incidents which marked the operations of the blockade until the end of the year 1861.

On the 5th of October a boat belonging to the Federal vessel *Louisiana* penetrated into one of the large lagoons on the Virginia coast by the pass called Chincoteague Inlet, and destroyed a schooner which the Confederates were fitting out for a cruise. This affair cost them a few wounded.

On the 9th one of the large Federal transport-ships anchored in Hampton Roads, having been driven upon the enemy's beach in Lynn Haven Bay, fell under the fire of one of the Confederate batteries at Sewell's Point; she was about to be captured, when the little steamer *Daylight* went to her assistance, and after a brisk cannonade succeeded in silencing the guns of her adversaries.

On the 12th of October the Confederates tried, for the first time, to force the blockade. The Federal division which guarded the entrances of the Mississippi was attacked and nearly dispersed by an unlooked-for adversary, fitted out by the authorities of New Orleans for the purpose of reopening their port, which

had been closed for six months. It is necessary to cast a glance over the map to form an idea of the extraordinary configuration of the mouths of the Mississippi. The great river, which empties its muddy waters into the Gulf of Mexico, not only forms a delta like the Nile, the work of a long series of centuries, but also two natural embankments, which confine its waters and extend with them to the sea. At a certain distance from the coast, the river, thus prolonged, becomes divided; it takes the shape of a half-closed fan, each branch lying between two similar dykes. Its depth diminishes gradually with the rapidity of its current, and it drives slowly before it, like a moving barrier, an accumulated mass of mud which interposes a serious obstacle to navigation; its waters no longer advance, but from the pressure of the mass which follows them they finally mingle with that sea which seems to shrink from their contact. Two important fortifications, Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip, command the course of the river near the point where it leaves the coast, to discharge into the open sea, the basis of the new delta which has been perceptibly forming around. The point where the waters divide is called *La Tête-des-Passes*, and among these channels there are only three practicable for vessels of great draught—on one side the south-west pass, and in an entirely opposite direction *La Passe-a-Loutres* and the north-east pass. The Confederates occupied the forts, but it was impossible to construct any fortification lower down the Mississippi, as the water penetrated everywhere the spongy soil of the levees which border the river. The Federals, therefore, had found no difficulty in entering these passes; and at the *Tête* pass they had established a naval station consisting of the sloop-of-war *Richmond*, the two war-steamers *Preble* and *Vincennes*, and the *Waterwitch*, order-boat. Every outlet was thus effectually closed by a fleet which had no fear of stormy weather. In order to disperse that fleet the Confederates determined to cover with sheathing (*blinder*), on the plan of those floating-batteries tried in 1855 in the attack on Kinburn, a vessel which should defy the Federal artillery. Captain Hollins, a former officer of the regular navy, was entrusted with the task of thus transforming a high-pressure steamer with double engines which lay in the port of New Orleans. The deck was

cut away and replaced by an iron-plated roof, into which were introduced a few port-holes. The bow was remodelled above the water-line, and so shaped as to leave room for a gun firing point blank, while below the water-line she was armed with a powerful iron spike. This vessel, called the *Manassas*, was to serve as a model to the famous *Merrimac*, of which we shall soon have to speak. A flotilla of seven small armed steamers was collected to support her operations.

Hollins had been for some days watching the movements of the Federals, who were beginning to lose faith in the existence of that *Manassas* which had been so long talked about. Finally, on the 12th of October, taking advantage of a very dark night, he moved off. The *Manassas* led the way with all her port-holes carefully closed; having no masts and presenting only a low back, she glided upon the water like a marine monster. The fleet, following at a considerable distance, had some fire-ships in tow, with orders to launch them as soon as a rocket from the *Manassas* should announce the commencement of the battle. Hollins's ram arrived unperceived at the *Tête-des-Passes* in the midst of the Federal vessels. Passing close to the *Preble* too rapidly to damage her with the spike, she directed her course towards the *Richmond*, then in the act of taking in coal from a brig grappled alongside of her; a moment after, she struck the side of that sloop, causing a leak of no great account below the water-line, shattering everything on board, and breaking the fastenings of the brig, which was carried off by the current. This was the time for the *Manassas* to try and sink her adversary by another stroke; but the first shock had deranged her engine, and, before it could be put in order, she had drifted to leeward, while the *Richmond*, breaking off from her moorings and quickly tacking (*virant a bord*), was ready for battle. This vessel opened fire, but her projectiles and those of the *Preble* could make no impression upon the sheathing of the Confederate ram. In the mean time, the fleet which accompanied the fire-ships, having noticed the signal agreed upon, advanced towards the scene of action, and moving fires soon lighted up the tall trees which skirted the river, threatening the Federal squadron with a new danger. That danger, however, was more apparent than real, for the Confederate steam-

ers, kept at a distance by the heavy guns of the *Richmond*, could not direct the movements of the fire-ships; the *Manassas* had gone up the river and disappeared. But it was difficult for a long sloop like the *Richmond* to come about in so narrow a strait as the south-west pass, and her commander, Pope, doubting his ability to make her head the current again, gave the signal for the three other vessels to retire beyond the bar. The fire-ships soon ran aground, with the coaling-brig, which had been separated from the *Richmond*; and the flotilla of Hollins followed the enemy at a distance. Everything seemed to be in his favor; the *Preble* ran aground on nearing the bar, and was almost thrown on her beam-ends, while the *Richmond* was stranded a little lower down; and if Hollins had been bolder, he could probably have destroyed both vessels. Fortunately, the *Richmond*, her broad-side facing the enemy's ships, was able to keep them at a distance with her guns. The commander of the *Preble* had abandoned his ship with unseemly haste, but by a lucky chance the match he applied to the powder magazine was extinguished some minutes before causing an explosion, and the Confederates, giving up the game at the decisive moment, withdrew without doing aught to secure the victory. The *Richmond* was speedily got off; the crew of the *Preble* again got on board, and succeeded in raising her. The damages sustained by the Federal squadron were promptly repaired, and it resumed its place at the *Tête-des-Passes*, while Hollins was pompously announcing a victory, the worthlessness of which was soon felt by the inhabitants of New Orleans, for the blockade continued in force as strictly as before.

A few weeks after, upon another point in the Gulf of Mexico, at Galveston, in Texas, the Federals by a bold stroke destroyed one of the vessels which the Confederates were preparing to break the blockade. During the night of November 7th two armed launches were sent by the frigate *Santee*, stationed outside of Galveston, to attack the steamer *General Rusk*, which was being fitted out for war purposes. The boats entered the port; but being discovered, they abandoned their original intention, seized the schooner *Royal Yacht*, which was also armed as a privateer, and were able to set her on fire before leaving. This expedition, which gave the Federal navy a few prisoners, cost them seven men.

At the same period, the 9th of November, a slight engagement took place in the estuary of the Rappahannock. A Federal transport-ship having run aground at Corrotowan Creek, the Confederates were going to seize her, when a detachment from the cruiser *Cambridge* set her on fire, after exchanging a few shots with the enemy. On the following day the same Federal cruiser bombarded the town of Urbanna, which served as a dépôt for the contraband trade with Maryland.

In the mean time, the Confederates had armed the *Patrick Henry* on the James River, a steamer which formerly plied in Chesapeake Bay, and of which they had taken possession. On the 2d of December they wished to try her strength against the small vessels which came up the James from the anchoring-grounds at Newport News to make reconnaissances. But those vessels having fallen back at her approach on the large ships at anchor in the harbor, the *Patrick Henry* only exchanged a few cannon-shots with them, and then disappeared without making any further demonstration. A few weeks after, the Confederates were more fortunate. Captain Lynch, formerly an officer in the Federal navy, who had acquired some distinction before the war by his hydrographical exploration of the Dead Sea, had been placed in command of a small steamer, the *Sea-Bird*, carrying two guns, which was then at Norfolk. He was to take her by way of the Albemarle Canal into the inland waters of South Carolina, in order to watch the Federals stationed at Hatteras. The condition of the canal having delayed his passage, he went to take position near the Sewall's Point batteries, erected at the entrance of James River, fronting those of Fortress Monroe, but out of reach of the latter. Being always on the watch and in search of opportunities to surprise the enemy, he perceived, on the 29th of December, a Federal steamer towing a schooner which was carrying drinking-water to the garrison of Fortress Monroe, the sandy soil of the Virginia peninsula furnishing but a small supply of that article. Starting with a full head of steam in pursuit, he compelled the Federal steamer to cast the schooner loose, took possession of her, and brought her back under shelter of the Confederate batteries, in spite of the efforts of the whole Federal fleet, which chased him in vain, and was finally com-

pelled to give up the pursuit among the shallow waters in the vicinity of Sewall's Point.

We shall close this somewhat monotonous sketch of the operations of the blockade in 1861 with a few words on the subject of an enterprise which must be classed in the same category, although of a very peculiar character. We allude to the attempt on the part of the Federals to place obstructions in the harbor of Charleston—a fruitless attempt, which had no other result than to provoke the most severe criticisms from the English press. As we shall show hereafter, the Federal fleet had taken possession of Port Royal, an important position on the coast of South Carolina, between Savannah and Charleston. But notwithstanding the facilities which that station offered, the fleet found it very difficult to maintain the blockade of Charleston in an effective manner. That port had become the principal focus of the contraband trade with Europe, because it was the best situated for distributing the commodities brought over by the blockade-runners through all the Confederate States, and because the configuration of its entrance afforded to such vessels great chances of eluding the blockade. It forms, in fact, a vast basin, the entrance of which was commanded by the batteries of Moultrie and Cumming's Point on either side, and by the guns of Fort Sumter, occupying a small island in the bay. Outside of this strait the sea is not open, and not far off lies a large sand-bank, always covered, extending in a line parallel to the coast southward to a distance of nine kilometres. It joins the coast to the north, near which there are three outlets, or narrow passes, only practicable for vessels of small size. The principal channel bends to the south after passing the narrow entrance, and runs between the coast and the bank. At the extreme point of this bank the shock of the ebb and flow has formed a bar across the channel, which presents only an elevation of five metres and a half at high water. The intervening space between the bank and the narrow entrance being entirely commanded by the Confederate guns, the Federal cruisers were obliged to keep outside the bank, and to watch the entrance of all the passes from a distance over an extent of coast of more than ten kilometres. It will be seen how difficult it was to prevent a swift vessel from forcing that line in the middle of a dark night.

Consequently, the naval authorities came to the conclusion that it would be easier to obstruct the principal channel, and thus get rid of a task which was not only irksome, but uncertain. It was determined to sink a certain number of old ships, loaded with stones, on the bar, which would render the passage absolutely impossible. This was to apply to an enemy's port what the Russians had done for their own defence at Sebastopol; and if the experiment should prove successful, it was proposed to repeat it in front of Savannah and the other Confederate ports. Towards the middle of December twenty-five whaling-ships of from three to five hundred tons each were assembled at Port Royal. They were loaded with large blocks of stone, and their sides pierced with openings which only required to be unstopped to sink them. Sixteen of these set sail. They were escorted by a few steamers, whose purpose was to effect the submersion of these old hulks and to receive their crews. On the 17th of December the fleet appeared before Charleston. A great disaster had just struck that city: more than half of it had been destroyed by fire; and the inhabitants were still wandering among the smoking ruins, when Fort Sumter signalled the approach of the vessels, the destination of which was unknown, and which seemed to be preparing a very determined attack. A different kind of spectacle was in store for them; and during two days they were doomed to witness, from too great a distance to interrupt the process, an operation which threatened to close the entrance of their port to all blockade-runners. The sixteen ships were sunk at certain distances from each other, in two lines, arranged like a chess-board, so as to leave openings for the tide-currents, without, however, allowing a direct passage for vessels which might attempt to steer among those artificial reefs. As soon as the hulks were all submerged their masts were sawed off to the water's edge, and their crews returned to Port Royal, persuaded that they should no longer be put to the trouble of blockading the port which had witnessed the birth of secession. The American journals, by means of bombastic announcements that "Charleston had ceased to be a port of entry, and that the bride of the West was henceforth widowed of her husband the Atlantic," succeeded in making the public believe that a terrible and irreparable chastisement had been inflicted

upon that rebel city. England was greatly moved by the occurrence, and her government caused representations on the subject to be made at Washington. This was showing a little more haste than was proper; for if the Federal government had trespassed against the law of nations, it had only done so through intent. The obstruction, which was only designed to be temporary, was even of much shorter duration than had been anticipated; the hulks were broken to pieces by the force of the sea; the stones sank deep into the sand; and at the end of a few weeks the entrance to Charleston was reopened by nature.

The third part of the task imposed upon the Federal navy—the forcible occupation of certain points on the enemy's coast—was the most important, and offers a more interesting subject. This occupation had both a political and military object in view. On one hand, it greatly facilitated the revictualling of the blockading squadrons; it diminished the number of hostile ports to be watched; it substituted a land siege for the maritime blockade; and it secured a base of operations for the army on the day when it should attempt to penetrate into the interior of the Confederacy by this method. On the other hand, the Washington government, in gaining a foothold by this means upon the soil of those States which it could not reach by land, was in hopes of reawakening some sympathy for the national flag, and desirous to establish a rallying-point for the Unionists of the South.

The extent of the coast of the insurgent States, the multitude of points at which large vessels could make land, and the deep channels where they found a safe anchorage were obstacles in the way of blockade, but they were favorable for landing. Not being able to maintain a defensive attitude everywhere, the Confederates were always liable to be surprised at some point.

The Federal navy began to prepare for its combined expeditions by land and sea in the month of August. The chief merit of their conception and organization was due to Mr. Gustavus Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who had already distinguished himself at a critical moment by attempting to revictual Fort Sumter. For four years his ardent mind, practical and full of resources, effectively controlled the department, and at the expiration of those memorable four years he retired without aspir-

ing to any other reward than the satisfaction of having served his country well. In the early part of August there arrived at Fortress Monroe the captain of a merchant-vessel who had been wrecked near Cape Hatteras, on the coast of North Carolina. Mr. Campbell, having been kept three months a prisoner in those parts, brought with him some exact information relative to the contraband trade carried on there and the preparations for defence on the part of the Confederates.

Between the ocean and the deeply indented coast of North Carolina stretches a narrow tongue of sand, which describes a convex arc and envelops a vast sheet of water. This inland sea, called Pamlico Sound, which resembles, on a larger scale, the lagoons of Venice, is almost everywhere navigable for vessels of considerable size. It is interspersed with numerous islands, the largest of which, Roanoke Island, divides it into two unequal parts; the southern portion, designated as Pamlico Sound proper, presents the larger surface; the sheet lying northward is known by the name of Albemarle Sound. This tongue of sand is intersected at intervals by difficult inlets resembling those of Lido and Malamocco; at the highest point of the arc which it describes lies Cape Hatteras, and a little farther to the south the inlet of the same name. This inlet was very much frequented by the blockade-runners, who found in the sounds the means of holding safe communications with all parts of North Carolina. It was defended by a large field-work of octagonal shape, situated on the north side of the entrance, near the inland basin, and consequently at some distance from the spot where it debouches into the open sea. This work, called Fort Hatteras, was built of sand; it had a considerable relief, magazines, and bomb-proof shelters; and its armament, which was still incomplete at the end of August, consisted of ten navy guns, thirty-two pounders. The approach by land was rendered extremely difficult by a swamp. In order to cover the entrance of the inlet on the side of the open sea the Confederates had erected on the shore, at a distance of seven hundred metres to the north-east of Fort Hatteras, a square redoubt, called Fort Clark, mounting five guns. A little farther on two field-pieces were posted in an epaulement designed to prevent a landing. These works were occupied by about one thou-

sand men, two or three hundred of whom were under Major Andrews, the commander of the forts ; the rest, under Colonel Martin, consisted of the Seventh North Carolina regiment. The entire control of the maritime defences of the State was entrusted to Commodore Barron. These three commanders did not agree ; the soldiers were inexperienced, the artillery of too small a calibre, and poorly supplied ; for the want of fuses to fire the shells it was necessary to fill them with sand. But the works were strong, and the heavy swell of the Atlantic made it dangerous to attempt a landing. The Washington government decided to send a combined expedition to destroy these works and to obstruct the Hatteras Inlet by sinking a few old hulks in it. To accomplish this object the frigate *Minnesota*, the sloops-of-war *Wabash* and *Pawnee*, and the advice-boat *Harriet Lane* repaired to Newport News, under command of Commodore Stringham. These vessels were to be joined by the frigate *Susquehanna* and the sailing sloop-of-war *Cumberland*. At the same time, General Butler, who had been superseded by General Wool, but who still retained command of the forces encamped at Newport News, embarked with nine hundred men on two large steamers and an advice-boat. The combined squadron got under way on the 26th of August, and on the following day anchored in deep water in sight of Hatteras Inlet.

Operations commenced on the morning of the 28th ; while the fleet was bombarding Fort Clark preparations were hastened for landing. The heavy naval artillery soon established its superiority over the five guns of inferior calibre which constituted the armament of the redoubt. The Federal frigates, steaming slowly in front of that work, poured shells into it, and soon silenced its fire. Fort Hatteras tried in vain to reach them ; the distance was too great for its thirty-two pounders. The bombardment had commenced at ten o'clock ; towards half-past twelve the two works had ceased firing ; their flags had been lowered ; and the defenders of Fort Clark, escaping in small squads, went, without orders, to seek refuge behind the parapets of Hatteras. In the mean time, a portion of the troops which the fleet had brought over effected a landing, notwithstanding the serious difficulties they had to encounter. To accomplish this disembarkation they

had only two wooden lighters and three or four iron launches. On the first trip the sea shattered the former and capsized the latter; the men came near being drowned; the ammunition and provisions were soaked with water; and as the swell was rapidly increasing, it soon became necessary to suspend the operation. Three hundred men, with two small howitzers and only a few rounds of ammunition, thus found themselves alone on a hostile shore, separated from the fleet by an impassable barrier of breakers, with the enemy in front, who, being four times stronger than themselves and firmly entrenched inside of his works, could have driven them into the sea. Fortunately, their commander, Colonel Max Weber, was not at all disconcerted; and marching boldly forward, he took possession of Fort Clark, which the Confederates had just evacuated. He was not, however, able to hold it; having tried to take possession of the other work, he was repulsed and dislodged from the first, which remained unoccupied between the two contending parties. Two Federal vessels, which attempted to run into the inlets, were also compelled to retire before the fire of Fort Hatteras, after having run aground several times. Finally, a steamer which was bringing reinforcements to the Confederates made her appearance in the inland sound. The weather was growing worse, the north wind rising, the sea was becoming violently agitated, and all the Federal vessels were obliged to haul off from the coast towards nightfall—a night full of anxiety to every one, and especially to the troops disembarked on that gloomy shore.

Fortunately for the latter, the Confederates themselves were in a great state of confusion. Commodore Barron had arrived with insignificant reinforcements; a vessel which was to have brought a regiment from Newbern had not made her appearance. The power of the projectiles used by the Federals, and the capture of Fort Clark, although evacuated afterwards, had greatly disturbed the defenders of Hatteras. The gunners were inexperienced, and there were only three pieces of artillery in the fort which could be brought to bear upon the entrance of the pass. The Confederates had no intention of troubling Weber during the night. When day reappeared, the sea was calm; and the Federal fleet, bringing their broadsides to bear upon the fort, began to bombard

it. The guns of the fort were speedily silenced and the garrison obliged to take refuge in the casemates. Weber's troops took advantage of this to reoccupy Fort Clark, and to turn the fire of two or three field-pieces upon the Confederate steamer which was at last bringing the reinforcements from Newbern, but had not yet been able to land them. Seeing that vessel put back, while the Federal fleet was preparing to cross the inlet, the besieged became discouraged. They had only, however, about thirty men wounded, the casemates were in excellent condition, and the weather, which had again assumed a threatening aspect, might at any moment interrupt the attack and deliver into their hands Weber's three hundred Federals. Notwithstanding all these chances in their favor, Commodore Barron, at eleven o'clock, hoisted the white flag. Cut off by Fort Clark from all communication with the land, he had no means of escape left. More than seven hundred prisoners, twenty-five pieces of artillery, with or without carriages, and two strong works, were surrendered to the Federals by the capitulation, signed a few days after. Butler and Stringham, appreciating the importance of their conquest, determined not to abandon it. The small garrisons which they left there were soon reinforced, and Hatteras became the base of naval and military operations along the whole coast of North Carolina. The capture of these forts, which had not cost the Federals a single man, was one of those unquestionable successes of which until then Fortune had been very sparing towards the North. It was the first step in a direction where many others still more decisive were to follow. The superiority of the guns on board the Federal vessels over the barbette batteries which the Confederates opposed to them was clearly shown. This first experience was destined to receive many confirmations afterwards.

The chronological order of our narrative compels us to take the reader back to the Gulf of Mexico, along whose coast the Federals endeavored during the autumn, by means of certain operations, to strengthen the naval blockade. We have stated elsewhere that Fort Pickens, which guards the entrance of Pensacola Bay, had remained in their possession at the time when the rebellion broke out. The position of this post rendered it easy for them to blockade one of the best ports in the Gulf of Mexico. But they had

left a large arsenal in the hands of their adversaries, where privateers were fitted out which occasionally succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the sentinels of Fort Pickens. They attempted in vain, on the 2d of September, to set it on fire, and only succeeded in destroying one of the stocks for ship-building. They soon returned to the charge. During the night of the 13th or 14th of September four boats belonging to the frigate *Colorado* proceeded as far as the dock of the arsenal, at which the Confederate schooner *Judah* was moored. They seized her by quick assault, set her on fire, and retired after having lost four men killed and nine wounded.

This successful attempt alarmed the Confederates, and they immediately set to work to harass the garrison of Fort Pickens. On the coast of Florida, eastward of Pensacola, there lies a narrow and sandy island, eighty kilometres in length, formed of downs shaped like those of Hatteras, and only separated from the mainland by a sinuous channel of from one to two kilometres in width. This island, called Santa Rosa, stretches in front of the entrance of Pensacola Bay; and at the extremity of this natural break-water stands Fort Pickens. Outside the fort the Federals occupied that portion of the island which lies nearest to it. During the summer a New York regiment, Wilson's Zouaves, had been landed there. Their unruly disposition had caused them to be designated for that mission, which had the advantage of isolating them completely. This regiment, reduced to three hundred and sixty men, of whom more than fifty were on the sick-list, was encamped about two kilometres from the fort, at a point where the island, closely shut in between the sea and Pensacola Bay, is only one kilometre wide. If the superior officers may be judged by the boastful extravagance of their reports, that regiment must have been very badly commanded. At all events, their encampment was very carelessly guarded. The Confederates knew this, and they determined to take advantage of it to attempt a *coup-de-main*, which they would never have thought of if they had had to deal with well-disciplined troops.

During the night of October 8th and 9th, General Anderson brought from Pensacola, in steamers and large boats, twelve or thirteen hundred men, whom he landed five kilometres east of the

Federal camp fronting the centre of the bay. The sand-hills of Santa Rosa island stretch out in that locality, and afforded him a more favorable ground for deploying his troops. As soon as they were landed he formed them into three columns, which advanced in silence, capturing the Federal sentinels, who were posted too near their camp. An instant afterwards the camp itself was seized, pillaged, and set on fire. It was two o'clock in the morning; the darkness was intense, and the flames rising among the tents and spreading here and there only served to increase the disorder caused by that surprise. The scattered zouaves rallied in detached groups between their camp and the fort; their adversaries, equally disorganized by the pillage, hunted for them at random, without following up their success. The reports of firearms were heard in every direction; and the soldier who fell, shot down at close quarters, could not tell whether he had been struck by friend or foe. On hearing the noise of battle, Colonel Brown, who was in command at Fort Pickens, sent Major Vogdes with two companies of regular infantry to Wilson's assistance. The major missed his way and fell into the hands of the Confederates, but the regulars sustained themselves in that difficult ordeal of a night battle, resolutely advanced in serried ranks upon the flank of their assailants, who had already driven the zouaves to the sea, and changed the aspect of the fight. The Confederates, becoming frightened in their turn, soon took to flight to regain their boats, into which they crowded in haste, leaving behind them about twenty killed, thirty prisoners, and a considerable number of wounded; they finally reached the main land at the moment when a small Federal steamer from Fort Pickens was about to cut off their retreat. The Wilson Zouaves had not fought well enough to lose many men, and out of thirty-seven Federals, who were wounded in that engagement, twenty-four belonged to the regular army.

The attack of the Confederates had been repulsed, but it convinced Colonel Brown that in the event of a serious attack he could only rely upon the small garrison of the fort for defence. In order to prevent similar attempts in future, he resolved to take the offensive; and as his soldiers were too few in number to make a sortie, it was necessary that the fort itself should take part in

the combat. Secession, as we have stated, had divided the line of defences at Pensacola into two parts, giving Fort McRae, on the west side of the inlet, to the Confederates, and leaving Fort Pickens, on the east side, in possession of the Federals. These two forts—guardians of the harbor—constructed with a view to their mutual support, belonged therefore to the two hostile parties, and levelled their guns against each other. They thus prevented any vessel, whatever might be her flag, from entering the bay, but by a tacit agreement they long continued to exercise a mutual forbearance towards each other. Colonel Brown wished to get out of this embarrassing position, which gave all the advantage to his opponents, allowing them to make free use of the vast resources which the arsenal of Pensacola afforded them. The frigate *Niagara* and the sloop-of-war *Richmond*, charged with the blockade on the Florida coast, took part in the bombardment, which was opened by Fort Pickens on the morning of November 22d. Fort McRae replied, and was supported by the fire of several field-batteries erected in the vicinity of the arsenal. The cannonading was thus kept up for two days without producing any result. There were twelve or fifteen men disabled on both sides. The vessels were only struck three or four times, and the *Richmond* alone seriously, while Fort Pickens had only one gun dismounted. On the Confederate side a few field-pieces were rendered useless; the village of Warrenton and a few huts were burnt; the arsenal only sustained trifling injuries, and the three steamers which happened to be there escaped without serious damage. This duel between two permanent works, which left both of them uninjured, is a unique occurrence in the contemporaneous annals of sieges. Although they were only two kilometres apart, neither of them was able to effect a breach in the works of its opponent; the fire of the ships was not more effective; the large spherical shells so effective against barbette batteries were powerless against masonry. The only piece of artillery which did any damage to the Confederates was a thirty-pounder Parrott gun mounted on Fort Pickens.

More to the west, in the Gulf of Mexico, and about the same time, the Federals seized an island almost deserted, flat, sandy, wind-swept, and parched by a tropical sun, but affording excellent anchorage for their squadrons, and an important point for

revictualling. This was Ship Island, situated on the coast north of the mouths of the Mississippi, and in continuation of that long chain parallel to the coast to which Santa Rosa belongs. The Confederates, who occupied it and had even made certain establishments on it, abandoned it on the 18th of September, on the approach of a few Federal vessels. It remained at first without an occupant; subsequently, the blockading fleet went there in search of temporary shelter; a detachment of marines was landed and lodged, with supplies, in a fort yet unfinished. Finally, towards the latter part of November a brigade of seventeen or eighteen hundred men from Fort Monroe, under General Phelps, took permanent possession of the island, and the troops were landed in that dismal locality between the 4th and 6th of December. Apart from the military object of that expedition, the Federal government had a political end in view. The occupation of Ship Island gave the government a foothold on the State of Mississippi; it was the first step in taking possession. Consequently, in again hoisting the Federal flag upon the soil of that rebel State, General Phelps did not fail to issue a proclamation to the people of the South-west, in which he declared himself in favor of the immediate abolition of slavery. This, naturally enough, had only the effect of exasperating the Confederates and of renewing the old quarrel between the Republicans and the Democrats at the North.

It now remains for us to relate the events of which the Atlantic coast was the theatre, after the occupation of Hatteras by the Federals. The latter, properly appreciating the importance of the forts they had captured on the 30th of August, had sent the Twentieth Indiana regiment to reinforce the small garrison that Butler had left there. Nor did they stop there, for they had only taken possession of an entrance into the inland sea, into which they had the utmost interest in penetrating, and it was important, above all, not to leave the other in the hands of the enemy, who yet occupied two of them. These two entrances, opening in the tongue of sand which envelops Pamlico Sound, are the Ocracoke Inlet, south of Hatteras; and more to the northward, the three contiguous estuaries called Oregon Inlet, New Inlet, and Loggerhead Inlet, situated near the island of Roanoke. At Ocracoke the Confederates

had erected a large earthwork, which they were busy in arming. On the 17th of September the guard-boat *Fanny* was sent to destroy it; finding that it had been abandoned, all she had to do was to dismantle it and throw its heavy guns into the sea. Nothing remained to be done but to close the northern inlets, but this was a more difficult task, for the Confederates had placed a strong garrison on the island of Roanoke, and were in possession of several steamers which could speedily convey that garrison to any of the neighboring points, and in case of need even threaten the small garrison of Hatteras. An expedition was organized under Colonel Brown to take permanent possession of the inlets. The Twentieth Indiana embarked on the 30th of September, and was landed in a few hours on the tongue of sand fifty kilometres north of Hatteras, not far from a village called Chicomacomico; he entrenched himself at that point, until the arrival of reinforcements should permit him to advance to the inlets and take possession of them. The *Fanny* returned the following day, bringing him guns, provisions, ammunition, and a portion of his baggage. But she had hardly commenced landing her cargo when she was surprised by three small Confederate vessels; and after exchanging a few cannon-shots with them her crew abandoned her, thus leaving a valuable prize in the hands of the enemy and depriving the expedition of the resources which it needed. Colonel Brown nevertheless took up his quarters with his eight hundred men in the neighborhood of Chicomacomico, in the expectation of soon receiving the supplies of which he had been deprived. But the Confederates did not allow him to remain long in peace. Commodore Lynch, whom we have already mentioned, had by activity and intelligence organized a considerable naval force on the inland waters, and he was not satisfied with the capture of the *Fanny*. As soon as the occupation of Chicomacomico was known at Roanoke, three regiments, numbering over two thousand men, were speedily embarked on board the flotilla and directed against the new Federal post. On the morning of the 4th of October they found themselves in front of the camp occupied by the Twentieth Indiana, and Lynch's guns soon threw disorder into the ranks of the Federals, who, surprised by this unexpected attack, had hastily rushed to their arms. The

Confederates availed themselves of the opportunity to land about fifteen hundred men north of Chicomacomico, while another regiment tried to effect a landing farther south, so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy. This last operation was thwarted by the shallowness of the water; but the Federals, believing themselves to be already surrounded, abandoned their camp, with everything it contained, and fled towards the beach of Cape Hatteras. They arrived, exhausted by fatigue, in the greatest confusion, leaving behind them fifty prisoners, with a large quantity of arms; they were accompanied by most of the inhabitants of Chicomacomico, compromised as Union men, and in a complete state of destitution. The Confederates, being obliged to drag the howitzers they had landed through the heavy sand, were unable to complete their success by a rapid march, and night overtook them before they had reached Cape Hatteras. On the following morning Brown's soldiers, who had gathered along the beach near the cape, saw the Federal frigate *Susquehanna* approaching, which brought them the provisions they so much needed, and the protection of her powerful guns; at the same time, they received by land a reinforcement of a few hundred men. Finally, another Federal ship, which was cruising on the coast, soon after came to present her broadside in their front. In the mean time, the Confederates had at last completed their landing, and were marching against them by two converging roads; but when they got near the beach, the fire of the enemy's ships revealed to them the fact that they had allowed the opportunity for crushing their adversaries to escape; they re-embarked with their trophies, while the Federals hastened back to Fort Hatteras. The success obtained in the month of August by Stringham and Butler had demonstrated to the Federal government all the advantages to be derived from such expeditions; it accordingly determined to try a new one upon a much larger scale, the results of which would in its estimation be proportionate to the means devoted to it.

During the summer a special commission was appointed to devise means for occupying certain points on the coast of the insurgent States; it was composed of army and navy officers, and members of the corps of hydrographic engineers called the Coast Survey, all under the presidency of Commodore Dupont. For many

years past this scientific and active corps had surveyed all the coasts of the United States, and had published maps which are models of clearness and precision. Mr. Boutelle, who, before the war, had charge of the coasts of South Carolina, brought valuable assistance and co-operation to the labors of the commission, which were stimulated by the indefatigable zeal of Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

It was determined to organize an expedition of sufficient magnitude to occupy one of the most important points on the enemy's coast, to establish itself there by means of a self-sustaining policy in such a manner as to defy all the efforts of the Confederates and gradually to extend the sphere of its operations upon land. All the ships of war which were not indispensable elsewhere were collected together, and no pains were spared to put them in a condition to perform the task which was assigned to them. Guns of the heaviest calibre were put on board, most of them smooth-bore howitzers of nine and eleven-inch calibre, and they were provided with well-trained gunners and picked crews. The fleet, under Dupont's command, was to consist of the steam frigates *Wabash* and *Susquehanna*, three sailing-frigates, five sloops-of-war, six large gun-boats, and several order-boats; to these was added a convoy of twenty-five ships loaded with coal, ready to form a vast dépôt capable of supplying the fleet so soon as it should conquer a point of landing. While the navy was making these preparations, General T. W. Sherman was organizing at Annapolis, Maryland, an army corps of fifteen thousand men, consisting of three strong brigades; and the quartermaster's department was making all the necessary preparations for transporting them. As we have stated elsewhere, it is this branch of the service which has the entire control, exclusive of the navy, of the matter of freight, and supervision of all vessels hired or purchased for that kind of service. Thirty-two steamships were in readiness for the embarkation of Sherman's corps, with all his *matériel* and a sufficient supply of provisions for a long expedition. A few of them, like the *Vanderbilt*, were magnificent packets admirably adapted for that purpose; others again were old ships almost unfit for service; but the government had to take everything that could be found. The *personnel* of this fleet, belonging chiefly to the

merchant marine, was not all that could be desired ; but in an enterprise so speedily organized, and of such unprecedented magnitude, perfection was not looked for. On the 25th of October the whole fleet and the vessels with Sherman's army on board were assembled off Fortress Monroe ; the order of sailing and of disembarkation had been arranged in minute details. The transport-ships were formed into three columns, each conveying a complete brigade ; they were provided with long-boats, and had in tow a sufficient number of surf-boats to land four thousand five hundred men each trip.

The point of attack was not definitely settled until the last moment, and its choice remained a profound secret ; it was only known to Dupont, Sherman, and the members of the cabinet, when the fleet got under way. This uncertainty regarding the destination of so vast an armament caused trouble and alarm along the whole coast of the Southern States. There was not a single Confederate port from Charleston to Texas where that fleet, whose power had long been the subject of comment in all the Northern papers, was not expected to appear soon. Having first thought of the Savannah River, Dupont had decided to direct his attack upon the entrances to Hilton Head. These inlets, situated in South Carolina at almost equal distances from Charleston and Savannah, form the principal entrance into a labyrinth of canals, with which the numerous islands along the coast comprised between those two points are intersected. Rivers run from every direction to mingle their waters with those of the sea. These islands, flat, sandy, and half submerged, produced the famous cotton known by the name of sea-island cotton, which sold in the European markets ten times higher than the coarser products of the inland plantations. Near the mouth of the rivers, which roll their waters sluggishly through an alluvial soil covered with forests and heavy thickets of myrtle and magnolias, there were swamps which the hand of man had converted into fruitful rice-fields. The white proprietors were all in the habit of flying from this deadly climate at the approach of summer, and even among the negroes themselves those alone could stand it who had been accustomed to it from their birth ; but the incomparable mildness of winter again brought back to the beautiful plantations which abound in the neighbor-

hood of the little town of Beaufort the richest proprietors of Carolina, who delighted in spending a few months among the orange groves and amid all the splendors of an almost tropical vegetation. In a military point of view, the bay of Port Royal, the entrance of which is narrowed by Hilton Head, is one of the finest ports in America, and the group of islands of St. Helena, sufficiently large to furnish supplies of every kind, yet easy to defend and surrounded by navigable arms of the sea, made an excellent dépôt for the navy. These advantages had not been unobserved by the navigator Jean Ribaut, of Dieppe, who, in 1562, had brought there a party of Norman Protestants, and had built a fort on one of the islands; the French names of Beaufort and Port Royal perpetuate the remembrance of those hardy pioneers, whom the sad religious wars of the sixteenth century had driven far from a country too little concerned to nourish her children at home.

Fine weather had favored the departure of the fleet, but it was not to escape the storm which, in consequence of its periodical return in the beginning of November, sailors call the death-blast. The bad weather overtook Dupont south-east of Cape Hatteras on the night of the 1st and 2d of November. When day dawned, cloudy and dim, on that immense sea, the waves of which the hurricane covered with foam, the squadron was entirely scattered and in a perilous situation. The ships of war braved the storm with impunity; but this was not the case with the military transports, overburdened with troops, some of which were better suited to navigate rivers than the high sea. Many of them sustained considerable damage and incurred great danger; four were obliged to seek shelter in Chesapeake Bay; several only saved themselves by throwing their cargoes overboard; two were wrecked on the enemy's coast and their crews made prisoners; and two others sank in open sea: the men they had on board were nearly all saved, thanks to the courage of the sailors belonging to the other vessels, who went to their assistance in spite of the storm. When the sea became calm, the captains of the scattered vessels, opening the sealed orders which had been forwarded to them, found Hilton Head designated as the place of rendezvous, and on the 4th of November a large number of them were already in sight of that point.

Dupont arrived in the course of the morning with twenty-five

vessels, after having put the *Susquehanna* about, opposite Charleston; and on that evening, when the sun went down behind the lower coast of Carolina, it shone upon the greater portion of the fleet riding peaceably on the bosom of a sea as smooth as a mirror. Most of the ships which had been dispersed were heard from, and that terrible storm so warmly welcomed in the South as an interposition of Providence had not, after all, caused any irreparable injury to the expedition.

The entrance of Port Royal was difficult of access. A bar, with eighteen feet of water at high tide, forms, several kilometres in front, a vast semicircle, the two extremities of which touch the coast. A tortuous channel leads through numerous sand-banks to the pass which opens between the island of St. Philip to the north and that of Hilton Head to the south. The latter takes its name from the cape formed by its northern extremity. Beyond it lies an immense sheet of water, tranquil and deep, which runs far inland and serves as the principal artery to the network of canals which render that region a perfect archipelago.

The whole line of defences along the entire coast of South Carolina had been entrusted to General Ripley. He had constructed two large earthworks to command the pass of Port Royal. The larger, Fort Walker, stood on the island of Hilton Head. It presented two faces to the sea, with two flanks, and was closed at the gorge by a bastioned curtain with a lunette. The other, of smaller dimensions, called Fort Beauregard, had a similar front, but was closed by a simple parapet, and was flanked by a line of breastworks, with platforms and embrasures for a few guns. These works, situated at a distance of four thousand metres from each other, had been constructed some time previously, but never finished, and both were imperfectly armed. Fort Walker only received its bomb-proofs towards the latter part of October, and they were, moreover, insufficient for its garrison, while the armament of the batteries was only completed in the presence of the enemy's fleet. It consisted of twenty guns for Fort Walker and nineteen for Fort Beauregard, but only eight of the former and seven of the latter had the range of the fleet; finally, out of these fifteen guns there were only eight with a calibre of more than eighteen centimetres, two of which were rifled.

The troops occupying that part of the coast were commanded by General Drayton, a rich proprietor of the neighborhood. The sad fatalities attending the civil war obliged him to fight against his brother, an officer of the navy, who had remained loyal to his flag, and who commanded one of the Federal sloops-of-war. His forces were scattered, but he succeeded, before the attack, in collecting two thousand four hundred and seventy-seven men, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven of whom were placed in the fort and on the island to the south, and six hundred and forty in the positions north of the pass.

A flotilla consisting of eight small steamers had been organized by Commodore Tatnall, a former officer of the Federal navy, who had distinguished himself in 1859 by the zeal he displayed in going to the assistance of the Anglo-French expedition in China after the check it sustained on the Pei-Ho. The Confederates placed great reliance on that flotilla and its commander. Their expectations were to be cruelly disappointed.

Immediately after his arrival Dupont set to work. A gun-boat had reconnoitred the bar while exchanging a few cannon-shots with Tatnall, and under the guidance of Captain Davis and Mr. Boutelle she had placed buoys in the channel where the large vessels had to pass. On that same evening all the smaller vessels and a portion of the transport-ships followed in her track. On the following day, the 5th, while some vessels were drawing the fire of the enemy's batteries to compel them to show their strength, the rest of the fleet entered in turn, and took a position whence they could speedily commence the battle, leaving only the three sailing-frigates outside. The strength of the enemy's works was such that Sherman's troops could not be landed until those works had been reduced; the fleet alone was called upon to play an active part. It was ready on the 6th, but the stormy weather rendered it necessary to postpone the attack till the following day.

The morning of the 7th was calm and radiant, and admirably calculated to favor the movements of the fleet. At an early hour Dupont gave the signal waited for, selecting Fort Walker for the special point of attack. His instructions to the war-vessels, which were formed in two columns, directed them to fight under steam,

and to keep always moving, so as not to become a fixed target for the enemy. The first division, led by the *Wabash*, which carried the commodore's flag, comprised the *Susquehanna* and the five sloops-of-war. It was to pass first in front of Fort Beauregard, then to veer in column inside of the pass, in order to defile in front of Hilton Head, heading seaward, then to resume its original course, thus describing an ellipse, and firing alternately upon the forts, until they should be reduced to silence. The second division, consisting of six gun-boats, was ordered to proceed beyond the pass, and to take such position as to enfilade the enemy's batteries. This plan of battle was carried out in every particular. At half-past nine o'clock the *Wabash* saluted the two forts with her broadsides from a distance, and half an hour after, the column, guided by that frigate, returned, passing within seven hundred and fifty metres of Fort Walker. The speed of the vessels was slackened in order to give more precision to their fire, and running against the tide enabled them to steer easily. The large shells of the Federal guns fell with terrible rapidity and precision within the narrow enclosure of the fort. The enfilading fire of the gun-boats, which, after a few shots, had dispersed Tatnall's fleet, soon made matters worse for the defenders of the fort, exposed as they were, without protection, to the converging fire of the whole fleet. Amid the heat of battle they had to contend with all those difficulties which insufficiency of preparation is sure to entail. All the guns differed in calibre, the projectiles did not fit the bores, and many of the carriages were already broken. Notwithstanding the courage of the Confederates, their fire slackened considerably after the first circuit of the fleet. General Ripley had not considered that his duty called him in person to the forts he had constructed, and General Drayton abandoned the post of danger at half-past ten under pretext of going in search of reinforcements. The Federal vessels had been struck repeatedly; many of their men had been killed and wounded. A ball had passed through the mainmast of the *Wabash*, but they had not suffered seriously; and when, continuing their manœuvre, they passed again in front of Fort Beauregard, they crippled it with their fire. At the second turn the Federal column, passing again before Fort Walker, approached within less than six hundred

metres of its breastworks ; fearing no longer the fire of that fort, it then slackened its speed and poured at leisure a shower of shot among the Confederate gunners. The latter, when they saw through the smoke that the assailants were retiring after the first broadside, thought they had got rid of them. This new assault, therefore, disconcerted them. In Fort Walker five out of eight guns had been dismantled ; the powder magazine was nearly empty, the dead and the wounded encumbered the enceinte of the fort. On the strength of some vague orders from their commanders the Confederates began to abandon it ; and breaking off into separate groups for the purpose of hastily crossing the vast open space ploughed by the projectiles of the enemy, they reached the neighboring woods one by one. Three brave soldiers alone remained at the post of honor, and for half an hour continued to serve the only gun which was still able to reply to the fire of the fleet. Fort Beauregard was evacuated in the same manner ; but before leaving it its commander conceived the truculent idea of placing a machine in it destined to blow up the first man who should cross its threshold. At two o'clock the battle ceased ; and the Federal sailors, having quickly landed, took possession of the two works of the enemy. That battle cost them eight killed and twenty-three wounded. The Confederates, on their side, lost eleven killed, forty-eight wounded, and seven prisoners.

The troops who were on Hilton Head and St. Philip Islands made haste to embark, after having gathered up the fugitives from the two forts, and gained the main land. Tatnall had to confine himself to covering that precipitate retreat, and afterwards to setting fire to his flotilla, which during the whole engagement had not even been able to attract the attention of the Federals for an instant. The latter were masters of the whole archipelago of St. Helena, and Sherman, on landing, had only to take possession of a territory which the enemy was no longer able to contest.

This success, so complete and decisive, was due to the superiority of the Federal artillery. It proved in a striking manner that uncovered batteries could not resist the converging fire of vessels, armed with those powerful howitzers with which the Federal navy had been supplied even before the war.

The effect of the battle of Port Royal was as largely felt in the North, where it revived the hopes of her people, as in the South, to whose people it revealed the presence of a new and pressing danger. The Federals had conquered a strong base of operations on the enemy's coast; they had carried the war into South Carolina, the State which had given the first signal of civil war, and had been the more ardent in the struggle because she had thought herself less liable to suffer from it. Sherman might, perhaps, at the first moment of his adversary's disorder, have been able to push his success farther, and to lead his army upon Charleston or Savannah. But he was afraid of risking such a venture, and contented himself with the occupancy of his new conquest, in order to make it the centre of operations rather political than military.

The archipelago of St. Helena opened the heart of the slave States to the abolition campaign, and offered a place of refuge to the negroes who were flying from the control of their rebel masters. The latter had all left Beaufort and its vicinity; and when the Federals occupied that small town on the 11th of November, they found only the black population, who had refused to abandon it. Notwithstanding their ignorance and stupidity, often feigned, which was the consequence of their servile condition, the negroes perfectly understood that the opponents of their masters could not be their enemies; they had frequently heard abolitionists spoken of with hatred, which set them to thinking; and when, in the course of the war, Federal vessels approached the plantations deserted by their owners, the abandoned slaves were more than once seen crowding on board in search of that legendary personage who was to deliver them from all their ills, and whom, in a jargon curiously expressive, they styled *Massa Bobolition*.

But General Sherman, who was not an abolitionist, and upon whom President Lincoln had moreover enjoined the greatest caution in regard to the slave question, could only protect them, without undertaking a direct propagandism against the servile institution. As we propose to return to this subject in a later volume, we shall merely remark in this place that he acquitted himself of this delicate mission very wisely, and that he performed the duties imposed by humanity towards the people whom he had

delivered from oppression, without touching upon the constitutional questions which were not within his province. He promised an indemnity to the owners of slaves who should give evidence of their loyalty to the Union. At the same time, he thought proper to issue a conciliatory appeal to the citizens of South Carolina, which the latter naturally received with contempt and derision, and to which they replied by causing the immense dépôts of cotton which had fallen into the hands of the Federals to be secretly set on fire by their emissaries. Faithful to the orders of their government, they hoped thereby to compel Europe to interfere to the extent of raising the blockade of the Southern ports. During several weeks the fires which were reflected in the waters of the archipelago, and which at times lighted up the whole sky with a lurid blaze, bore evidence to the ardor which animated the combatants in that great political conflict. "King Cotton" was on fire, but it was a useless sacrifice; the reign of Slavery was not to spring again into life from its ashes.

The occupation of most of the islands in the vicinity of the St. Helena group was the natural consequence of the victory of Hilton Head. It was effected gradually before the end of the year. Among all the points of the coast which the Federals had thus seized without striking a blow, thanks to the *prestige* of their success, the most important was Tybee Island, at the entrance of the Savannah River. Situated on the right bank of the mouth of that river, and being the spot where the lighthouse stands, Tybee Island enabled the Federals, as soon as they became masters of it, to obstruct the passage of the *blockade-runners* on their way to the great mart of Savannah. At a distance of about six hundred feet from its borders, on an islet in the middle of the river, stood Fort Pulaski, so called after the illustrious exile, to whom America had the honor of giving an asylum. This great work of masonry, constructed on General Bernard's plan, on the same model as Forts Warren at Boston and Sumter at Charleston, commanded the entire course of the river. Tybee Island afforded some positions from which its high walls could be easily bombarded. On the 25th of November the sailors of the steamer *Flag* landed on this island, and the government had the satisfac-

tion of being able to announce to the public that the Federal banner floated once more on the soil of Georgia.

A few days after, the navy extended its conquests still farther south. The group of islands to which Tybee belongs is separated from another group, called Warsaw Islands, by a deep entrance which bears that name. A navigable channel connects this pass with the estuary of the Savannah River above Fort Pulaski. The Federal gun-boats ran into it, putting to flight on their approach the Georgia militia occupying the works erected on Warsaw Islands, and thus opening a passage for future operations, which would enable them to reach Savannah by turning Fort Pulaski.

Finally, on the 12th of December, Captain Rodgers, who commanded the naval squadron operating along this part of the coast, entered Ossabaw Bay, but, doubting his ability to establish himself there, merely exchanged a few cannon-shots with a fort situated at the extremity, and retired after making a thorough reconnaissance of the bay.

In the mean time, similar enterprises were progressing on the other side of Hilton Head. The group of St. Helena Islands is bounded on the north by a deep bay bearing the same name, and on the south by that of Port Royal. This bay, which was destined to be of great use to the navy, was occupied at the end of November. The vessels which were sent to make a reconnaissance of it found the works erected upon its borders without defenders, and they penetrated as far as the river Coosaw, which empties its waters into it, without any difficulty. A few weeks after, the Federal ships made their appearance in the estuary called North Edisto River, situated between St. Helena Sound and Charleston. On Edisto Island, which separates that estuary from the bay of St. Helena, there were several fortifications and a camp of considerable size, all of which were evacuated after an insignificant cannonade.

Thus, at the end of the year, Dupont's fleet, supported by detachments from Sherman's army, was in possession of the five large bays of North Edisto, St. Helena, Port Royal, Tybee, Warsaw, and the whole chain of islands which forms the coast of Carolina and Georgia between those bays. After the battle of Hilton

Head it came in contact with the enemy but once; this was on the 1st of January, 1862. The Confederates had massed several thousand men on the left bank of the Coosaw River, in a number of fortified works recently erected for the purpose of commanding the course of that stream. It was determined to dislodge them. Four gun-boats, accompanied by two ferry-boats and four barges, gained the entrance of the Coosaw through inland canals, while the brigade of Stevens, numbering four thousand five hundred men, joined them by land from Beaufort by crossing the island of St. Helena. The troops were conveyed to the other bank of the Coosaw, and attacked the Confederate works in rear, while the vessels cannonaded them from the river. After a short fight, in which they lost nine men, the Federals occupied all the positions of the enemy, who fled rapidly into the interior.

In this chapter we have seen the task which events had imposed on the Federal navy, and how well that task was accomplished. We have shown how it had been necessary at the commencement to create and organize everything, the *personnel* as well as the *matériel*, ships, and guns. The navy, once in a condition to enforce respect, came to the protection of merchant-vessels by going in pursuit of Confederate privateers. It established, in the face of unheard-of difficulties, an effective blockade along the whole of the enemy's coast; and finally, it occupied a number of important points on that coast by means of combined expeditions, the largest and most successful of which was that of Port Royal.

We have now to relate an event which came near changing the whole aspect of the war, and caused a commotion both in Europe and America which nobody can yet have forgotten. Although this incident was essentially of a political character, it must take its place in the chapter devoted to maritime operations. We allude to the arrest of the Confederate commissioners on board a British vessel.

The Richmond government had scarcely been constituted when it aspired to official recognition on the part of Europe, the rights of a belligerent, which had been so readily granted to it, not being deemed sufficient. This recognition would not have been of any

great value of itself. It could neither have prevented the blockade nor have secured one cannon or one musket more to the Confederates; but the United States justly regarded it as an act of moral hostility which they were determined to oppose most energetically. It was because it hoped to see the latter thus drawn into an European war that the Confederate government insisted with so much pertinacity on being recognized, and it had deputed two prominent politicians, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, to go and plead its cause in London and Paris in the capacity of envoys extraordinary. These two agents left Charleston by the steamer *Theodora*, and reached Havana after eluding the vigilance of the Federal cruisers. On the 7th of November they embarked, with their secretaries, Messrs. Eustis and McFarland, for St. Thomas and England, on the English mail-packet *Trent*. At that time the Federal sloop-of-war *San Jacinto* was cruising in the Florida waters and among the Antilles in search of the *Sumter*. She was commanded by Captain Wilkes, a navigator known by his discoveries in southern lands, a man of scientific acquirements, but of an eccentric and independent character. He had devoted the long leisure hours of his voyages among the icebergs of the polar sea to a profound study of maritime law, an inextricable labyrinth, more difficult of exploration than the inhospitable regions to which he had given his name. Chance took him to Havana, where he found the Confederate commissioners feasted by that pro-slavery community and preparing for their departure, concerning which they made no secret whatever.

Feeling annoyed at the facility with which they had eluded the blockade, Wilkes thought he would make amends for the negligence of the Federal cruisers by a bold stroke; it may be that he also courted an opportunity for bestowing that popularity upon his name which his scientific labors had failed to secure. Whatever may have been his motives, he consulted the works considered as authorities in such matters, and persuaded himself that he was justified by international law in capturing the enemy's commissioners on the high seas under a neutral flag. Having arrived at that conclusion, he proceeded to post himself in the Bahama channel, and waited quietly for the English steamer, which was to pass there after leaving Havana. The *Trent* hove in sight on the 8th

of November at the very hour that Wilkes had expected her. Everything was ready for battle on board the *San Jacinto*; the men were at their posts and the guns loaded. A blank cartridge was fired; but as the English packet did not obey that summons, Wilkes sent after her a shell, which burst in front of her bow and compelled her to heave to. A moment after, a boat with Lieutenant Fairfax and a detachment of marines boarded the *Trent*, whose deck was crowded with passengers awaiting the issue of this unexpected scene. The Federal officer, closely followed by a few armed men, came forward and informed the commander of the steamer, Mr. Moir, that he intended to exercise the right of visitation. The commander having refused to produce the list of passengers, he declared that he had come to seize the persons of the commissioners, whose presence on board could not be denied. He was determined not to withdraw until he had executed the orders of his commander, and in support of that declaration he called up two boats which were at hand with reinforcements. Mr. Moir and the English mail agent, Mr. Williams, an old retired naval captain, replied to him with much warmth, which capped the climax of the passengers' excitement. In the midst of this scene the commissioners themselves came forward, protesting in their turn against the act of violence with which they were threatened. The reinforcements called for by Fairfax had come aboard and been drawn up amidships with fixed bayonets, while Messrs. Mason and Slidell retired to their respective cabins, declaring that they would not come out unless compelled by force. Fairfax went to bring them out, and with the aid of a few armed men took them by the shoulders, as if intending to carry them along. While engaged in the performance of this degrading act of violence he was struck, it is said, by Miss Slidell, who had bravely posted herself across the door to defend her father. The commissioners were taken into the boats, where their secretaries followed them without resistance. The families of Messrs. Slidell and Eustis, who accompanied them, refused the repugnant hospitality of the *San Jacinto*, and preferred to continue their voyage to England, where they could be more useful to their cause.

Three hours after the first cannon-shot had been fired Captain

Wilkes set the *Trent* free and proceeded with his prisoners to Fort Monroe, while the English packet steamed in the direction of St. Thomas, where her passengers and Captain Williams took the British mail, to bear to Europe without delay the particulars of the drama of which they had been helpless spectators. The news of the arrest of the commissioners was known in the United States on the 16th of November, and in England on the 30th; the different impressions produced by it may be easily imagined.

In America it was hailed with a shout of joy; people saw nothing in it at first but the result obtained—the capture of some of the most inveterate foes of the Union. When the act of daring violence, committed in contempt of the British flag, was understood in all its details, the satisfaction of having humbled that rival flag overrode every other consideration. Wilkes, after taking his prisoners to Fort Warren, in Boston harbor, was congratulated by the Secretary of the Navy, everywhere met with flattering demonstrations of respect, and elected by acclamation a member of the Historical Society of New York. He became the object of universal curiosity, and his bold stroke was celebrated as if it had been a great victory. In the midst of this concert of praises not a single protesting voice was raised, and yet the unanimity was only apparent. In countries called democratic—that is to say, where popular opinion, that of the masses, is freely expressed and exercises in one way or other an irresistible influence—the excitement of the moment at first carries everything before it, and causes all discordant voices to be silent. But if such a country should possess at the same time truly liberal institutions, men of enlightened and reflecting minds, after having maturely formed their opinions, obtain an ascendancy in the end. Such minds, deeply imbued with the sound political traditions of their country, were not rare in America, and only awaited an opportunity to make the people listen to the counsels of true patriotism. Aside from this, Wilkes himself was not dazzled by appearances; he was preparing to justify his course at a moment when no one had yet dared to cast any blame upon him. He made a report to the government, in which he endeavored to demonstrate the legality of the arrest of the Confederate commissioners, citing precedents and referring to the opinions of his favorite authors.

In his effort to sustain this view he unquestionably displayed the skill of a jurist.

The news of the insult offered to the national flag naturally caused much indignation in England. The whole nation felt outraged by the violation of the right of asylum, of which it is so justly jealous; it shared the feelings experienced by the passengers of the *Trent* when they saw the deck of the vessel occupied by Federal soldiers. There was no discussion as to texts or precedents; all the vexations to which the British navy had subjected neutrals in the beginning of the present century, when it was playing the part of a belligerent, were forgotten. The enemies of the American republic, specially numerous among the rich classes, encouraged those sentiments to gratify their own hatred. They had a leader in the prime minister, Lord Palmerston, who, notwithstanding his sagacity, allowed himself more than once during his life to be blinded by prejudice. After a summary and partial investigation, the law advisers of the Crown had pronounced the seizure of the Confederate commissioners illegal. The British government acted at once as if it had already been at war with the United States. The moderate counsels of a few eminent men were not listened to; moreover, the government carefully concealed from the public the existence of a despatch from Washington, written immediately after the arrival of Wilkes, in which might have been seen the sure pledge of a friendly settlement. Indeed, the cabinet of the White House declared that the commander of the *San Jacinto* had acted without instructions, and that it was ready to discuss the question regarding the legality of the seizure.* The British government only sought to make a parade of its power. It prohibited the exportation of powder, military preparations were made with feverish activity, and a large body of troops was embarked in haste for Canada. The Guards, who have the noble privilege of taking part in all important wars, were the first to start. These troops went on board the vessels playing an air well known in America—" *I am off to Charleston*"—for they thought they were going to assist the Confederates. The latter were already looking out for them as their

* Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, November 30, 1861.

saviours, and beheld in that terrible crisis the certain fulfilment of their hopes.

There were two men who, by a single imprudent word, might, at that critical moment, have caused irreparable mischief: these were Lord Lyons, British minister at Washington, and Mr. Adams, the American minister in London. They both evinced a tact and a moderation for which their fellow-citizens ought to be extremely grateful. They had the Atlantic for their auxiliary, which, by rendering communication between the two countries impossible for fifteen days, gave both parties ample time for sober reflection. At a later period Mr. Adams told the author, who happened to be then in Washington, that if the Transatlantic cable had been in existence at that time war would have been inevitable.

The point of law so irrelevantly raised by Captain Wilkes may be summed up in a few words. From the day when England became the first naval power in the world she asserted the right of belligerent vessels to search the ships of neutrals and to seize enemies' property. It was by resisting this pretension that the continental States and America laid the foundation of modern maritime law. England was at last obliged to renounce that claim by the treaty of Paris in 1856—a treaty to which the United States refused to become a party, but only on account of the maintenance of the blockade system. The great principle that the flag covers the merchandise was solemnly acknowledged, and the only exception made was against vessels which should attempt to force a regular blockade, and against those engaged in carrying contraband of war to a belligerent. This principle had found nowhere more zealous supporters than in the statesmen of America. After invoking the doubtful precedent of a minister arrested in a foreign land during the war, at the beginning of the present century, Captain Wilkes endeavored to justify the arrest of the Confederate commissioners by assimilating them and the despatches of which they were the bearers to contraband of war. He acknowledged that to keep strictly within the bounds of the law he should have also seized the vessel which carried the commissioners, and brought her, with her pretended contraband, before a Federal prize-court for adjudication. His excuse for not having done

so was that he had acted out of consideration for the passengers. Unfortunately for him, he did not seize the despatches, which had been saved by Mrs. Slidell. But, in any case, his theory does not seem tenable; the assimilation of the commissioners to contraband of war was false, and the circumstances under which the seizure was made rendered it illegal. In fact, no merchandise whatever becomes contraband of war except by virtue of its destination; thus it is that, since the invention of steam, coal has been classified in that category; guns, ammunition, articles of equipment, coke, are not liable to seizure unless the captor can prove that they were intended for a hostile port or fleet. The destination of the vessel which carries such goods can alone give them that character; and if they are transported in good faith from one neutral port to another neutral port, they are covered by the flag. Without this restriction, every belligerent could intercept the commerce of the whole world; as, for instance, it would suffice for China and Russia to be at war, to justify the latter in searching and seizing every ship engaged in carrying arms, and even coal, between France and England. The Confederate commissioners, therefore, could not be assimilated to contraband of war, because, their hostile character being inherent in them, there was no occasion for making the essential distinction in regard to destination, as in the case of merchandise; and on the other hand, the seizure of all the contraband of war on board the *Trent*, and the arraignment of that vessel before a prize-court, would have been illegal, because her destination was in reality from one neutral port to another neutral port.

Some persons, thinking that it would be of importance to the whole world to have these principles asserted by America on so important an occasion, asked the Federal government to take the initiative; they proposed that it should take advantage of the fact that Captain Wilkes had acted without instructions, to disavow the act before England should make any demand regarding the matter. But Mr. Lincoln, who preserved a prudent silence on that subject, did not at first deem it expedient to brave public opinion. To those who represented to him the danger which would be incurred in allowing the public to become exasperated, and the impossibility for America to support at once a civil war

and a foreign war, he replied with one of those anecdotes he excelled in telling. "My father," he said, "had a neighbor from whom he was only separated by a fence. On each side of that fence there were two savage dogs, who kept running backward and forward along the barrier all day, barking and snapping at each other. One day they came to a large opening recently made in the fence. Perhaps you think they took advantage of this to devour each other? Not at all; scarcely had they seen the gap, when they both ran back, each on his own side, with their tails between their legs. These two dogs are fair representatives of America and England."

The demands of England came at last. They exacted a formal apology and the immediate release of the prisoners. It was expedient to decide at once. The counsels of wise policy and true patriotism prevailed at Washington. The government frankly adopted the course it intended to pursue, and instructed the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, to inform Lord Lyons that the Confederate commissioners should be released. The clever secretary found means to present that declaration in a manner which satisfied both the self-love of his fellow-citizens and the demands of England. In that despatch he explained at length all the causes which justified Captain Wilkes, according to the traditional policy of England, and only acknowledged that the fact of not having brought the *Trent* before one of the prize-courts constituted an illegal act which rendered it impracticable to justify the seizure; that the Federal officer had erred from motives of humanity. Mr. Seward covered his retreat by congratulating himself on finding one of the fundamental principles of American policy thus vindicated by England. To view matters in such a light was certainly an unexpected success.

The American public, who, the evening before, seemed unwilling to listen to any proposition looking to the release of the prisoners, received the decision of the cabinet with a feeling of relief fully shared by England. Both sides had had time for reflection. Each had calculated the disasters which the threatened war would inflict upon the two nations, and this reflection had the most salutary effect upon their subsequent relations. Peace between them was consolidated by the very dangers they had in-

curred ; and when the Confederate commissioners landed in England in January, they were received with an indifference which showed them how fruitless their mission was to be. They were even reproached for the premature delight their associates had exhibited when war seemed inevitable.

A portion of the troops who had embarked in England for Canada had not yet arrived when the commissioners left Fort Warren. Mr. Seward took advantage of this delay to wind up the negotiation with one of those strokes of wit which that humorous statesman never failed to launch at his opponents. He hastened to inform the British consul at Portland, Maine, that the English troops would be allowed to land at that port, and pass freely through the territory of the United States, to avoid the New Brunswick route—impeded by snow and ice at that season—on their way to Canada.

We have reached the end of the first year of the long war the narrative of which we have undertaken. It terminated contrary to the expectations of both parties, without securing to either of them a decided superiority. It had dissipated many illusions. Nothing but new sacrifices and additional sufferings were in prospect for the year 1862. The struggle, the importance and the difficulties of which no one had foreseen at the commencement, was daily increasing in proportions. But both parties were preparing for the issue with equal determination of purpose. Everything was put in operation to raise and equip larger armies than those which had been fighting before. The people of the North and of the South, with this purpose in view, submitted to the severest measures, and those most contrary to their habits of life. We shall find them at work in the following chapters.

The British Government refused these offers, which, by the bye, were somewhat perfidious, as it would have been impossible for them to prevent the desertion of their soldiers, who would have been seduced from their allegiance by the large bounties and high pay allowed to the American volunteers.—AUTHOR'S NOTE.

BOOK V.—THE FIRST WINTER.

CHAPTER I.

THE FIRST WINTER.—DONELSON AND PEA RIDGE.

THE new Southern Confederacy, notwithstanding the false impressions its first victory had created, found itself at the beginning of the year 1862 strongly organized for the defence of a territory which comprised nearly all the slave States. The South persuaded herself, as she had persuaded Europe, that all the efforts of her adversaries could not prevail against her resistance.

In fact, the North had only been able to wrest from her an insignificant portion of territory compared with the entire extent of her domain. Of the whole slave territory, the North only occupied Maryland, Western Virginia, some parts of Kentucky, the greater portion of Missouri, and certain positions along the coast. But time had enabled her to display her resources, and the war was about to assume new proportions. The volunteers, flocking from all parts, were being organized on the borders of the Potomac, the Ohio, and the Mississippi into large armies.

We shall deal first with those which were about to operate west of the Alleghanies. As we have seen, these were divided into three distinct corps. One, under General Curtis, in Missouri, had drawn close to the Arkansas frontier, towards the end of the year. The second, under General Grant, guarded the Mississippi and the mouth of the Tennessee at Cairo and Paducah. The third, under General Buell, operated in Kentucky, with its centre near Elizabethtown. The first two were under the chief command of General Halleck, a wise officer, with fine organizing abilities, but who was accused of too frequently thwarting the designs of his subordinates, and of leaving them afterwards to carry out in presence of the enemy the plans of campaign he had elaborated in his office.

These armies were to find a new auxiliary, whose power was beginning to be appreciated, in the fleet which was being fitted out on the Ohio and the Upper Mississippi. Two remarkable

men, both of whom were to succumb under the effect of the wounds received while leading that fleet against the enemy, Commodore Foote and Colonel Ellet, had superintended its formation with all the ardor of their patriotism and all the resources of their inventive minds. We shall relate elsewhere how they gathered this fleet upon the hitherto peaceful waters of the Mississippi; the services it rendered to the Federal armies will appear in every line of this narrative. That fleet was divided into three categories: 1st. The gun-boats, some of them being old ships more or less adapted for military service, and most of them, thinly plated; the others were of new construction; they all carried powerful guns; were manned by sailors, and commanded by the brave Foote. 2d. The rams, the creation of Colonel Ellet, formed a separate division, organized by the War Department, and manned by land-troops. 3d. The transport-ships, which were large Mississippi passenger-boats bought or hired by the quartermaster for the conveyance of troops.

The facilities afforded by this fleet for the movement of armies naturally indicated the West, and in the West the courses of the Mississippi and the Tennessee, as destined to be the theatre of the first military operations of 1862. This calculation had formed the basis of the general plan drawn up by General McClellan for the beginning of the year. It was, however, in Eastern Kentucky that the struggle was renewed at first; and the successes which the Federals achieved there would have caused them to modify their plan if the force of events had not obliged them to adhere to it.

We have stated that the Confederate line of defences in Kentucky rested upon Columbus at the west, upon Bowling Green in the centre, and at the east upon the group of mountains from which the Cumberland springs to enter the plain. The first two points had become important military posts; another was established to cover the third. The position of Mill Springs, south of Somerset, had been selected for that purpose, because it was near the river at the place where it begins to be navigable. The unsuccessful attempts of the Federals at Pikeville, and in the direction of Cumberland Gap, had taught their adversaries that they had nothing to fear on that side, and that any expedition directed

upon East Tennessee would have to bear more to the westward, to follow the open country and avoid the defiles of the Cumberland Mountains. It would be obliged, after crossing the river, to take either the Jacksborough road through Williamsburg, or that of Jamestown (Tennessee) by way of Monticello. The entrenched camp at Mill Spring, near this last town, covered them both.

The first battle was to be fought more to the east, among the gorges of the chain which separates Kentucky from Virginia. Since the month of November, one of the small Confederate corps which occupied that chain had returned to Piketon, of which place, as we have seen, Nelson had for a while taken possession. This corps was commanded by Colonel Humphrey Marshall, whose name, celebrated in Kentucky since the Mexican war, had drawn a large number of ardent and adventurous young men to his standard. But unwieldy from excessive obesity, Humphrey Marshall in 1862 was no longer the brilliant colonel of cavalry whom we saw fighting at Buena Vista by the side of his friend Jefferson Davis. His troops, numbering two thousand five hundred men, were stationed at Prestonburg, and stretched as far as Paintsville, in the valley of the West Big Sandy River.

Notwithstanding the season, so rigorous in the mountains, a Federal brigade, under Colonel Garfield, was sent to dislodge him. Garfield occupied George Creek, on the West Big Sandy, where he could obtain his supplies by water. He started, on the 7th of January, with two thousand infantry, four hundred horses, and a few field-pieces, and carrying three days' provisions. On being informed of his approach, Humphrey Marshall abandoned Paintsville and fell back upon Prestonburg, leaving a few hundred men to cover his retreat upon Tenny's Creek, which could be easily defended. The Federal cavalry, and a few companies of infantry that accompanied it, encountered this rear-guard of the enemy on the 7th of January, and attacked it without waiting for the remainder of the troops; the Confederates were put to flight after losing a few of their men. Being obliged to replenish his supply-train before going farther, Garfield took the Prestonburg road on the 9th of January with about one thousand five hundred men. On the following morning he encountered all the forces of Marshall posted along the right bank of a little tributary of the Big

Sandy called Middle Creek, which the recent rains had swollen. The Confederates occupied a semicircular hill, the two extremities of which rested upon the stream. They had posted their four field-pieces on the left, and concealed their centre, in order to draw the Federals towards that point and take them between two fires. Garfield did not fall into that snare. Sending out a swarm of skirmishers, he compelled the enemy to discover himself, and as soon as he had reconnoitred his positions he sent a few hundred men to turn his left by crossing the stream near its mouth. After a brisk engagement the Federal detachment took possession of a height which commanded the positions of the Confederates. Garfield then gave the signal of attack to his right. The Confederates, being caught in their turn between two fires, began to fall back. A timely reinforcement made success certain for the Federals, and night alone prevented them from dislodging Marshall from all the heights he had endeavored to defend. The Confederate general took advantage of the darkness to retire in great haste, abandoning his dépôts of provisions, his wounded, and the little town of Prestonburg. The battle of Middle Creek cost him about sixty killed and one hundred wounded; the Federals had only twenty-seven men disabled. Their success was complete but barren, because, not being able to subsist at Prestonburg, they were soon compelled to return to Paintsville. No decisive operations were possible in that region.

It was some time after the check he had experienced at Wild Cat camp, that Zollicoffer, leaving Barboursville, had proceeded to occupy the important position of Mill Spring. Mr. Davis, although displeased with him, had not dared to dismiss him from the service on account of the popularity he enjoyed in Kentucky, but he had been placed under the command of General Crittenden. The latter presented a sad example of the domestic convulsions which followed the outbreak of the civil war. His father, an old gentleman justly respected throughout America, was a member of the House of Representatives at Washington, and his brother held the rank of general in the Federal army. The command which had been conferred upon Crittenden at the end of December gave him about ten thousand men; he had conveyed part of his forces to the right bank of the Cumberland and

fortified the position of Beach Grove, in front of Mill Springs, but the nature of the ground had obliged him to extend his works in such a manner that the troops at his disposal were not sufficient to defend them. Beach Grove could nevertheless be made the base of operations of a Confederate army which might penetrate into the heart of Kentucky by avoiding the formidable positions of Wild Cat camp. Buell, therefore, had ordered General Schöpfung to occupy the small town of Somerset, whence he could watch the Confederates and oppose their march. In the beginning of January he determined to prevent that march, and sent General Thomas from Louisville with one of the four divisions of the army of Kentucky to join Schöpfung and dislodge the Confederates from their positions on the Cumberland River. Thomas left his cantonments at Lebanon, where he formed the left wing of the army assembled on the road from Louisville to Bowling Green, and the heads of his column arrived on the 17th of January at Logan Cross-roads, an intersection only sixteen kilometres distant from Beach Grove. The road which leads from Somerset to Monticello becomes separated at this point from those running in a westerly direction towards Columbia and Jamestown (Kentucky). Thomas thus threatened to occupy the borders of the Cumberland below Mill Springs. It was by this river that Crittenden received part of his supplies, for the Cumberland Gap road was too long and too difficult to bring him the necessary provisions for his nine or ten thousand men from East Tennessee. Fearing lest he should be cut off on that side, or be attacked in a position too extended for the number of his soldiers, Crittenden resolved to forestall the movements of his adversary. He started for Logan Cross-roads with the two brigades of Zollicoffer and Carroll and a battery of artillery, forming all together an effective force of from five to six thousand. He was in hopes of surprising Thomas before the latter had been able to effect a junction with Schöpfung, and collect all his forces, which had been delayed by the bad condition of the roads. But the Federal general had been joined on the 18th by a portion of his troops, and had been apprised of the movements of the enemy in the course of the following night. He was, therefore, on his guard and prepared at all points to receive his

attack. He occupied Logan Cross-roads with four regiments, the Ninth Ohio, Second Minnesota, Tenth Indiana, Fourth Kentucky, and a battery of artillery; the brigade of Carter was only a short distance off, ready to support him, thus swelling the total amount of his forces to five or six thousand men, about equal in number to those of the enemy.

The latter began the fight at an early hour on the morning of the 19th of January. The Federal line, formed in haste, fell back under the first fire of the Confederates; its left rested upon a hill whose summit was opened and exposed, and towards which Zollicoffer, who led his brigade valiantly, directed all his efforts. It was on the point of being carried; but the brigade of Carter having come to the assistance of the Federal centre, Thomas detached Colonel Fry with the Fourth Kentucky from that portion of the line, and sent him to the left to support the Tenth Indiana, which the enemy was driving before him. His timely arrival changed the aspect of the fight; the belligerents came to close quarters, and in the midst of the *melée* Fry met General Zollicoffer, whom he shot dead on the spot with his pistol. On seeing their commander fall the Confederates became disconcerted; and the Ninth Ohio, which formed the Federal right, seizing the favorable moment, drove them back in disorder upon their second brigade. Crittenden, who had displayed great courage, tried in vain to bring back once more the chances of victory; his line, which had been for an instant re-formed, was again broken by the brigade of Carter. The volunteers from East Tennessee, who composed this brigade, displayed extraordinary ardor. The Federals pressed their adversaries on every side; they had the impetus which a first success imparts, and nothing could resist their onward course. Two cannon, ninety prisoners, arms and equipments of every kind, remained in their hands; the Confederates, leaving one hundred dead and sixty wounded on the battle-field, fled in disorder towards their entrenchments. The battle of Logan Cross-roads, improperly called Mill Springs, only lasted a few hours, and cost the Federals thirty-eight killed and one hundred and ninety-four wounded in all. Their victory was complete. On the same evening, Thomas, after receiving an important reinforcement from Schöpfung, appeared before the works of Beach Grove; but darkness

having supervened, and his soldiers having eaten nothing since the day previous, he contented himself with firing a few cannon-shots into the positions of the enemy. The Confederates, being entirely disorganized, were unable to defend them; they crossed to the other side of the Cumberland during the night, destroying the boats which carried them over, and afterwards dispersing among the mountains in order to procure food and to escape from all pursuit. On the morning of the 20th the Federals occupied their works and the camps adjoining them; they took possession of ten field-pieces and more than one thousand five hundred wagons. The Confederate army was annihilated.

During this short campaign Thomas displayed some of those military qualities which at a later period made him conspicuous among the foremost leaders. But he had to rest contented with this success; the condition of the roads and the inclemency of the weather rendered all pursuit impossible. Crittenden had retired by way of Monticello in the direction of Nashville, and part of his troops had gone towards Cumberland Gap. But to undertake to rescue East Tennessee from Confederate rule, to wrest from them the salt-works and the coal-fields which they possessed in the Cumberland Mountains, would have required an army sufficiently strong and well provisioned to advance alone through a difficult country without fear of being cut off or surrounded. Agents of the War Department, who had been sent on special missions into Kentucky, testified to the impracticability of such an enterprise, and the efforts of the Federals had to be directed elsewhere.

We have stated that Columbus, on the Mississippi, and Bowling Green, in the centre of Kentucky, were the two points upon which the Confederate line of defence rested. Polk's army, occupying Columbus, closed the great river against the Federals. That of Sidney Johnston, at Bowling Green, controlled the whole network of railways. Between these two points two large water-courses, the Tennessee and the Cumberland, ran parallel from south to north, the former to the left, the latter to the right, and finally emptied into the Ohio, one at Paducah, the other at Smithland, a little higher up. It was a road with two tracks, open in the most vulnerable part of the Confederate line. In order to

command its entrance they had erected two forts, called Henry and Donelson. The first, of comparatively small dimensions, was situated on the right bank of the Tennessee. The other, about twenty kilometres south-south-eastward of that point, rested upon the left bank of the Cumberland, near the village of Dover, an important station of the great railway line which leads from Bowling Green to Columbus and Memphis; it was much larger and better constructed than Fort Henry. They were so placed as to command the two rivers and the narrow strip of land which separates them. They were connected by a good road and a telegraph line, which enabled their garrisons to give each other mutual support.

These positions presented a powerful line of defence, but they were too much extended for the forces which had to guard them. It is difficult, among so many contradictory statements, to form a correct estimate of the number of those forces. According to Confederate historians, the total number could not have exceeded thirty thousand men, all included; the War Department at Richmond rated them at more than sixty thousand men. Mr. Stevenson, an impartial writer, whom we have already quoted, and who was employed in the administrative branches of that army, states that in the month of January they received one hundred and twenty thousand rations. Taking all deficiencies into consideration, and making ample allowance, even, for the greatest want of order in the distribution of those rations, such a figure would denote at least the presence of seventy thousand able-bodied men. The numerous reports of Confederate generals gave very imperfect indications as to the total number of their troops. Such differences, however, should be attributed to the fact that the irregular corps, such as the militia and guerillas, were sometimes included as part of the total effective force of the army. Deducting these corps, the army commanded by Sidney Johnston must have numbered more than fifty thousand and less than sixty thousand men. This was a small force with which to exercise a *surveillance* at once over the Alleghanies and the Mississippi. Alarmed by the defeat of Crittenden at Mill Springs, Johnston had detached several regiments from Bowling Green and sent them into Eastern Tennessee, thus raising the number of troops posted *en echelon*

on his right to nearly ten thousand men. In order to hold in check the army of Buell, who had pushed his outposts as far as Green River, he had massed about thirty thousand men in the large fortifications of Bowling Green; Forts Henry and Donelson were occupied by four or five thousand men, and nearly the same number were stationed among the small posts and in the city of Nashville. His left, commanded by Polk, and subsequently by Beauregard, who guarded Columbus and the Mississippi, numbered scarcely ten thousand men. The Richmond government had turned a deaf ear to the representations of Johnston, who kept asking for reinforcements. He had not even been allowed to carry into Kentucky the twelve months' volunteers raised by the State of Tennessee. Seeing the number of his opponents increase daily, the Confederate general understood at last that the time was approaching when his line would be pierced, and that, in order to avoid that danger, it was necessary for him to assume the offensive. His plan of campaign, arranged with Beauregard, was to be carried out in the early part of February, but the Federals did not give him time. Grant's command had been extended and his forces increased by large additions of recruits. General Halleck, who thought he had found in him a modest subordinate without ambition, favored him in every way, while Commodore Foote was ready to afford him the powerful co-operation of his flotilla.

Towards the latter end of January a column of a few thousand men had proceeded as far as within sight of Columbus, and, following the line of the Tennessee in returning, had reconnoitred all the intervening space between that river and the Mississippi. About the same time Foote and General C. F. Smith appeared in front of Fort Henry on board a gun-boat, and examined its approaches. Seated upon low and marshy ground, its sides protected by two streams, that work presented the appearance of an irregular bastioned pentagon. It had an armament of seventeen guns placed *en barbette*, twelve of which pointed towards the river; so that, although it had neither masonry nor shelters, it was able to make a long resistance on the land side. But the choice of its position proved that the Confederate engineers had not understood the true principles of river defence in America.

In placing it close to the water's edge they exposed it to be demolished, like the forts of Hilton Head, by the large Dahlgren shells, while its guns could only strike the sides of vessels protected by iron armor. Experience soon taught the Confederates to appreciate the superiority of works constructed on elevated positions, such as are to be met with at long intervals along the line of American rivers. Indeed, whenever such works were attacked by Federal vessels, the latter suffered cruelly from the plunging fire, which easily pierced their decks, while they could not raise their guns to a sufficient elevation to reach the interior of the enemy's defences at good range. Finally, on the opposite side of Fort Henry there stood an unfinished work, the fire of which, when completed, would have crossed its own. Three thousand Confederates occupied the fort, under General Tilghman.

Towards the middle of January, Grant and Foote proposed to Halleck to undertake the reduction of Forts Henry and Donelson by land and water at once. But after having approved their plan, this general postponed its execution from day to day. It required the most urgent solicitations to obtain his permission to commence the campaign. At last, on the 2d of February, Grant embarked with the two divisions of McClelland and C. F. Smith on several of those large steamers resembling floating houses which furrow the rivers of America. The first division and one brigade of the second were to land on the right bank of the Tennessee, for the purpose of investing Fort Henry and cutting off the retreat of its garrison. The other two brigades were ordered to land on the left bank, to occupy the unfinished works to be found there, and to assist with their artillery in the general attack. Foote's fleet was to co-operate energetically. The iron-clad vessels, which were to be put on trial, recalled to mind from their construction the floating-batteries used in bombarding Kinburn. They were very broad, with flat bottoms, and their sheathing, sloping inwards at an angle of nearly forty-four degrees, was covered with plates of iron of six to seven centimetres in thickness; the deck, razeed fore and aft, presented, above the water-line, surfaces sloping in the same way and sheathed, carrying two or three guns. They were, in one word, redoubts in the shape of rectangular pyramids placed on low hulls, the whole

being moved by high-pressure steam-engines. The mortar-boats were mere barges intended to be towed, the deck of which, surrounded by an iron wall, was occupied by a single mortar of large size, measuring eleven, and sometimes thirteen, inches of interior diameter. The ships collected to form the flotilla comprised eight mortar-boats, a certain number of transports, carrying a few guns, and several iron-clad vessels; but among the latter there were only four ready for use at the end of January. They formed, including three steamers not iron clad, the naval division which left Cairo on the 2d of February, under the command of Commodore Foote, at the same time as the vessels with Grant's troops.

On the following day the Federal commodore passed from the Ohio into the Tennessee, and leisurely ascended the latter river, fishing up the torpedoes which the enemy had scattered over his course. On the 5th of February the whole of Grant's troops were landed six or seven kilometres below the fort; the positions of the enemy had been carefully reconnoitred, and the fleet was ready. The attack was fixed for the day following, at noon. Grant had intended to appear before the fort with the land forces at the same time as the fleet; but not anticipating the difficulties of the road, he had fixed the hour of departure for eleven o'clock in the morning, and thus missed the opportunity of taking part in the battle. General Tilghman, on his side, was aware of the danger which threatened him. The troops under his command were inexperienced and restless, and inspired him with no confidence. He would not shut them up in the fort, which the inundation had nearly isolated from land; exposed to useless losses, they would only have embarrassed the defence. He placed them on a height adjoining the fort, and then shut himself inside of the entrenchments with sixty cannoneers determined like himself to do their duty. Grant's soldiers had been delayed on their march for several hours by the unpropitious weather and the condition of the roads. Foote, who had vainly asked their commander to give them an earlier start, did not wait for them to open his fire. He thought that in all probability this cannonading would occupy and detain Tilghman's troops until Grant could cut off their retreat. But the four iron-clads having approached within six hun-

dred metres of the fort, they soon obtained a manifest superiority over its fire. Its best guns exploded, while others were dismounted. At the first news of Grant's march, the Confederate infantry left the place of the conflict, of which they had remained spectators, and fled in disorder towards Dover without firing a single shot. The brave Tilghman still tried to maintain a struggle so unequal; but the shells from the fleet crushed him as they had crushed the defenders of Hatteras and Port Royal. He was at last obliged to surrender to an enemy who admired his valor. The battle only lasted one hour and a quarter.

This was a brilliant success for Foote's improvised gunboats, and an earnest of the important part they would play in the future. Their armor had protected them against most of the enemy's shot. One among them, however, the *Essex*, had its boiler pierced by a ball, and the explosion killed and wounded twenty-nine men upon that vessel alone.

Grant only arrived in time to take possession of the works which had been captured by the fleet. The garrison had escaped, it is true, but it was to be found a little later among the vanquished of Fort Donelson; and apart from that, a few prisoners the less could not detract from the great result which had just been obtained—the opening of the Tennessee to the Federal fleet.

The latter took advantage of it without delay. On that same evening it destroyed the large bridge of the Bowling Green and Memphis Railway; and ascending the river as far as the depth of water allowed, it proceeded to display the Federal flag in the midst of the Alabama plantations without encountering the least opposition on its route.

This first success, however, was only a beginning, and would lose all its importance if Fort Donelson remained in the hands of the enemy. The Confederates might at any moment return thence to the banks of the Tennessee for the purpose of occupying and fortifying some new position, which would again close that river against the Federals. The importance of Fort Donelson was equally appreciated by both Federals and Confederates. At the very time when Sidney Johnston was arranging the plan for an offensive movement with Beauregard, he was making preparations for evacuating Bowling Green. Indeed, it was well to

FORT DONELSON

Scale of 80,000
0 1 2 3 Kilometers
Scale: $\frac{1}{1000}$ in = 1 Mile
0 1 2 Miles

Direct Road From Fort Henry

Genl Grant's Headquarters

Road From Fort Henry

CUMBERLAND RIVER

FORT DONELSON

DOVER

Enck & Mc Farbridge Lith. Phila.



have foreseen the check of that hazardous movement, as the position of Bowling Green could not long be defended against Buell's army after it had lost the *point d'appui* which the position of Mill Springs afforded it on the extreme right. The Federals, being masters of the Upper Cumberland, could take Bowling Green completely in the rear. It was, therefore, along the Cumberland that Johnston had to look for a new line of defence whose centre should be at Nashville; but in that case the possession of Fort Donelson became the much more important, since that fort alone was able to stop Federal vessels on the Cumberland and protect the capital of Tennessee. Consequently, when Grant had broken at Fort Henry one link in the chain upon which all the system of his adversary's defences rested, the latter hastened to repair the want of foresight which had caused this weak portion of his line to be neglected. While his *matériel*, followed by the bulk of his army, was gradually proceeding from Bowling Green towards Nashville, he concentrated all his available forces at Fort Donelson. General Pillow, the same who as division commander in Mexico had caused so much trouble to General Scott, had joined with his division on the 9th of February the garrison of Fort Henry, which had taken refuge in Fort Donelson since the rout of the 5th. Buckner with his division from Bowling Green had arrived on the 11th. He was followed on the 12th and the 13th by General Floyd, at the head of a strong brigade of Virginians from Russellville and Cumberland City, whither those troops had retired and reorganized after their defeat in West Virginia a few months previously. The Confederates did wrong to reward the criminal services Mr. Floyd had rendered them whilst Secretary of War in Washington by entrusting him with important military commands; they paid dear for this error. Floyd took command of the little army, numbering from fifteen to sixteen thousand men, whose mission was to keep Grant in check. After having determined to place it at some distance above Dover, so as to harass the Federals if they should besiege Fort Donelson, he decided at the last moment to keep the whole of it inside of the exterior works which had been roughly constructed on the surrounding positions. The Federals on their side collected all their forces in order to strike a decisive blow. All the available

troops to be found at Cairo, Paducah, and St. Louis were hurried on transports for the purpose of joining Grant, while several regiments from the far West—from Iowa, and from Nebraska—descended the Missouri to form a junction with them. Buell's army also sent reinforcements, which, after amusing the Confederates at Russellville, not far from Bowling Green, embarked on Green River, a tributary of the Ohio, and came down this latter river as far as Smithland, at the confluence of the Cumberland, where they joined the large convoy of transports. Some of the troops who had appeared before Fort Henry also re-embarked to reach Fort Donelson by water. There remained fifteen thousand men at Fort Henry, who were re-formed into two divisions under McClelland and C. F. Smith, and with these Grant started for the purpose of investing by land the positions occupied by Pillow. Although the distance was only about twenty kilometres, it was a bold movement, for Grant's army was scarcely organized; it had no means of transporting its provisions and ammunition, and many regiments were without the necessary equipments for a winter campaign. In this condition the Federals were about to attack an enemy equal to them in number, posted inside of works carefully constructed, and controlling the river which secured his communications. But Grant knew what he could expect from the hardy men of the West who composed his army. The success at Fort Henry had inspired them with great confidence in the fleet, and with a desire not to allow themselves any longer to be surpassed by it. On the other hand, it was important not to allow the enemy time to recover himself and to concentrate all his forces around Fort Donelson. It was necessary to strike quickly in order to threaten Johnston's communications on the side of Nashville, and not to permit him to cover that only line of retreat by the erection of new works. In short, the utter inaction of the garrison of Fort Donelson, which had not even sent a single horseman to watch his movements, caused the Federal commander-in-chief to anticipate the military blunders his adversaries were about to commit; it may be, also, that, being aware that the latter were commanded by Pillow, he relied upon the incapacity of that individual, proverbial among his companions in arms of the Mexican war. On the 12th of

February the steamers, which had remained in front of Fort Henry, rapidly descended the Tennessee, with instructions to turn back whatever reinforcements they might meet on their way and direct them to rendezvous at Smithland. On the same day Grant started with his two divisions; and easily driving before him Forrest's cavalry, which had at last come to watch him, he presented himself in front of Fort Donelson during the afternoon at the moment when Floyd's first troops were landing.

The works occupied by the enemy consisted of the fort proper, a redoubt situated a little higher up, and a strong line of breastworks and *abattis*, which had been hastily constructed since the fall of Fort Henry, and were still unfinished at certain points. Differing widely from Fort Henry, Donelson was much better defended on the river than on the land side. A few redoubts had been erected close to the water's edge, but they were commanded by a steep acclivity in the shape of a semicircular hill, on the summit of which rose powerful batteries, which, owing to a curve in the river, commanded its course to a great distance, and could direct a plunging fire upon any vessels that should venture too near them. But on the land side the same works, resting upon certain undulations of ground which did not permit them to cross their fires, were commanded by other heights, more remote from the river. Consequently, the real point of defence of this portion of the line lay, not in the fort, notwithstanding its numerous and powerful guns, but in the exterior works. These works described a large semicircle of more than four kilometres in radius, resting their two extremities upon the river. Covered at the north by an impassable creek, they were, for the most part, laid out across woods which were only cleared by the *abattis*. They were redans and demi-lunes constructed of earth and wood, partly isolated, and partly connected by breastworks or simple *trous de loup*. They formed an excellent line of defence for a small army; but this line is sometimes liable to the objection of being traced half-way up the hillsides, thus exposing the reserves placed in the rear along their flanks. The little town of Dover was comprised within this *enceinte*.

On the 12th, before the close of a short winter day, Grant's soldiers had invested these entrenchments, which bristled on

every side with the bayonets of the enemy. This investment on the part of the Federal chief was a new act of daring; for as he was obliged to envelop the enemy's positions, his fifteen thousand men presented a very slender line, while his adversary, who knew the country, with forces equal to his own, and who could partially strip most of his works of their soldiers, was free to concentrate his troops upon a single point, to pierce that line by a vigorous effort. But Grant knew how to conceal his weakness skilfully from an enemy whose courage was already shaken. On the day following, after replying for some time to the artillery of the enemy with his cannon, he ordered the entrenchments within which it was posted to be attacked, with a view of ascertaining its strength, if he could not succeed in carrying them. No breach could be effected in the Confederate works. But on the extreme right—that is to say, on the side of Dover and above—the vigorous attack of the Federals secured to them at least positions closely adjoining those of the enemy, whence they could constantly threaten him.

In the mean time, the condition of Grant's army gave its chief considerable anxiety. The ammunition and provisions were becoming scarce, for no distribution had been made to replace what the soldiers had brought in their haversacks, and the means of transportation scarcely yet existed in that army. The enemy, master of the other side of the river, could neither be blockaded nor deprived of the reinforcements he was certainly expecting. The attack which had just been made proved that the idea of carrying those works by main force was not to be entertained, and that the enemy might at any moment ascertain the numerical weakness of the adversary in whose presence he had remained inactive behind his parapets. The fleet, which was expected to bring reinforcements and provisions, was not in sight, and all these difficulties were still further increased by the inclemency of a rigorous climate. A heavy fall of snow, accompanied by extreme cold, proved a terrible ordeal for those soldiers, most of whom were poorly clad, with only a few days' experience in the field. Among those who had provided themselves with blankets, a large number, bending under the weight of an unwonted burden, and deceived by the mildness of the first day, had left them

behind at Fort Henry or thrown them away on the road. It was a night of suffering in the two camps, but especially on the battleground, where many of the wounded, lying between the two hostile camps, had not been removed before night. On the following morning nothing but frozen corpses were found.

But on that morning (February 14th) the sound of cannon upon the river made the soldier forget the sufferings of that terrible night, for it brought the certain news of the presence of the fleet, which had arrived the evening previous. In fact, while Foote with one of his gun-boats was drawing the fire of the Confederate batteries to show their strength, as he had been directed to do, the transports were landing, out of reach of the enemy's guns, the first reinforcements and the provisions so impatiently looked for. The provisions were soon distributed by the army wagons, which hastened to the river-side to obtain them. The reinforcements, consisting of eleven regiments, or about five thousand men, were hastily formed into a third division, the command of which was conferred upon General L. Wallace, who had arrived at the same time from Fort Henry with his brigade. This division, placed between McClernand, who held the right, and Smith, commanding the left, enabled the Federals to present a stronger line of investment to the enemy. While these movements, always difficult in the presence of an enemy, were taking place in Grant's army, and rations and cartridges were being distributed, Foote diverted the attention of the Confederates by an attack upon the batteries which commanded the course of the Cumberland. He could not hope to renew the brilliant success of Fort Henry, for his gun-boats, which had been considerably damaged in that first affair, had not had time to undergo any repairs, and it was with four small vessels in bad condition that he now exposed himself to the concentric fire of batteries armed with powerful guns, the range of which had been carefully studied beforehand by their gunners. But it was important to engage the enemy's attention during the day of the 14th at all hazards. Foote drew up his fleet within three hundred metres of the Confederate works, and for the space of one hour and a quarter he sustained an unequal contest against them. There was even a moment when his daring seemed about to be crowned with suc-

cess. Several of the batteries near the water had been abandoned, while only a few out of the twenty guns which commanded the river were still served; and if Foote had been able to avail himself of this momentary silence to reascend the river, he could have reached a place whence, by enfilading the positions of the enemy, he would have rendered them untenable. But at this critical moment his two best gun-boats were disabled by two successful shots, which shattered the rudder of one and one of the wheels of the other, and both were soon carried far away from the scene of action by the force of the current. The other two, not being able to sustain the contest alone, were drawn off by Foote. The Federal navy was taught to appreciate the difficulties it would encounter on the large rivers wherever the enemy should be skilful enough to take advantage with his fire of the nature of the ground.

The fruitless attacks of the 13th and 14th by land and sea had shown that if the enemy knew how to defend the positions he occupied, it would be necessary to resort to regular operations. As soon as Grant saw the gun-boats disabled by the fire of the Confederate batteries, he determined to lay siege to the place, thinking that the very slowness of the operation would render success more certain by giving time for the arrival of the numerous reinforcements which had been promised him.

In the mean time, notwithstanding the double check experienced by the Federals, there was nothing but trouble and confusion in the Confederate camp, especially in the councils of their leaders. They had suffered less from cold than their adversaries, inasmuch as the troops who were not doing guard-duty in the works were quartered in well-sheltered barracks. But the Federal artillery kept up, day and night, a regular fire of shells, which, without doing them much damage, worried them extremely. The fugitive garrison of Fort Henry, far from gathering courage on finding itself near the fresh troops assembled at Fort Donelson, had, on the contrary, shaken the confidence of the latter by exaggerating the number of the Federal forces. In short, the soldiers, with that instinct which governs them everywhere, had soon felt that they were not properly handled, and

had discovered the incapacity of those in command, in spite of pretentious appearances.

These generals had committed a great error in shutting up an army of fifteen thousand men inside of works where they could be surrounded, but they committed a still more grievous blunder when they resolved, on the 14th, to open a passage for themselves through Grant's lines by main force. Such a hopeless attempt should have been made before the arrival of the fleet and the Federal reinforcements. The investment was not then complete; the other bank of the river was still free; steamers could have been brought from Nashville to transport the army to the other side of the Cumberland; and Grant's attitude was a sufficient guarantee that he would not renew the assault. Floyd did not even take the trouble of informing his commander, Johnston, of his position, nor of asking for instructions. It was decided that Pillow should come out of his entrenchments and attack the extreme right of the Federals in front of Dover, while Buckner should make strong demonstrations upon the rest of the enemy's line. As soon as Pillow had opened a passage, Buckner was to follow him, after evacuating the fort and bringing along with him as much *matériel* as possible, and then he was to form the rear-guard to cover the march of the army towards Nashville.

On the 14th, at the moment when this plan was to be carried out, after the fight on the river, an unaccountable caprice prompted Pillow to defer that movement till the following day. This was a wilful sacrifice of the few good chances which yet remained to the Confederates, for each hour added strength to the positions which Grant occupied around them. Yet these positions, taken at first somewhat at random, were not all well selected, and the Federals, not yet possessing the experience which they subsequently acquired, had neglected to protect themselves by means of *abattis* and wooden breastworks; in short, being exhausted by fatigue and cold, they neglected all necessary precautions. Consequently, McClernand's division had barely time to get under arms, when, at early dawn on the 15th, Pillow's eight thousand men rushed in close column upon his right. This portion of his line, formed by the brigade of McArthur, had not been able to extend to the river. While it was vigorously resisting the first attack, Colonel

Baldwin, who commanded the first of Pillow's brigades, had one of those inspirations which sometimes decide the fate of a battle. He caused part of his troops to file off on his left along the river: thanks to a deep ravine, the enemy reached McArthur's flank unperceived, and threw confusion into the ranks of Oglesby's brigade, which formed the centre of McClernand's division, and which the Confederates were already vigorously pressing in front. Being in turn attacked in flank, it fell back like its neighbor. It re-formed for an instant near the third brigade, commanded by W. H. Wallace. But notwithstanding the efforts of their officers and their own persistency, the Federal soldiers did not succeed in rallying until many men and much ground had been lost. At this hour Grant had not yet made his appearance on the field of battle. Being desirous to have an understanding with Foote regarding the operations of the siege he intended to undertake, he had gone to the gun-boat to visit the brave commodore, who had been seriously wounded in the battle of the day previous. But L. Wallace, who was encamped on the left of McClernand, and whom the noise of the battle had already roused, hastened to send his right brigade, commanded by Cruft, to the aid of the latter. This brigade arrived on the field of battle at the moment when the Confederates were bringing new forces into line. Adhering to the plan agreed upon the evening before, Buckner had only left in the entrenchments he occupied, in front of Smith, such troops as were strictly required for their occupancy, and had followed Pillow with the rest of his division. As soon as Pillow had deployed his forces he took position on his right; and when McArthur's and Oglesby's soldiers began to lose ground, he threw a portion of his men upon the brigades of W. Wallace, which formed the left of McClernand, and of Cruft, who had come to his assistance. The Confederates had thus far succeeded in throwing their entire army upon the flank of that commanded by Grant, and in concentrating the efforts of more than twelve thousand men upon the positions defended by scarcely seven or eight thousand. Pillow, who had followed the inspiration of Baldwin, outnumbered the right of the Federals more and more; he brought his regiments into action one after another, and attacked his enemies in flank as fast as they re-formed to face the fire which was

beginning to envelop them. He was already master of all the positions which had been occupied at first by McClermand in the morning. He had opened a breach which was to be the salvation of his army, and he felt so sure of victory that he hastened to communicate the news to Johnston by telegraph. He had nothing more to do than to push his troops forward to gather the fruits of his first success.

A portion of McClermand's division was in disorder; a few regiments had kept their ranks, but they could not resist the onset of superior forces, and they had, moreover, exhausted all their ammunition. The brigade of Cruft, pressed on all sides, was falling back slowly. L. Wallace found himself in turn overpowered on his right, and the fugitives who were already crowding in his rear threatened to throw his ranks into confusion. What had been left of his division was rapidly formed *en-potence*; a portion faced to the right and rallied the remnants of McClermand's division; the other part was drawn in front of the enemy's entrenchments, where Buckner was massing all his troops for the purpose of attacking in turn and widening the passage which had been opened by Pillow. At this junction the Confederate leaders committed an error which was irreparable. Carried away by their first success, they desired to complete the victory; and forgetting that their object should have been to escape from a siege, they only thought of driving back the right and centre of the Federals upon their left wing. Full of mistaken confidence, they already foresaw the moment when, driving the whole of Grant's army upon Smith's division, they should re-enter their entrenchments to force their adversaries back upon the river north of Donelson. These fatal illusions, after having caused them to lose much precious time in trying to force their way through the gap they had opened, were quickly dispelled. Indeed, Pillow had exhausted his strength in the fortunate attack he had just made; and when, following up his success, he encountered the line of L. Wallace, he broke down before the resistance of a single regiment, the First Nebraska, composed of the hardy hunters of that territory, hardly yet reclaimed. A few moments after, Buckner came out of the entrenchments with his reserves; but his soldiers, fatigued and discouraged by the efforts of the preceding days, did

not go into the conflict with alacrity, while their officers, knowing that they were destined for the rough work appertaining to the rear-guard of the army, were desirous, they said, of sparing their men. Consequently, the attack was faintly made. After the first unsuccessful assault, the Confederates fled in disorder, and sought shelter behind the breastworks, whence no exhortations on the part of their chiefs could drag them. This was the decisive moment. Buckner was repulsed, and Pillow, being no longer sustained, found it impossible to advance farther with men exhausted by six hours' fighting. He had brought his last reserves into action, and was obliged to stop. The Federals were thus allowed time to form again ; connecting their various positions in an uneven line, they were soon enabled to present a new line of battle alongside of the road, the possession of which had been the object of all the enemy's efforts. The passage was yet open for the Confederates, but it became more and more difficult for them to avail themselves of it to push their whole army through in the presence of an adversary who had had a breathing-spell. .

In the mean time, Grant had repaired to the field of battle. He had seen his line driven in, but he thought, nevertheless, that if he could for an instant check the impetus which the Confederates had acquired by their first success he might yet snatch the victory from them. As to the besieged, who fought with the energy of despair, a half triumph was to them an overwhelming defeat, and their first effort had exhausted their energies ; so that when, at two o'clock, after a conflict of eight hours, he saw Pillow's soldiers pause on the ground they had conquered, and those of Buckner fall back at the first fire of L. Wallace's division, he judged that the moment had arrived to assume the offensive, and to derive a great success from the battle which had nearly upset all his plans. In proportion as the prolonging of the conflict had shaken their confidence and dispelled their first illusions, trouble and uncertainty had anew taken possession of the Confederate leaders. While Buckner was vainly endeavoring to lead his men once more into the fight, the evacuation of the fort, just commenced, was suspended ; and Pillow, seeing the Federals forming again to recover the ground lost in the morning, fell back to take position upon an elevated hill situated a few hundred metres

in advance of his entrenchments. It was at this moment that Grant ordered the fresh troops of Smith on the left and L. Wallace's division in the centre to make a general attack upon the enemy's works, before the latter could have time to look about him. While McClelland's regiments were forming again, those of Wallace bravely marched up to the assault of the height occupied by Pillow, and carried it after a bloody engagement. But they were not equally successful in capturing the entrenchments behind which they had just driven the enemy.

On the left, Smith, after making several feints in the direction of the works, where Buckner had left part of his division, placed himself at the head of Lauman's brigade, which he electrified by his words and by his example. The Confederates were unable to resist that shock, and Smith, with the aid of his artillery, which took position in the entrenchments from which they had just been dislodged, easily repelled all their efforts to retake them.

Night at last put an end to that sanguinary conflict, which cost each army more than two thousand men. It found the Federals masters of all the positions they had lost in the morning on the right, and firmly established on the left among the enemy's entrenchments. From these they commanded the greatest portion of the ground where the Confederate soldiers were encamped pell-mell, as well as the works of Fort Donelson. The dawn of day, which they impatiently awaited under arms, now cheerfully bearing cold and hunger, would enable them to complete their victory and gather its fruits.

But, on the contrary, trouble and discouragement prevailed in the Confederate camp. After fighting a whole day to force a passage through the enemy's lines they found themselves again shut up within the same enclosure they had vainly attempted to leave; and furthermore, they beheld the enemy posted in the very centre of their line of defence. From the general-in-chief down to the last soldier all felt that the game was lost beyond hope of recovery, and no one seriously thought of prolonging the struggle. Amid the darkness, which alone afforded protection to the vanquished army, scenes were then witnessed which presented a shameful contrast to the valor and energy of which the Confed-

erates have given proof on so many other occasions. The commander-in-chief, Floyd, having summoned a council of war, declared that the army had nothing to do but surrender, for the two small steamers at their disposal could not convey it to the other side of the river during the night, and at daybreak, not a battle, but a massacre, might be expected. In the mean time, as he was aware that the Yankees particularly desired to seize his person, he announced his intention of effecting his escape; and to that effect he resigned the command of which he made such miserable use. Pillow, who succeeded him by right of seniority, insisted that Grant could yet be resisted; but when he found himself invested with authority, he changed his mind, and after declaring that he shared the personal views of his superior, he followed the example of his defection. He hastened, in his turn, to transfer the command to Buckner, who, alone actuated by a sense of military honor, accepted the painful task of capitulating at the head of those soldiers whom their unworthy commander so basely forsook. Through a whimsical scruple, prompted perhaps by the favorite theory of the Confederates regarding the independence of States, Floyd requested and obtained permission from his late subordinate to take with him in his flight the regiment of Virginians he had brought with him from his native State. During this painful comedy the rumor of an impending capitulation spread like lightning among those soldiers who were already crushed by the weight of their defeat. All the bonds of discipline were broken at once; and following the example of his leaders, each man thought only of himself. The disorder reached its culminating point when that bewildered crowd witnessed through the darkness of the night the preparations for flight on the part of a few privileged individuals. Men rushed to the wharves, where the two small steamers were receiving those persons who, profiting by their defection, were to be spared the sad fate of being made prisoners of war. Floyd, Pillow, and a large number of staff-officers had already crossed over to the other side of the river with about three thousand men, when the two steamers, instead of returning to take another load of fugitives, who were waiting for them as their last chance of safety, steamed rapidly up the Cumberland. Day was beginning to break; and the pale

glimmer of that winter morning announced to Buckner that the time had arrived for proposing a capitulation to Grant. From that moment he could no longer authorize the flight of a single man. While the Federals were preparing for the attack they saw the enemy displaying the white flag on every side. A few hours after, Buckner accepted, with bad grace and without dignity, Grant's propositions. He constituted himself a prisoner of war, with the remnants of the army which had been beaten the day before. The Confederate colonel Forrest, whose mission during the battle had been to clear the road, had taken advantage of the night to draw off with his cavalry, across swamps impracticable for the army, by following a narrow path running along the steep banks of the river. He made his escape, leaving his rear-guard in the hands of McClernand.

The capture of Donelson was a great and glorious success for the Federals. The material results were considerable. The capitulation delivered into the hands of Grant fourteen thousand six hundred and twenty-three prisoners, sixty-five cannons, seventeen thousand muskets—that is to say, an entire army, with all its *matériel*. His entire losses amounted to two thousand and forty-one men, of whom four hundred and twenty-five were killed; the Confederates had about the same number of men disabled.

The moral effect was immense. The remembrance of Bull Run was blotted out by a victory much more hotly contested, and the results of which were otherwise of importance. In short, after the scenes which had just been witnessed in Floyd's tent and on the banks of the Cumberland, the Confederates could no longer taunt their enemies with the panic of the 21st of July: the game was henceforth even between them.

This defeat was a terrible blow for the South. It caused great surprise to the Richmond government as well as to the public, who had too long been lulled by dangerous illusions. From the impression produced by this reverse we may already remark the difference of character in the two peoples who were struggling on the soil of America. The South bore the disaster without being discouraged, but no indication could be perceived of that patriotic impulse which had armed so many volunteers in the

North to repair the disaster of Bull Run. The belligerent ardor of the South had reached its height at the outset of the war, and after having then filled the ranks of the Confederate armies, it was already on the decline. The confidence felt during the early stages of the rebellion had disappeared; people fought because they had entered upon a path from which they could see no possible issue but victory. Whatever sacrifices might be deemed necessary to secure the success of an enterprise so imprudently begun they were ready to make without a murmur, but also without enthusiasm. The conduct of all the Confederate authorities was for a time severely commented upon. But like all absolute power, dreading discussion even when likely to be favorable to its measures, Mr. Davis's government, on the one hand, relieved both Floyd and Pillow from their duties, and on the other, it imposed silence upon those who presumed to criticise the management of military affairs.

The capitulation of Fort Donelson greatly embarrassed all the operations of the Confederate armies. During the battle of the 15th, Floyd had announced a certain victory by telegraph to Sidney Johnston, who was assembling his army in front of Nashville to defend the line of the Cumberland. In the evening the general-in-chief learned the full extent of the disaster. The confusion caused by this news was such that a brigade of one thousand five hundred men, which had been sent as a reinforcement to Donelson, was not countermanded. Having quietly entered the entrenchments near Dover, these troops found themselves, to their great surprise, surrounded by Federals and obliged to lay down their arms. In the mean time, the Confederate generals felt that it was necessary to look out, without loss of time, for a new line and other defensive positions in those parts of the Confederacy which yet remained intact. Bowling Green had already been abandoned. Johnston, while sending part of his army to Donelson, following close upon his *matériel*, had fallen back upon the Cumberland, thus delivering the whole of Kentucky into the hands of the Federals. As soon as he heard of the defeat of Floyd, he understood that it would be impossible for him to maintain himself upon that river, which he had once thought of making his line of defence. The evacuation of Nashville and

Columbus was instantly determined upon. These were the first fruits of Grant's victory.

It was above all essential to abandon Nashville, for the magnificent suspension bridge across the Cumberland was the only line of retreat for Johnston's army, and Foote's gun-boats might at any time come to destroy it. There was no longer any fortification along the course of the river that could stop them. The city itself, situated on the south bank, was everywhere commanded, and incapable of defence. This city, containing seventeen thousand souls, had played a part far above its real importance in the last revolution. Inhabited by a rich aristocracy of slaveholders, it had distinguished itself by its zeal in favor of the secession movement, and had even once aspired to the honor of becoming the capital of the Confederate States. The entire State government of Tennessee had remained there in spite of Grant's invasion, and both houses of the legislature daily passed resolutions of the most violent character, and indulged in bitter invectives against the Yankees. Carried away by a deceiving confidence, they always said they would die rather than withdraw or surrender. But when, at the sight of Johnston's regiments, which passed through the city on the morning of the 16th without stopping, the rumor went round that Nashville was about to be abandoned to the invaders, the excitement was greater, says the historian Pollard, than if an earthquake had levelled every building. Very soon the departure of all the State authorities with the archives and public funds, and in such haste as their former speeches had not foreshadowed, confirmed this news. An unheard-of panic then seized the inhabitants of Nashville. One would have said that they were flying before a deluge which threatened to swallow up everything. Nothing was thought of but to save what each possessed of any value. Horses and carriages of every description, hired at fabulous prices, set out *en masse* on the roads leading south, laden with everything susceptible of transportation. But it was even worse when, on the 18th, Floyd, arriving with his brigade from Fort Donelson, was ordered to close up on Johnston. The burning of the great suspension bridge and the construction docks along the Cumberland was the signal of disorder which defies description. It hav-

ing been found impossible to remove the goods from the military dépôts of provisions, they were thrown open and plundered by the populace. The last Confederate soldiers had disappeared amid the imprecations of those who had not been able to follow them. Anarchy reigned supreme. At last the mayor and a few citizens succeeded in restoring some degree of order while waiting for the arrival of the Federals.

The latter appeared on the 23d. They were a portion of Buell's forces, consisting of a regiment of cavalry, the Fourth Ohio, of Mitchell's division. This division had been sent by the commander of the army of Kentucky to watch Johnston's movements as soon as he had heard of Grant's march upon Fort Donelson. Having started on the 13th in full haste, it reached Bowling Green on the 14th just in time to see the last Confederate troops evacuate that place, set fire to their storehouses, and quickly disappear, destroying all the railroad bridges behind them. It required no less than nine days for Mitchell's soldiers, who had been delayed for want of provisions, to reach Nashville. They got there, however, in advance of the Federal gun-boats and the conquerors of Donelson.

On the 20th the indefatigable Foote had taken possession of Clarksville, an important position situated on the river, below Nashville, and was preparing to take four thousand of Grant's soldiers on board for the purpose of occupying the capital of Tennessee without delay. But this operation was forbidden by orders from General Halleck. Grant's army, worn out by that trying campaign, and still more by the climate than by battle, counted many on the sick-list, and needed rest. Consequently, it was only on the 27th that one of his divisions was able to reach Nashville by land. And this movement came near costing Grant his command. He was accused of having overstepped the imaginary line which, in the departments at Washington, divided all the Southern States among the various Federal proconsuls. They set up against him the brilliant conduct of Smith at the assault of Donelson; a feeling of old regimental fellowship was seeking to attribute to the latter all the merit of the victory; and Grant found himself for a while detained at the dépôt of Fort Henry by orders from headquarters, while most of his soldiers continued to pen-

etrate into the enemy's country. But this disgrace was not of long duration.

On leaving Nashville, Johnston had followed the Chattanooga Railroad. He was thus moving away from the two rivers, of which the Federals were already masters, and could easily make connection with the troops which had evacuated Eastern Kentucky under Crittenden. His army was still numerous, but it had lost all confidence, and Johnston did not think he would be able to make it face the enemy. In choosing this line of retreat he obliged the Federals either to allow him time enough to reorganize his army or to come to attack him, after a fatiguing march, in positions which were very strong and with only a portion of their troops. The retreat of the Confederates had been troublesome, for the weather was frightful and the roads extremely broken up. But the very obstacles they encountered rendered pursuit impossible for their adversaries. Johnston stopped at Murfreesborough, about fifty-two kilometres from Nashville, where he was joined by Crittenden, and found himself at the head of an army able to make head against the Federals.* The latter took good care not to go in search of him.

In the mean while, the Confederates, in pursuance of Johnston's instructions, had abandoned Columbus a few days after the evacuation of Nashville, thus giving up the whole State of Kentucky. The fate of the garrison of Fort Donelson was a warning to Polk's army not to allow itself to be shut up in Columbus. Beauregard, who had been appointed commander-in-chief of the defences of the Mississippi, had selected, in order to bar the river against the Federals, a point situated about seventy kilometres lower down. The great river, in its thousand bends, describes at this point two angles, turning first to the west, then to the north, to sweep again to the west, and finally to the south, so that between the two it runs in a direction opposite to its general course. In the centre of the upper elbow stands one of those numerous islands, formed by the alluvial accretions of the river, which nav-

* Pollard only gives Johnston seventeen thousand men, but Stevenson, who was present, ciphers up nearly sixty thousand men; it is probable that the truth lies between the two figures, and that he could muster nearly forty thousand effective men.

igators have merely laid down in the chart by number; it is called No. 10. At the second angle, which, although situated below, lies more to the north than the first, stands the village of New Madrid, on the right bank of the Mississippi.

The evacuation of Columbus began on the 25th of February, and was completed by the 3d of March. The next day a party of Federal cavalry from Paducah penetrated into its abandoned entrenchments with its spiked guns and still burning magazines. A few hours afterwards, Foote's fleet, which Halleck had recalled from Donelson, landed at the foot of the deserted works a recently formed division, the command of which had been given to W. T. Sherman. The latter thus reappeared on the military stage, which he was not to leave again, and on which the part he was to play increased in importance from day to day.

Polk, with a portion of his troops, fell back as far as Corinth, the centre of the approaching operations against Grant's army. The remainder, about four or five thousand men, occupied Island No. 10 and the batteries which completed the system of defence on the left bank of the river. Commodore Hollins had brought a few iron-clad vessels from New Orleans to support them, but the armor of most of them was quite inadequate. The Confederate government made every effort to convince the public that Island No. 10 would definitively check the progress of the Federals on the Mississippi; but notwithstanding these assurances, the military leaders were fully aware that this position was too advanced and too isolated to be able to hold out long. Their only object in occupying it was to cover the left extremity of their line during the time required for massing the forces destined to fight Grant's army in the centre of that line. It was on that side, in fact, that the two parties were preparing for a conflict the proportions of which were to exceed all that this war had up to that time displayed.

Before describing this conflict we must cast a glance along the west bank of the Mississippi, where the adversaries, who had remained in sight of each other, were about to meet again in battle. Upon that remote theatre, as we have already stated, military events could not possess a decided importance, and the movements of the armies which met there were subordinate to the

issues of battles fought on the other side of the river. Nevertheless, as with all secondary operations, neither of the two parties could neglect them without being exposed to serious dangers.


We left the two enemies widely separated from each other in Missouri at the close of the year 1861. The greatest part of that State was in the hands of the Federals. But in order to subsist their troops with greater facility during the winter, they had brought them back into the neighborhood of rivers and railways. These railroads were but the forerunners of the lines destined at some future day to connect New Mexico, Colorado, Texas, and Lower California with the borders of the Mississippi. They stretch towards the deserts of the far West like the arms of a giant striving to grasp the immense spaces that still rebel against civilization. The village of Rolla, thus named by some transatlantic admirer of Alfred de Musset, was the terminus, as we have said before, of that branch among those groups of railways which run to the south-west. The road which Lyon had followed before the battle of Wilson's Creek, of great importance in those primitive regions, although in a wretched condition, was in prolongation of the railway. It passed through Springfield, descended into Arkansas, and after crossing the long chain of the Ozark Mountains near Bentonville, reached Fort Smith, on the great Arkansas River. Beyond this last station the habitations and cultivated lands which the facilities of communication had developed along the road became more and more rare; at last, on leaving Fort Belknap, in Texas, the mail-carrier had no other guide than a small compass to direct him in finding out the stages marked by the whitened bones of the Anglo-Saxon emigrant or the Mexican adventurer. The two adversaries, one resting upon St. Louis, the other on the State of Arkansas, had to meet on this road whenever the aim of their campaigns was the possession of Missouri.


Hostilities commenced west of the Mississippi about the same time as on the banks of the Tennessee. Hunter, after superseding Fremont, had left the army of the Missouri and taken command of the troops assembled in the State of Kansas. His mission was simply to hunt the guerillas, to protect the Unionists,

and to secure them some measure of safety. He succeeded to a considerable extent, and restored some degree of order in that State, which, since its birth, had never been aught but a battle-field.

In that part of Missouri situated north of the river of that name the Confederates still counted a large number of partisans; but they had given up the idea of disputing its possession with the Federals, who, under Pope, occupied all the principal points in the country, and especially the lines of railroad. They confined themselves to the task of recruiting volunteers, who afterwards crossed the river to join Price's army, while, on the contrary, all the efforts of the Federals were intended to disperse or to intercept those recruits. In this war of detail we have only a single serious engagement to record, that of Silver Creek, where, on the 8th of January, a party of Federal cavalry routed a small body of Confederate partisans, who had just met there and were in the act of organizing.

In the mean while, Curtis, who had retired with the army of the Missouri as far as Rolla, was preparing to go in search of Price in the southern part of the State. The Confederate general, whose troops were daily increasing in number, occupied a threatening position at Springfield, from which it was important to dislodge him. Curtis had collected twelve thousand men, forming four small corps, improperly called divisions, for they possessed only the numerical strength of weak brigades. On the 11th of February he started for Springfield, following the post-road. Frightful weather rendered that march extremely painful, and seemed to promise Price an easy success. His ten thousand men were well entrenched, and encamped in good quarters. But the Confederate general felt isolated; and since the forces assembled in Arkansas had refused to join him the preceding year, he had become less daring. Without waiting for his adversary, he fell back towards the south with his Missouri militia, and only used his cavalry on the 12th of February in covering his retreat. The Federals crossed the Arkansas frontier in his tracks, still following, like him, the post-road. On the 17th of February they had a slight engagement with the rear-guard of the enemy near Sugar Creek; and soon after, they reached the Ozark Mountains.





PEA RIDGE

Burk & McFetridge Lith. Phil'a.

The nature of the country imparted an altogether peculiar character to that war. The post-road afforded Curtis great facilities for moving his supply-trains and his artillery, and for receiving reinforcements, ammunition, and all the materials of war which were to be forwarded to him from the arsenals of the North, but it did not give him the means of drawing provisions from his distant dépôts, as a line of railway or a navigable river would have done; thousands of wagons would not have sufficed to perform that service between Rolla and Bentonville. In those regions of the far West, therefore, armies were always obliged to subsist upon the country through which they passed; and that country being scarcely under cultivation, on the one hand, those armies had to be limited as to number, and on the other hand it was necessary to scatter them over a vast extent of territory, in order to collect the meagre resources of the country in sufficient quantities. Hence in the early part of March we find Curtis's troops divided into small detachments encamped at great distances from each other along the Ozark Mountains. After advancing as far as Fayetteville, the Federal general, fearing that he had ventured too far into the enemy's country, fell back upon the valley of Sugar Creek, whence he could if necessary easily regain the State of Missouri. This water-course, in the vicinity of which the last engagement had taken place, afforded him positions easy to defend, the natural strength of which he further increased by means of entrenchments, in which he expected to rally his scattered troops in the event of the enemy's coming to attack him from the south. Part of the infantry took possession of the mills bordering on Sugar Creek, and set to work to make flour, while the cavalry and draft animals went in search of forage, wandering about from one pasture-ground to another. A few parties proceeded as far as the valley of the Arkansas. The Federal general took up his quarters along the post-road, a little to the south of Sugar Creek, at a place called Cross Hollows. Carr's division was encamped near him. Sigel, with the nucleus of two small divisions, neither of which was larger than a French regiment, was at Bentonville, about fifteen kilometres from Sugar Creek. But the positions selected by Curtis, for the purpose of checking any enemy coming from the south, were in rear of that

stream, which runs from east to west before pursuing a northerly direction. A ravine watered by this stream separates two of the hills forming the chain of Ozark Mountains, which both alike slope down in gentle declivities towards the north and very abruptly to the south. The one commanding the ravine at the north is known by the name of Pea Ridge. It is separated from another steep acclivity, which rises still more to the north, by another wooded ravine, called Cross-Timber Hollows, running from east to west, the waters of which, having reached the plain, finally mingle with those of Sugar Creek. These breaks in the ground were generally covered with small copsewood, intersected here and there by cultivated clearings and tall trees shooting up from the watery bottoms. Communicating by cross-roads with Bentonville, which it leaves on its right, the post-road descends into the ravine of Sugar Creek at the eastern extremity of the crest of Pea Ridge. Before reaching that point, midway of the gentle declivities which slope down towards the north and which the road easily ascends, it encounters a small solitary building called Elkhorn Tavern. Here branches off a road which leads to Bentonville through the hamlet of Leetown, situated in the centre of the ridge. Such is the ground upon which the first battle that drenched Arkansas with blood was about to be fought.

The Southern generals, having received reinforcements, prepared to resume the offensive. Price, who had retired south-west into the Indian territory among the Boston Mountains, had again been joined by Generals McCulloch and McIntosh, at the head of two divisions of Confederate troops, and by a considerable body of Indians under the leadership of a Northern man, named Albert Pike, who, by reason of his tall stature, his dauntless spirit, and his mother-wit, had become a man of great influence in the Far West. The redskins, who formed his following, had adopted the externals of our civilization, from which they had also contracted a taste for the use of firearms. They had not forgotten the traditions of their race, and they eagerly seized the unlooked-for opportunity offered them to assist the whites, their old enemies, in destroying each other. Van Dorn, that captain of cavalry whom we saw in Texas at the outset of the rebel-

lion in vain exciting his own soldiers to desert their colors and making them prisoners afterwards—Van Dorn, who had become one of the important personages of the new Confederacy, had assumed the chief command of that army. He had more than sixteen thousand men under him, which gave him a great numerical superiority over his opponent. Consequently, he went forth to meet the small Federal army in the hope of destroying it altogether, and of not allowing a single one of those abolition soldiers to re-enter Missouri who had ventured so far from all possible succor.

On the 5th of March Curtis had been warned of his approach by parties of his own cavalry scattered far into the country, and he ordered all his troops to concentrate upon Sugar Creek. That position was well selected, for the steep acclivity of the ridge, covered as it was by the strong current of the stream, presented a formidable front to an enemy coming from the south. But the latter was aware of this, and resolved to strike elsewhere. He had brought with him provisions to last for several days, and was, therefore, free in his movements in a country where the population was generally friendly to him, and where he could move his supply-trains in every direction without escort. Curtis, on the contrary, was, by the very circumstances of his position, tied to the post-road, which he had followed from Rolla. He had undoubtedly given up the idea of keeping it always open, being well aware that the advantage of that route as a line of retreat depended entirely upon the strength of his army; he could not, however, abandon it for any length of time without the risk of becoming short of ammunition and provisions, and without seeing his army gradually weakened for want of the necessary means to keep up his *personnel* and *matériel*. Consequently, he had been obliged to establish small posts *en echelon* along the most important points of his line.

It was by this line that Van Dorn desired to attack and take the Federal positions in rear, thus reversing the order of the two armies and placing them in the position of two combatants in the lists who had changed places. He calculated that his numerical superiority would enable him to remain longer in that difficult position than his adversary. Consequently, after leaving Boston

Mountains on the 4th; and having occupied on the 6th the village of Cross Hollows, which the Federals had just evacuated in great haste, he suddenly changed his route, and marched to the northwest, upon Bentonville, on the same day. One of his columns met there the rear-guard of the small corps of Sigel, which, having been called back by Curtis, was retiring towards Pea Ridge. A brisk engagement immediately took place. The Confederates eagerly attacked the Federal general, who had only six hundred men with him. Surrounded nearly on every side, the latter, with the aid of a few field-pieces, nevertheless repulsed all the assaults of the enemy, and succeeded in joining the rest of his troops. Then, drawing up his battalions *en echelon*, he fell back in good order, crossed Sugar Creek, and, reaching Pea Ridge in the evening, took position west of the rest of the army.

Instead of following him, Van Dorn continued his flank movement, crossed Sugar Creek below the Federal camps, and bivouacked before night on the right bank of that stream, at the extremity of the long slopes which terminate on that side the plateau of Pea Ridge. The Federals were thus taken in rear, and Van Dorn had already obtained an important advantage before the battle had commenced.

But Curtis had got wind of this manœuvre. During the night he changed all his plans, and prepared to receive the attack of the enemy on the side of the positions to which Sigel had retired the day before. The early part of the day, however, passed without any sign of battle; the Confederates were completing their manœuvre, as they wished to be in possession of the post-road before making the attack. They reached it at last, near the place where it crosses the ravine of Cross-Timber Hollows, and the firing of musketry from the posts which alone covered the rear of the Federal positions on that side soon made Curtis aware that the enemy was carrying out his plan of attack. He immediately made his small army face to the rear in line of battle. Sigel, who had begun this movement in the morning, and had already sent a few regiments, with Colonel Osterhaus, to occupy a position on the side of Leetown, in order to forestall the enemy by a counter-attack, thus found himself forming the left of the Federal line. Asboth's division, which had been placed under his command,

formed the extremity of his line, and rested upon the crest of the Pea Ridge plateau, above Sugar Creek. Osterhaus's troops stretched out a little beyond the Bentonville road, towards the Elkhorn Tavern, and faced north-west. The right of the Federal army was composed of Carr's division, which, at the first indication of the enemy's presence on the post-road, hastened to contest with him the important position of Elkhorn. A little beyond, and at a certain distance from his front, wound the ravine of Cross-Timber Hollows, which, by an abrupt turning, covered his right flank. The attack of the enemy forced Carr to face northward, and thus gave to the Federal army the form of a broken line. In the centre the action had not yet commenced.

Indeed, the attack of the Confederates was divided into two distinct engagements. The divisions of McIntosh and McCulloch had been left by Van Dorn near the place where they had bivouacked during the night, with orders to march upon Leetown as soon as his left wing had become engaged. They formed the Confederate right, and those were the troops that Osterhaus encountered before Leetown.

In the mean time, Price and his seven or eight thousand Missourians, under the personal lead of Van Dorn, had made the great flank movement which brought them, by way of the post-road, in sight of Elkhorn Tavern, at the moment when Carr was preparing to dispute that position with them. They constituted the left wing. But their flank manœuvre had completely separated them from McCulloch and McIntosh. The Confederate army was thus divided into two parts, with inadequate connections between them, and utterly unable to afford each other mutual support, while the two Federal wings could hold easy communications by means of interior lines.

In proportion, however, as the battle progressed, the chances seemed to turn in favor of the Confederates. Encouraged by the success of their first manœuvre, they attacked their adversaries with great impetuosity. The thickness of the woods favoring their approach, they made great havoc in the Federal ranks: they put buckshot into their guns on top of the balls.

On the left, the small division of Asboth, which had been ordered by Sigel to guard the extreme flank of the line, was not in

action; but that of Osterhaus, which had gone forward to meet McIntosh and McCulloch, found it difficult to resist them. An unfortunate cavalry charge against an enemy concealed in the woods had cost him the loss of several guns at the outset of the battle.

On the right, Carr was being more and more closely pressed and Price was gaining ground. His adversaries left many wounded and a few cannon in his hands. On both sides of the post-road, beyond the Elkhorn Tavern, of which the Confederates had taken possession, the fight was carried on furiously. The latter had the advantage on the two flanks. The Federals saw the enemy upon their line of retreat—a bad state of things for young soldiers to fight under. This was the opportunity of which McIntosh and McCulloch availed themselves to make an important move. They outflanked Osterhaus's right, which had been shaken by the unequal struggle, and pushed forward to the assistance of Price, who was already almost victorious; but here they were met by a new adversary. Curtis had brought his last division, commanded by Colonel Jefferson Davis,* upon the field of battle, and placed it in the centre of his line, between Leetown and Elkhorn, within the space separating the right of Sigel's divisions from Carr's left. Davis received the attack of McIntosh and McCulloch on his left with a portion of his troops, while the remainder, placed *en potence* upon the right, took them in flank. This violent shock staggered a few of the Federal regiments, but the others resisted. An almost hand-to-hand fight now took place in a thick and low coppice-wood. While the action was at its height the two Confederate leaders fell mortally wounded, both, as it were, at the same instant. Their soldiers, over whom they had an immense control, became discouraged at this sight, and were finally repulsed.

It was time for the Federals to obtain this partial success, for along the post-road their right was still retiring before the vigorous attacks of Price. Carr, aided only by a few regiments detached from Davis's division, was no longer able to maintain such an unequal fight, when Sigel sent Asboth to his assistance, with a portion of his troops which had been freed by the check of the

* Jefferson C. Davis, now colonel of the Twenty-third Regular Infantry.—ED.

Confederate right. This timely reinforcement put a stop to Price's progress. Van Dorn tried in vain to make a last effort to reunite his two wings; but the lieutenants to whom he had entrusted his right were no longer there to execute his orders, and their soldiers, discouraged and depressed, no longer possessed the required energy to seize the victory which was slipping away from them.

Night, moreover, soon came to put an end to the struggle—a night full of uneasiness and anxiety to both armies. The Federals saw an enemy superior in numbers firmly established along their only line of retreat. After having fought him a whole day, they had not been able to prevent his taking part of the field of battle from them, and a certain number of cannon. How were they to hope that the morrow would secure to their diminished forces a victory which was so far from their reach, and that they would then recover what they had not been able to preserve the day before? Yet this victory must be achieved at any price; for if the Federals were not conquerors, they would be prisoners. Accordingly, they availed themselves of the darkness of the night to prepare their forces for the decisive battle of the next day. Being at ease so far as his left and left centre were concerned, where Davis's and Sigel's divisions had hardly any enemy left in front of them, Curtis brought those troops back to the right, upon the ground where Carr had struggled all day and lost one-third of his effective force. It was there that he concentrated all his available forces, for it was there that he was chiefly menaced; it was the post-road which it was essential above all to wrest from the enemy. While Price, who occupied it, should be attacked on the right by Asboth, in front by Carr, and on the left by Davis, Osterhaus, deploying still farther to the left, would prevent Van Dorn from renewing the attack on the side of Leetown. If, as it was supposed, the latter should find no enemy before him, he was to wheel to the right, take the Confederates along the post-road in flank, and drive them into the deep gorges of Cross-Timber Hollows. The success of this manœuvre was uncertain, but the attempt must be made, for the fate of the army depended upon it.

The Federals would have felt less anxiety if they had judged the situation of their adversaries, not by the results obtained, but

by the sacrifices they had cost them. The Confederate soldiers, accustomed to a rough and adventurous life, had exhibited great courage and dash, but they did not possess those military qualities which discipline imparts. The battle had thrown a certain amount of disorder into their ranks; McCulloch and McIntosh were killed, and Price seriously wounded; they had been in the habit of following those leaders, and did not care to obey commanders whose voices were new to them. Finally, the corps of Indians, from whom such prodigies of valor were expected, had been rather an encumbrance than a support to the Confederates. Those savages possessed the bravery which a contempt for death inspires, but not the courage engendered by the sense of duty. Excellent marksmen, but of a temperament too easily excited, they completely lost their presence of mind amid the tumult of a pitched battle and the roar of cannon. The fatigue and the reduction of rations, which, according to the practice of young troops, had been wasted during the first day's march, were additional causes calculated to damp the ardor of the Confederates. Nevertheless, they prepared themselves for the conflict. Feeling, like their adversaries, that the position of Elkhorn Tavern, which they had conquered the day before, was the key of the battle-ground, they had also gathered all their forces; the remnants of McIntosh's and McCulloch's corps had been rallied and massed there by Van Dorn. At the same time, Sigel, on the side of the Federals, made an analogous movement. The struggle was, therefore, concentrated within a narrow arena.

The day broke and the Confederates remained inactive, thus allowing their enemy time to prepare himself. The latter took at last the offensive, and opened fire against Elkhorn and the positions situated on both sides of the post-road. Van Dorn defended himself with great obstinacy, and repulsed the Federals several times. But Sigel soon deployed on the left of Davis's division, and thus took the Confederates in flank, while Asboth threatened them on the right. It was their turn to be surrounded. After continuing to defend themselves for some time, they recrossed the ravine of Cross-Timber Hollow and abandoned that long-contested battle-field, upon which they left more than one thousand men in killed and wounded.

The losses of the Federal army were nearly equal, amounting to two hundred and three killed, nine hundred and seventy-two wounded, and one hundred and seventy-six prisoners. These numbers included no less than sixty-nine officers disabled; but it had achieved a victory. The enemy, who, a few hours before, appeared ready to capture that entire army, was in full retreat and fast disappearing among those vast spaces whence he had suddenly emerged for the purpose of attacking it. It was not destined to meet him again for a long time to come. Indeed, so far from intending to go in pursuit of that enemy, it was also about to fall back. The battle of Pea Ridge had greatly weakened the small army of Curtis; and having no expectation of receiving the necessary reinforcements to maintain himself so far within an enemy's country, that general withdrew into the southern counties of Missouri; he established himself there without having to fight any more battles but a trifling engagement at Salem, on the Arkansas frontier, where, on the 18th of March, his cavalry obtained some advantage over a party of Confederates. This new campaign, although more bloody, terminated like those which had preceded it, and could exercise no decisive influence over the *ensemble* of military operations collectively. It may be said that there is just as much difference between the modes of waging war in countries already civilized, and those campaigns of which the far West was the theatre, as there is between a duel with swords and with pistols. In the first the two adversaries follow each other, watch each other, close upon one another by crossing sword with sword, and the conqueror is the one who knows how to profit by the errors of his antagonist. On the contrary, when they have pistols in their hands, the combatants, being placed at a certain distance from each other, fire successively balls which either hit or miss, while the skill of the individual who serves as target has nothing to do in the matter; thus in that war across the prairies it frequently happened that two hostile armies would lose sight of each other, each marching on its own side, and only meeting again suddenly on the day of battle, to part as quickly after a passage-at-arms, and each resuming its march without taking thought of the other.

Van Dorn, however, had profited by this kind of warfare to

find the weak side of his adversary. His flank movement was well conceived. But having fallen into the error which lost the battle of Wilson's Creek to the Federals, he divided his army too much; and in order to completely surround the enemy, he so extended his left, that on the first check experienced by his right he was unable to support it effectually. This error, together with the want of discipline of his soldiers, was the principal cause of his failure.

The most important result of his defeat was to relieve the Federals of all anxiety regarding the possession of Missouri. They were thus able to concentrate in Tennessee all their available forces, the labors of which we are about to narrate.

CHAPTER II.

SHILOH.

BEFORE resuming the narrative of the campaign undertaken by Grant, and of which the victory of Donelson had formed such a brilliant beginning, we must transport ourselves for a brief period to one of the most remote sections of the Union, which, after having long escaped the horrors of civil war, became at the commencement of 1862 the theatre of bloody conflicts.

In an early chapter of this work we gave a description of New Mexico, which occupies the elevated table-lands comprised between two spurs of the great chain of the Rocky Mountains. Protected as much by vast deserts as by the dangerous passes of those mountains, this territory presents formidable obstacles to the smallest bodies of troops that might venture there. We have related the sufferings of the small army of Sterling Price, which conquered that territory in 1846. The Rio Grande del Norte, fed by the snows from the mountains where it takes its rise, waters the only fertile valley to be found in those regions, where it seldom rains. After passing not far from the city of Santa Fé, it leaves New Mexico at the gorges of El Paso, and from this point to its mouth, at Matamoras, it separates Mexico from Texas. The Federal government had established a line of fortified posts along this river for the purpose of defending its lower course against the Mexicans, and the upper portion against the incursions of Indians. The detachments of the regular army which occupied New Mexico at the breaking out of the rebellion were scattered among these forts, and had their dépôts and victualling stations at Santa Fé. The most important of these posts were Fort Fillmore, near El Paso, then Fort Craig and the town of Albuquerque, higher up, and to the east, in the mountains, Forts Union and Staunton. Since the capitulation of Major Lynde's troops, near Fort Fillmore, in

July, 1861, the Confederates had been masters of the course of the Rio Grande, in the southern portion of New Mexico, from El Paso to above Fort Thorn, also situated on that river. But they had refrained from disturbing the Federals in their possession of the rest of that territory, and had contented themselves with drawing them into two unimportant engagements in the vicinity of Fort Craig. Being sustained by their governor, the population of New Mexico, among whom were many emigrants from the North, had remained loyal to the Union, and some volunteers, raised in the neighboring territory of Colorado, had come to reinforce the small garrisons which protected that vast region. At the end of 1861 the government had sent to Santa Fé General Canby, an officer of great energy, who set immediately to work to multiply the means of defence. He had, in fact, to sustain with inadequate force the attack which the Confederates had long meditated against New Mexico. The Confederates were commanded by General Sibley, lately an officer in the regular army, who must not be confounded with his namesake, made prisoner by Van Dorn the year previous, who had remained loyal to the Union.

The Confederate general assembled on the frontier at Fort Bliss all lovers of war and plunder who, under the name of settlers, occupied Texas. When, in the early part of February, he had thus collected a small army of two thousand three hundred men—a considerable force for those regions—he took up his line of march, passed Fort Thorn, and proceeded in the direction of Fort Craig, where Canby, apprised of his movements, had repaired with all the troops at his disposal, about four thousand men, to await his coming. This position, well fortified, and defended by a few guns of heavy calibre, was the key of the valley of the Rio Grande and of the Santa Fé road. But Canby's troops, although numerically superior, were far inferior in quality, to the Texans, who had long been inured to the hardships of war by their incessant struggles with the Indians and the Mexicans. The two batteries which constituted his whole artillery were in excellent condition; a regiment of volunteers, commanded by Kit Carson, that bold trapper who had already played an important part in the conquest of New Mexico, was composed of good material; but

his three battalions of regulars were filled with recruits, and the rest of his troops consisted only of inexperienced soldiers hastily levied.

Ascending the right or western bank, upon which Fort Craig stands, Sibley made his appearance in front of the Federal positions on the 16th of February. He saw at once that he could not reduce that work, in which Canby was quietly awaiting him, with his field-pieces. In order to compel this adversary, whom he could neither attack nor leave behind him with impunity, to come out, Sibley tried, by a bold manœuvre, to menace his communications with Albuquerque and Santa Fé. On the right bank of the Rio Grande, facing Fort Craig, there is a succession of sand-banks extending from the margin of the river into the interior. These were thought to be inaccessible to wagons, and this obstacle compelled all the trains coming from the south to pass under the guns of Fort Craig. Sibley, better informed by his scouts, was not afraid of venturing into the wilderness. On the morning of the 19th of February, while the Federals were under the impression that he was about to retreat, he was crossing the Rio Grande, which is almost everywhere fordable, about ten kilometres below the fort. He then proceeded with all his army, his artillery, and his baggage across the heavy sands which the Federals had erroneously considered as a sufficient protection. Canby, astonished at such high daring, determined at once to occupy, with three battalions of regulars, some hills situated in front of the fort, whence he could watch the movements of his adversaries. The march of the Texans, however, had been toilsome in the extreme. In order to drag their wagons through the sand, where they sank up to the hubs, it had been found necessary to double, and even triple, the teams. The mules, exhausted by fatigue, had no water to slacken their thirst; this was also wanting to the men, and a night of great suffering was the consequence. Next morning the Federal regulars, supported by two regiments of volunteers, tried to bar the passage of the Texans. But the latter, rather stimulated by their privations to open for themselves a passage to the river above Fort Craig, were not intimidated by this demonstration. Cannon-shots were exchanged at a long distance; and before losing a single man the greater part of the Union troops fell back in disorder,

and sought shelter among the recesses of the hills adjacent to the river. Among the volunteers Kit Carson's regiment was the only one not affected by the panic; the regulars themselves showed no firmness during this first trial. Such conduct was a bad omen for the future; and General Canby found himself obliged to take his soldiers back into the fort to reorganize their ranks and restore them to some degree of equanimity.

On the evening of that conflict, however, the Texans had not yet reached the borders of the river, because, not being able to approach it under the guns of the fort, they were obliged to proceed about twelve kilometres higher up to find, in the vicinity of the hamlet of Valverde, a point where the inaccessible acclivities which surrounded it might give place to an easier ascent. Consequently, that second night was even more trying than the preceding one. The mules, crazy with thirst after two days of incessant work, broke all their fastenings to rush towards the river, whose vapors were wafted by the evening breeze as far as the desert. The Federal scouts picked up more than one hundred of them; and when, on the morning of the 21st, the Texans resumed their march, they were obliged to burn a number of their wagons thus deprived of teams. The loss of these means of transportation would have been fatal to them if Canby had been able to face them with troops inured to war. In spite of the previous day's experience, he resolved to dispute the possession of Valverde, and not to allow them to establish themselves upon his line of communication without a fight. Sibley thus far succeeded in drawing him off from the protection of his fortifications.

While the vanguard of the Confederates was at last approaching the river at Valverde, and hastening towards its waters to slacken their thirst, the Federals, who had ascended the river by the right bank, appeared upon the opposite shore and opened fire upon the head of their column. Canby had pushed forward the three battalions of regulars, his two batteries, two squadrons of cavalry, and Carson's regiment. He followed them closely with that of Colonel Pino, thus bringing all his available troops into line—about one thousand five hundred men—after having secured the safety of the fort. The Federal artillery, well served, obliged the Confederates to retire from the borders of the river, which the

small Union army immediately forded in order to take position on the left bank, in front of them. Canby drew up his soldiers on the open spaces of ground constituting the Valverde farm, with the river at his back, and facing some woods and brush, behind which Sibley had halted his men. Being fully aware that in order to impart strength to his line he could only rely upon his artillery, Canby had posted Captain McRae's battery on the left, and Lieutenant Hall's two guns on the right, assigning no other task to the infantry than that of supporting them.

Up to two o'clock the fighting was confined to a cannonade, in which the artillery of the Federals, being better served than that of their adversaries, had a manifest advantage. Conscious of this superiority, and seeing the enemy take shelter in the woods instead of coming forward to dispute the possession of the river, Canby felt already certain of victory, and was about to order a forward movement for the purpose of driving the Texans back into the desert which they had just crossed, when the latter suddenly took the offensive. Their rear-guard had been brought into line, and Colonel Green, of the Fifth Texas, which was in front, had received the command of the whole army from Sibley, who was sick. He immediately made arrangements to throw his intrepid soldiers upon the Federal artillery, the galling fire of which was beginning to affect them. On the left his cavalry was preparing to charge Hall's guns, while a portion of his infantry advanced in the centre as far as the skirt of the wood, to occupy the attention of the Federals. In the mean while, he massed two regiments on the right, his own, upon which he particularly relied, being one of them, and directed them against McRae's battery.

The attack of the cavalry was easily repulsed, but not so that of the infantry. The Texans, numbering about one thousand, rushed, with their customary cries, into the space of a few hundred metres which separated them from the Federal guns. They flung the carbine over their shoulders to grasp the two weapons which in their eyes represent the two different civilizations of the United States and Mexico, between which they are placed—the revolver and the bowie-knife. As soon as McRae perceives them he directs his guns, loaded with grape-shot, upon their compact mass. The first discharge has full effect, without, however, stag-

gering them for an instant. The Federal gunners have time to reload their pieces and to make another bloody breach in the Confederate column, which is as promptly closed up. The space of ground already overrun by the Texans is strewn with the dead and the dying, but the projectiles only check the career of those they have struck. The grape-shot of a few guns cannot reach them all, and those whom death spares, confident of success, still pursue their onward course without stopping to fire a single musket. At their approach the Federal infantry desert the guns which they were to defend. Regulars and volunteers, equally deaf to the exhortations of their officers, take to flight before an enemy less numerous than themselves. It is in vain that the Federal gunners set them an example of indomitable courage. When the irresistible tide of Texans reaches them at last, they rally round their pieces; and encouraged by the voice of McRae, who, pistol in hand, has mounted astride on one of the guns, they suffer themselves to be hacked to pieces rather than abandon them. In an instant they are all killed or wounded. The Texans turn the guns they have captured upon the Federal centre, and rush in pursuit of the troops who have not had the courage to contend for those trophies. It is enough for them to show themselves armed with the revolver to put these new adversaries also to flight. The whole Federal line, in the midst of the utmost confusion, rushes headlong towards the Rio Grande, which it recrosses in breathless haste. It never stops until it reaches the breastworks of Fort Craig, leaving in the hands of the conqueror the balance of its artillery, with a large quantity of other arms. The rout of the Unionists was too sudden and rapid to leave many prisoners in the hands of the enemy. They had sixty killed and one hundred and forty wounded. The losses of the Texans were nearly equal, a few of their bravest officers having paid with their lives for the victory which was due to their example.

Timidly shut up in the fort, the Federals were no longer in a condition to molest their adversaries. Sibley felt that there was no necessity for him to take any further notice of them; and ascending the Rio Grande, he boldly advanced with his little army, whose strength had been greatly increased by success, into the interior of New Mexico. He no longer met with any serious resist-

ance. He left his wounded and sick at Socorro, reached Albuquerque, where he found abundant provisions, and proceeded thence to Santa Fé, bearing to the right by the Apache Pass defile, near which stands Fort Union, situated at a distance of about twenty-five kilometres from the capital. Anticipating no resistance, he allowed a detachment of about one thousand men to proceed in advance under Colonel Scurry. On the 24th of March the latter found the Apache Pass occupied by a few hundred regulars and about one thousand volunteers, who had come from Colorado by forced marches. After dispersing the Federal scouts, the Texans arrived in front of the enemy's position, which was defended by a battery of artillery. They renewed, without hesitation, the bold attack which had proved so successful at Valverde. The Federal artillery, still well served, inflicted upon them some terrible losses. As to the infantry, it made a somewhat better resistance than that of Canby, and held them sufficiently long in check to secure the safety of the guns. The Texans themselves came near being surrounded by a few companies, which, passing behind them, had fallen upon their train. But the rest of the line being weakened, that detachment was obliged to beat a speedy retreat. The Federals, whose losses amounted to twenty-three killed, fifty wounded, and about sixty prisoners, fell back in the direction of Colorado. This new success cost Sibley thirty-six killed and sixty wounded, together with the lives of some of his best officers. It delivered a great part of New Mexico into the hands of the Confederates; but they were not able to hold that region which had been conquered in such a brilliant manner for any length of time. The people of Santa Fé did not conceal their hostility. They found but few resources in that city, whose entire intercourse was confined to Colorado and Missouri, and their communications with Texas became very difficult. Finally, Canby, taking advantage of the respite granted him, was preparing to harass their rear. In less than a fortnight after his entrance into Santa Fé, Sibley found himself under the necessity of evacuating that city to concentrate his forces at Albuquerque, where his dépôts were already menaced. He had scarcely reached that post when he realized the impossibility of remaining in New Mexico, and on the 12th of April he retraced his steps towards Texas. He soon found him-

self in the presence of Canby, who was waiting for him with a superior force on the left bank of the Rio Grande. But he dreaded to bring on a fight the issue of which might prove fatal to his troops, already reduced and fatigued; and in order to avoid it, he concentrated his troops upon the right bank; then, abandoning all his wagons, and loading his provisions upon the mules which had been used in drawing them, he struck out for the open desert, dragging his artillery behind him with extraordinary effort. This time it was deemed necessary to make a circuit across those terrible solitudes, which consumed, not three, but more than ten, days. Finally, after a painful march, the Confederates reached a point on the river bank where they could not be disturbed. While they were resting in the vicinity of Fort Bliss, Canby, who had not even thought of pursuing them, was quietly taking permanent possession of New Mexico.

We must now return to the consideration of more important events, which were taking place in the State of Tennessee at the same period, and which were destined to exercise so great an influence over the entire course of the war. On the 11th of March the President had relieved General McClellan of the supreme control of military affairs, and had reserved to himself that task, so onerous for a man without experience. But he had not yet aggravated this error of judgment by those lamentable attempts at strategy which a few months later caused so many disasters to the Federal arms. He had, on the contrary, extenuated his fault by investing Halleck with the command of all the armies situated west of the Alleghanies.

The co-operation of the armies of Buell and Grant, which had hitherto been subservient to direct orders from Washington, was thus better assured. Grant resumed once more the command, of which he had been temporarily deprived, and received considerable reinforcements, which enabled him to continue an offensive campaign. To the three divisions whose movements we have followed in front of Donelson there were added three others, under Generals Hurlbut, Prentiss, and Sherman. That of the latter was brought back from Columbus, where it had been sent after the evacuation of that post by the Confederates. All three were composed of new men, who had never marched nor fought,

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Park & McFetridge Lith Phil^a

and were as yet ignorant of the very first principles of discipline. The fleet of transports assembled at Fort Henry, and convoyed by two wooden gun-boats, the others being in the Mississippi, was again employed in enabling the army of invasion to make a great step forward. The course of the Tennessee has been described elsewhere. After running for a long distance from north-east to south-west, along the foot of the Alleghanies, it pursues a course almost due west for nearly one hundred and eighty kilometres. Towards the middle of this part of its course it is intersected, near Florence, by shallows, called Muscle Shoals, which do not allow large vessels to proceed higher up, and which at times even completely interrupt its navigation. Finally, at Eastport it again resumes its original course to run directly north as far as Paducah. The distance in a straight line between those two points is about two hundred and sixty kilometres. Fort Henry is situated on the lower part of the river, about two hundred kilometres below Eastport. This path, opened by the battles of February into the heart of the rebel States, was the one to be followed by Grant. It had been reconnoitred during the early part of March by C. F. Smith, who, after making a feint against Eastport, had landed his division upon the left bank of the river at an almost desert place called Pittsburg Landing. A few log huts alone marked the spot, where a rough road terminated at the river bank, and where, before the war, steamers stopped to land provisions and load with cotton. The small city of Savannah, situated on the right bank, eleven or twelve kilometres lower down, was selected as a *dépôt* for the army, the entire supplies of which were naturally obtained by water. It was between this city and Eastport that, on the 17th of March, Grant joined his troops, scattered along both sides of the river. Leaving his headquarters at Savannah, he assembled five divisions in the neighborhood of Pittsburg Landing, and stationed the sixth, under Lewis Wallace, at Crump's Landing, a few kilometres lower down, on the same side of the river. These two points had been selected by the Federal general as a base of operations for the new campaign, which was to bring him face to face with the Confederates upon the frontier of Mississippi; but he was not yet in a condition to undertake it. As we shall find him again in the

same positions three weeks later, we shall take advantage of his inaction to indicate the movements which were being made at the same time at the two extremities of the line of which he occupied the centre.

Buell had met with no resistance during his march from the borders of Green River to those of the Cumberland. Johnston had not stopped even once for the purpose of holding him in check, and had left no trophies in his hands. After the evacuation of Nashville, the Confederate general had to choose between two lines of retreat: he could either follow the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad, in order to keep himself in communication with the Mississippi valley, or the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, so as to rest upon the mountains. He preferred this latter route, either because he was afraid of seeing the former intercepted at Eastport, as it actually was, or because he wished to draw Buell far away from the large rivers, and to separate him as much as possible from Grant's army. He halted, as we have said, at Murfreesborough, a station situated about fifty-two kilometres south-east of Nashville, which will play a conspicuous part throughout the history of the war. Buell, after taking up his quarters at Nashville, and placing himself in communication with Grant's army, contented himself with observing him without seriously molesting him. It was at this time that Grant's troops, transported by way of the Tennessee, landed in the neighborhood of Savannah; they thus found themselves about three hundred kilometres south-west of Nashville, and the two hostile armies were entirely separated. But Johnston, far from taking advantage of this to attempt to recover a part of the ground he had lost in the east, took yet another step backward, and led his army, exhausted by so many fruitless marches, as far as Bridgeport and Chattanooga, on the Upper Tennessee. This retreat was no doubt rendered necessary by the difficulty of subsisting his soldiers at Murfreesborough, so near to an enemy who had the advantage of numbers, but it was also necessary for the execution of the plan of campaign which he had formed. As Buell did not come to look for him in the east, he had resolved to proceed rapidly to the west to dispute the valley of the Mississippi with Grant; to accom-

plish this object, it was necessary to post himself at Chattanooga, which was the nucleus of the various railways he was to use. There were hardly any musket-shots fired by the scouts of either army during the month of March.

On the extreme left of Buell, Garfield had remained in the mountains of Kentucky which adjoin West Virginia; and in order to be able to pursue the Confederate bands that overran them more effectually, he had taken up his quarters at Picketon, in the heart of those mountains. On the 16th of March, by a bold and difficult advance, with one thousand men, he surprised a small Confederate brigade upon the elevated defile of Pound Gap, and dispersed them after a slight engagement.

On the same day, at a distance of more than six hundred and fifty kilometres from this point, the Confederate partisan Morgan pushed a bold raid as far as Gallatin, on the right bank of the Cumberland, where he gathered some booty. But he was immediately after obliged to fall back as far as Shelbyville, while a detachment of Federal cavalry, which in turn entered McMinnville, south-east of Murfreesborough, on the 26th of March put to flight the troops who had come to dispute the possession of that place.

The victory of Donelson was bearing its fruits, and the Federals were masters of the largest portion of the State of Tennessee. Having full confidence in the power of their fleet when supported by an army, they prepared to renew the tactics which had already proved so successful against the new defences of the Confederates on the Mississippi. Foote, as we have stated, had found the position of Columbus evacuated in the early part of March. He had immediately descended the Mississippi as far as Island No. 10, the cannon of which informed him that the enemy was at work. While Sherman was embarking for Columbus, the troops which had been fighting for some time in Eastern Missouri, after being consolidated into one division of three strong brigades, under command of General Pope, landed on the 28th of February at Commerce, on the right bank of the Mississippi. On the 2d of March they dispersed the small force of J. Thompson, capturing six guns, and on the following day they appeared before New Madrid; they found that village surrounded by con-

siderable works, occupied by a numerous garrison, and supplied with a powerful artillery.

On the Confederate side, the defence of the Mississippi had been entrusted to Beauregard, but he only reached Columbus to learn of the capture of Donelson, and his first act in the exercise of his new authority was to order the evacuation of the fort which had been too hastily called the Gibraltar of the West. He found, however, scattered over the vast expanse of territory confided to him, the elements of quite a respectable army, to which he was bringing the prestige of the victory at Bull Run. His name could not fail to infuse martial ardor into the Army of the Mississippi, of which these troops were destined to form the nucleus. He hastened to reorganize Polk's regiments, which had just left Columbus, and addressed an urgent appeal to his friend General Braxton Bragg. This stern and resolute officer, who was commanding at Mobile, and had already imparted a certain military education to the troops he had assembled there, immediately started for the North with all the forces at his disposal.

Beauregard was fully aware that the fall of Donelson and of Nashville rendered all the defences of the Mississippi above Memphis powerless. It was, therefore, near that city that he prepared a system of works capable of definitely checking the Federals. But to retard their progress, and gain time to finish those works, he had fortified New Madrid and Island No. 10. After making what resistance he could, he intended to fall back upon his true line of defence, with the determination to attack the enemy in an open country rather than allow himself to be shut up like Floyd in entrenchments. The six gun-boats of Commodore Hollins, which had arrived from New Orleans to support the army of Beauregard, and to dispute the mastery of the Mississippi with Foote, had taken position between New Madrid and Island No. 10.

It is known that the first of these two points lies both below and north-west of the second. The Federals, therefore, in order to take possession of it, could land at a short distance without passing under the fire of the second; and once masters of it, it would be easy for them to riddle any vessel with balls that should

attempt to go up the river for the purpose of revictualling Island No. 10. Consequently, the Confederates had concentrated all their available forces for the defence of New Madrid. They had erected two large earthworks, which, besides the field artillery, were armed with sixteen guns of large calibre. Hollins's gun-boats, anchored in an elbow of the river, had complete command of the low and marshy grounds which surrounded them. Pope saw at once that he would not be able to reduce these forts with the cannon at his disposal, and found himself under the necessity of undertaking a regular siege. While waiting for the heavy guns which he had ordered from Cairo, and which were to be landed above Island No. 10, he sent a portion of his troops, with his field-batteries, to occupy Point Pleasant, about fifteen kilometres lower down, on the right bank of the river. From that place they were to intercept any reinforcements coming up the Mississippi, which could pass through a narrow isthmus to reach Island No. 10 directly. This operation was successfully conducted, despite the fire of the enemy's gun-boats. In the mean time, the Confederates continued to reinforce New Madrid; and the troops assembled there, under General McCown, numbered nine thousand men, when at last three twenty-four-pounders and one mortar, dragged across a marshy country with great difficulty, arrived in the trenches of the besiegers. These guns were placed in position on the 12th of March, not without losses from the fire of the Confederates, at eight hundred metres from their works. They immediately opened a brisk cannonade against the latter. Hollins's gun-boats came down from Island No. 10 to participate in a fight which seemed to continue the whole day with equal chances on both sides. Pope had one of his guns dismounted and about fifty men disabled; but the Confederates were discouraged by the unexpected appearance of that siege artillery, and took advantage of a frightful storm which prevailed during the night to conceal their precipitate embarkation. They left in the hands of the Federals, who were astonished at their easy success, well-stored magazines, and on the parapets sixteen guns ineffectually spiked. These guns were immediately ranged along the borders of the river, forming at Point Pleasant a powerful battery, which effectually blockaded the course of the Mississippi. From that mo-

ment the garrison of Island No. 10 found it impossible to obtain supplies, except by carting on land the provisions landed on the left side of the river below the last of the Federal batteries.

But in order to thoroughly invest that island, Pope should have been able to cross to the other bank of the river, opposite New Madrid, which was in the enemy's hands. It is true that a small body of cavalry was operating below Columbus, which, on the 12th of March, had captured from the Confederates an insignificant post at Paris, in Tennessee; but it was too weak to undertake such a task, and Pope had not even a barge to convey his soldiers to the other side of that immense sheet of water which was spread out before him. In fact, Foote's fleet, after taking possession of the little town of Hickman, which was the terminus of a line of railway, and which had served as his *dépôt*, was held in check by the batteries of Island No. 10. It was now the beginning of April; and for the last fortnight this fleet, armed with mortars and Parrott guns, as well as the land-batteries erected by Pope, had been vainly exchanging shots with the heavy guns placed by Beauregard on all the points which commanded the sinuous current-valley (*thalweg*) of the Mississippi. This regular bombardment ceased at last to produce any impression. It, however, diverted the attention of the Confederates from the gigantic work which their patient and laborious adversaries had just undertaken behind the wooded screen bordering the margin of the river. Unable to force a passage in front of the Confederate batteries, they had determined to avoid the elbow of the Mississippi by cutting a canal across the peninsula formed by it, through which the fleet should debouch into the river in the vicinity of New Madrid. This peninsula is more than fifteen miles in width at the most accessible point. It was for the most part covered with old trees, the feet of which were bathed to the depth of more than one metre by stagnant water, proceeding from the infiltrations of the river. A volunteer regiment, called a regiment of engineers, dug a channel across this isthmus fifteen metres in width, and accessible to all flat-bottomed vessels. Although one-half of its course ran across the forest, where the trunks had to be sawed below the surface of the water, the passage was opened in nineteen days. This work, boldly conceived and cleverly exe-

cuted, presented a striking proof of the industrious character of the American army, and, surviving the circumstances which caused it to be undertaken, will long remain, no doubt, a monument to remind the peaceful traveller on the Mississippi of the troublous epoch we are narrating.

The fleet, however, was not satisfied to occupy the enemy with a fruitless bombardment. On the 1st of April the crews, assisted by a few volunteers from Pope's army, had landed on the left bank of the river, and taking one of the principal Confederate batteries by surprise had spiked six of its guns. Finally, when the channel was nearly completed, one of the gun-boats, which until then had not dared to attempt a passage under the fire of Island No. 10, made that dangerous experiment. The *Carondelet* reached New Madrid during the night of the 4th-5th of April without being struck by a single ball. On the morning of the 6th another vessel, the *Pittsburg*, cast anchor near her, after performing that perilous feat with the same good fortune. The Confederates, who were not prepared for the display of so much daring, were still more astonished when, a few days later, they saw a whole fleet of transports loaded with troops and several floating-batteries debouch from a creek near New Madrid which served as the head of the canal. Notwithstanding the reports of their spies, they had been unwilling to believe in the accomplishment of such an enterprise. The astonishment of the soldiers was the greater because their position had been represented to them as impregnable.

Beauregard no sooner reached the West than he became sensible that, notwithstanding its natural strength, Island No. 10 never could serve as a point of support to the army he was forming. It was to little purpose that this island enabled him to keep at bay the soldiers of Pope and the gun-boats of Foote; the presence of Grant almost close upon his rear, at Pittsburg Landing, did not allow him to remain with his army in a position which was thus turned on the land side. He had gathered together his best troops under the orders of Pope, and had appointed, as their place of rendezvous, Corinth, an important railroad junction, situated near Pittsburg Landing; this corps was to serve as a nucleus for the new army, with which he calculated to reconquer all the ground lost since the 1st of January. But on leaving them

he had taken care to say a few words of encouragement to the six or seven thousand men he left at Island No. 10. Moreover, General McCown, to whom he had entrusted the command, had taken advantage of the time employed by the Federals in the construction of the canal to cover the left bank of the Mississippi with batteries. He thus preserved open communications between the island and the main land, while, on the other hand, his troops, which were sufficiently numerous to oppose the crossing of such a river, could, with the support of a powerful artillery, hold those of Pope in check. But the remembrance of Donelson exercised a fatal influence upon men who had already been obliged to evacuate the position of Columbus without a fight, after having been taught to believe it impregnable; and a change of commander at the last hour increased their trouble. General McCown, having been relieved on the 5th of April by the Secretary of War, was succeeded by General Mackall.

At the sight of Foote's vessels assembled before New Madrid, Mackall posted all his available troops so as to repulse a landing. But the fire of the two gun-boats of the enemy sufficed to keep them at a distance; all his batteries were silenced; and on the evening of the 7th the first Federal soldiers who set foot on land, on the left bank of the river, found no one to oppose them. Abandoning the feeble garrison of artillery soldiers which had been left at Island No. 10, Mackall's corps had retired with so much speed that its flight soon became a perfect rout. An uninterrupted chain of lakes and swamps, formed at several kilometres from the left bank by a rise in the bed of the Mississippi, stretched out in a line parallel with its flow; this impenetrable barrier cut off all retreat towards the interior, and compelled the Confederates to follow a strip of land along the river side at times very narrow. More than two thousand of them (some reports say seven thousand) were stopped in their flight and made prisoners in small parties; the remainder scattered in every direction; some wandered about in the swamps, and many perished there; others returned to their homes. Scarcely two hundred reached Memphis to tell the story of their disaster.

In the mean while, Island No. 10 was occupied without resistance. The Federals found considerable *matériel*, with a strong

artillery yet uninjured; seventy guns of large calibre, some of which were rifled, constituted the armament of the seven forts which the bombardment had not damaged. Hollins, being in turn blockaded by the occupancy of New Madrid, endeavored to destroy the fleet he had uselessly brought so far, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. But he had no time to complete that operation. His principal floating-battery, carrying sixteen guns, instead of sinking, got adrift, and was found stranded upon one of the sand-banks of the Mississippi; the Federals took possession of the four steamers which were still afloat, and the other three were easily raised.

A complete success had crowned their ingenious efforts and their perseverance; the Mississippi was open for more than eighty miles in a straight line, and for nearly twice that distance, following its sinuosities, across the low and marshy grounds, where no fortified works could be erected, as far as the first bluffs, like those of Columbus, which are found a little above the city of Memphis. These bluffs were covered with several works of considerable importance—Forts Wright, Randolph, Harris, and Pillow—which had been erected under the superintendence of Beauregard at the very time when Island No. 10 was being evacuated. These forts protected not only the approaches of Memphis, but were intended to cover the left wing of the army assembled at Corinth; and their fate was inseparably connected with that of this position, as Columbus had been before with that of Bowling Green.

The intersection of the two principal Southern railways had designated Corinth as the point of concentration of all the forces that the Confederates could dispose of for resisting Grant. Beauregard, as we have stated, had been the first to take up his quarters there with Polk's corps. Braxton Bragg had rejoined him towards the latter part of March with the troops he had brought over from Pensacola. Finally, after the battle of Pea Ridge, Van Dorn had taken advantage of Curtis's retreat to abandon Eastern Arkansas. Having turned his back upon his late adversary, he was marching eastward, with all the forces he could muster, to reinforce Beauregard with more than 20,000 well-trained soldiers for the great struggle which was impending.

In the mean while, a similar concentration of Federal troops

was taking place on the Tennessee. While the steamers were rapidly conveying Grant's soldiers to Pittsburg Landing, Buell's troops were undertaking a long march by land to join them. This general, being satisfied that Johnston, who had fallen back beyond Murfreesborough, would not be able to make any demonstration against Nashville, had left that city with the whole of his army, and was slowly advancing towards Savannah. Once united, it was the intention of the Federal generals to march with all their forces against the enemy's army, to attack it on the right, so as to cut off its communications with the east, and to drive it back upon the Mississippi to the great city of Memphis. Being invested in that place, before which Foote would soon appear with his gun-boats, it would have to experience the same fate as the garrison of Donelson. If, on the contrary, it should abandon Memphis, one-third of the course of the great river, and a new network of railways, would fall into the hands of the Unionists.

At the end of March, Chattanooga was no longer menaced, even from a distance, and Johnston was no longer obliged to cover that important centre. Nor was he, on the other hand, sufficiently strong to take advantage of Buell's march, either to fall upon his rear or to recapture Nashville. He could only, therefore, try to reach the borders of the Tennessee before him. In order to accomplish this movement, he had to make a great *détour*, but the distance was very considerably shortened by a railroad. Consequently, when Beauregard asked him for some reinforcements, he replied by putting all his troops in march to join him. A portion of them were forwarded by railway, the rest on foot. But when they arrived at Corinth, they no longer presented the appearance of that fine army which had evacuated Kentucky six weeks before. Sickness, long marches, and above all desertion, had reduced them to about seventeen thousand men. Such a long retreat, during which they had not even once seen the enemy, incessant marches through the mud, and bivouacking in torrents of rain, had exhausted both the moral and physical strength of those young soldiers. A large number of them, natives of Kentucky and Tennessee, on seeing their homes deserted, left the ranks to return to them. Those, however, who reached Corinth soon recovered their spirits by contact with their comrades. The

combined army, of which Johnston had assumed command, numbered on the 2d of April a little over forty thousand men; it was encamped upon the different lines of railway which meet at Corinth, and which could thus easily bring the necessary provisions to the quarters of each corps. The position of Corinth was the key of all that region. An important line of railway leaves the Mississippi at Memphis, pursuing an easterly direction. It crosses the Tennessee above Muscle Shoals, and consequently cannot be interfered with by large vessels, and it continues in a north-easterly direction as far as Chattanooga. It was the great artery which connected the east of the Confederacy with the west. It was intersected at Corinth by a long line, called the Mobile and Ohio Railway, which extended directly from the north to the Gulf of Mexico, placing the Confederate army in communication with the States adjoining that sea. Pittsburg Landing is only about twenty-six miles from Corinth, and the concentration of the Federals on the right bank of the Tennessee clearly demonstrated to Beauregard that this junction was the point they intended to strike to disorganize the network of his railroads. It was, therefore, on that spot that this network had to be defended.

The position occupied by the Federals at Pittsburg Landing was also extremely well chosen. Grant was blamed for not having posted his troops on the right bank of the Tennessee, sheltered from the attacks of the Confederates; this criticism was unjust, because, in order to prevent them from obstructing the course of the river by the batteries, and to be able to take the offensive against adversaries whom it was his mission to conquer, he could not do otherwise than take position on the same bank with themselves, and this he could do without imprudence, inasmuch as his forces were equal to their own. In this position he had not the river at his back, but on one of his flanks, which was protected by the gun-boats; and in the event of his being beaten, he could fall back as far as he desired along the left bank. The ground about Pittsburg Landing was easy to defend; it consisted of undulations intersected by numerous streams, and almost entirely covered with woods, partly brushwood and partly tall forest trees. It is bounded by two watercourses, Lick Creek, to the south, which debouches obliquely into the Tennessee, Owl

Creek, to the north, which, after taking its rise near the former, separates from it and unites with a third, Snake Creek, running from the north-west, and forms impassable swamps to the bank of the Tennessee, into which it empties very near to Pittsburg Landing. This country is traversed by several roads, which meet at the latter point; that of Hamburg, to the south, runs along the left bank of Lick Creek; that of Crump's Landing, to the north, crosses the swamps below the confluence of Owl Creek and Snake Creek. In the centre a third road leads towards the north-west to the town of Purdy, and two others in a south-westerly direction to Corinth.

The two streams of Owl Creek and Lick Creek, separated at their mouths by a space of little more than four kilometres, formed an excellent protection for the flanks of the Federal army. But the latter, at the time when the Confederates were preparing to attack it, had not yet learned to avail itself of the natural advantages of the position it had occupied for three weeks. The divisions were scarcely landed when they were posted at hazard, and from that time their positions had never been altered. They were not disposed so as to enable them to support each other mutually, and there were intervals between them through which the enemy might penetrate. Sherman formed the right with three of his brigades; he occupied one of the Corinth roads, that of Purdy, and a prominent point adjoining the first of these roads, where stands the plain wooden chapel known by the name of Shiloh. This little church—or, to use the expression more generally applied by the sect to which it belonged, this meeting-house—resembling those primitive religious edifices erected in the New World by the Puritan colonists, was to give its name to the bloodiest battle that had yet been fought on the American continent. At a considerable distance on the left, and a little in the rear of Shiloh, were encamped the two brigades comprising the division of Prentiss. Still farther back, and entirely isolated on the borders of Lick Creek, was the fourth brigade of Sherman, commanded by General Stuart. The division of McClernand was placed one kilometre in the rear of Sherman and Prentiss, or rather fronting the large interval which separated them. This broken and irregular line formed a kind of arc, the centre of

which was at Pittsburg Landing, which rested at the left on Lick Creek near its mouth, and at the right on Owl Creek, and which had a radius of from four to six kilometres. Upon a second line of heights, in advance of the last elevations which command Pittsburg Landing, were posted the divisions of Hurlbut on the left and of W. H. Wallace on the right. But the fault of these arrangements was a small matter compared with the neglect of all the precautions with which the Federal army should have surrounded itself. Not a shovelful of earth had been thrown up in those three weeks to fortify either the Federal camps or the approaches to the dépôt of Pittsburg Landing. The tall trees of the forest, in the midst of which the army was established, had not even been cut down to construct *abatis* and guard against an unforeseen attack. The very position of the camps exposed them to all kind of surprises. In short, the surrounding country had not been reconnoitred. The cavalry, still greatly inexperienced, instead of moving about and constantly searching the thick forest which separated the Federals from their adversaries, was assembled near the river, and for three weeks had only made a single reconnaissance, of no consequence whatever. Each general would send out his pickets at random without connecting them with those of his neighbors; and the divisions of Sherman and Prentiss, which had charge of the matter, being the newest in the army, this service was very poorly performed. The men had the bad habit of firing their muskets in the air on being relieved, so that it was impossible to be warned in time of the approach of the enemy.

Generals and soldiers were alike novices. Grant was not accustomed to handling a large army. He was ignorant of the importance of entrenchments, of which he was afterwards to make such great use. Sherman, who displayed so much foresight in his subsequent campaigns, did not appear to possess as yet that vigilance which became one of his prominent military qualities. Notwithstanding the reports of deserters and fugitive negroes, no one had been able to form an idea of the movements by which seventy thousand of the enemy were being massed at Corinth. Even Halleck, in his central office at St. Louis, was indulging in the same illusions as his subordinates, and, thinking himself able to

plan at leisure the offensive campaign of which the arrival of Buell was to be the signal, had not even thought proper to urge the union of the armies of the Ohio and the Tennessee.

Before being placed under his command, Buell had already proposed to him to march upon Savannah. He only received orders to undertake this movement on the 12th of March. But on the 17th his progress was checked at Columbia by Duck River, which the rains had greatly swollen, and which was then more than thirteen metres in depth. It was found necessary to reconstruct the great railway bridge, without which the army could not have been victualled, and to wait until the 31st of March for the completion of that work to enable him to resume his march. His army then advanced rapidly towards Savannah, where it arrived on the 5th of April. In the mean while, Halleck so little suspected the movements of the enemy that he sent an order to Buell to make a diversion to the north to occupy Waynesborough—an order which, by a providential chance, did not reach him in time; while Grant, who was as badly informed as his superior, wrote on the 4th of April to Nelson, who commanded the advance guard of Buell's army, not to hurry, because the vessels which were to convey him to Pittsburg Landing would not be ready before the 8th. Fortunately, Nelson continued his march without heeding this advice.

The Confederates were preparing a terrible awakening for their imprudent adversaries. The army of the Mississippi, reconstructed and reorganized, had been divided into four corps of unequal proportions. The first two, under Polk and Bragg, each consisting of two divisions, numbered, one, nine thousand, the other, thirteen thousand five hundred men. The third, under Hardee, composed of part of Johnston's old army, and the reserve corps, commanded by Breckenridge, presented each an effective force of from six to seven thousand men, and were divided into three brigades each. The cavalry formed a division of four thousand four hundred horses. Johnston was commander-in-chief, Beauregard second in command. Many persons thought they saw in the one the arm, in the other the head, of that army. There is nothing to justify this opinion. Johnston, before deserting his flag, had acquired a well-deserved reputation in his difficult expedition

against the Mormons. He had had an experience which Beauregard did not possess. So that while the latter, by means of a glibness of speech, dazzled the vulgar with the glitter of a renown which his military career was far from sustaining, professional men—that is to say, nearly all the generals of the army of the Mississippi—paid much greater deference to the moral authority of Sidney Johnston.

The latter had at first determined to wait before attacking Grant for the arrival of Van Dorn, who was expected to join him on the 5th or 6th of April. The troops which that general was bringing over with him, increased in number by those he had picked up on his march through Arkansas, would have swelled their combined forces to nearly seventy thousand men. But having been apprised of Buell's march towards Savannah, Johnston anticipated the date which had been fixed for his offensive movement, in order to prevent the junction of the two Federal corps. Therefore, while the two hostile armies, each about forty thousand strong, were going to meet near Pittsburg Landing, two other armies, that of Van Dorn and that of Buell, were hastening on, one from Arkansas and the other from Nashville, each hoping to arrive first in order to throw a decisive weight into the scale.

On the 3d of April news reached the headquarters at Corinth that Buell had left Columbia. It was important to anticipate his arrival at all risks, and all the marching orders were issued on the same day. The Confederate army was to be put in motion on the following day, Friday, preceded by the cavalry, and in the following order: the third, second, and first corps, and lastly the reserve. It carried five days' rations, with as much ammunition as possible. The scarcity of roads, together with their narrowness, could not but stretch out the columns, which were obliged to march by the flank, and only four abreast. But when they had once reached the space between Lick Creek and Owl Creek, where they knew the enemy to be posted, the battalions were ordered to take position in the forest, on the same line and at proper distance from each other, massed in double column on the centre, so as to be able to deploy promptly in line of battle. According to this arrangement, each corps thus deployed was to form a line

which, with the aid of cavalry, should occupy all the space comprised between the two streams. An interval of a thousand metres was to be preserved between the lines; and in order that they might present a front nearly equal, the second corps supplied the third with a few brigades.

Johnston was in hopes of making his army perform the greatest part of the distance of from twenty-six to twenty-eight kilometres, which separated him from the Federal outposts, during the 4th, so as to be thus able to fight the battle on Saturday, the 5th. But night overtook the soldiers, little accustomed to marching, before they had reached the points determined upon. The next morning the roads were soon crowded; some corps remained eight hours under arms before they could be started, and all that could be done was to go into bivouac almost in sight of the enemy's outposts on the evening of the 5th.

A cavalry reconnaissance had been made the day before along the whole Federal line, and towards the close of that very day some patrols of Hardee's corps exchanged shots with Sherman's outposts; but they had immediately fallen back, and the Federal generals attached no importance to such trifling skirmishes. In the mean time, an army of forty thousand men, lying in ambush within reach of the guns of its camps, was waiting, under the cover of darkness and the thick foliage of the virgin forest, for the break of day, which was to be the signal for the attack. A warm spring night gave assurance that a burning sun would shine over the bloody morrow; but there were no camp-fires to enliven the long hours of that night for the soldiers of the army of the Mississippi. They were surrounded by a line of outposts carefully stationed; the sentinels had been doubled, and they were instructed to allow no one to cross their line—an indispensable precaution, in view of the fact that a single deserter might put the enemy on his guard, especially in an army which, having been levied for a civil war, counted more than one resident of the North in its ranks who had been enlisted by compulsion. It would have required a keen eye to discover at the bottom of a ravine the only fire which had been kindled in that camp, where every one was preparing in silence, and without light, for the conflict of the next day. Its flickering flame projected on the surrounding trees

the shadows of a few officers wrapped up in cavalry cloaks. These were the leaders of the Confederate army, assembled to discuss the chances of the battle which was to restore to them the whole valley of the Mississippi ;—Johnston, who seemed already to bear upon his gloomy brow the presentiment of his approaching death ; Beauregard, full of ardor and of confidence, which he was endeavoring to impart to the others ; Hardee, the practiced officer, whose European military education invested him with a peculiar authority ; Braxton Bragg, as stiff, and even haughty, towards his equals as he was stern to his inferiors ; Bishop Polk, who only remembered the early years of his youth passed at the West Point Academy ; finally, Breckenridge, the politician, very lately Vice-President of the United States, an improvised general, who was learning his profession in this great and rough school. Their deliberations were long. At last the soldiers, who were watching them at a distance, saw them separate and each direct his steps towards his own head-quarters. “Gentlemen,” said Beauregard, “to-morrow we shall sleep in the enemy’s camps.” The plan determined upon between the leaders was explained by each of them to all his subordinates, for it was easy to foresee that in a battle fought in the extensive forest it would be impossible to direct the movements of troops from a central point. This plan was simple ; its object was to attack the enemy constantly by the right, so as to dislodge him from Pittsburg Landing and drive him into the angle comprised between the Tennessee and the marshes of Snake Creek.

On Sunday, the 6th, Hardee started before break of day. The first Confederate line, to avoid the deep ravines which run into Lick Creek and Owl Creek on the right and left of the Corinth roads, followed the plateau upon which these roads run, and which separates the valleys of those two streams, and over which those roads pass. It was precisely at this central point that the Federal line was left open between the left of Sherman, which did not extend beyond the church of Shiloh, and the right of Prentiss, whose front on that day was formed by a single brigade. Colonel Peabody, who commanded it, had sent five companies to reconnoitre the ground beyond Shiloh, where some vague indications had caused him to suspect a hidden danger. When day was be-

ginning to break, this reconnoitring party was saluted, not by isolated discharges of musketry from a few skirmishers, but by a well-sustained fire of two ranks; these were the Confederate battalions, which, deployed under shelter of the woods, were now advancing in a compact line, despite the obstacles of the forest, and were fully determined to drive everything they met before them. An instant after the battle commences in the very camp of Peabody's brigade; for the Federals, accustomed to hear every morning the pickets fire their muskets in the air, have paid no attention to the discharges of musketry, which should have been a warning to them. They cannot even offer any resistance; their ranks are broken before they are formed, and the camps are strewn with the killed and wounded, whom the balls of the enemy have struck down before they had time to seize their arms. The victorious Confederates chase the remnants of Peabody's brigade, and drive them vigorously before them. The Federals rally at last upon the second brigade, posted at some distance in the rear, and hastening to their assistance.

The surprise of the Federals was complete and unquestionable, and their commanders sought in vain to excuse themselves. Their apologists vainly tried to make it appear that the Federals were aware of the movements of the enemy, and had prepared themselves to receive him. If they could have believed that an army of forty thousand men was near enough to attack them, they would not have contented themselves with sending a few insignificant reconnoitring parties some hundreds of metres only from their camps; they would not have allowed their soldiers to lie down in those camps as quietly as if they had been near St. Louis. Grant himself would have hurried to the centre of his army, instead of remaining at his headquarters in Savannah. He would have hastened the march of Buell's heads of column, which had just reached that town. He would have ordered Lewis Wallace to Pittsburg Landing, instead of leaving him with seven thousand men at Crump's Landing, separated by a distance of nearly twelve kilometres from the rest of the army. In short, if he had foreseen the danger which threatened him, the forces he could have arrayed against the forty thousand Confederates massed between

Owl Creek and Lick Creek would not have thus been reduced to the figure of thirty-three thousand men.

While the right wing of Hardee was achieving this first success, his left centre encountered the extremity of Sherman's line. The latter had left Stuart's brigade at the extreme left, near Lick Creek, which he had posted there when he was guarding Pittsburg Landing alone. He had three left: the one on the right was guarding the bridge over Owl Creek, the other two were posted on each side of Shiloh church and across the Corinth road. The brigade posted on the right of that road, and, consequently, in the centre of the division, occupied a commanding position over a ravine which covered its front. The other had nothing before it but the plateau upon which the Confederates were debouching. It was upon this brigade that their first effort was directed. Warned by the firing of his outposts, Sherman had time to place his division under arms, and to send a message to McClernand, who was encamped in his rear, requesting him to fill up, without delay, the gap which separated him from Prentiss. His soldiers, encouraged by his example, resisted the first shock. It is true that a few regiments on his extreme left, near a battery which covered his flank, were scattered, but a reinforcement sent by McClernand arrived in time to take their place.

In the mean time, the attack of the Confederates redoubles in vigor. Bragg, who forms their second line with five brigades, has brought them successively into action, where he sees that Hardee needs support. Three of these brigades, composing the division of Ruggles, have crossed the ravine which covers Sherman's front, and press upon the whole of his line. On the left, Withers, with the remainder of the second corps, resumes the fight against the remnants of the two brigades of Prentiss, and thus enables Hardee to re-form his troops. The latter takes advantage of this to penetrate into the interval which has remained open between the two divisions of the first Federal line, and separate them irreparably. This movement is decisive. The Confederates reach the positions occupied by McClernand in the rear of this interval. While some charge this new adversary in front, others rush, on the left, upon Sherman, striking him on the flank and taking him almost in the rear. The latter sees his

brigade on the left, which is the most exposed, give way under such pressure. It disperses at last, leaving many guns in the hands of the enemy. But the others, sustained by the heroic conduct of their leader, hold their ground; and for another hour, Sherman, surrounded almost on every side, gallantly defends the position of Shiloh, the importance of which he thoroughly appreciates. But towards ten o'clock he is obliged to abandon it, in consequence of the repeated assaults of Hardee. He tries in vain to make a stand behind the first screen of trees, where his decimated soldiers again lose several guns. At last he succeeds in occupying a good position on the left of McClernand, who is beginning to be sorely pressed in his turn.

Sherman's division was considerably reduced. He had eventually lost important positions and left part of his artillery in the hands of the assailants; but through his sagacity and courage he had gained time—precious time—which might save the Federals from an irreparable disaster. His truly warlike instinct made him discover at a glance the points most easy to defend, and his indomitable courage rallied once more the dismayed soldiers, who would no longer listen to the voice of any other leader. Those who knew this officer best, generally so chary of his words and sharp in discussion, looked upon him as a new man. Danger had revealed the qualities of the great general, quick in his decisions, clear in his orders, imparting to all, by a word, a gesture, or a look, the ardor which fired his own breast. In the midst of this hand-to-hand conflict, the most terrible he said himself to the author that he has witnessed during his whole career, he soon became the soul of resistance. Wherever he passed along, his tall form overshadowing all disordered groups, the ranks were reformed and the fighting was renewed. McClernand himself, who, a few days before, had quarrelled with him regarding the command of the army during Grant's absence, felt the power of his influence at this trying moment, and deferentially followed all the counsels of his colleague.

In the mean time, the battle was extending and becoming fiercer. On the part of the Confederates, nearly the whole of their army was engaged. A portion of Polk's corps which had deployed to the left supported Ruggles and Hardee in their attack against

Sherman and McClernand. Breckenridge's reserves, extending on the right along Lick Creek, finally met the brigade of Stuart, the 4th of Sherman's division, which had not yet participated in the fight, and which for a brief period made a strenuous resistance. On the part of the Federals, the two divisions of W. H. Wallace and Hurlbut, which formed a kind of second line, became engaged in their turn. The first of these two generals had sent the brigade of McArthur to Stuart's assistance, but it had not reached this general, and, while looking for him, it had met the enemy's brigade of Withers, near the positions where Prentiss was endeavoring to rally the remnant of his troops. It was joined by Hurlbut's division, before which the Confederates halted a while. Unfortunately for him, Prentiss persisted in defending a clearing situated in front of Stuart's and Hurlbut's line, and he found himself at last surrounded by the constantly advancing tide of the triumphant enemy. Assailed on all sides, without hope of assistance, he was made prisoner with three regiments, like himself the victims of their determination and tenacity.

Encouraged by this new success, the Confederates make one great effort on their right to secure the victory; for it is on this side that they desire to strike the decisive blow, and their left has, according to their plan, gained too much ground. Sidney Johnston at the point of greatest danger directs in person the concentration of all his forces upon this wing, and carries his men along by his example. At this moment he falls mortally wounded by the bursting of a schrapnell; but the martial ardor which he has communicated to his soldiers survives him. Hurlbut, who occupies alone the left centre of the Federals since Prentiss's division has been captured or dispersed, receives their violent shock, and is unable to resist it. The brigade of Stuart is likewise driven back on the extreme left. W. H. Wallace had hastened in time with his three brigades to fill up the space which separated those two generals. He brings with him soldiers proved in the Donelson campaign, who sustain the assault of the enemy without flinching. But isolated in their turn, they are compelled to take a new position, under a cross-fire which decimates them and causes the loss of their general. The shock given to the line is communicated from left to right. It is now three

o'clock. McClelland's left, somewhat exposed by the disorderly retreat of Hurlbut, is again violently attacked, and the assault of the Confederates, spreading more and more, once more strikes Sherman's division, already so terribly reduced by seven hours of incessant fighting. The right wing of the Federals is again driven in; but Sherman and McClelland, who are still united, yield their ground but slowly, and they stop upon two small hills separated by a small ravine, which cover the road from Crump's Landing as well as the bridge across the Snake Creek marshes. It is of the highest importance to keep this passage open; for it is through this that Lewis Wallace's division, so impatiently looked for by the Federal commanders, must make its appearance.

While the Confederates are thus once more directing their efforts upon the Federal right, which, after the first shock, finally keeps them in check, they allow the left one moment's respite. The latter, although considerably disorganized, succeeds nevertheless in re-forming along the last chain of hills, which still alone protects the wharves at Pittsburg Landing. At this critical moment they receive valuable assistance from two gunboats, whose large shells, fired against the flank and the rear of the Confederate columns, create astonishment and confusion in their ranks.

The strength of both parties is becoming exhausted, and general disorder is beginning to appear. The Confederates have lost their leader and several other generals. The more impetuous their first attacks, the more dearly has their success been bought. The weakness of some of the troops has been in striking contrast with the courage of the rest. The number of stragglers and plunderers increases the more rapidly that the camps captured from the Federals offer them a rich prize. The Confederates, improvident, like all young soldiers, have consumed their five days' rations in forty-eight hours; they have moreover left their knapsacks behind them before going into battle, and they cannot resist the sight of the provisions abandoned by their adversaries. Finally, the divisions brought into action, regiment by regiment, along a front of considerable extent, are so disconnected that no bond exists between their different parts, and each fraction fights on its own account without any common direction.

But on the other hand, the situation of the Federals is alarming in the extreme. They have lost all their positions and four kilometres of ground. The enemy is master of their camps, even of those occupied by the second line. Five or six thousand men have been killed or wounded and three thousand taken prisoners. Two divisions are completely disorganized, the other three greatly reduced, and about thirty pieces of artillery have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Only one line remains to be defended, and in its immediate vicinity, along the banks of the river, a frantic crowd of fugitives is pressing, whose appearance alone would be enough to disconcert much better trained soldiers than those of Grant. Their number is rapidly increasing as the sound of the enemy's cannon approaches the wharves, until it reaches the figure of seven or eight thousand men. The hours pass by without any sign of Lewis Wallace's division on the battle-field, which should make its appearance by way of the Crump's Landing road. This road, which Sherman is defending with great pertinacity, is the only one remaining open in case of a retreat, which has become almost inevitable, for behind all the other Federal positions are the impassable swamps of Snake Creek, and the army cannot go back another step without falling into them. Wallace, apprised of the situation by his commander, has been under arms since morning. The instructions of Grant, however, who feared an attack on that side, have detained him until half-past eleven at Crump's Landing. At last he is ordered to cross Snake Creek to take position on the right of the Federal line, and his soldiers march forward with alacrity, stimulated by the sound of cannon, which increases as they advance. But Grant's despatch did not indicate the road he was to follow, nor did it inform him that, the Federal right having been repulsed, he had to look for it near the mouth of Snake Creek. He therefore followed the road leading to the church of Shiloh, which would have taken him into the midst of the enemy's battalions. It was only when he came near the stream that he found out his mistake and the danger into which he was running. He was placed on the right road by two of Grant's aides-de-camp, Captain Rawlins, the faithful companion of the latter throughout the war, and McPherson, the young and brilliant officer, who, after attaining the highest rank, perished in the

very hour of triumph, and whose untimely end is still deplored by the American army. Much precious time was wasted by these countermarches. The first division of Buell, commanded by Nelson, should also be already on the field of battle, for it had reached Savannah the evening before. Grant, on leaving his headquarters in the morning, had ordered it to make all possible haste to join him. But Buell, not believing that any serious engagement was taking place, detained it until one o'clock to wait for the vessels which were to transport it. Since the commencement of the battle Nelson has been listening anxiously to the sound of cannon, which is becoming more and more distinct; he was soon convinced that the enemy was gaining ground, and he finally obtained permission to march forward by the right bank of the river, until he found himself in front of Pittsburg Landing. He started at once, leaving behind him his artillery, which cannot follow him along the miry roads through which he pushes his columns. But despite his ardor, it will take him yet many hours before he can reach the scene of conflict.

In the mean time, Grant, who had hastened by ten o'clock into the hottest of the action, is not discouraged. He has passed along his lines during the whole day, trying to preserve some connection between the movements of his divisions in the midst of that wooded country, and has been able to appreciate how dearly the enemy has paid for his success. He knows that Nelson is approaching, that Buell's army will soon follow him, that the gun-boats command the shores of the river; and relying upon his ability to hold out till night, he already issues orders for the offensive movement of the following day. His line, naturally contracted in proportion to the extent of ground lost, is easier to defend. On the right the two small brigades which Sherman has kept about him cover the Crump's Landing road; on his left extend the divisions of McClernand and Hurlbut, yet compact, though much weakened. The divisions of Prentiss and W. H. Wallace have been disorganized, but their remnants are again forming around the others. While along the borders of the river a portion of the fugitives present the sad spectacle of a rabble crazy with fright, the rest are spontaneously forming again into regiments and provisional brigades under the very fire of the enemy. Scattered among

the woods, constantly separated from their leaders, the soldiers who desire to continue the fight—and these constitute the immense majority—meet again within the narrow space in which the army has been contracted, and hasten to fill the intervals of the line already engaged. This line, however, is too short to cover all the space comprised between the Crump's Landing road and the banks of the Tennessee. Two fortunate circumstances enable Grant to prolong this line on the left, along the last hills which terminate above the river, and to raise a formidable obstacle upon that point, the loss of which would involve that of his whole army. On one hand, a deep ravine filled with thick brushwood covers the whole front of those hills on the side where the right of the Confederates, which, according to their plan, always advances first, is to approach; and on the other hand, an unexpected piece of good fortune has caused the park of siege artillery recently landed to be placed in that position, when nobody supposed that a battle would have to be fought so near the dépôts of the army. The heavy guns of which it was composed were entrusted to a simple guard incapable of serving them; but an officer of Grant's staff, Colonel Webster, conceives the happy idea of hastily collecting together all the cannoneers he can find who have lost their guns, and puts them in charge of this new park of artillery, which he places in battery together with a few field-pieces that have escaped the disaster. The fate of the day depends upon the preservation of these heights, whence the enemy could have commanded Pittsburg Landing. Webster has not acted one moment too soon, for the Confederates are about to make a desperate effort against the positions he defends.

But the death of Johnston has already produced its effect among them. Their three lines are confused into one, and in this amalgamation of all the corps their several chiefs command, each on his own responsibility, the troops they meet, without any concert of action. They have divided the field of battle among themselves, Polk taking the left, Hardee the centre, and Bragg the right; but this improvised arrangement cannot remedy the disorder which has been introduced into their ranks. Bragg, who has found at the right wing three generals each acting according to his own inspirations, can only unite two brigades from his own

corps, commanded respectively by Chalmers and Jackson, with which to attack the great Federal battery. At the sound of the well-known voice of their chief these troops bravely march up to the assault. They are received by a terrible fire from the whole Federal battery, which is supported by the gun-boats stationed at the mouth of Lick Creek. Nevertheless, at the sight of the enemy's battalions advancing in good order, the soldiers that have been grouped together in haste to give an air of support to Webster's battery become frightened and scatter. It is about to be carried, when a new body of troops, deploying in the rear of the guns with as much regularity as if they were on parade-ground, receives the Confederates with a fire that drives them back in disorder into the ravine. This was the brigade of Ammen, belonging to Nelson's division, that rushed forward so opportunely. Having succeeded, by dint of perseverance, in making his way through swamps almost impassable, Nelson had arrived with his infantry in front of Pittsburg Landing, and had found steamers, which immediately conveyed his soldiers from one side of the river to the other. Not disturbed by seeing the frightened mass that was crowding around the wharves, he had hastened to where the noise of battle called them. It was near sunset, there being just enough daylight left to enable the Confederates to try a last attack. It might have proved more successful than the previous one if it had been made along the whole line at once. Many of the generals, Bragg among the rest, were preparing for it, when an order from Beauregard, who had assumed command, caused a suspension of the battle. This was the *début* of the new general-in-chief. Deceived by reports that made him believe Buell's army to be still far away, more impressed by the disorganization of his own army, which he had under his eyes, than of that of the enemy, which he should have been able to discover, he postponed the continuation of the battle to the next day, which, as he thought, was to witness the complete destruction of Grant's army. That next day had some terrible surprises and bitter deceptions in store for him.

In going into bivouac for the night, no order was observed on the part of the Confederates. Each brigade or regiment selected its position at its own will; some corps retired to a great distance

from the Federal lines ; others, on the contrary, remained within musket-shot of the enemy ; but on finding themselves isolated, they also removed farther off, so that during the night the Confederates abandoned many of the positions they had conquered with so much trouble the day before. In the rear of their lines were the Federal camps, filled with a greedy multitude of stragglers and plunderers, who loaded themselves with spoils under cover of the darkness. More than ten thousand wounded were lying on the field of battle. They probably found some mitigation to their sufferings in the copious rain which was sent to refresh them, and which, extinguishing the fires in the brushwood, the inevitable consequence of a battle, preserved them at least from a frightful death. This storm, however, contributed still more to the prostration of the soldiers, deprived as they were of their knapsacks, their provisions, and their overcoats. During the entire night the two Federal gun-boats fired shells in the direction of the Confederate camps every ten minutes. These enormous projectiles, bursting among the trees and breaking the branches with a dismal noise, did scarcely any harm ; but they caused considerable uneasiness to the troops, who were so greatly in need of rest. Those explosions, regular as the tolling of a funeral-bell, alone interrupted the silence, which, with nightfall, had succeeded the tumult of the day.

Grant's army was beaten, but not destroyed ; and its stubborn resistance during the long struggle it had sustained with only thirty-three thousand men assured the large reinforcements that had just been added to it an easy victory for the next day over an exhausted foe. L. Wallace had arrived about sunset with seven thousand men, all fresh troops. Buell, on his side, before repairing in person to Pittsburg Landing, where he was present with Grant in all the latter part of the battle, had sent orders from Savannah to all his divisions to quicken their steps. Transports were in readiness, on board of which those reinforcements embarked the same evening, and the greater portion of them disembarked at Pittsburg Landing during the night, with the artillery of Nelson, whose last brigade was landing at the same time on the left bank of the Tennessee.

Before sunrise the divisions of Nelson and Crittenden, de-

ployed one in rear of the other, and led by Buell in person, had passed as a front line on the left. They occupied, without striking a blow, part of the positions which had been lost the evening before, and subsequently abandoned by the Confederates. The third division of this army, under General McCook, at last arrived at Pittsburg Landing. As soon as it was sufficiently light to attack the enemy Crittenden was to take position on Nelson's right. McCook, who followed them with his first brigade, Rousseau's, the only one yet landed, was ordered to make a similar movement immediately after. He would thus connect Buell's line with L. Wallace's division, which was to extend the extreme Federal right as far as the borders of Snake Creek. Three regular batteries of artillery were ready to support this movement. From half-past five in the morning the army of the Ohio was advancing slowly through the woods, which were partially lighted by the first faint glimmer of a rainy morning. The traces of the previous day's struggle were visible everywhere—the dead and the wounded of both parties lying in confused heaps, carcasses of horses, dismounted cannon and broken weapons, accoutrements scattered over the ground, trunks of trees blackened by fire or torn by cannon balls. The condition of the soil, softened by the rain, and the fear of breaking their line, delayed the progress of the Federals.

The Confederates, on their side, were in no hurry to renew the fight. The commanders, taking no thought for that rest they had so well deserved, had spent the night in looking up the scattered fragments of their respective commands, and in endeavors to restore order in their lines. They had not been entirely successful; but the return of day enabled them to form again to some extent, and to prepare for a new attack, which to them was an imperative necessity. Being in want of everything, they could not afford to remain inactive a single day. They believed, moreover, that they were certain of their prey, and counted upon gathering, by an easy success, all the fruits of the bloody struggle of the day before. Were they not, in fact, lying in the camps of the enemy, as their new commander had promised them before the battle?

Bragg had gone to the left to get his corps together, the greater

part of which was on that side. Polk and Hardee commanded the centre upon the two roads from Corinth, Breckenridge the right on the Hamburg road. But Buell's movement did not allow them time to take the offensive. At six o'clock in the morning Nelson met them on the plateaux which separate the valley of Lick Creek from that of Owl Creek. This unlooked-for attack, together with the regularity in the fire of the new assailants, left no doubt in Beauregard's mind as to their character. He understood at once that he had before him another army than that he had beaten the day before. How greatly must he then have regretted both his delay of two days in leaving Corinth, and his hesitancy to strike on the evening of the 6th a last blow which might have proved decisive!

In the mean while, the Confederates, warned by their skirmishers, quickly form in line, and sustain with the assurance of an army yet victorious the first shock of Nelson's attack. The latter, being alone in line, finds himself suddenly checked, and waits before renewing the charge for Crittenden and McCook, who are close at hand, to deploy on his right. While this movement is being made, the Confederates have recovered from their first surprise and reconstructed their lines. In accordance with their customary tactics, they are preparing to resume the offensive by a sudden attack upon one of the most vulnerable points in the positions occupied by Nelson. At seven o'clock the two adversaries renew the fight by advancing against each other. Buell, deploying his three divisions, orders a movement of his whole line, while Beauregard, who has concentrated all his available forces upon his right, puts his columns in motion at the same time. The latter attack Nelson with extraordinary vigor for fatigued troops, and the combat soon becomes general. It was long and bloody. Beauregard meets with a resistance he had not anticipated, for he was still in hopes that he had only a single division of Buell's army before him. Consequently, he had gradually stripped the whole of his line to sustain the attack on his right. At eight o'clock in the morning the division of Cheatham, ordered back from the neighborhood of Shiloh, brings him important assistance. These gallant soldiers forget their fatigues of the previous day, and show themselves as strong and as resolute as the new adver-

saries who have arrived during the night. The Federal left is driven in more than once by their repeated attacks; but Buell always succeeds, with the aid of his excellent regular batteries, in retrieving the fortunes of the battle, and each time he recaptures, together with the lost ground, some guns which had been momentarily abandoned.

Nevertheless, at nine o'clock, it would seem that victory, bent upon rewarding the unflinching valor of the Confederates, is about to declare once more in their favor, and that the defeat of Buell is to add new glory to that which they won the day before. The left flank of Nelson, the nearest to the river, not being protected by artillery, has at last been turned. The brigade of Ammen is attacked, and resists with difficulty. The battery of Terrill, just landed, comes up at full gallop, and takes position alongside of it, but is soon charged by the enemy, and barely escapes by a speedy retreat. During this time the efforts of Crittenden and Rousseau to break the enemy's centre have been frustrated by a wood from which they have been unable to dislodge it.

In pursuance of the plan agreed upon between the two Federal commanders, Buell was to commence the attack on the left with his fresh troops. Grant's divisions, so greatly tried on the previous day, were waiting for the din of battle to announce to them the first success of their comrades to put themselves in motion. But as we have seen, the army of the Ohio had not achieved the easy victory it had counted upon. However, while the Confederates appeared already certain of success on the right, they were unable to gain ground in the centre, and confined themselves to the energetic defence of that which they occupied. At last, cut up on that side by the concentric fire of three regular batteries, they lose several guns, together with the position which these pieces defended. The division of Cheatham is obliged to make a second countermarch to restore the battle at this point. His departure paralyzes the decisive effort of the Confederates against Nelson's left; but his presence does not assure to the centre any permanent success. In fact, they cannot continue for any length of time a struggle in which they are doomed to remain stationary. Little by little their attenuated lines fall back and give way, sometimes at one point, sometimes at another. The last brigades

of McCook's division, which have just landed, arrive during the battle, and take position between the right of Rousseau, who commands the first brigade, and the left of L. Wallace; but they cannot entirely fill up the space which remains open between the latter division and the army of the Ohio. This gap is filled by detachments composed of troops who have been in action the day before, and who are stationed a little in the rear of the first line, under the command of Hurlbut, McClelland, and Sherman. The moment has arrived for the Federals to make a vigorous effort. At a signal given by Buell, his three divisions under Nelson, Crittenden, and McCook, put themselves in motion at the same time. The soldiers of the army of the Ohio, constantly drilled for the year past by a rigid disciplinarian, and trained by their long marches across two entire States, are distinguished by their discipline and their fine bearing. The steadiness with which they march against the enemy wins the admiration of generals who, like Sherman, have had to fight a whole day at the head of raw and inexperienced troops. The Federal left makes one great stride forward. Grant, who, while leaving great freedom of action to Buell, has reserved to himself the chief direction of the order of battle, seizes this moment to substitute a vigorous attack for the slack firing of musketry which the skirmishers have been keeping up since morning on his right. Hurlbut, McClelland, and Sherman reanimate their worn-out troops by promising them a victory which shall compensate them for the defeat of the previous day, and lead them against Beauregard's left centre. Wallace, near Owl Creek, finds at last an opportunity to measure strength with that enemy whom an unlucky chance has not allowed him to meet sooner. At this moment the entire line of both armies becomes engaged. It is ten o'clock. Fortune on this second day has not yet pronounced in favor of either party; but everybody feels that her favors are already changing places. The Confederates no longer fight with the hope of driving their enemies into the river: the presence of a new army has made itself too clearly manifest for them to cherish that illusion any longer. Their leaders henceforth think only of covering their retreat and avoiding a rout. The attack of the Federal right menaces directly that line of retreat; for Sherman, who has not

forgotten the little church of Shiloh, around which he has so gallantly defended himself the day before, directs all his forces against that position, which commands the principal road to Corinth: he must be stopped at all hazards. Beauregard declines to take the offensive on his right, already much weakened, and speedily brings back to the centre all the troops he can gather. True to their tactics of attacking the enemy suddenly, even when they do not intend to pursue their success, the Confederates strike at once both the centre and the left of Grant's line, which has been broken by the irregularities of the ground. Whole regiments, and even brigades, have lost their places. Sherman receives the first shock, and is staggered by it; McClelland experiences a similar fate, almost at the same time. McCook comes up in time to re-establish the battle on that side; but this movement leaves an empty space between his division and that of Crittenden, into which the enemy rushes instantly. The confusion thrown into this part of the Federal line is soon remedied by a few batteries of regular artillery, which, as usual, are always in the thickest of the fight. The Confederates, despite their courage and their obstinacy, cannot follow up this momentary success. Sherman attacks the Shiloh church with great vigor, and this sanctuary, scarcely known before except to a few poor Methodists, becomes for the second time a scene of carnage. Finally, the whole Federal line, which has again been formed by the constant efforts of its commanders, advances against the enemy. Beauregard has not waited for this movement to order a retreat. The Confederate columns, exhausted and decimated by two days' fighting, disappear in the density of the forest; they turn their backs in sadness upon that battle-field which they have vainly drenched with their blood, and covered with their dead and wounded, for the glory they have so dearly bought is henceforth a barren glory.

The order for retreat was given at two o'clock. At four o'clock the sound of the last musket-shots was dying away in the forest, and the Federals halted on the reconquered ground. The battle of the 7th was won; they had repaired the defeat of the preceding day. But these two days' fighting had cost them very dear; their collective losses amounted to more than thirteen thousand

men, nearly eleven thousand of whom were from Grant's army of forty thousand men. The Confederates had suffered no less; they acknowledged one thousand seven hundred and twenty-eight killed, eight thousand and twelve wounded, and nine hundred and fifty-nine prisoners. Among the killed there were two generals and the rebel governor of Kentucky, and among the wounded five generals, two of whom were generals of division—proof of the courage with which the leaders had exposed themselves. Modern history mentions, we believe, few instances of a general-in-chief being killed, like Johnston, at the head of his troops in the height of a great battle and in the midst of his success. The total losses of the Confederate army amounted to ten thousand six hundred and ninety-nine men—that is to say, more than one-fourth of its entire force*—but on the evening of the battle its strength was much more reduced by the scattering of individuals and the disorganization of *cadres* than by the number of men disabled. According to the reports of the Confederate generals themselves, they had no more than twenty thousand men answering the rolls, all of them exhausted by fatigue and hunger, discouraged by so many failures, and around whom was hovering a crowd of soldiers, scattered among the woods and along the roads, always ready to be carried away like a whirlwind by the least symptom of a panic, and threatening to communicate its contagion to those around them.

The retreat towards Corinth was painful and full of suffering. Along the road, huts, houses, churches, everything, had been

* The following is the official account of the total force of the Confederate army before and after the battle of Shiloh :

	Before the battle.	After the battle.
First corps, Polk, . . .	9,136	6,779
Second corps, Bragg, . . .	13,589	9,961
Third corps, Hardee, . . .	6,789	4,669
Reserve, Breckinridge, . . .	6,439	4,206
Cavalry, Gardner, . . .	4,382	4,084
	<hr/> 40,335	<hr/> 29,636
		Killed, 1,728
		Wounded, 8,012
		Prisoners, 959
		<hr/> 10,699

turned into hospitals. The wounded whom the army left behind it, huddled together in miserable hovels, presented a spectacle of every variety of human suffering to their retreating comrades. The army equipage, the ambulances, and the artillery, confused with the *débris* of so many different regiments, proceeded with difficulty along roads broken up by the storm of the preceding day. The care of covering this delicate operation was entrusted to Breckenridge, whose reserve corps had been the least engaged.

But the Federals made no serious attempt to embarrass the retreat. Buell, thinking that his soldiers, after having been for two consecutive days on the march, were too tired for him to take advantage of the two hours of daylight which yet remained when the battle was brought to a close, halted them on the field of battle. On the following day, the 8th, Sherman made a simple demonstration, during which one of his regiments was furiously charged and driven in by the enemy's cavalry, a novel feature in this war. His troops were also too much exhausted to engage in a serious pursuit. It seems that this task might have been entrusted to the army of the Ohio, which had suffered much less, and which by harassing the Confederates would have greatly aggravated their disaster. This was not done. Such inaction, it appears, must be attributed to the want of harmony between the two generals-in-chief, each of whom was invested with an independent command.

The battle of Shiloh was to mark an epoch in the history of the war we are relating. It is the first of those desperate though undecisive conflicts which during three years drenched the American continent in blood. Its duration, as well as the enormous losses experienced on both sides, bear sufficient evidence to the stubbornness of the combatants. Like nearly all those battles, its scene of action was a forest interspersed with but few clearings—a circumstance which should never be lost sight of in the study of this war. On such ground the generals-in-chief cannot be expected to combine great concerted movements, and to handle their armies as on a drill-ground. Grant, having come from Savannah at the first booming of cannon, spent the day in running from one end of his line to the other, trying to re-form and rally his soldiers, without sparing himself; he could do no more. On their

own side, Johnston and Beauregard, after having conceived a simple plan and explained it to their subordinates, found themselves almost constantly obliged to direct the operations over the limited space of ground they could embrace at a glance; they both displayed great personal bravery.

The errors committed on both sides are easily discernible. Notwithstanding Halleck's instructions, Grant and his generals had neglected to fortify their positions. They aggravated this fault by the carelessness with which they guarded their lines; consequently, the attack was a perfect surprise to them. Moreover, in placing L. Wallace's division so far away as Crump's Landing, Grant neglected to secure easy communications with it, which would have enabled him to bring it upon the field of battle towards the middle of the first day. Buell had marched from Nashville to Columbia with a degree of tardiness that could hardly have been accounted for by those even who knew how much time he required to put a division in motion on the drill-field, if there had not been a cause and an excuse for such tardiness in Halleck's and Grant's despatches. Once beyond Duck River, he accelerated his pace, and one might unhesitatingly praise his promptitude in forwarding part of his army from Savannah to Pittsburg by water if he had not at the same time compelled Nelson to wait four hours, which prevented the latter from reaching the field of battle before evening; by this delay his colleague came near being crushed. Let us add also that if the honor of the victory of the 7th falls mostly upon him, one has good reason to be astonished that he did not follow up that success with more vigor when he clearly saw the design of the enemy to retreat.

The Confederates were unfortunate in the choice of the day for their attack. If they had fought the battle twenty-four hours sooner, they would only have had Grant to cope with; if they had waited a few days longer, the arrival of Van Dorn in their camp would have largely neutralized that of Buell at Pittsburg Landing. They had only themselves to blame for that misfortune; they had hesitated at first, had delayed from day to day, then determined too suddenly to act. It is difficult to conceive why, on the field of battle, they wanted to push their right wing forward. In doing this they brought it closer to the Tennessee, and exposed

it to the fire of the Federal gunboats, and they were obliged to cross, near their mouths, all the little streams which fell perpendicularly into the river, instead of turning their sources. By attacking with the left wing, on the contrary, they would have driven the Federals back to the river bank, always preserving over them the advantage of dominant positions. We are also of opinion that they committed a grave mistake in deploying the different corps in successive lines along the whole front of the army, instead of entrusting a part of that front to each corps, itself formed on several lines. In fact, from the outset of the battle, the second line came to the assistance of the first, to support it where it was falling back, and to occupy the intervals opened by the fire of the enemy. Before noon the third line became in its turn engaged in the same manner, here forming a reserve, there going to the relief of some exhausted and disorganized corps; so that during the height of the engagement the three lines found themselves completely entangled with one another. Divisions, brigades, and even regiments being broken up and mingled, the generals could no longer get their commands together, and that system, the real sinew of armies, which is called the hierarchical organization, being destroyed, all command of the whole became impossible. In short, among the Confederate officers there were many who accused Beauregard of having been in too great a hurry to give up the chances on the evening of the first day of gathering all the fruits of his success, and of having thus lost the only opportunity of driving the invading army far off.

After the battle of Shiloh both sides claimed the victory, but both parties also indulged in serious reflections upon that bloody fight. Notwithstanding the pompous despatches of Beauregard,* the Confederates felt that such a victory exacted new sacrifices on

* Beauregard announced to Mr. Davis a complete victory, only adding, in conclusion, that he had fallen back upon Corinth when he saw Grant reinforced by Buell. He also wrote a letter to Grant, after the battle, in which he appears to excuse himself for having been beaten, and to reproach his opponent for having received reinforcements during the battle. This letter begins thus: "April 6th; Sir, at the close of yesterday's battle, my troops being exhausted by the extraordinary length of time they were engaged with yours on that and the preceding day, and as it was evident that you had received, and were still receiving, reinforcements, I deemed it my duty to withdraw my troops from the scene of action."

their part. The army of the Mississippi, after the cruel retreat from Shiloh to Corinth, could not indulge in any self-deception concerning the struggle it had just undergone; but it could boast of having fought gallantly, and washed out, in its own blood, the humiliating remembrance of Fort Donelson.

The Federals had received a great and wholesome lesson: it could not be lost upon men of such sterling worth as Grant and Sherman. Henceforth both officers and men felt the necessity of constant vigilance, for they were all learning their trade at once in this great and severe school. The nation, enlightened by that universal publicity which has become so deeply grafted upon its customs, was perfectly aware that the success of the second day had been preceded by a bloody defeat; and far from being carried away by the cries of victory, it set itself earnestly to work to sustain the struggle, the terrible magnitude of which it was at last beginning to appreciate. Up to the present time, in fact, the general impression had been that one or two battles would suffice to decide the fate of the continent; and Grant himself had been led astray by this popular delusion. When the Confederate army was seen to recover so speedily from the disaster of Donelson, and to strike such a terrible blow at the conquerors, who were already flattering themselves that they had nothing but easy successes before them, people at last began to understand that, in asking for 200,000 men to conquer the West, Sherman had been right, against all the world. To use another expression of this remarkable man—as profound a thinker as he was just and intrepid in action—"It was necessary that a combat fierce and bitter, to test the manhood of the two armies, should come off, and for such a struggle the battle-field of Pittsburg was as good as any other." It was, in fact, from the date of this battle that the two armies learned to know and to respect each other. Taught by the experience thus gained, their generals felt that so long as such armies continued in the field the struggle between the North and the South would not come to an end. Hitherto their object on both sides had been to capture or defend certain positions, rivers, and territories. Beauregard, in the East, had thought of nothing but the defence of Manassas. In the West everything had been sacrificed by the Confederates in order to preserve the countless forti-

fications upon which they thought depended the possession of the central States—Mill Springs, Bowling Green, Donelson, Fort Henry, Columbus, and Island No. 10; the main object of all the efforts of the Federals had been to wrest these positions, rivers, and territories from their opponents. Johnston and Beauregard, whatever may have been their individual share in this new idea, put into practice at Shiloh an entirely new plan, and their efforts were solely directed to the destruction of the enemy's army. If this well-conceived plan had not been frustrated by the arrival of Buell, the results of their victory would have demonstrated the correctness of their calculations. Grant, having only his own forces to depend upon on the 7th, would have been crushed; Van Dorn, arriving a few days later, would have enabled the Confederate army to make Buell pay dear for his hazardous march from Nashville to Savannah. The armies of invasion once dispersed, ten new fortifications as strong as Donelson or Columbus might have been erected along the line of the rivers, which would have closed their navigation against the Federal gun-boats; the positions conquered by the North after so many efforts would have fallen of themselves, and the war would have been carried back to the borders of the Ohio and the Missouri.

During these hours of anxiety, when he saw his army driven back to the river which was to engulf it, Grant no doubt made all these reflections; and from that time he never ceased to repeat that the main object of war should be the destruction of the enemy's armies rather than the conquest of such or such portions of territory. He saw nothing in such territory except the resources in men, provisions, and *matériel* which the armies could derive from it; he only disputed it with his adversaries so long as it was necessary to deprive them of those resources, deeming it more important to cut railways, to destroy dépôts, and to prevent all possible concentration of provisions than to occupy a vast extent of country.

The battle of Shiloh might therefore have proved fatal to the Federals. Notwithstanding its undecided issue, and although the Confederates retired with the honors of war, it was destined to be productive of fatal consequences to them, for it again compelled them to assume a strictly defensive attitude, while it enabled

their adversaries to mass at leisure all the forces required to break the new line of which Corinth was the principal centre.

The shock, however, had been so severe that both parties felt an imperative need of rest and reorganization. We shall take advantage of it to return with the reader to the east of the Alleghanies; for since the battle of Pea Ridge no military event deserving of mention has occurred in the far West. The conflicts at Independence, in Missouri, where the Confederate Quantrell was routed on the 22d of March, and those of Neosho, near the Arkansas frontier, where the Federal cavalry dispersed a few Confederate guerillas, were of no importance, even for those uninhabited regions. Price, who remained alone to watch Curtis from a long distance, while Van Dorn was marching upon Memphis, was assembling, east of the Ozark Mountains, all the Missourians whom the prestige of his name always collected around him, and was preparing to lead them, as soon as he had gathered a sufficient number, to the great rendezvous at Corinth. When at last, towards the beginning of April, he took up his line of march, following the course of White River, to approach the Mississippi, the cavalry of Curtis followed him at a distance, reconnoitring the country, and occasionally engaging his rear-guard in some slight skirmishes.

CHAPTER III.

ROANOKE.

THE terrible battle of Shiloh, as we have just stated, was full of useful lessons for both North and South. In order to continue the desperate struggle of which it, so to speak, marked but the beginning, and to keep up the full complement of armies which lost one-fourth of their effective force in a single day, it required the mustering of a large number of men into the service at any cost. The Richmond government already felt this, but thus far it had only succeeded in deceiving itself. We have seen under what delusion Sidney Johnston and Beauregard had labored, by comparing the actual forces placed under their command with the fictitious total of troops furnished them by the Secretary of War. The Confederate government made a new and powerful effort to fill up the *cadres* of its armies during the month of April, 1862. This affords us a favorable opportunity for casting a rapid glance at all the measures of this kind that were adopted from the day when it unfurled the standard of civil war, up to the period when the machinery it had called into existence to secure all the able-bodied men of the country was in full operation—that is to say, down to the fall of 1862. The history of a war, and especially a war like this, in which armies were improvised in all their parts, would not be complete without some details regarding the administrative processes which supplied those armies, and sometimes exercised a decisive influence upon the issue of the struggle. We have related elsewhere how the first volunteers were obtained in the insurgent States for the purpose of resisting the Federal authority. When Mr. Davis sought to give them a general organization, and to centralize the resources of the slave States, he met with but little success. The number of troops raised by local initiative was considerable; but each

State, adhering strictly to the principle of State sovereignty, wished to keep those troops for the exclusive defence of its own soil. A struggle for power and influence began between the States which, being threatened with invasion, did not want to sacrifice themselves for their neighbors and for the Confederate government, which, while directing general operations, took no notice of those particular interests. Mr. Davis and the central power, pleading the stern necessities of war, finally got the better of those earnest and plain-spoken men who had placed a literal construction upon the programme of secession. But this was not done without trouble, and the most despotic measures had to be resorted to to conquer all resistance. Thus, about the time of which we have just been speaking, Beauregard received information that one of the best divisions in the army of the Mississippi—that of Hindman, composed of soldiers from Arkansas—was striking camp and preparing to leave for home. It had been summoned by the governor of its own State to repel the invasion of Curtis. Beauregard hastened to the spot. This occurred shortly before the battle of Shiloh, and the Confederate army would have been lost by this kind of desertion; but Hindman had received positive instructions from his own State, whose authority he considered paramount to all others, and in spite of every argument he was preparing to obey them, when Beauregard, assuming a defiant attitude, treated this desertion as a mutiny, and threatened to kill with his own hand the first officer or soldier who should leave the camp. Sustained by the rest of the army, which saw its own ruin in this departure, he succeeded in intimidating Hindman's soldiers, and in shaking the resolution of their leaders. They remained; and from that time the orders of particular States no longer prevailed against those of the Richmond cabinet. But it required more than a year to secure the supremacy of the latter; and this occurrence, which took place in 1862, will convey some idea of the difficulties which the delegates of that government had to encounter at the outset of the war. In the month of April, 1861, although six weeks had already elapsed since the call for one hundred thousand men, of which mention has been made, although the popular enthusiasm had caused a large number of volunteers to assemble at every point of the slave territory, Mr.

Davis had only been able to get thirty-five thousand men among them to enlist in the service of the central government. This was a very small number; but the people of the South, who, in an unguarded moment, had overthrown the mild authority of the Federal government, manifested but little zeal in behalf of the despotism which succeeded it. They still indulged in some illusions; but it was too late to draw back. Having irrevocably plunged into the fatal paths of rebellion, they were obliged to accept all the consequences, and to pass through extreme conditions which they had been far from anticipating.

Every time that a new event occurred to enlighten the North as to the gravity of the situation and to call for greater sacrifices, the rebound was immediately felt in the South, who responded on her part by some new effort.

We have seen that, on hearing of the capture of Fort Sumter, the North had responded with enthusiasm to the call of the President for three hundred thousand volunteers. This national movement proved to the majority of the Southern people that the armed peace, the maintenance of which their leaders still promised them, was a chimera. The reconciliation which the North proposed to them wounded their angry spirits as a humiliation. They freely accepted the war. Volunteer regiments were immediately offered *en masse* to President Davis. A new law of the Congress authorized him, on the 9th of May, to organize regiments himself, by accepting such companies as might be raised in the different States; and on the 16th of May the definitive organization of the Confederate army was decreed.

But, after all, this organization was nothing but a confirmation of the rules which had governed the formation of the provisional army, and did not differ in any material point from that of the Federal volunteers. The only difference was that it instituted a higher grade, that of *general*, which was conferred upon a few officers appointed to the principal commands, and which they were to retain in the regular army after the disbanding of the volunteers. At a later period there was added yet another intermediate grade, that of *lieutenant-general*, so that there were four grades of general officers—brigadier-generals, major-generals, lieutenant-generals, and generals. This variety of ranks and

distinctions pleased the Southern people, who fancied that they were thereby giving themselves an aristocratic polish.

As we have stated, the third levy of volunteers in the North was ordered on the day following the battle of Bull Run, and it was the excitement caused by that defeat which chiefly stimulated them to enlist. This new effort on the part of an adversary who rose up at the moment he was believed to be crushed excited a similar ardor in the South; it was the occasion of a third call for troops by the government of the Confederacy, and the cause of the alacrity with which this call was responded to. On the 22d of July Mr. Lincoln was authorized to raise five hundred thousand volunteers to serve for three years at the utmost. On the 8th of August Mr. Davis received similar authority from his own Congress to raise four hundred thousand volunteers, enlisted for the same period of three years at most, one year at least. The Confederate government had then about two hundred and ten thousand soldiers under arms; it had, therefore, of the four hundred thousand called for, one hundred and ninety thousand men yet to enlist. In the course of that year it succeeded in raising one hundred and forty thousand men, fifty thousand of whom came from those States which, while acknowledging more or less the Federal authority, contained nevertheless a large number of inhabitants who sympathized with the cause of the South. Most of them voluntarily came forward to serve her; a large number, however, were carried off by cavalry raids (*razzias*) in the disputed districts of Kentucky and Missouri, and forcibly incorporated into the Confederate army. By this means the total of three hundred and fifty thousand volunteers, above mentioned, was reached by the end of 1861.

It was with these forces that the Confederate government resisted, during the year 1861, the ill-directed efforts of its adversaries; but when the war had attained its true proportions, at the beginning of 1862, these forces were no longer sufficient. We have shown how, after the battle of Bull Run, the Federals, who were faintly prosecuting a campaign which they had not the means of rendering decisive, employed the autumn in organizing numerous armies which were subsequently to form into line under McClellan, Buell, and Grant. The Confederate government, appreciat-

ing the danger which threatened it, was making analogous efforts. But it soon discovered their inefficiency, and was obliged to resort to other means. During the great operations of 1862 the Federal armies continued to be recruited in the same manner as before; it was far otherwise with the armies of the Confederacy. The former were constantly supplied with volunteers whom the bounties, high pay, and other nobler motives induced to rally around the flag, while the draft which was resorted to at a somewhat later period was productive of utterly insignificant results. This mode of recruiting was, on the contrary, since 1862 the principal resource of the Confederate armies, which before long were entirely composed of conscripts. The three hundred and fifty thousand men who had gradually filled their ranks within the space of one year, and had arrived in time to keep the constantly increasing forces of the Federals in check along an extensive frontier, had suffered greatly for the important service rendered to their cause. In the absence of bloody battles, sickness had already cruelly tried these improvised armies; then they were discouraged by the disasters they had sustained in the West at the outset of the campaign of 1862. Desertion, under the influence of physical and moral prostration, assumed frightful proportions—so much so, indeed, that in February they were already materially reduced. The first moments of enthusiasm had passed away. On one hand, the volunteers whom that enthusiasm had prompted to join the ranks were impatiently waiting for the day when the expiration of their year's term of service should restore them their freedom; on the other hand, those who the preceding year had resisted the pressure of public opinion cared still less to put on the uniform now, when they had a better understanding of the privations and dangers of a soldier's life. Consequently, at the time when every preparation was being made in the North for striking a truly effective blow, the Confederate armies were on the eve of dissolution.

It was a trying hour. It would probably have marked the downfall of the Confederacy if the central government had not boldly thrown aside the mask of pretended respect for the autonomy of the States, which it had worn until then. It turned a deaf ear to the tardy remonstrances of those who, having essayed

the dangerous game of revolution against a national and popular government, were now complaining of the consequences. The danger was imminent, and the government met it by resorting to extreme measures. The strong hand of Mr. Davis set all the engines in motion which had been prepared in anticipation of this crisis. The enlistments were suspended, and the country was beginning to feel exhausted. It was important to find some means to retain, at any expense, the soldiers who were in the service, and to fill the gaps which the enemy and disease made daily in their ranks. Such was the double purpose the Confederate government had in view. In order to comprise all the laws concerning enlistments into the same chapter, we propose to speak of them in detail after having disposed of the year 1862, and shall confine ourselves at present to a summary view.

The government began by addressing the volunteers whose term of service was about to expire, and in order to induce them to re-enlist for another year offered them two months' leave of absence. Some time after, when its authority was felt to rest on a firmer foundation, it did not keep its mild promise. The leave of absence which had been proffered threatened to bring about a desertion *en masse* at a singularly critical moment. The volunteers were allowed to re-enlist for the duration of the war, or for not less than two years, on condition that they should not leave their ranks; and as a kind of compensation, they were allowed the privilege of changing their officers and of electing new ones. This permission was, in fact, an order, for the rule of political euphemisms was now established. So, when some regiments hesitated to avail themselves of this permission, they were treated as seditious, and the most refractory soldiers, on the point of being shot, only saved their lives by the prompt signature of their comrades to the compact of a new enlistment. Finally, in order not to lose the services of any one of those volunteers who were beginning to regret their first enthusiasm, the term of service of those who, when once set legally free, would be placed by their age beyond the reach of conscription, was lengthened for periods of three months repeated. It was ordered that they should not, under any circumstances, leave the service until the effective force of the regiment to which they belonged was complete. All these violent measures, how-

ever, were insufficient; they prevented the immediate dissolution of the armies, but they could not repair the losses to any great extent.

It was necessary to reach all that able-bodied portion of the population that had remained at home when the organization of volunteers took place. Consequently, from the 15th of April, 1862, the conscription was established in all its rigor. The law regulating its operations, which we propose to analyze hereafter, continued in force until the last days of the Confederacy, and soon entirely replaced voluntary enlistments. Able-bodied men over eighteen years of age and under thirty-five were placed as a class at the disposal of the executive power, which was finally able to dispense with all formalities, such as drawing lots or dividing into classes, which in other countries tend to lighten the burden of this blood-tax. It applied the simple processes and expedients practiced in France during the first empire. All who desired to avoid the conscription were allowed one month's time to enlist voluntarily. Men over thirty-five years of age, who were thereby exempted from serving in the Confederate army, were enrolled into the militia up to the age of fifty-five. It is true that such troops were not obliged to fight except upon the soil of the State to which they belonged; but as the war had been carried more or less into the territory of all the rebel States, the militia had no more chance of escaping the hardships of active service than the conscripts. Indeed, their duties were the same as those performed by the other contingents.

After having once determined upon such a measure, it was important to carry it out as thoroughly as possible, in order to turn all the resources of the Confederacy to account. The more those resources became exhausted, the greater the necessity for a rigorous application of the conscription law. All able-bodied men who, without special exemption, remained away from the army were evidently deserters or recusants. In seizing them, therefore, wherever found, and sending them to join the army without any other formality, there could be no trespassing the limits of the law. A fanatical portion of the population, eagerly adopting the calling of informers, assisted the agents of the central power in hunting conscripts; and these agents carried their despotism to

the remotest corners of the Confederacy. Everything conspired, moreover, to strengthen and confirm this despotism; the very forms of liberty were rejected, and Congress, holding only secret sessions, became the blind instrument of the executive power.

After this rapid glance at the mode by which the secession leaders had raised their army, no one need be astonished at the severe discipline introduced into their ranks from the outset. They had been accustomed to enforce it upon their slaves. It would be more correct to say, however, that the soldiers were at times turbulent, but that the want of discipline was corrected by means almost always violent. Most of their officers had been taught to entertain but little regard for the lives of others; and from the first gathering of volunteers, bloody punishments, summary or judicial, were inflicted, without exciting any of that opposition which would have been encountered in the North. Numerous executions were the means of quelling the attempts at revolt which the conflicts between the State authorities and the central power, or the irregularity of pay, frequently gave rise to at the commencement; and the least suspicion of desertion, even to the interior, was mercilessly punished with death.

We have stated that the want of *dépôts* had been a constant source of weakness to the Federal army, that regiments had been reduced to skeletons for want of recruits, and that the bounties had failed to keep up their effective force; the consolidation, which was only introduced at the close of the war, had no other effect than to unite the old regiments, whereas it should have merged the new regiments into the old ones. When conscription was resorted to, the number of men furnished by that process was so insignificant that it would not have sufficed to form *dépôts* capable of supplying the regiments in the field. In fact, this local conscription, which was only brought into operation for the purpose of completing the figure required for those contingents which had not been filled up by voluntary enlistments, differed entirely from that which prevailed in the Confederate States in 1862. In the South, all able-bodied men being enlisted, there was no longer any fixed limit for the contingent due from each State; consequently, the States had no longer any interest to encourage voluntary enlistments as in the North, where, the quota

of each State having once been furnished, no further demands could be made upon it. The result, as we have said, was that the recruiting of the army was soon exclusively carried on by conscription. The central government was constantly obliged to intervene in order to enforce its application; and leaving the control of the militia to the special authorities of the States, it finally substituted its own action for theirs in the organization of other troops. It thus found itself freed from all the embarrassments which the rights of the States and the enlistment contract entered into with the volunteer imposed upon the authorities of Washington. It could dispose, as freely as any European government, of the soldiers whom the law had authorized it to raise. It made use of this power without any reservation whatever. Camps of instruction were formed during the early part of the war for the purpose of assembling and organizing the volunteers; these camps were further extended, and became permanent *dépôts* for drilling recruits and for maintaining the effective strength of the regiments in the field. As the conscripts of the South had no choice of regiment when once taken by the recruiting officers, they were promiscuously forwarded to one of these *dépôts*. There they remained, simply divided by States, until the day when they were put on the march to join one of the armies in the field, and to be incorporated into those regiments of their own State which most needed reinforcements. This proceeding was certainly much at variance with Southern theories regarding the sovereignty of States, but it rendered the armies of the Confederacy more homogeneous, and thus assured them, for a time, a decided superiority over their adversaries.

Both parties, it is seen, were eagerly preparing for the struggle. If the conflict did not commence as soon in the East as on the great rivers of the West, it was the absence of those ever-open highways, together with the importance of the game about to be played, and not the want of military resources, which kept the combatants apart.

We left the army of the Potomac in its quarters around Washington at the close of 1861, organizing for the great campaign which was to open—at least it was so hoped—the gates of Richmond to the Federal troops in the spring. Nothing had been

spared in the preparation of this campaign. The nation had been prodigal of men and money; the government had placed all its resources at the disposal of the new commander-in-chief, and he was applying himself with indefatigable zeal to turn them to account. A few mistakes, some trivial errors and imprudences committed by the civil and military authorities, were unfortunately destined to compromise the results of so many efforts, even before the season permitted the army to take the field.

We have seen what a fatal influence political considerations had exercised over military operations in Virginia since the beginning of the war, owing to the situation of Washington. The army of the Potomac, having its headquarters in the Federal capital, was therefore in the President's hands and under the eyes of Congress, and was doomed to see the civil authority, controlled by a wild ardor or miserable intrigues, constantly interfering with its management. Moreover, being entrusted with the defence of this capital, it could not move one step away from it without causing inquietude to those even who were loudest in denouncing its inaction. Consequently, during the four years of its collective existence, it had to struggle against unjust impatience and puerile alarms, which frequently lost it the fruits of long labors and painful sacrifices.

After the severe lesson of Bull Run, however, the good sense of the public silenced the clamors of criticism. General McClellan knew how to make excellent use of this respite; but he deceived himself as to its duration. Shortly after the disaster of Ball's Bluff, his elevation to the supreme command of the army entailed upon him the most overwhelming cares; the reorganization of all the armies of the republic, and the plans for combined action he had conceived, no longer allowed him to think of putting the troops, the command of which he had especially reserved for himself, immediately in the field. The people, who placed at first entire confidence in the young general, and properly mistrusted their own judgment, had easily become reconciled to a long inaction during those months when the season might yet have admitted of military operations. But their patience began to give out when the opportunity had passed, just as the coming of winter doomed the army of the Potomac to several months of inac-

tivity. The soldiers, fascinated by the attractions of a life which was new to them; the lower officers, stimulated by the hope of some distinction—all were anxious to take their revenge without delay, and it required all the authority their general had established among them to make them bear this long inaction without a murmur. The leaders, on the contrary, deeply impressed with a sense of their responsibility, with sufficient experience to see all that was wanting in their men, and forgetting at times that their adversaries were in a similar condition, were nearly all desirous of postponing the opening of the campaign until spring.

This delay certainly involved some serious military and political disappointments; but its most fatal consequences must be attributed to the spirit of party, which sought to employ it for its own purposes. President Lincoln and General McClellan, although differing widely in character and disposition, might easily have come to an understanding, for they were actuated by a patriotism equally disinterested. But the latter belonged to the Democratic party, which had opposed the election of the former. In America, where everybody entertains an opinion, and must adhere to it not to lose influence, the party which attains to power is very exclusive in the distribution of places and favors. Consequently, the nomination of General McClellan, and several other officers of the same party, to important commands, was regarded as a significant fact. It was construed as a pledge of patriotic harmony among all those who remained loyal to the national cause. But this kind of reconciliation could not extinguish party jealousies and personal animosities. The most intolerant among those who had carried Mr. Lincoln into power could not forgive the young Democratic general for the high position he had achieved, and both in Congressional committees and in the bureaux of the War Department the interests of the army were more than once sacrificed to their unjust prejudices against him. On the other hand, the late opponents of Mr. Lincoln, although they had rallied around him in defence of the Union when menaced, were nevertheless convinced that his election was the cause of all the public misfortunes. Attached to General McClellan by old personal and political ties, they delighted in beholding in him the future chief of their party and the representative of all their

ideas. They replied to the attacks of their adversaries with threats. Their language, always imprudent, and even reprehensible, although spoken in low tones, was at last heard by a people noted for their scrupulous observance of the formalities of law, and always mistrustful of military chieftains. Too much absorbed by other cares, General McClellan was unable to silence his dangerous friends, and thus more than once his own acts were distorted in a manner which his conscience loudly repudiated. On one occasion, as he was paying a just tribute of respect to the qualities of his adversaries, in language full of dignity and propriety, there happened to be by his side some old political allies of the South, who ventured to express a hope that they might soon find auxiliaries in them against the "accursed abolitionists." They wished to convey the impression that the first victory of the army of the Potomac would enable its chief to play the part of a mediator, to impose a peace of their own choosing upon both the government of Washington and that of Richmond, pretending that they saw a deep political combination in the inaction to which McClellan was condemned by the difficulties of his task. His loyalty, his patriotism, and the character of the American people fortunately rendered all such dreams perfectly chimerical; but they afforded a plausible pretext to his enemies, and the honest soul of President Lincoln was more than once troubled by it. These seeds of mistrust brought forth fruits fatal to the Federal cause. In representing General McClellan to Mr. Lincoln as an ambitious politician, he was persuaded to interfere personally in military affairs. The practical good sense and innate uprightness which had won the latter the appellation of "Honest Abraham" failed him on this occasion. He brought his legal habitudes to questions the solution of which admitted of no compromise. While leaving the responsibility of command to McClellan, he thought he could withdraw from him a portion of that confidence he had manifested in him until then. He thought himself skilful in allaying the prejudices of some, and the ambition of others, by creating military commands for politicians, and giving them divisions, as we bestow diplomatic or administrative posts. In short, being surrounded by cabinet strategists, he ended in believing himself capable of directing military operations. We

shall presently see what frightful disasters he thus brought upon the Federal armies. But he prepared their reverses even before they had taken the field, for he never would either frankly reject or accept the plans which the commander-in-chief submitted for his approbation.

The day had gone by when Mr. Lincoln, unexpected, alone, and on foot, would make an evening visit to the little house which served as the headquarters of the army of the Potomac, take an interest in all the details of the work undertaken by General McClellan, and have them explained to him, aiding and encouraging the general with all his power; when at other times, while waiting for McClellan, he would take a seat in a corner by the fire, among some officers, to listen to the stories of old soldiers of the Mexican war, or to repeat to the youngest among them, with his habitual good nature, one of his favorite anecdotes.

General McClellan, overburdened with work, had been seized with typhoid fever, which was then raging in Washington, and seemed about to succumb on his bed of suffering. At the time we have now reached, the army, shut up in its quarters by the mud, no longer possessed even the distraction of manœuvres and drills. Their chiefs naturally came to spend their hours of forced leisure in the capital, and it was difficult for them to escape from the thousands of intrigues so easily carried on in a small city in which a great government resides. A committee appointed by both houses of Congress in the month of December, for the purpose of inquiring into the conduct of the war, had become the instrument of all the prejudices excited against McClellan and a certain number of his subordinates. So long as this committee confined itself, in the exercise of that vigilance which appertains to the supreme councils of the nation, to matters connected with the general conduct of the war, its influence was salutary. In requiring generals and civil functionaries to appear at its bar; in examining their past conduct, compelling their evidence, and thus collecting valuable documents both for the present and for future history,—it enlightened the country and placed a wholesome restraint upon men discharging public functions. But we have only to look into one of the seven volumes in which its labors are recorded to see that the committee did not confine itself to this task. Being

composed of men utterly unacquainted with military matters and the rules of discipline, this secret tribunal proceeded to interrogate subordinate officers regarding the campaign plans of their chiefs, encouraged their criticisms, addressed to them the strangest questions to gratify a childish curiosity, and meddled with everything without being responsible for anything. For several months this committee did nothing else but try General McClellan and the officers who had the misfortune to displease the extreme radicals. The President himself, being obliged to act with this committee, too frequently followed its baneful suggestions, to the injury of the Federal armies.

The patience of the people reached at last those bounds which General McClellan had not foreseen. The pressure of public opinion upon Mr. Lincoln became too strong for him to resist it: he would have liked, he said, "to have borrowed the army for a few days, on condition," as he quaintly added, "of knowing what to do with it." This is precisely where the difficulty lay. What, in fact, was the army of the Potomac to do in response to the cry which was urging it on to Richmond? On what ground was it to seek revenge for Bull Run from Johnston's soldiers?

Winter had found the latter still occupying the battle-field of the 21st of July. Bad weather had converted the few leagues of country which separated them from the Federal cantonments into an impassable barrier, and their number was much reduced. It was difficult to subsist at Manassas during that season the great army that had been waiting for McClellan's attack until the end of the year, and which then had numbered nearly one hundred thousand men. A portion of those troops, perfectly useless in Virginia, might have been of great service in the West, where the fitting out of Foote's fleet indicated the approach of military operations. Consequently, during the first two months of the year a detachment of about fourteen thousand men was sent from Johnston's army to that of Beauregard, who, as we have said, was earnestly calling for some of his old soldiers of Bull Run. We have seen at the battle of Shiloh that he had good cause to rely upon them. Manassas Junction was the central point of the long Confederate line, extending from the foot of the Blue Ridge, at Leesburg, as far as the confluence of the Occoquan and the Poto-

mac. A great portion of it was covered by the course of Bull Run. Johnston had the tact to magnify the number of his forces in the North as well as in the South; but it was well known to the general staff of the Federals that in the beginning of 1862 he had only fifty-three or fifty-five thousand men of all arms on that line; that on the right the lower course of the Potomac was guarded by about ten thousand men; and that Jackson, on the left, occupied the valley of the Shenandoah with twelve or fifteen thousand, many of whom were militia and guerillas; this, at the utmost, figured up seventy-five thousand men. A winter the extreme rigor of which was new to most of the Confederate soldiers had developed diseases which greatly diminished the number of combatants in the army of Northern Virginia. The following figures have been obtained from Confederate official sources, where the truth is more likely to have been underrated than overdrawn. They convey an idea of the powerful influence exercised by the season and by *ennui* in reducing the strength of the Southern armies, without the aid of battles. On the 31st of October, 1861, the army of Northern Virginia, out of sixty-six thousand two hundred and forty-three men, counted forty-four thousand one hundred and thirty-one present, and twenty-two thousand one hundred and twelve absent. On the 31st of December, out of ninety-eight thousand and eighty-eight men there were sixty-two thousand one hundred and twelve present and thirty-five thousand nine hundred and seventy-six absent. Finally, when reduced, on the 28th of February, 1862, by the detachment sent to Beauregard, to an effective total of eighty-four thousand two hundred and twenty-five, it no longer counted more than forty-seven thousand six hundred and seventeen present, against thirty-six thousand six hundred and eight absent. The data are wanting to enable us to fix the exact proportion of the sick and deserters in this number of absentees, which, as it increased at a frightful rate, had at last brought the representative figure down to three-sevenths of the nominal total of the army; but it is easy to show that the information obtained by the Federal staff, through the reports of deserters and fugitive negroes, which were shortly after confirmed at the time of the evacuation of Manassas, was not far from the truth. Indeed, if we bear in mind that out of

Jackson's twelve or fifteen thousand men there were only five or six thousand troops in the pay of the central government and borne upon the rolls of the army, the total force of that army in men, either present in the ranks or scattered among the division hospitals, is reduced to about seventy thousand men, out of whom it is no exaggeration to reckon twelve thousand sick, and consequently forty-eight thousand able-bodied men, which is the official figure given above. But under the same date, the secret service of the army of the Potomac, credulous as the police force almost invariably is, represented the Confederate army as one hundred and fifteen thousand strong, with three hundred cannon. The exaggerations emanating from this source contributed to a great extent, perhaps, in rendering General McClellan excessively cautious.

The Confederates had constructed a considerable number of fortifications along the line of Bull Run and the Manassas plateau, but they had not armed them with heavy cannon, which proved that the leaders contemplated their abandonment. But on the right bank of the Lower Potomac, from the mouth of the Occoquan to Aquia Creek, they had erected batteries, which were mounted with the most powerful guns at their disposal. The navigation of the Potomac, therefore, as we have stated, had been interrupted by these batteries, and the injurious effects of this interruption were beginning to be sensibly felt in Washington. This blockade soon became the principal complaint against General McClellan, and its removal formed a conspicuous feature in all the programmes of operations devised at that period.

The chiefs of the army of the Potomac had several plans of campaign to select from. Between Johnston's army, encamped at Manassas, and Richmond, which was their objective point, there lay a tract of wooded and broken country greatly adapted to defensive warfare, intersected by several rivers and numerous water-courses, all running perpendicularly to the direction of march which the Federals would have had to follow. Was the unfortunate experiment of the previous year to be repeated, and without taking into consideration the moral effect of the memories it had left behind? should they go and attack the Confederates in front in their newly-fortified positions of Manassas? This would have

been taking the bull by the horns. But to storm such entrenched positions with an army that had never yet been under fire would have been to expose it to probable defeat. In short, even if this army should be successful, it could not gather the fruits of victory, because, having no rivers whereby to obtain its supplies, it would not have been able to pursue the enemy as he disappeared in the forest after having destroyed the railways behind him.

Should an attempt be made to turn the Confederate positions on either flank;—in order to flank them on the west, it would have been necessary to take the main portion of the army to Harper's Ferry and proceed by following the line of the Shenandoah. This large and fertile valley afforded great facilities for subsisting and marching, but its direction would have taken the Federals too far from Richmond, exposed their own line of communication, and unnecessarily uncovered Washington. Notwithstanding these drawbacks, this plan was commenced, as we shall presently see.

To the east the courses of the Potomac and the Occoquan did not admit of manœuvring for the purpose of turning the Confederate right. But the batteries which blockaded the approaches of the capital had to be got rid of at any cost. The navy had declared that it could not undertake that task alone. The chief of the Federal corps of engineers, after reconnoitring the enemy's positions, had asked for three divisions to carry them. Yet even this force was too small; for it was evident that to destroy them effectually it was essential to occupy them permanently, and to be prepared, therefore, to withstand the shock of all the enemy's forces. Accordingly, it was proposed to employ the entire army massed around Washington in this operation. While a portion of it, crossing the Lower Potomac, should engage the batteries, the rest were to attack the Confederates in front, and join hands with the troops that should have landed. This was risking a great deal for the sake of a trifling result; for the batteries that blockaded the Potomac were merely an accessory destined to fall whenever the Confederates should lose Manassas. It was to divide the Federal troops and place the enemy between the two fractions. In short, it was to attempt a landing, under the most unfavorable circumstances, in the presence of the enemy at a point where the latter could easily concentrate all his forces.

So that, whether the attack was made upon the centre, the left, or the right of the Confederates, it was still an extremely hazardous enterprise. But could they not find, in seeking to reach Richmond, the capture of which was the sole aim of the campaign, a more vulnerable point than Manassas? Since the Federals had control of the sea, could not this advantage be turned to account to transfer the theatre of war elsewhere, and strike the enemy far from a battle-field of his own choosing and haunted by sad memories? Such, from the end of 1861, were the reflections of General McClellan. His attention had been directed to the facilities afforded by the numerous steamers which ploughed the large American rivers for the transportation of troops for a short time, and by the peculiar conformation of the Virginia coast for the debarkation of an army. We have already mentioned that south of the Potomac three deep bays, known by the names of Rappahannock, York, and James River, empty into the Chesapeake, a vast inland sea, which runs parallel with the Atlantic to a distance of nearly two hundred and fifty miles. These estuaries are separated by long peninsulas very favorable for landing: the army which makes one of those peninsulas the base of operations can rest its two flanks upon arms of the sea which ensure for it the protection of the navy. General McClellan conceived the idea of embarking all the available portion of the army of the Potomac at Annapolis, at the extremity of the Chesapeake, to convey it to the borders of one of these estuaries, and thence to march upon Richmond, availing himself as much as possible of the water-courses. This plan was in conformity with the military rule which counsels that the enemy should be sought where he does not expect to be attacked. It lessened to a considerable extent the distance to be marched in order to reach Richmond; the rivers, instead of being formidable obstacles, became powerful auxiliaries; while the difference of climate would enable the commander-in-chief to begin the campaign fifteen days sooner than in the neighborhood of Washington. Owing to the maritime resources at the disposal of the army, the enemy could be forestalled along the coast, and several days' march be accomplished before meeting with any serious resistance; in short, by menacing Richmond directly, without exposing their own communications,

whose base rested on the sea, the Federals would compel their adversaries to evacuate Manassas without a fight, that they might hasten to the assistance of their capital.

Fort Monroe, situated at a point which divides the James from the York River, seemed to be the most natural landing-place for the Federals, who were already masters of it. Nevertheless, General McClellan had various reasons for preferring the village of Urbanna, on the right side of the Rappahannock; it was nearer both to Annapolis and to Richmond; the landing could be effected with more speed, and the campaign by land occupy less time. The Confederates had made preparations for resistance along the peninsula at the extremity of which stands Fort Monroe; but there were no fortifications between Richmond and Urbanna. The landing at the latter place, however, also presented some difficulties. The approaches were not so easy as those of Fortress Monroe; once landed, the army must turn its back upon the Rappahannock and proceed in the direction of York River or its tributaries; during this march a river very difficult of access, called the Dragon Swamp, must be crossed; it was also necessary to find a new revictualling point on York River, and this estuary was closed to navigation by the famous stronghold of Yorktown, which could not be taken except by investing it on the side of Fort Monroe. Consequently, whatever was done, the possession of Yorktown, which commanded both York River and the peninsula—called by pre-eminence the Peninsula of Virginia—was essential in any campaign undertaken by resting on the Chesapeake. From that moment the most rational course was to begin by laying siege to that place.

Such were the various combinations which offered themselves to the choice of General McClellan in the month of February. It will be seen in the following chapter how his plans were frustrated by the vacillations of the executive power.

But while he was waiting for the opportune moment to take the field, he had prepared an expedition which was brilliantly carried out by one of his lieutenants, and caused a fortunate diversion in the public mind by showing for the third time what results the Federals might obtain by combining their land and naval forces.

The successes obtained at Hatteras and Hilton Head had secured to them the possession of two important points on the enemy's coast, and had greatly facilitated for the blockading squadron the accomplishment of their task. The intention was to turn these first successes to greater account, and to make Hatteras the base of operations for a new expedition more powerful than the preceding ones. The object was not merely to occupy one of the passes leading into the inland sea of North Carolina which we have already compared with the lagoons of Venice, but to establish the Federal authority in all those waters and in the small towns situated along their borders. A twofold advantage was anticipated from this expedition; on one hand, it would be the means of destroying root and branch the contraband trade, which, owing to the numerous channels and sinuosities of the coast, was kept up in spite of the blockading fleet and the occupation of the Hatteras passes; on the other hand, it would keep the partisans of the Union in countenance, who were believed to be very numerous in North Carolina, and detach at least a portion of that State from the rebel Confederacy.

Annapolis was again the point of *rendezvous* for this expedition, which was fitted out with the utmost care during the early part of January, 1862. It was composed of three strong brigades of infantry, forming a division of sixteen thousand men, under command of General Burnside, and a fleet of twenty-nine gunboats or merchant steamers fitted out for war purposes, commanded by Commodore Goldsborough. More than fifty transport-ships had been assembled for the embarkation of the land forces and their *matériel*. The fleet, after descending the Chesapeake, sailed from Hampton Roads on the 12th of January. It was a great risk to send such a fleet to sail along those inhospitable coasts in the depth of winter, for it was suffering from the effects of a too hasty preparation; many of the vessels were in a bad condition; some of the transport-ships were mere river boats, most of them overloaded and all of light draught, an indispensable quality for getting through the inlets of Hatteras, but dangerous on the open sea. Consequently, when this numerous squadron was struck by one of those terrible south-easterly storms so common on the American coasts at that season, it was thought that the fleet was

about to meet the fate of the great Armada. It got through, however, with considerable damage, and only lost two small vessels, which were driven ashore on the coast. All the rest of the fleet rallied in a few days in sight of the Hatteras lighthouse, the point designated as their rendezvous. But there were fresh dangers in store: the storm prevented the large transport-ships from venturing among the difficult passes of Hatteras, and for more than a week they were exposed, with their precious human cargo, to all the violence of the wind and sea. Thanks to the untiring zeal of the navy, the disaster which had seemed imminent was avoided, and on the 24th of January the whole fleet, favored by an extraordinary tide, raised by the end of the gale entered the calmer waters of Pamlico Sound. The first object of the expedition was to take possession of Roanoke Island, situated at sixty kilometres to the north, which, as we have already mentioned, commands the entrance of Albemarle Sound. It required some time, however, for the fleet to repair its damages, and it was not until the 5th of February that it was enabled to put itself in motion. The sixty-five vessels of all kinds of which it was composed formed a column of more than two miles in length, which, as it followed the devious course of the only practicable channel, described some curious gyrations upon the glassy surface of the waters. Nothing could be seen from the low and humid beach of North Carolina but the large forests of pine which produce turpentine, whose trunks, enveloped by the mirage, seemed to be looming up from the sea.

An altogether novel experiment on this continent was about to be tried—the use of modern improvements for landing the whole of a small army in the presence of the enemy; for on this occasion it was not intended that the naval forces should bear all the brunt of the battle, as they had done at Hatteras and Hilton Head. Nothing had been neglected to secure the prompt execution of this delicate operation.

The troops are embarked with their *matériel*, partly upon steamers of light draught, partly upon lighters towed by them. The transports preserve the order of march of the troops they carry. They follow each other by brigades; each brigade divided into three columns, which pursue a parallel course, or follow

each other according to the nature of the ground, is led by the vessel that has hoisted the flag of its general at the mizzenmast, whence that officer directs the movements of the train. The gunboats take the lead; the smaller vessels of war, carrying one or two guns, guard the flanks; and when night compels the fleet to cast anchor, they perform the duties of outposts. Burnside and Goldsborough, stationed on board a light steamer of great speed, pass along the whole line. Particular instructions have been issued regarding the manner of manning and loading the launches and the position that each is to occupy when the signal for landing shall be given.

But if the Federals were well prepared, they could not flatter themselves with the idea of taking the enemy by surprise. In fact, since the arrival of the fleet in the vicinity of the Hatteras lighthouse, the Confederates had had more than three weeks to prepare for the defence of the island of Roanoke, which was the evident aim of the expedition. The Croatan channel, west of the island, which is the only practicable one, had been obstructed by the submersion of old hulls fastened together with piles. Strong batteries, constructed of earth and sand, occupied the extremities of this stockade on both sides. Advantage had been taken of a winding formed by a re-entering in the island shore to erect other batteries in the rear for cannonading any vessel that should attempt to pass through the channel. Abreast of the stockade, the island, long and narrow, was shut in between two swampy bays, which rendered its defence easy; for the Union troops, after landing on the southern part of the island, which the Confederates had no intention of disputing, were obliged to pass between these two bays in order to reach the forts which commanded the Croatan channel. A fortification, surrounded by *abatis*, had been erected on the only road that ran across this isthmus, and the three guns with which it was mounted commanded all its approaches at short range. These positions were guarded by five or six thousand men, part of whom were quartered on the island. Wise's Virginia Legion was encamped on a sand-bank which separates the inland sea from the Atlantic. A small fleet of seven gunboats, that had been merchant steamers, the armament of which

had been hastily improvised, was assembled behind the stockade, under the command of Commodore Lynch.

On the 4th of February the whole expedition entered the narrow passes of the Croatan channel; and Goldsborough, leaving behind him the transport-ships, ready to effect a landing on some quiet spot, advanced against the enemy's batteries at the head of his gun-boats. An engagement at once commenced with Lynch's fleet and a fortified work called Fort Bartow, situated on Roanoke Island, at the point where the extremity of the stockade rested. The other redoubts had been constructed to cover the middle of the channel; but their embrasures being too narrow, Goldsborough was able to avoid an enfilading fire by hugging the Roanoke coast. The cannonading was brisk, but the losses were but few on either side. The fleet, however, had a decided advantage, and accomplished the double object it had proposed to itself. The strongest of the Confederate ships, the *Curlew*, was sunk by one of those large hundred-pound shells which were so destructive to wooden vessels. Another was disabled; and Lynch, fearing to lose the rest, disappeared during the night, leaving the defenders of Roanoke to their own resources. The latter had been entirely absorbed by the bombardment of the fleet. Fort Bartow, enveloped in the burning of its barracks, had kept up the fight with difficulty; while some ten thousand men, favored by this diversion, landed during the night in a solitary creek of Roanoke Island. The operation had been conducted with great method and speed, demonstrating the special fitness of the Americans for this kind of enterprises.

The next morning, February 8th, the troops started for the redoubt situated in the centre of the narrowest part of the island. Burnside's three brigades, although without their full complement, were all represented in the body of troops just landed. Having reached, by the only practicable road in the place, the edge of a clearing which widens to the right and left, and is bounded on both sides by deep swamps, the Federals perceive at the other extremity the enemy's battery, which immediately opens fire upon them. Some howitzers, served by sailors, reply to it, while Foster's brigade deploys along the skirt of the wood near the road. The other two brigades form also, Reno to the left

and Parke to the right, but the character of the ground does not allow them to place more than their heads of column in line. The firing of musketry commences. The Federals, huddled together within a narrow and exposed space, suffer greatly. They return the fire, but in doing so they shelter themselves behind the trees or among some breaks in the ground, instead of charging the enemy. The latter, believing his flanks well protected by the swamps, concentrates all his fire upon the clearing, into which nobody dares to venture.

In the mean while, Reno and Parke, unable to charge the enemy in front, try a double flank movement across these swamps, where they hope to find a passage. On the right, Parke is stopped by an impenetrable thicket, but his soldiers, once in motion, precipitate themselves into the clearing and continue to advance against the enemy. The Ninth New York, being the most exposed, as it forms the left of the brigade, rushes to the charge in obedience to the call of its officers, and approaches the enemy's guns. At the same instant, Reno's column, having overcome the obstacle the enemy had relied upon as a protection, bursts suddenly upon the right flank of the Confederates. A few volleys then suffice to put the defenders of the work to flight. This combat cost the Federals thirty-five killed and two hundred wounded. Among the former there were many superior officers, who had exposed themselves personally to encourage their soldiers, as yet unused to the ordeal of fire—among them a Frenchman, Colonel V. de Monteil. He was present in the fight as a volunteer, his regiment not having been engaged; hanging his coat upon a tree, he had seized a rifle, which he used as a common soldier. When the Ninth New York charged the enemy's works, he joined that regiment, and was killed at its head, worthily sustaining the honor of his country.

The Confederate forces held in reserve in the rear of the redoubt numbered about two thousand or two thousand five hundred men, including a portion of Wise's legion. Seeing that this work had been turned, they fled and ran across the woods towards the shore, in hopes of being able to get on board some vessel; but only a small number of fugitives succeeded in doing so. Although scarcely one-third of these soldiers had been under fire,

the whole force surrendered without the slightest attempt at resistance. The island of Roanoke, the key of the inland sea, with all its works, together with about twenty cannon and more than two thousand prisoners, fell into the hands of Burnside. The fruits of this victory were promptly and easily gathered. Two days after, Elizabeth City, the most important town in that part of the country, with the abandoned hulls of Lynch's fleet, fell into the power of the Federal navy after a brief engagement. In a few days the latter acquired absolute control of the whole coast of Albemarle Sound and the mouth of the principal rivers which empty into it.

Burnside then directed his attention to the city of Newberne, seated on the borders of the Neuse, toward the south of the inland sea. Following the course of this navigable river is a railway which runs from Raleigh and Goldsborough to Newberne, touching the Atlantic at Beaufort, near one of the passes which fall into the ocean from the inland sea. This double line of communication gave considerable importance to Newberne, and it was then thought that it might be made the base of operations in a campaign directed against the network of railways in North Carolina. This campaign was in fact undertaken, and Newberne played an important part in it; but the first attempt was only made the following year, to be again renewed three years later, during the closing hours of the war.

The Federal fleet left Hatteras on the 12th of March, and on the day following, the transport-ships landed Burnside's three brigades in one of the creeks of the estuary of the Neuse, situated near the Newberne and Beaufort road, about twenty-eight kilometres from each of those towns. A battery of naval howitzers, served and drawn by sailors, still accompanied the little army. The spongy ground on that alluvial coast greatly impeded the progress of the Federals, who, as soon as landed, proceeded towards Newberne, following the right bank of the Neuse. The artillery was dragged along with the utmost difficulty, the superior officers, almost all on foot, with the mud up to their knees, setting an example to their soldiers.

Night obliged them to bivouac before they had met the enemy. They had travelled about sixteen miles and crossed many lines

of entrenchments, abandoned on their approach. The Confederates, numbering about five or six thousand, were waiting for them nearer Newberne, inside of better constructed works, mounting a large number of heavy guns, which, placed across the railway, rested on the right bank of the river; these works extended to a distance of more than four kilometres, but could only be approached at certain points, in consequence of impassable swamps. The principal defences of this line were along the edge of the river—a hexagonal, covered work mounting thirteen guns, and a large redoubt of an irregular form, partly constructed in the railroad embankment, with a strong redan between the two,—the whole being connected by breastworks built of wood and earth, protected by strong *abattis*. To the right of the railroad, the line, running back across a country full of ravines, was continued by a succession of thirteen small redans, placed along the ridges which intersected it perpendicularly. To the left of the covered work it was prolonged by a kind of stockade, intended to block the passage of the Neuse to the Federal fleet. This obstacle consisted of schooners sunk in the river, with the masts projecting obliquely, according to the current of the water, the tops of which were either pointed with iron or surmounted by a shell ready to explode as soon as brought into contact with any hard substance. The Confederate artillery at this point consisted of forty-six guns of large calibre and a great number of field-pieces.

The Federals appeared before these works on the morning of the 14th of March, when, deploying along the edge of the woods which had concealed them until then from the enemy, the fighting at once commenced along the whole line. The firing thus continued for more than two hours without results. The assailants, being obliged to uncover themselves, and exposed to the fire of a numerous artillery, sustained more loss than their adversaries. The naval howitzers kept up the unequal fight with difficulty, and those who served them had to be constantly replaced, while the Confederates fought from behind their parapets with scarcely any risk. But the recollection of the victory of Roanoke imparted to the Federals that assurance which is a great element of success; they knew that a battery could be taken by storm; they had already seen the Carolinians abandon works which

seemed formidable, and experience was beginning to teach them that it is less dangerous to rush upon the enemy than to remain immovable under his fire; consequently, they did not wait for a signal from their chiefs to charge the Confederate works. One regiment gets over the parapet first; it is not well supported, and is soon repulsed; but immediately after, the Fourth Rhode Island penetrates into the railroad redoubt, followed by the whole of Parke's brigade. On the right, Foster's brigade, taking advantage of the enemy's confusion, carries the central redan, and soon after, being supported by the rest of the army, takes possession of the small works which covered the right of the Confederates. The latter fled in disorder towards Newberne, leaving two hundred prisoners and sixty-four guns (eighteen of which were field-pieces) in the works they had so poorly defended. This brilliant and decisive success cost the Federals ninety-one killed and four hundred and sixty-six wounded. Their losses would probably have been less if they had determined sooner to make a vigorous attack.

Burnside arrived in time to stop the fire which the Confederates had lighted in Newberne on retreating towards Goldsborough. At Newberne he joined the fleet, which had so skilfully and successfully overcome the obstacles placed on its route, and took possession of large dépôts which the Confederate army found it difficult to replace.

Commanding the mouths of the Neuse, he was able to menace the most important railway lines of North Carolina, cutting off, at the same time, all communication with the port of Beaufort; this place, which was of great use to the contraband trade the Southern States were carrying on with England, was occupied on the 25th of March. Moorehead City, situated opposite, and Washington, on Tar River, had already been similarly occupied a few days before.

But the Beaufort inlets were commanded by an old Federal fort contemporary with Fort Warren, Fort Monroe, and all the casemated works constructed on the American coast on the plans of General Bernard; this was Fort Macon, situated at the extremity of a long sand-bank similar to that of Hatteras. It was occupied by rebel troops, and could only be reduced by a regular

siege. More than fifteen days were consumed in preparing for this operation, which did not commence until the 11th of April. Besides, owing to the nature of the ground, a few regiments were sufficient to invest it. The rest of the troops were occupied, for the most part, in serving as garrisons, small but numerous. Reno's brigade, being available, was sent by Burnside to land at Elizabeth City, on the north, whence it was to make a demonstration against Norfolk which should prevent the enemy from attempting a diversion to save Fort Macon. On the 19th of April Reno met a small body of Confederate troops, accompanied by a few guns, at South Mills. He attacked it, and after a brisk engagement, during which he lost fifteen killed and ninety-eight wounded, compelled it to retreat. He himself re-embarked on the following day.

Washed on three sides by the sea, Fort Macon was only approachable by the narrow strip of land the extremity of which it occupied. It was a polygonal work of masonry, surrounded by a ditch and a *glacis*, having one casemated battery and one *en barbette*. When the government of North Carolina took possession of it at the breaking out of the rebellion, it was only occupied by a single non-commissioned officer of the regular army. The Confederates had entrusted its defence to five companies, numbering about four hundred and fifty men.

On the 25th of April, in spite of the fire of the fort, which did them but little harm, the besiegers had erected their batteries at a distance of a few hundred metres from the walls; eight ten-inch mortars and three Parrott guns (hundred-pounders) opened fire; and in ten hours seventeen of the enemy's guns were dismounted, including all those that were serviceable. Out of eleven hundred projectiles, five hundred and sixty had reached the fort; the embrasures were destroyed and the magazines riddled. The garrison capitulated the next day; it had eight men killed and twenty wounded.

The capture of Fort Macon gave the Federals the best access to the inland sea, and completed the land blockade of all that part of the coast. Fort Pulaski, in Georgia, had been reduced a fortnight before; and as the operations which caused its fall were on a much larger scale, we propose to relate them in detail

hereafter, in order to show the first efforts of the Americans in sieges.

The object of Burnside's expedition was accomplished. The results achieved, in a military point of view, were considerable; those of a political character did not answer the expectations of the Federal government. Not that North Carolina was as ardently devoted to the Confederate cause as her southern sister, for in reality she did not care much for either party, but that, while a large number of her inhabitants would have liked to wait for the issue of the struggle to declare their preferences, those even who at heart had remained loyal to the flag of the Union were too much afraid of a turn of fortune to avow their sentiments openly. To go in search of new successes it would have been necessary to penetrate into the interior of the land. A large army, and not a single division, would be necessary for such a task. But on the other hand, the fifteen thousand or sixteen thousand men composing Burnside's division were not required to guard this new conquest. In leaving those troops as garrisons of the inland sea the Washington government committed a serious mistake, for, scattered along those sterile coasts, they were useless to their cause at a time when they might have rendered valuable services in the campaign of which the peninsula of Virginia was about to become the theatre. One might even criticise the plan of the expedition, which had deprived the army of the Potomac of a strong division on the eve of a decisive struggle; the diversion, however, was justified by the success that attended it; but this success should at least have been taken advantage of to bring Burnside back promptly to other battle-fields. Having once obtained the most considerable results, his protracted absence was a fatal and inexcusable error.



HAMPTON

FT MONROE

Old Pt. Comfort
Light House

Fort Calhoun

Willoughby Pt.

Willoughby Spit

Sewells Pt.

Tanners Pt.

Lambert Pt.

HAMPTON

ROADS

Scale of 150,000

Kilometers

Scale: 1 inch = 1 mile

0

1

2

3 Miles

PORTSMOUTH

Fort Norfolk

NORFOLK

Washington Point

CHAPTER IV.

HAMPTON ROADS.

BURNSIDE'S expedition was but an episode quite secondary as compared with the great struggle that was about to take place between the army of the Potomac and that of Northern Virginia in the early part of April. This struggle opens the second year of the war, counting from the 14th of April, 1862, the first anniversary of the bombardment of Fort Sumter. Before closing the narrative of the first year with this volume, we must show what had been the preparations for this campaign, and go back to the beginning of 1862 to speak of the different events that occurred during this period of comparative rest to both armies, which had such an important bearing on their destinies.

Among these events there is one which it behooves us to mention in this place, as being intimately connected with the history of the army of the Potomac, although, from its peculiar importance, it is proper to separate it in our recital from the simple military incidents that filled up the first months of that year. It was indeed productive of much more lasting effects, and caused in Europe as well as in America a far greater sensation than a bloody battle. We allude to the naval combat of which the harbor of Hampton Roads was the theatre on the 8th and 9th of March, 1862, and which marks the greatest and most sudden of all the revolutions that have been effected in the science of maritime warfare.

It is not necessary for us to enumerate all the studies that had been made within the last few years by naval constructors of different nations to protect war-vessels by means of iron armor from the terrible effects of hollow projectiles fired horizontally. As we have before stated, these studies had not as yet produced, up to 1861, any experiment which could be considered decisive.

The floating-batteries which had been used in the attack upon Kilburn were condemned as incapable of exact steering. Thanks to M. Dupuy de Lome, France had the honor of possessing the first real war-vessel with iron-plated sides; but the *Gloire*, in 1861, had not accomplished anything beyond simple efforts at navigation. In England the *Warrior* was not launched until the close of that same year. Among the inventions of all kinds elicited by the new problem proposed to naval architecture, there was one which, although still confined to the sphere of models, nevertheless already attracted the attention of the most competent men. The honor of this invention is shared between Captain Cowper Coles, a man of fertile resources and daring enterprise, who was doomed to perish in so unfortunate a manner with the vessel he had looked upon as his master-piece, and the Swede Ericsson, who had long been a naturalized citizen of the United States, where he had already become celebrated for his construction of the *Princeton*, the first war-ship provided with a screw-propeller, and by important improvements in steam machinery. This invention, now familiar to everybody, is that of vessels with revolving turrets, which Ericsson had submitted to the French government as early as 1854, during the siege of Sebastopol. He was aware that, in order to solve so novel a problem, it would be necessary to discard all traditions regarding naval architecture, to abandon the system of high-decked ships, as the engineers of the sixteenth century had given up the castellated forts of the Middle Ages for the low profiles of modern fortifications; then the necessity of encasing the sides of vessels with heavy iron armor introduced a complete change in the conditions of the equilibrium which establish their water-line. This armor, in order to afford efficient protection, had to be of such thickness that it greatly over-weighted vessels of moderate size; and in order to reduce the proportional relations between the weight of the armor and that of the volume of water displaced by the hull to a figure compatible with the essential conditions of navigation, it was necessary to build vessels of enormous tonnage. The *Warrior* was then the type of such vessels, to which European navies have persistently adhered, notwithstanding the fact that the increasing thickness which it has been found indispensable to impart to their sheathing no

longer admits of protecting every part effectively. Ericsson, on the contrary, sought to solve the problem by reducing, so far as it could be done, the surfaces exposed to the fire of the enemy, and presenting them under an angle which gave them the greatest possible capacity of resistance. He discarded the system of vertical sides, concentrated the guns upon the axis of the ship, and placed them inside of one or more turrets. He was thus enabled to increase both the calibre of the guns and the thickness of the sheathing which sheltered them, without overloading the hull. While the curved faces of the turrets presented but one mathematical line where a cannon ball could strike them normal to the surface, the deck, lowered nearly to a level with the water, could not be reached by projectiles except under an extremely sharp angle. The turret, supported at once upon rollers placed under the base and by a central axis put in motion by a cog-wheel, turned easily with the two guns it contained. They could thus point in every direction, and a prismatic glass permitted this to be done without opening the port-holes. Thus the ship projected by Ericsson could easily be constructed, and at a moderate expense ; in case of a reverse, but few lives were exposed, as it only presented a small number of surfaces to the enemy ; with the whole horizon as the range of shot for each of the guns she carried ; in short, this vessel combined the double advantage of being encased in a thicker armor and of carrying more powerful guns than the largest high-decked vessels. It is true that her flat bottom and slight elevation would not permit her to make long voyages on the high sea ; and Captain Coles had intended to remedy this difficulty by proposing a ship with a keel, whose inclined sides should be surmounted by the turrets. But we believe that Ericsson was right in designing iron-clad vessels exclusively for the coast service. He saw, what experience will demonstrate more and more conclusively, that a mixed vessel, built to carry an armor and at the same time to undertake long voyages, will always be less powerful in a fight than the coasting-vessels she will find at the entrance of the enemy's ports, and less buoyant on the waters than the wooden or plated vessels that will elude her to scour the seas.

When the civil war broke out, it was as easy for both parties

to foresee the great part reserved for iron-clad vessels as it was difficult to make a definite choice among the opposite systems, none of which had as yet received the sanction of experience. It was important, in the first place, that their construction should be rapid and easy. There were no American establishments at that time able to build vessels that could compare with those of France and England. Workmen and materials were wanting in the dock-yards of the South, time was lacking in those of the North, occupied with more pressing labors. Consequently, the first rudely-constructed iron-clads which figured in the war before the end of 1861 met with but little success. We have seen how Hollins could attempt nothing serious with the *Manassas* at New Orleans, and that Foote's gun-boats were not protected by their armor against the plunging fire of Fort Donelson.

In the mean while, more formidable adversaries were preparing on both sides to enter the lists. As early as the month of July, 1861, the Federal Secretary of War had appointed a committee to examine all the plans that had been submitted to him for building iron-clads. A few months after, this committee recommended the construction of three vessels, expressing, at the same time, very serious doubts as to the advantage to be derived from them. The first two, with bulwarks, named respectively the *Galena* and *Ironsides*, played but an insignificant part during the war; the third was Mr. Ericsson's. The Swedish engineer engaged to construct, in less than four months, and at a cost of two hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars, a vessel of nine hundred tons, forty metres in length, eleven in width, whose deck, covered with iron plates of fourteen centimetres in thickness, should jut out beyond the hull to protect it, drawing three metres twenty centimetres of water, and carrying a single turret, three metres in height and six metres fifty centimetres interior diameter, formed of plates laid upon each other, the entire thickness being eighteen centimetres. This vessel was to carry two Dahlgren guns of thirty centimetres calibre. Entrusting the execution of his work to three different private establishments, Ericsson set to work to superintend the details with ardent solicitude, foreseeing the services his invention might render to his adopted country. The prospect of a war with England arising out of the *Trent*

affair contributed to hasten the completion of the *Monitor*. It was by this name that Ericsson's vessel became famous. At the time it seemed especially intended for the protection of the port of New York against British squadrons. On the 30th of January, after three months' work, she was launched in the presence of a curious and incredulous crowd, that flocked to see if the strange machine would not sink in the water under the weight of her armor. It required four weeks more to complete her interior arrangements.

The Confederate government did not lag behind its adversaries. Even if it had been able to command the services of an Ericsson, it did not possess, as we have stated, the necessary workshops for building a *Monitor*, and it saw at once that it must limit itself to making the most of the vessels in its possession. A distinguished officer, late of the Federal navy, Captain Brooke, had proposed to the government the construction of a vessel with inclined sides. He borrowed one-half of Cowper Coles's plan, while the Federals made use of the other half. At the end of June, 1861, he was directed to modify the hull of the *Merrimac* in accordance with this plan. The reader will recollect that this fine frigate, which was partially burned, had been sunk in the port of Norfolk at the moment the Confederates took possession of it. After many efforts she was finally raised, and her machinery put in order. The lower part of the hull was uninjured, and was razeed one metre below the water-line; she measured sixty metres in length and nineteen in width. A kind of large casemate was constructed upon her new deck, which was of great strength, in the form of a roof with a flat top, presenting at both stern and bow two inclined faces, each sheltering two heavy guns. Eight port-holes were opened in the sides of the casemate, which formed an angle of only thirty-five degrees with the decks. Railroad iron, passed through the plate-rolls at the Tredegar iron-works, near Richmond, were formed into long plates sixteen centimetres broad, some forty and some sixty-eight millimetres in thickness. Her bow was armed with a steel beak, the government being unable to procure the construction of such a machine in iron. The sides were strengthened by large beams to protect them against any concussion. Vast compartments had been introduced at both ends, where it was sufficient to let in the water to

submerge the vessel up to the line of the casemates. Finally, the armament of the side batteries was composed of eight Dahlgren howitzers of twenty-four centimetres calibre ; and four rifled guns of nineteen centimetres calibre were placed at both stern and prow. These pieces, constructed by Captain Brooke, as we have said elsewhere, on the Parrott plan, carried a ball of nearly fifty kilogrammes in weight.

We shall be excused for having entered into these details regarding the construction of two vessels destined to make the first trial of two systems so entirely new, and in so singular a combat. By an extraordinary coincidence, they were both ready on the same day ; their armament was completed on the 5th of March, one at Norfolk, the other in New York.

Both were manned by crews who were going to take them under fire without having had time to learn how to manœuvre them ; but the courage and intelligence of their commanders were to make up for their want of experience. The *Monitor* was commanded by Lieutenant Worden ; the *Merrimac*, which had just been named the *Virginia*, by Captain Buchanan, a former officer of the Federal navy.

On quitting the mouth of the James River with Burnside, Commodore Goldsborough had left there, under Captain Marston, the largest ships of his squadron, whose draught of water prevented them from steering through the Hatteras passes. This division, which was very strong, from the number of its guns, but not on account of their calibre, and which was moreover unable to perform any evolution, consisted of two old sailing frigates, the *Congress* and *St. Lawrence*, the sailing sloop of war *Cumberland*, and the two steam frigates *Roanoke* and *Minnesota*, sisters of the *Merrimac*. But the *Roanoke*, which carried Captain Marston's pennant, was deprived, by the breaking of her horizontal shaft, of the use of her machinery. The last three vessels alone were well armed with Dahlgren howitzers of twenty-four centimetres calibre.

For some time past the Federals had been apprised of the work undertaken on the *Merrimac*, but they believed themselves able to cope with that vessel, and her forthcoming had so frequently been announced in vain that they had ended in not be-

lieving in it. Accordingly, the 8th of March found them in perfect security. The *Congress* and the *Cumberland*, riding at anchor near the tall pines of Newport News, had not even a solitary tug to enable them to move about, while the commander of the latter vessel had gone to attend a court-martial on board the *Roanoke*. The other three frigates were anchored several miles from there, in sight of the sandy shore of Fortress Monroe, in the rear of muddy banks which are only ploughed by narrow and difficult channels.

In the mean while, during the calm of a beautiful spring morning, the Confederates were making active preparations for battle. Five steamers, formerly employed as packets on the Chesapeake, had been armed, the *Patrick Henry* with six guns, the *Jamestown* with two, and each of the other three with one. This flotilla had descended the James River, and passing off Newport News during the night stood in for the *Virginia*, which, on the morning of the 8th, was coming out of the port of Norfolk, near Nansemond River, under the command of Captain Buchanan.

At one o'clock in the afternoon the lookout on the *Congress* discovered the Confederate steamers descending with the tide towards Newport News; in their midst the armored hull of the *Virginia* was perceived. The enemy so long expected was easily recognized, and orders were immediately given to clear the decks for action. But the *Cumberland* and the *Congress* were out of reach of all assistance and unable to manœuvre by themselves. Buchanan took advantage of the opportunity offered, without losing a moment, and steered direct for the *Congress*, which was nearest to him.

The latter vessel has commenced firing upon the strange craft, which is only within three hundred metres of her, without producing the slightest perceptible effect. At this moment the *Virginia* opens her two forward portholes, fires two shells, which burst between-decks of the *Congress*; then, turning away from the frigate, she heads straight for the *Cumberland*, whose large missiles are beginning to fall upon her roof. Her first object is to silence the more powerful artillery of this second adversary. The crew of the *Cumberland* see the danger, but cannot avoid it, for it is too late to put the vessel under sail. All her fire is concentrated

upon the *Virginia*, and the small steamers which follow Buchanan's flag have not even the honor of attracting a Federal shot.

Everybody feels that the few minutes during which the iron-clad vessel will be exposed at short range to the balls of the *Cumberland's* guns of twenty-four centimetres must decide one of the most important questions of the war; if these guns do not succeed in penetrating the armor of the *Virginia* at such a distance, she will secure the mastery of the James River and the Chesapeake, and wooden vessels will be definitively condemned. By some unaccountable neglect, the *Cumberland*, it is true, was only supplied with shells, being without a single solid ball in her magazines; but the weight of the former was already such that the trial could be considered as sufficient. It was indeed decisive; the large round projectiles of the *Cumberland* rebounded from the inclined sides of the *Virginia* "like india rubber balls," as the official reports said. Thousands of spectators witnessed this strange and unequal duel between the graceful but powerless champion of sailing-vessels, and the mastless monster whose iron scales alone were visible above the surface of the water—a combat resembling a conflict between a swan and an alligator. On the part of the Confederates, the garrison of Norfolk, the inhabitants of the city and the suburbs, as soon as they saw the *Virginia* in motion, rushed in crowds to the beach, whence they could see the Federal fleet in the distance, and anxiously waited for the issue of the struggle. On the other side, the news of the appearance of the *Virginia* was quickly spread. While the *Roanoke*, the *St. Lawrence*, and the *Minnesota* were proceeding towards Newport News, and the tugs were hastening to proffer their valuable assistance to the sailing-vessels already engaged in the action, an extraordinary excitement prevailed on land; everybody wanted to see the famous *Virginia*. At last the troops encamped in the vicinity of Newport News came to range themselves along the shore with some field artillery, in the hope of being able to salute the Confederate vessel with a few shots. The latter, in the mean while, continued to advance slowly and regularly towards the *Cumberland*, for the condition of her machinery, which was somewhat out of repair, did not allow her to proceed at a faster rate than three knots. But this very slowness rendered her attack

still more terrible; from time to time her port-holes would open and a few shells be discharged against the sides of the *Cumberland*. During the manœuvre one of her guns was broken, and many of those serving them, by a shot in the embrasure, were wounded. This accident did not stop her progress. Having at last arrived within a few metres of the *Cumberland*, Buchanan ordered all the port-holes to be closed, and steered right for the enemy's vessel. A moment after, the beak of the *Virginia* penetrated slowly but surely into the hull of the Federal sloop; then, immediately reversing her engines, she withdrew, leaving an enormous gash in the side of her adversary, into which the water rushed with great violence. On her part, the *Virginia* had sustained some serious injuries; the point of her steel beak was broken, and the engines, which had not been stopped in time before the encounter took place, received such a concussion as to render their management extremely difficult. But these accidents did not at first attract any notice. As soon as he had drawn off, Buchanan, placing his vessel at a distance of a few metres from the *Cumberland*, and presenting her broadside toward the latter, poured a volley from his four large howitzers into her. This was more than enough to destroy that unfortunate vessel, which the water was already filling, while the enemy's shot carried death and destruction into every part of her hull that still floated above the waves. Braving this twofold danger, her valiant crew worked at the pumps, in order to keep the vessel, which was pitching heavily and ready to sink, at least a little while longer afloat. Without allowing themselves to be discouraged by the uselessness of their fire, which could not pierce the armor of the *Virginia*, the gunners suffered themselves to be killed one after another by the side of their guns; the dead were immediately replaced. In the mean time, the water was gaining; it had filled the powder magazine, drowning several cannoneers who would not abandon their posts; the space between decks was submerged, and all the wounded who happened to be there met with a frightful death. Shortly after, the battery placed on deck was submerged; a single gun still rose above the water; it was fired by the last surviving gunner, and the ball, skimming the surface of the sea, had scarcely struck the sides of the *Virginia*, when the *Cumberland*, with one hundred

and twenty of her heroic defenders, went down in eighteen metres of water. The rest reached the shore by swimming. The top of the mainmast alone remained above water; and the flag of the United States, which had been nailed to it during the height of the battle, floated for several years a mournful and glorious emblem, marking the spot of the submerged hull which had served as the grave of so many brave men.

On perceiving the disaster of the *Cumberland*, the *Congress* took advantage of the respite granted her to weigh anchor and run upon the muddy banks adjoining the beach of Newport News. She was thus sure to avoid being sunk; but the same act also doomed her to remain motionless, and the *Virginia* could henceforth cannonade her at leisure. This is what Buchanan did as soon as he saw the *Cumberland* disappear. It was half-past two; while the small Confederate steamers were exchanging shots with the *Congress* from a considerable distance, the *Virginia*, approaching within two hundred metres of that vessel, took a position so as to enfilade the whole of her battery without being herself exposed to the fire of more than three or four guns. Her first discharge produced a terrible effect on board the *Congress*, most of the gunners being entirely disabled by it. Although the Federals had already sufficient proof of the inefficiency of their guns against the iron plates of the *Virginia*, they continued the fight with that self-devotion and determination of purpose which *esprit de corps* imparts to select troops. The field-artillery massed on the shore tried in vain to take part in the combat; but the fire of the infantry was more effective. The *Virginia* having approached the shore, a few well-directed bullets penetrated through the open port-holes, and among the persons struck by them was the brave Buchanan, who was severely wounded in the thigh.

For an hour and a half the *Congress* kept up the fight, the issue of which could no longer be doubtful; she had lost all hope of assistance on seeing the *Minnesota* stranded in the distance upon a sand-bank, as she was coming from Fortress Monroe to take part in the conflict. Nevertheless, amid the dead and wounded who encumbered the decks, her gunners continued to fire upon such of the enemy's steamers as happened to be within reach of their guns. Resistance, however, could be prolonged no further;

the commander had been killed, about one hundred men were disabled, and, according to eye-witnesses, "the deck was slippery with the blood that had been shed." The *Congress* struck her colors, and several boats came alongside to take possession of her. But while these boats were taking a portion of the frigate's crew as prisoners of war on board the Confederate steamers, the troops stationed along the shore poured a volley of musketry into the *Virginia*, which wounded some of the men who had ventured out of the casemate. Suspecting treachery, Buchanan immediately began to cannonade the *Congress* again; and the Federal sailors who were still on board took advantage of this attack to jump into the sea and save themselves by swimming. The vessel, being thus abandoned, was fired by the Confederates, who proceeded at once in search of another adversary. The *Minnesota* seemed to offer them a new and easy success. On her way to Newport News she had run into a channel which was only navigable for her at high water, but through which she hoped, by the combined aid of sail and steam, to be yet able to open herself a passage. She did not succeed; and the receding tide left her completely stranded three miles below the *Congress*. Near her lay the *St. Lawrence*, which, having tried to follow her under sail, had also run aground. The *Roanoke* also had run upon a bank, but had floated off again and had retired towards Fort Monroe. The *Virginia*, having been delayed in consequence of her injuries, arrived at last within reach of cannon-shot of the two motionless vessels waiting for her in the mud. Their destruction seemed inevitable; but fortunately the state of the tide at that moment did not allow the *Virginia* to approach them nearer than sixteen hundred metres. Buchanan opened fire at that distance, while at the same time the *Patrick Henry* and the *Jamestown*, favored by their light draught of water, took position nearer to the *Minnesota*, and commenced cannonading her with their rifled pieces. Many people on board this vessel were killed and wounded; but the game between them was equal, and the Dahlgren howitzers of the Federals soon compelled the two rebel steamers to seek their safety in retreat. The *Virginia* could render them no assistance; either through the fault of her gunners, or some defect in her guns, or rather because she could not elevate her pieces suffi-

ciently high, her fire was extremely uncertain. Only one missile reached the *Minnesota*; another struck the *St. Lawrence*: it was the last shot fired on that memorable day. It was seven o'clock in the evening; the Confederate squadron retired for the night to the vicinity of Norfolk, to prepare for a renewal of the work of destruction as soon as daylight should appear.

It seemed as if no human precaution could snatch the prey from the grasp of the *Virginia*, and spare from the fate of the *Cumberland* and the *Congress* the three frigates which night alone had saved from her attack. The high tide would, in fact, enable her to approach them much nearer the following morning than she had done the day previous. The Federal fleet once annihilated, Buchanan could proceed to bombard Fort Monroe, drive all the enemy's transports from Old Point Comfort, thus obliging the troops to evacuate the peninsula, and, after freeing the James River, himself blockade the whole of the Chesapeake. The *Virginia* was not enough of a sea vessel and carried too little coal to venture upon the high sea, and, as it was then thought, to carry dismay even into the port of New York; but she could take advantage of a calm to go and recapture Pamlico Sound from Goldsborough's fleet; or, better still, she could ascend the Potomac as far as in front of Washington and throw bomb-shells into the capital of the Union. The parts would then have been reversed; it would no longer have been the part of the Federals to attack Richmond by resting on the sea, but the turn of the Confederates, who, once masters of the inland waters, would have had the powerful co-operation of naval forces in resuming the offensive. All the previsions of the Federals, founded upon the superiority of their magnificent fleet of wooden vessels, would have disappeared with the *Cumberland* and the *Congress*. The war would have changed front, and the Confederate flag, opening a new era in maritime warfare, would easily have raised the blockade which prevented the slave States from freely procuring supplies in Europe. This was enough to excite the lively imaginations of Southern people. The Federals, on the contrary, were filled with consternation and dismay. The *Congress* was burning slowly, casting a lurid glare upon the tranquil waters of Newport News, while her guns, which were still loaded, went off in

proportion as the flames reached them; their fire, which no gunner had directed, resounded like a funeral knell amid the silence of the night. At midnight she blew up with a terrific crash, and everything was again enveloped in darkness. But this mournful sight did not for an instant divert the Federals from their work of restoring the glacis of Fort Monroe to a proper condition; for old General Wool, who commanded that place, was of the opinion, and not without reason, that the Federal fleet would henceforth be unable to protect it.

While the telegraph was spreading throughout the Union a degree of anxiety which it would be impossible to conceive without having witnessed it, day had dawned upon the waters that had been the scene of the previous day's battle, and at six o'clock the *Virginia* left her anchorage at Craney Island. Her sides had been greased in order to facilitate the *ricochet* of the enemy's projectiles, and she was accompanied by five transports loaded with troops destined to take possession of the *Minnesota* as soon as the guns of that vessel should have been silenced. The realization of this hope could not long be delayed; indeed, all the efforts of her crew and the tugs that surrounded her had not been able to set the stranded frigate afloat, while the recoil of her heavy guns, by throwing her on one side, had driven her deeper and deeper into the mud, where she was completely imbedded. Fearing lest she should also run aground, and wishing at the same time to cut off her retreat, the *Virginia*, instead of attacking her directly, ran into the deep waters which surround the Rip Raps in the harbor of Old Point Comfort; thence the Confederate ram entered the channel in which the *Minnesota* was stranded, to come upon her by following the same direction she had herself taken the day before.

But as the Confederate gunners were about to open their port-holes at the prow to reply to the fire of the pivot gun placed at the stern of the Federal frigate, a strange diminutive machine was seen to move off from her side and insolently place herself between the *Virginia* and the victim she already felt sure of having. "It was like a cheese-box," observed the Confederate sailors afterwards, "placed on a raft." This machine, however, moved about like a real vessel; she had hoisted the Federal flag; and if the

sailors who brought her into the fight were not crazy, they must certainly have been courageous adversaries. The interloper who had thus come to meddle with the conflict must be got rid of without delay. Two empty shells, each weighing fifty kilogrammes, were sent after the intruder from a distance of a few hundred metres. What was the general astonishment when these shells were seen to rebound and fall harmless into the sea. "The cheese-box is an iron tower," they exclaimed on board the *Virginia*.

It was, in fact, the *Monitor*, which, having been completed on the same day as the latter vessel, had, by a second chance, not less strange, just reached the battle-field of Hampton Roads at the moment when her presence alone could change the aspect of the fight.

It was not for the purpose of holding the *Virginia* in check that she had been brought into the waters of the Chesapeake. As we shall show hereafter, the Washington government had prepared a plan of attack against the batteries which blockaded the Potomac, and the Secretary of the Navy had promised the co-operation of the *Monitor* in carrying out this project. The latter vessel was scarcely finished when she left the port of New York in tow of a steamer, and after encountering a gale of wind, during which she behaved well, she had entered the waters of the Chesapeake on the 8th of March. She had strict orders to touch only at Fort Monroe, and to ascend the Potomac at once, where she was anxiously looked for. But as she was approaching the entrance of the James, the booming of cannon at Newport News apprised her commander, Lieutenant Worden, that a naval battle was being fought in those waters. Suspecting the danger, he increased the speed of the vessel, whose capacities he had not even yet tested, when he was boarded by a pilot, who informed him of the disaster that had just occurred. For all answer Worden quietly requested him to take his vessel straight against the *Virginia*. The unfortunate pilot, seized with terror, preferred leaving him rather than execute an order which seemed so preposterous. In the mean time, night had come. As soon as he had cast anchor, Worden, taking upon himself the responsibility of violating the letter of his instructions, made up his mind to take a hand

in the battle of the next day, and went to hide himself behind the large hull of the *Minnesota*, in order to fall suddenly upon the *Virginia* as soon as the latter should reappear. The system of revolving turrets had never been tried, and all was as new to the gunners as to the engineers of the *Monitor*. For his two guns of twenty-nine centimetres calibre Worden had shells weighing seventy-two kilogrammes, cast-iron balls weighing eighty-four, and wrought-iron balls weighing ninety-two. He decided to use projectiles of the second class, as the shells would certainly break against the iron plates of the *Virginia*, while his wrought-iron balls seemed too heavy for his cast-iron guns, which might burst and damage every part of his vessel. At a later period these same guns, loaded with wrought-iron balls and a charge of powder weighing fifteen kilogrammes, were fired without accident, but in this first trial the decision of the Federal captain was the wisest.

The Confederate officers understood that a foeman worthy of their steel had come to play with them, double or quits, in the game which the star-spangled banner had lost the day before. Letting alone the large Federal frigate, which, unable to defend herself, was to be the prize of the contest, their present thought was only to fight the *Monitor*. Being both impatient to achieve a victory, and each confiding in the powerful armor of his vessel, the two iron-clads rapidly approach each other and exchange shots from their tremendous guns at a few metres distance. The confidence felt on both sides was fully justified. The crew of the *Minnesota* beheld with admiring wonder the enormous balls which their own vessel could not have withstood glancing off or breaking against the armor of the two combatants. The fight, which began at eight o'clock, was long continued without either of them having been able to effect a breach in the armor of his antagonist. At last, Captain Jones, who succeeded Buchanan in the command of the *Virginia*, after the latter had been wounded, determines to apply the same tactics against the *Monitor* which have proved so fatal to the *Cumberland*. She steers with direct aim toward her in order to strike her with the beak, but the point of this weapon was broken the day previous; and a clever shifting of the helm causing the *Monitor* to sheer off at the critical moment, the prow of the *Virginia* only touched the edge of her deck, and turned

her around without inflicting any damage. Once apprised of this new danger, the Federal vessel, which is swifter and more skillfully handled than her heavier adversary, continues to manœuvre so as to avoid coming in contact with her, and keeps turning round, firing through the embrasures, in hope of disabling her. The two vessels are only ten metres apart. The balls, failing to penetrate their armor, fly in every direction; some of them strike the *Minnesota*; another bursts the boiler of a steam-tug fastened to her sides; the little Confederate steamers have deemed it prudent to withdraw from this dangerous locality. At last, after four hours' fighting, a shot from the *Monitor* strikes the *Virginia* near the water-line, and opens a dangerous leak in her. Almost at the same moment one of the enemy's balls strikes against the small observatory within shelter of which Worden is directing his vessel. This was a square box composed of iron ingots thirty-two centimetres in thickness, with small crevices between them, through which the captain could observe all that was going on outside, for the whole interior of the ship, with the exception of the turret, lighted from above, was enveloped in utter darkness. The shock detached some splinters, which severely wounded the brave Worden in the eyes. He was struck at the moment of his triumph. The *Virginia*, being in danger from the leak, paralyzed by the condition of her engines, which were working worse and worse, despairing, in short, of getting the upper hand of her invulnerable antagonist, gave up the game and slowly retired in the direction of Norfolk.

The *Monitor* remained on the battle-field near the ships she had just saved; but the service she had rendered them was but a small matter compared with the other results of her victory. All the fears that had sprung up in consequence of the previous day's battle were dissipated. The *Virginia* was not able to come out of the James River. The Chesapeake, the Potomac, the high sea, in short, were under the control of the Federals; and if the latter had been taught to feel that their wooden fleet could not withstand a single iron-clad vessel of the enemy, they had also found an engine of destruction superior in every respect to that which the Confederates had just put on trial against them.

The battle of Hampton Roads will continue to be one of the

most memorable events in modern warfare; never were so many new inventions exposed at once to the practical ordeal of battle. Wooden vessels of every class, together with iron-clads, some with batteries, others with turrets, were all put upon trial at the same time. It was the first time that, besides such vessels, screw-propellers—which, however, had been in existence for twenty years—had been seen to figure in a naval combat. The propellers were found to be as powerless in this kind of warfare as the old sailing-vessels. The iron-clads, on the contrary, showed themselves to be invulnerable to shells; the deep indentations made upon the armor of the *Monitor* and the *Virginia*, however, proved that they might be penetrated by heavy cannon-balls fired from land-batteries, where the weight of the gun is not subservient to the exigencies of the floating surface. Finally, the destruction of the *Cumberland* demonstrated the power of the sharp beak, forgotten since the days of the Romans, this last and formidable resource of resolute sailors, the use of which the two greatest naval commanders of our own times, Farragut and Tegethoff, as well as Buchanan, have again taught us.

The *Virginia* had suffered from the engagement, but her injuries were of such a character as to admit of being promptly repaired. If she should succeed in acquiring a rate of speed equal to that of the *Monitor*, which was an easy matter, with an engine as powerful as hers, might she not reappear in Hampton Roads, and, taking no notice of the adversary whose attack had probably occupied her too exclusively, renew her work of destruction upon the wooden vessels? In that case, the *Monitor*, having no beak, would be reduced to the use of her guns, the effect of which the *Virginia* had already borne without much damage. The Federal naval authorities fully appreciated all the drawbacks to the success of March the 9th; and in order to avert the danger of another attack from the enemy's iron-clad, they hastened to station several large vessels at the mouth of the James, which were to board the *Virginia* and sink her as soon as she should appear. But the latter vessel did not avail herself of the chances she still possessed on the 10th of March. Were her injuries more serious than had at first been supposed? Was much precious time lost in reconstructing her beak, or in increasing the calibre of her ar-

tillery? Was her inaction to be attributed to the timidity of the Richmond government, unwilling to jeopardize a vessel whose presence alone closed to the Federals the maritime approaches to their capital? It is difficult to say. It may be that the *Virginia* lost all her efficiency with the loss of the brave commander who had so skilfully handled her on the first day, and who would doubtless not have accepted the combat of the day following as a final defeat.

Before proceeding any further, we must go back to the period when we left General McClellan planning the operations upon which the battle of Hampton Roads was to have such an important bearing. We have indicated the combinations among which he could make a choice, and the difficulties that each of them presented. His plan was determined upon by the end of January. He only took into his confidence the President, a few cabinet ministers, and his principal generals; and while the construction of his bridge equipages was being completed, he devoted all his time to devising the necessary means of transportation in order to carry out with precision and promptitude the bold movement he had conceived. Unfortunately for his army, a violent sickness, as we have already stated, came to interrupt these labors, and for a time to paralyze his faculties at the moment when they would have been of the utmost value. The fever had seized him before he had time to transfer the command to one of his lieutenants. Seniority would have designated McDowell. The staff did not deem it proper to recommend the vanquished soldier of the 21st of July for so important an interim, and they continued to exercise the command in the name of the sick chief. The President, on his part, did not dare to strike at the power of a general whose convalescence was announced to him from day to day; but at last, on the 10th of January, having become impatient at not being able to confer with him, he sent for two generals of the army of the Potomac and bluntly requested them to furnish him with a plan of campaign which could be carried out with the least possible delay. The next day, the 11th, these generals proceeded to institute inquiries into the condition of the army, through the administrative bureaux, and requested the Secretary of the Treasury to confide to them all the plans of

General McClellan, which were immediately revealed, and examined before a council in which there sat, besides themselves, the President, the Secretaries of State and Treasury, the Postmaster-General and an Assistant Secretary of War.

On the 13th, after a few more conferences, this same council, increased in numbers, met at the house of General McClellan, who was scarcely convalescent. He refused to discuss his plans in the presence of an assemblage the composition of which seemed to him somewhat whimsical, and the President sustained his objection by breaking up the meeting.

Fifteen days elapsed, during which the severity of the weather rendered it impossible to put the troops in motion, and which General McClellan employed in re-examining the plan he had to submit to the President; but suddenly the latter decided to exercise the supreme command, which the Constitution conferred upon him, in person. Without even consulting the man whom he had appointed commander-in-chief of his armies, he published, on the 27th of January, under the title of "First general orders of the President," a document which will ever be regarded as one of the strangest monuments of that epoch. This order directs all the land and naval forces of the Republic to attack the enemy on the same day, and to this effect he designates the 22d of February, the anniversary of Washington's birth-day. Generals, heads of departments, and their employés, are each to be held responsible for the non-execution of this order, although none of them have been consulted, and although the date of this simultaneous movement has been fixed without any regard to the differences of climate, the positions of the enemy, and the peculiar circumstances under which each army may happen to be placed. Soon after this General McClellan submits to the President, in detail, his plan for landing the troops at Urbanna. But on the 31st of January the latter refuses to endorse it. Penetrated by the necessity to begin the campaign at once, unwilling to belie the order by which he had directed a general movement on the 22d of February, and dreading the delays which a naval operation would occasion, Mr. Lincoln substituted another plan for that which had been proposed to him. Leaving to General McClellan the responsibility of carrying out this new plan, he directed him to attack

the enemy by menacing Manassas on the west—that is to say, on the side of the Shenandoah valley.

On the 3d of February, after a verbal discussion, the President propounded to him a series of questions in writing upon the relative merits of the two plans, and the general replied on the same day, in the shape of a memorial addressed to the Secretary of War, wherein the advantages of his project were clearly and irrefutably set forth. Mr. Lincoln, without being convinced, felt nevertheless that it would be dangerous to compel the general to execute an operation he had pronounced impracticable, and suspended the order he had given him to attack Manassas. But he insisted that the army of the Potomac should, before moving away, completely ensure the communications of Washington with the Western and Northern States; to accomplish this the army had to reopen the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which had been interrupted at Harper's Ferry since the beginning of the war, and to destroy the batteries which blockaded the Lower Potomac.

This preliminary task was not easy to accomplish; nevertheless, as soon as the weather permitted, General McClellan set himself to work. On the 24th of February Banks's division, encamped on the left borders of the Upper Potomac, and that of Sedgwick, the same which, under Stone, had experienced the reverse of Ball's Bluff, made a demonstration against Harper's Ferry. A few companies crossed the river in boats; they found no enemy among the desolate ruins of that charming little town, and they occupied the surrounding heights. A bridge equipage, forwarded from Annapolis by rail during the night of the 25th–26th, was unloaded at ten o'clock in the morning. Four hours later the last boat was fastened to the Virginia shore, and the general-in-chief was the first to cross from one side to the other, with the heads of column of several divisions concentrated in haste on the left bank. At this place the river was three hundred metres wide, seven metres deep, with a rapid current, a rocky bottom, and scarpèd banks. Nevertheless, this delicate operation, so entirely new to an American army, was accomplished with great celerity and success. Encouraged by such a beginning, General McClellan thought for a moment of turning the simple demonstration he had just made into a decisive operation, of which the valley of

Virginia would have been the theatre. He had already issued orders, directing the greatest portion of his army to proceed towards Harper's Ferry, when one of those incidents which make so hazardous a game of war compelled him, in spite of himself, to adopt once more the project which had so long had his preference. The bridge of boats thrown, on the 26th, over a river so wide and so subject to sudden risings as the Potomac could not suffice for the communications of a large army. Accordingly, in order to establish a more solid crossing, a large number of barges, which were to debouch into the river through a lock situated in front of Harper's Ferry, were assembled in the Ohio Canal. But when everything was ready, and an attempt made to bring down these barges into the waters of the Potomac, above the rapids which obstruct its course, it was found that they were too broad for the lock, the latter being especially intended to allow the entrance into the canal of the small boats which ply on the Shenandoah. It would have required several days to widen the passage; the army would have lost all the advantages that a rapid movement might have secured, and would have found itself in a perilous position. General McClellan gave up the plan he had just formed, but did not return to Washington until he had secured the restoration of the railway, which Mr. Lincoln considered so important.

The latter at last decided to furnish the commander of the army of the Potomac the means for undertaking his maritime expedition. On the 27th of February the first orders for chartering numerous vessels to transport the army were received at the War Department. The government, notwithstanding its impatience to act, had thus wasted six weeks, during which all the necessary preparations might easily have been completed. In the mean while, before taking the field, General McClellan was obliged, in compliance with the orders of the President, to raise the Potomac blockade. Any attempt at disembarkation or movement of his army on that side might have brought on a general engagement under the most unfavorable circumstances. The naval force, being otherwise engaged, had not the means to attempt such a difficult enterprise. "It could only promise him for the 10th or 12th of March, an auxiliary which might prove useful, but upon which

it would have been imprudent to rely absolutely. This was the *Monitor*. We have seen how from her entrance into the Chesapeake she found a better opportunity for making a successful trial of her qualities as a man-of-war. The battle of the 8th of March deranged all the plans that had been formed for the future campaign of the army of the Potomac; and by a new coincidence, as strange as the meeting of the two iron-clads at the mouth of the James, it was precisely on the 8th of March that these plans had been definitely determined upon.

In fact, after having ordered the preparations which McClellan had so long solicited, Mr. Lincoln relapsed into hesitancy, and insisted that the general-in-chief should submit his project to the examination of a council of war. Twelve generals* assembled on the 8th of March, not to receive the instructions of their chief, but to constitute a tribunal for passing judgment on his plans; these were approved by a majority of eight to four.

Bound by a decision he had himself courted, the President accepted it with a bad grace; and being still under some fatal influence, he published two orders which indirectly interfered with its execution. The first of these orders divided the army of the Potomac into five army corps; and regardless of McClellan's opinion as to the qualifications of his subordinates, it gave the command of these army corps to five of the oldest generals of division. Among these officers there were three who had just condemned the plan of their chief in a council of war. This was to substitute oligarchy for that despotism which Washington considered indispensable in an army. McClellan might have prevented this fatal decision by forming the army corps himself, but he had preferred to wait for the trial of the first campaign, in order to bestow the distinction upon those most worthy of it.

The second order directed him to leave such a number of troops in Washington as the majority of his corps commanders should deem necessary to secure the safety of the capital; not to transport more than fifty thousand men, and to wait for a new order from

* This council was composed of McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, F. J. Porter, Franklin, McCall, Blenker, division commanders; Naglee, representing Hooker, chief of the tenth division; A. Porter, provost-marshal-general; and Barnard, commander of engineers. The three first named and the last voted against General McClellan's plan.

the President to embark the remainder; to begin the movement not later than the 18th of March, and finally to make an effort, with the co-operation of the navy, to put an end to that blockade of the Potomac which was the source of so much alarm to the inhabitants of the capital.

This was to divide the army into three parts: one to embark at Annapolis, the second to attack the batteries on the Lower Potomac, the third to keep guard over Washington; it was, in short, to fix a specified date for an operation which did not depend alone upon General McClellan, as he could not embark on the 18th of March unless the War and Navy Departments should furnish him in time with transports, the chartering and equipment of which had been taken from his control.

The news of the destruction of the *Congress* and the *Cumberland*, which was received on the morning of the 9th, caused all these preparations to be suspended, for it was no longer Richmond but Washington that was menaced. On the same evening, however, a despatch from Mr. Fox, who had gone to meet the *Monitor*, announced the success of that vessel and the retreat of the *Virginia*. The immediate result of this second day's fight was to render the navigation of the Chesapeake once more safe. If the James River remained closed by the presence of the *Virginia* at Norfolk, Urbanna and Fortress Monroe were both accessible, and could yet afford a solid base for the great operation which the army of the Potomac was about to undertake. But the plans of McClellan, already so frequently frustrated, as if by a kind of fatality connected with the dates of the 8th and 9th of March, were again seriously compromised by an event which was almost as unexpected as the battle between the iron-clads; we allude to the evacuation of Manassas by the Confederates. Was this evacuation, which had long since been contemplated and in active preparation for more than a week, hastened by some criminal indiscretions? There are many indications which would seem to justify such a conclusion, although not affording positive proof of the fact. Whatever the case may be, on the very day following that when the maritime expedition was determined upon by a council of war, the Confederates, by a rapid retreat, escaped the most serious dangers they would have

encountered from this expedition. Now they had time to reach Richmond even before the Federal army could embark upon the transports, whose arrival was delayed from day to day. The long-debated question, however, relative to the raising of the Potomac blockade was solved by the abandonment of the enemy's batteries. Instead of going to Annapolis in search of the vessels which were to convey his soldiers to the coasts of the Chesapeake, McClellan would see them arrive in front of his encampments at Alexandria. The famous redoubts at Manassas were invaded by a crowd of curious persons who could without danger underrate their importance and criticise the general whose prudence did not allow him to sacrifice the *élite* of his young army for the sake of carrying them. But the moral effect which the retreat of the Confederates would have produced a few days later was wanting. If so much time had not been wasted in indecision, the evacuation of Manassas would have coincided with the disembarkation of the first Federal soldiers at Urbanna or Newport News, and everybody would have attributed it to the bold movement of McClellan.

The army of the Potomac left its quarters to take possession of the enemy's works. On the 10th of March it occupied Centreville; on the 11th Manassas Junction. Large quantities of stores, burnt or scattered in the mud, storehouses still in flames, the smoking *débris* of numerous trains, traces of destruction everywhere, imparted a lugubrious and sinister aspect to the celebrated plateau. Although the Federal army was to encounter no adversary, this movement was useful to the soldiers as a marching exercise. It was, moreover, necessary in order to occupy the positions which were to cover Washington during the future campaign. It was at Manassas that the garrison of the capital ought to be placed, for it could thence command the whole surrounding country; but this was the extreme scope of the aggressive movement so suddenly undertaken. The enemy had disappeared; and although the smoke of burning bridges behind him still rose above the forest which greets the eye at Manassas Junction, all serious pursuit was impossible. The troops had no means of obtaining supplies; the roads were broken up, and the water courses, swollen by the rains, were no longer practicable.

General Joseph Johnston, who, since the battle of Bull Run,

had commanded all the Confederate forces at Manassas in the valley of Virginia and on the Lower Potomac, had conducted the delicate operation which transferred the greatest portion of his army to the new battle-field selected by his adversary with equal ability and success. His own soldiers only learned on the 7th of March, on receiving marching orders, that the evacuation of Manassas had been secretly going on for several weeks. Not a single cannon nor gun-carriage nor projectile had been left in the vast dépôts the Confederates had established at the intersection of the two railways. With regard to the batteries which blockaded the Potomac, the difficulties were much greater, owing to the distance of the Aquia Creek station; stores, ammunition, and even a few pieces of artillery had to be left behind. In order to keep these objects from falling into the hands of the enemy, the Confederates buried them in the ditches, to which they gave the appearance of newly-dug graves by means of crosses and other devices; but they carried the joke a little too far. The inscriptions which adorned the false graves, invoking, with much affectation, respect for the dead, excited the suspicion of the Yankees, who were not long in discovering the trick.

Leaving Jackson in the valley of Virginia, free to act in accordance with his judgment, Johnston fell back upon the Rapahannock with little less than fifty thousand able-bodied men. Resting his right on Fredericksburg, and taking his left to the rear of the Rapidan, he waited in these positions, destined to become so celebrated at a later day, for McClellan to define his movement either by land or water.

The choice of the Federals had long since been made; and a reconnaissance undertaken by General Stoneman with a brigade of cavalry and a regiment of infantry only served to demonstrate the impossibility of pursuit. Stoneman followed the enemy across a country absolutely destitute of resources, from Manassas to Cedar Creek, exchanging a few musket-shots with the Confederate rear-guard. Menaced by the rapidly swelling streams behind him, he hastened to retrace his steps; and although perfectly unmolested, he had much trouble in bringing back his soldiers, whose provisions were exhausted, to the vicinity of the Federal dépôts.

In the mean while, politics continued to interfere in military affairs. On the 12th of March a Washington journal published an order of Mr. Lincoln depriving General McClellan of the supreme command of the armies, and limiting his authority to the army of the Potomac. The other armies were to form independent commands, under the immediate control of the President, who claimed the right of directing their collective operations in future. It was through this journal that General McClellan was informed of his removal from the command-in-chief. Mr. Lincoln had not the courage to notify him of the fact, and only signed the order after he had seen him leave Washington to take the field. The general bore this insult with patriotic resignation.

The evacuation of Manassas had changed the relative position of the two armies. On the 13th, McClellan submitted the plan for disembarking on the shore of Fortress Monroe to a council composed of four of his corps commanders, who, on this occasion, adopted it unanimously, provided that there should be nothing to fear from the *Virginia*, that the transportation should be effected rapidly, that the naval force should co-operate in the attack upon the batteries of York River, and that the garrison of Washington should be sufficiently strong to secure the entire safety of that city. The President confirmed this decision; and the War Department, until then paralyzed by so much indecision, applied at last all its energy to collect the immense *matériel* requisite for the transportation of the army.

Positive orders were forwarded to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and especially to New York; and the Potomac was soon seen swarming with steamers of every description, from the Transatlantic packets down to flat-bottomed boats intended exclusively for river service. The latter could carry as many as one thousand four hundred men in a single trip, navigation on the tranquil waters of the Chesapeake occupying only from twelve to fifteen hours. They had large barges and tenders in tow for conveying horses and artillery. It was expected that fifty thousand men, with their *matériel*, could be transported in a single trip; but the flotilla assembled below Washington could scarcely accommodate one-half of that number, which was a new cause of delay in the opening of the campaign. Nevertheless, on the 16th of March,

the whole army was massed in the neighborhood of Alexandria, where the embarkation was to take place. Near this city eighteen wooden piers jut out into the waters of the Potomac, many of which have wharf accommodations for three large steamers. The transports come alongside, and the quartermaster on duty immediately telegraphs to headquarters the number of men, horses, and *matériel* that can be embarked at each wharf. In accordance with this information, General McClellan also transmits orders by telegraph to such and such corps, directing them to repair to the piers whose number he specifies, and in a few hours a whole division is thus embarked without confusion or accident. The steamers are immediately unmoored, actually swarming with human ants, and with scarcely a revolution of their immense wheels suffer themselves to drift down the current like a swimmer who is afraid of fatiguing himself. In their midst may be seen several diminutive steam-tugs, broad and short, constantly in motion, going by twos and threes to give a shoulder lift as it were to some large craft that has run aground, or descending the river with a long string of barges and schooners in tow. At last, on the 18th and 19th, the first division of the army of the Potomac disembarks at Fortress Monroe, the operation having been retarded in consequence of the small number of landing-places to be found about this locality. The second division left Alexandria on the 22d. A little later two divisions could be conveyed at once.

While the army of the Potomac was thus temporarily turning its back upon the enemy, in order to go and attack him on a different ground, the latter, in falling back upon the Rappahannock, entirely destroyed all the lines of railway which separate this river from Washington, thereby debarring himself from every chance of making an aggressive retrograde movement. But the valley of Virginia was occupied by an intrepid soldier, T. J. Jackson, who, since the battle of Bull Run, was only known by the name of *Stonewall Jackson*. The military genius of this man made ample amends for the eccentricity of his character; his humanity tempered the zeal of his religious enthusiasm, which at times partook of the fanaticism of the old Puritans, while his strict sense of justice and equitable dealings made the most reck-

less tamely submit to his unbending severity. He had accordingly acquired a prodigious influence over his soldiers, and from the first day he led them into battle, the old professor of chemistry in the military college of Virginia displayed that quickness of perception, that decision, that energy in the execution of his plans, which constitute the true man of war.

Since the battles of which West Virginia had been the theatre at the close of 1861, the Confederates, weakened and discouraged, had made no attempt to recover the ground they had lost in that part of the country. All their forces were concentrated in the Alleghanies; and Lee, having been summoned to Richmond, had been succeeded, in December, in the Shenandoah valley, by Jackson, who was appointed to the command of the so-called army of the Monongahela. Soon after, General Garnett came to join this army with Jackson's old brigade, from which the latter had separated with great reluctance, thus increasing the number of his forces to about ten thousand men. The Confederate general determined to assume the offensive at once. He left Winchester on the 1st of January with Garnett's troops and two brigades commanded by General Loring. The weather was beautiful and mild, and Jackson's soldiers crossed the gorges of the Alleghanies with a firm step, in the hope of surprising the Federal garrison of Bath, a small town situated near the Potomac, on the line of the Ohio Railway. But the next day they were overtaken by a snow-storm; winter, after having long held back, had at last arrived in all its rigor, and surprised them in the midst of a difficult march. They suffered terribly, and only reached Bath to see the Federals, who had received timely warning of their approach, stationed on the other side of the river. Jackson, inflexible of purpose, would not yield to the cold. After destroying the railroad-track, he led his soldiers to Romney, which General Kelly evacuated without waiting for him; and leaving a portion of Loring's troops in this town, he returned to Winchester with the remainder of his army. The soldiers he brought back were exhausted, discouraged, and discontented. The effects of the severe cold had reduced his effective force one-half. The volunteers whose term of service was about to expire no longer obeyed their commanders; those who re-enlisted claimed the right to

elect new officers ; and as the merits of the candidates were freely discussed, drunkenness and want of discipline prevailed everywhere. Finally, the officers who served under Jackson, encouraged by Loring's example, no longer hesitated to criticise his acts openly. So loud were their complaints that Mr. Davis, imitating the government of Washington, ordered Loring to evacuate Romney without even apprising Jackson of his intention. The latter had need of all his patriotism to continue in the service of those who so poorly appreciated the difficulties of the task they had laid upon him when they entrusted him with the defence of that important section of country.

General McClellan, being desirous to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from any further attack, had, during the short campaign of Jackson, united all the small bodies of troops scattered along that line, between Hancock and Cheat River, in a single command. These troops, to which were added a few reinforcements, were formed into a division under the orders of General Lander, his personal friend and an extremely brave officer, who had been wounded in a skirmish at Edwards's Ferry a few days after the battle of Ball's Bluff. Lander did not remain inactive. The portion of the railroad most exposed to the enemy was that which follows the right bank of the Potomac between Hancock and Cumberland. It never had been entirely reopened, the section between Hancock and Harper's Ferry being still in the hands of the Confederates. Lander undertook to reconstruct the Cacapon bridge near Bath, and to open the railroad between Cumberland and Hancock, in order to establish a line of communication between the latter point and the borders of the Ohio. With a view of protecting the laborers, he determined to dislodge the Confederate brigade of Carson from the Blooming Gap passes, above the Cacapon valley, whence they could come down at any time and interrupt their work. He arrived on the 14th of February, at daybreak, with five hundred horsemen, at a little village situated at the foot of the passes, where he hoped to surprise a detachment of the enemy. The latter, being warned in time, had retired towards the mountain. Lander followed them ; but when he sought to attack the position occupied by the Confederates, his troopers refused to follow him. Then the brave Lander, charging upon

the enemy, followed only by his staff, made a rebel colonel prisoner with his own hand. Fortunately for him, he had only a small detachment of Carson's brigade to deal with, the brigade itself having fallen back towards Winchester; and the approach of two regiments of Federal infantry was sufficient to put the Confederates to flight, who, without the arrival of this reinforcement, having fully recovered from their first surprise, would have made Lander pay dear for his audacity. They left in his hands seventy-five prisoners, seventeen of whom were officers. In the mean time, a small body of troops had hoisted the Federal flag at Moorefield, above Romney, among the gorges of the Upper Potomac, and this last town, having been evacuated by Loring, was at once occupied by Lander. Jackson, who attached the greatest importance to its possession, was contemplating its recapture, when his attention was diverted by other duties. Indeed, the arrival of two Federal divisions at Harper's Ferry on the 26th looked like the prelude to a great campaign in the valley of Virginia. McClellan was at Charlestown in person. Jackson brought back his troops to Winchester in great haste. He lingered there for the purpose of watching the movements of the Federals; but at the same time he was preparing to go up the Shenandoah as soon as Johnston should give him the signal; for the evacuation of Manassas, which was then in course of execution, once accomplished, would necessarily involve that of Winchester.

In the mean while, Lander had died; he was succeeded by General Shields, a gallant officer,* who had already distinguished himself in the Mexican campaign, and his division, united to that of Banks, formed the fifth army corps, under command of the latter general. When Johnston evacuated Manassas, Jackson, leaving Winchester, proceeded to Strasburg, thence to Woodstock, and only stopped at Mount Jackson, the terminus of the Manassas Gap Railway, situated on the north branch of the Shenandoah. This movement towards the south was followed by all the small bands operating among the Alleghanies; and the railroad between Cumberland and Hancock being entirely open, Shields proceeded

* James Shields was a brigadier-general of *volunteers* during the Mexican war. He was brevetted a major-general, and was twice severely wounded. He was mustered out of service at the close of the war.—ED.

to Winchester with his division, to join the first division of Banks, of which General Williams had assumed the command. Spurred on by his ardor, and encouraged by his chief, who did not much relish the defensive rôle allotted to him in McClellan's programme, Shields, on the 18th of March, pushed forward in the track of Jackson as far as beyond Strasburg, pressing close upon his rear-guard. But he could neither continue this eccentric movement nor remain in the isolated position in which he found himself. Indeed, the army of the Potomac, when it embarked, had left all the care of covering the line of the Potomac, against any demonstration on the part of the enemy, to Banks's corps. The two fine divisions of which it was composed were amply sufficient for this purpose, provided they were exclusively devoted to such service. The division of Williams was to leave Winchester on the 21st for Centreville and Manassas, to replace the troops about to embark at Alexandria. Shields, left alone in the valley of Virginia, was obliged to shut himself up in the lower part of this valley, and on the 20th of March, early in the morning, he left Strasburg, with all his forces, to return the same day to Winchester, which Banks had directed him to hold. Shields knew the ardent temperament of his adversary; and since he could not come up with him in order to attack him, he determined to lay a trap for him, so as to induce him to follow in pursuit, by giving to his retreat the appearance of a precipitate flight. His pickets were suddenly withdrawn; and when, after a long march, his worn-out troops reached Winchester, he hurried them through the town and made them encamp a few kilometres to the north, on the Martinsburg road. On the morning of the 22d Williams's division left Winchester, where there only remained a few companies, and took up its line of march through Berryville, towards the Snicker Gap pass, in the chain of the Blue Ridge. The inhabitants of Winchester, nearly all secessionists, hastened to send word to Ashby's cavalry, which had followed in the wake of the Federals, to let them know that their town was evacuated. This information was immediately forwarded to Jackson by means of signal-fires kindled on the mountain-tops. When Shields saw thick columns of smoke rising above the woods, he understood that his manœuvre had succeeded, and prepared to receive the enemy on the ground he had

selected. Ashby, expecting to find an easy prey in Winchester, did not wait for Jackson, but vigorously attacked the Federal outposts a few kilometres south of the town. In order to hold them in check, without, however, revealing his strength, Shields sent the brigade of Kimball to take position near the village of Kernstown, but only brought two regiments into action, with which Ashby kept skirmishing until night, believing that he had all the available forces of the Federals before him. In placing these two regiments in position, Shields had an arm shattered by a splinter from a shell, but he continued to give his orders without even allowing his wound to be dressed, and on the following day, despite his sufferings, he directed all the movements of his division from his bed.

Jackson had reluctantly abandoned a portion of the Virginia valley and slowly fallen back before an enemy greatly superior in number. As soon as he was apprised of the retreat of the Federals towards Winchester he could not resist the desire to retrace his steps. In the course of a single day, March 2d, he travelled, with his small army, the distance of forty kilometres, which separates Mount Jackson from the borders of Cedar Creek, where he encamped for the night. He had with him the three brigades of Garnett, Burks, and Fulkerstone; Ashby's brigade of cavalry, together with a light battery, was already near Winchester; his artillery consisted of twenty-seven field-pieces; but the infantry was so much reduced that his forces did not amount to more than four thousand two hundred, or four thousand three hundred at the utmost. On the morning of the 23d he resumed his march, having yet nearly forty kilometres to travel before he could reach Winchester.

On the same morning the three brigades of Shields's division took position five kilometres in advance of this town. The turnpike road leading southward divides into three branches on the summit of a hill situated this side of Kernstown village, and sloping down gradually to the edge of a ravine running from west to east. The left branch leads to Front Royal, the right to a ford of Cedar Creek at the foot of North Mountain; the principal road in the centre runs to Strasburg. The country, highly cultivated and intersected with wall fences and small woods, is one of

the richest in the valley of Virginia. In the absence of Shields, who was kept in Winchester by his wound, Colonel Kimball had assumed command of the three brigades. His own was drawn up in front across the turnpike road, his right wing extending opposite a wooded hill among the recesses of which the ravine buried itself; still more to the right there were several large stubble-fields. The brigade of Sullivan was drawn up on the left, a little in rear, and Tyler's was massed on the Winchester road. A reconnaissance made in the morning had demonstrated to the Federals that they had only some cavalry and a few pieces of artillery before them; and Banks, convinced that Jackson, when better informed, would not dare to attack his seven or eight thousand men, had just left for Washington when Ashby's artillery opened the fight along the Strasburg road. The latter, having been informed of the near approach of Jackson, and wishing to test the strength of his adversaries, began the attack upon the left wing of the Federals, and soon compelled them to bring a portion of Sullivan's brigade into line. But the remainder of their forces being concealed by a rise in the ground, Ashby still believed that there were only four or five regiments before him, and forwarded this false information to Jackson when the latter reached the village of Kernstown, about two o'clock in the afternoon. The Confederate foot-soldiers were worn out by their long and rapid march, but their commander was in the habit of not considering their fatigue. Believing he has a chance of crushing a detachment of fifteen hundred or two thousand of the enemy's troops, he allows his soldiers but a few moments' rest, and immediately after leads them into action. Fulkerstone, on the left, Garnett, in the centre, and Burks, on the right, are all deployed in a single line of battle, which Jackson leads against the position occupied by Kimball's brigade, leaving to Ashby the care of holding the left wing of the Federals in check. His batteries occupy the wooded hill we have mentioned, and open a murderous fire, to which the Federal artillery, being more exposed, replies with difficulty. Fulkerstone stretches out into the fields which open on his left, and threatens to flank the extremity of the Union line. It is four o'clock. Kimball, in order to parry this danger, summons Tyler's brigade, some of whose regiments take position

on his right. The battle rages along the whole line. Garnett, with the celebrated brigade he has the honor of commanding, emerges from the wood along the edge of which the Confederate artillery is posted. Kimball causes his brigade to make an analogous movement, and these two forces, both uncovered, obstinately fire at each other at a distance of two hundred metres. On the right of the Federals, Tyler has not only checked the movement of Fulkerstone's brigade, but outflanks it in his turn; on the left, Sullivan easily keeps Ashby in check, although compelled to send two regiments to support the centre, which is closely pressed.

At this place the two lines are separated by a large stone wall. Each party is endeavoring to take possession of this sheltering parapet; but Garnett, with his Virginians, is the first to reach it. The Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania, led by the brave Colonel Murray, tries to take it from him, and rushes to the charge despite a terrific fire; it arrives within twenty metres of the prize; but Murray is shot dead; his soldiers reel, fall back, and scatter, leaving the ground covered with the dead and wounded.

Jackson has at last discovered his error; but still retaining full confidence in his soldiers, he hopes to be yet able to wrest the victory from an enemy vastly superior in number. But while he brings his last reserves into action, Sullivan's troops and the remainder of Tyler's brigade come into line. Kimball makes one more effort to carry the position occupied by Garnett. His artillery covers the Confederate line with shells, and the second charge succeeds better than the first. The Stonewall brigade, being out of cartridges, abandons the wall it has so well defended. The Federals take possession of it, rush past it, and penetrating the enemy's line threaten to entirely cut off Fulkerstone, who is becoming more and more compromised. It is in vain that Jackson leads his soldiers back to the charge, accustomed as they are to follow him through every danger; he cannot recover the ground lost. A piece of artillery has remained in the enemy's hands, and Fulkerstone, who is falling back in his turn, is also obliged to abandon one; finally, at the extremity of the line, the Federals under Sullivan have assumed the offensive, and are driving Ashby before them, whose guns, falling back farther and far-

ther, announce to Jackson that the turnpike will soon be cut off from him. It is near six o'clock; night comes on, and the Confederates have lost the battle. Jackson lingers among the last combatants, but cannot prevent his soldiers from giving way in every direction before the efforts of the Federals. They fall back while still preserving their ranks, and often facing about to fire, then soon disappear in the darkness, leaving the battle-field covered with their wounded.

The bloody battle of Kernstown, which did honor to the two small armies, cost both parties dear. The Federals had one hundred and three men killed and four hundred and forty-one wounded; the Confederates lost four hundred and seventy-five men in all.

Jackson bivouacked not far from the field of battle. His courage had raised him still higher in the estimation of his troops; but he was inconsolable on account of his reverse and the error that had caused it. He was not, however, in a condition to resume the fight, and on the following day he reached once more the borders of Cedar Creek. On the same day Banks returned to Winchester with a portion of Williams's division, but had no idea of pursuing Jackson. The vigor displayed by the Confederates led him to believe that he had about ten thousand men in front of him. He could not believe that his adversary would have ventured so far without some reinforcement within his reach; and after following him for a few kilometres, he brought back his troops to Winchester, beyond which his instructions did not permit him to go.

Notwithstanding this reverse, Jackson's movement was not without results. It compelled Banks to concentrate once more his two divisions in the valley of the Shenandoah, and to leave the care of defending Manassas to other troops. The Confederate general was thus precluding the operations in which a few months after, and on the same ground, he was to distinguish himself. It was, in fact, by a series of bold moves in the valley of Virginia that Jackson first, and others after him, menaced the Federals and filled the government of Washington with alarms that invariably betrayed it into the adoption of unfortunate measures.

These alarms, as we have observed before, were exhibited at

the bare idea of the army of the Potomac contemplating a departure for a theatre of action remote from the capital. General McClellan, although determined to guarantee the safety of Washington as fully as possible, could never come to an understanding with the strategists of the cabinet, whose advice controlled Mr. Lincoln, as to the manner of defending the capital. From the moment that the army of the Potomac concentrated all its available forces upon any given point for the purpose of undertaking some great offensive movement, its detachments and accessory corps had to confine themselves to the strictest defensive everywhere else. When, therefore, this army embarked for Fortress Monroe, all that the home troops had to do was to prevent any aggressive movement of the enemy against Washington or the Maryland frontier. West Virginia, being impracticable for large armies, could take care of herself. In order to close the Virginia valley, to protect the crossings of the Potomac at Harper's Ferry and Williamsport, and to cover the Ohio Railway, it was sufficient to occupy strongly the central position of Winchester. In short, in order to afford entire security to the capital, it was necessary, without counting dépôts and non-combatants, to establish two strong garrisons, one in the powerful works on the right bank of the Potomac, and the other in the Manassas lines of defences, reconstructed and turned round, so as to cover the approaches to Washington. But no personal or party considerations should have been allowed to interfere with what ought to be the sole and paramount object of war, the destruction of the enemy. There should have been no desire for compromise between men or their different plans of campaign. The satisfaction of occupying the whole country south of Washington should have been foregone for a while longer, and the Confederate guerillas allowed to remain in possession of it.

The President, who, six months before, had suddenly taken away the command of the great department of the Missouri from General Fremont, had just created a new one in West Virginia expressly for him, called "the Mountain Department." This department had been so curiously marked out that Fremont was unable to find an enemy within its prescribed limits, and yet the President could not withstand the representations of those who

were urging him to dismember the army of the Potomac for the purpose of adding unnecessary strength to this new army. Blenker's strong division, composed exclusively of German soldiers or men of German origin, was, for no other reason, taken away from General McClellan on the eve of his departure for Fort Monroe, and transferred to Fremont. General Banks, with his twenty-five thousand men of the fifth corps, was kept in the valley of Virginia by the fears which Jackson and his eight thousand soldiers created in Washington, and the authorities only waited for the departure of McClellan to convert this corps into another independent army. And yet neither Fremont's troops, with no enemy in front of them, nor Blenker's ten thousand men, sent in search of the former, nor Banks's twenty-five thousand, to whom Jackson could only oppose eight thousand soldiers shaken and demoralized by unsuccessful fighting, were considered by the President as forming part of the defenders of Washington. He regarded them as separate armies, destined to wage war on their own account, and desired to provide for the protection of the capital from forces outside their organization.

General McClellan had not foreseen these new military combinations. He thought that, at a time when the entire nation was giving so many proofs of patriotism, those who governed it would be able to resist the influence of idle fears and intriguing ambition. The troops he left behind him on the day of his embarkation, within reach of and ready to defend Washington, amounted to seventy-three thousand four hundred and fifty-six men and one hundred and nine pieces of field-artillery, including Banks's corps and Blenker's division. It is true that out of this number were to be deducted the non-combatants, who always detract from the real strength of a large army. There were nearly three thousand five hundred recruits from New York and Pennsylvania who had not yet left their respective States; and about five thousand men were engaged in keeping guard over the railways. The twenty-two thousand men comprising the garrison of Washington had nearly all recently enlisted, and were quite inexperienced. In short, out of the twenty-nine thousand or thirty thousand men constituting the active forces of Banks and Blenker, from fifteen thousand to eighteen thousand had to be left in the valley of Vir-

ginia. Nevertheless, after making all these deductions, it was easy to mass a corps of from twenty thousand to twenty-five thousand well-trained soldiers at Manassas, and to place in second line, in the fortifications of Washington, twenty-five thousand or thirty thousand soldiers, raw, no doubt, but quite able to make a good figure behind a parapet. These were more than were needed to protect the capital until the day when, like an electric cloud which attracts another of an opposite character, the army of the Potomac should have drawn the Confederate army to itself, when all danger to the Federal capital would have ceased. This moment once arrived, Blenker's division could have been removed without inconvenience from Washington, and sent as a reinforcement to Fremont's army.

General McClellan was obliged to submit to the new requirements of the government. On leaving Alexandria the 1st of April for Fortress Monroe, he left eighteen thousand five hundred men as a corps of observation between Manassas and Warrenton, and one thousand five hundred on the Lower Potomac; the garrison of Washington was soon to be raised to eighteen thousand men, with twenty-two pieces of field-artillery. He had not dared to strip the valley of the Shenandoah, where thirty-five thousand men, comprising the reserves, were massed; but these troops, already organized and partly trained, could, at the slightest intimation of danger, be summoned to Washington if the inexperienced soldiers forming its garrison were not deemed sufficient by the military authorities.

The government decided otherwise. The President again committed the wrong of allowing McClellan to depart with assurances which he immediately falsified. While the army of the Potomac was embarking, full of confidence and hope, and happy at being delivered from a long-protracted inaction, many people in Washington still felt, or pretended to feel, seriously alarmed on seeing the capital of the Union thus stripped. It was an easy matter to revive the old objections of the President against the plan which was at last being executed by his orders. There happened to be two generals in whom he reposed the utmost confidence, who declared that, in case of an attack, the garrison of Washington would not be sufficient; and although they had added that the

capital was not menaced, Mr. Lincoln determined to ward off this imaginary danger by an act of authority.

On the 3d of April the great operation of transporting the army of the Potomac was considerably advanced, and promised entire success. With the exception of a few belated regiments, no troops remained in the neighborhood of Alexandria but McDowell's corps; but this corps was the finest in the army; it presented an effective force of thirty-eight thousand four hundred and fifty-four soldiers of all arms, well drilled, thoroughly equipped, admirably commanded, divided into three divisions of infantry, four regiments of cavalry, and twelve batteries of artillery. Embarked entire and at once upon transports which had at last been collected in sufficient number, while the remainder of the army was advancing through the peninsula, between the James and the York Rivers, it was to land on the north bank of that arm of the sea, so as to cause the fall of all the defences erected for the purpose of closing its entrance. The fulfilment of the task assigned to this corps was, in the judgment of General McClellan, indispensable to secure the success of a rapid campaign. Yet just as he was about to embark, McDowell received an order from the President directing him to remain, with all his forces, in the neighborhood of Washington; while a laconic despatch informed McClellan that these troops, for whose arrival he had been waiting so impatiently, were taken from his command. Since the operations had commenced he had thus been deprived of nearly one-third of that army he had formed with so much care, and for the perfect organization of which he had even sacrificed a portion of his popularity.

The government of Washington, by its want of skill, from the outset compromised the success of the decisive campaign for which the patriotic people of the North had begrudged it neither men nor money.

In the next volume the reader will see how dearly this error cost.

APPENDIX TO VOL. I.

NOTES.

NOTE A, PAGE 29.

WE append here, for the benefit of those who may feel interested in the subject, a more detailed description of the functions of the various departments and their respective positions in the staffs of the American armies.

The province of the adjutant-general comprised ;—the recruiting of regiments, their organization, their interior movements, their relations with the special authorities of States, the enrolling of militia and volunteers in the Federal service, the condition of the men and officers, the promotions, casualties, and resignations, and, finally, the creation and distribution of commands. All correspondence with bodies of troops in the field was conducted by him ; he transmitted the orders of the President and the Secretary of War to the generals in command, and the latter addressed all their reports to him.

The assistant adjutant-generals, besides special duties which might be entrusted to them—such as the organization of new regiments—were attached to the staffs of the army or army corps of every division and brigade. They prepared, received, and classified all the reports, regulated the commands, transmitted all the records relating to the *personnel* of the army corps, and kept up with them the general correspondence ; they thus descended from organization to organization, until the regiment itself was reached, the adjutant of which, having control of all administrative operations, was in direct communication with the assistant adjutant-general of brigade.

The functions of the quartermaster's department, which at a later period were distributed among nine offices into which the department was subdivided, comprised the following services : the purchase and distribution among the army corps of all the effects of the men, equip-

ments, tents, tools, camp furniture, cooking utensils, transportation by land and water—that is to say, the hiring or purchase of vessels conveying troops, war material, or provisions on the high seas, lakes, or rivers, and even the equipment of military flotillas on inland waters independently of the navy; the direction of the several maritime services, of all telegraph lines and railways which the armies had taken possession of; contracts with other railways for every kind of transportation; the construction and distribution of all wagons, field-forges, ambulances, and harness; the purchase of all animals required for that service, and the repairing of roads; the purchase and distribution of fuel, forage, straw, and stationery; the construction and supervision of barracks, hospitals, stables, bridges, magazines, and wharfs for landing; the renting of army quarters; in short, all the expenditures of the armies not under the special care of some other department. All these operations were effected by means of contracts with private individuals, through the medium of the department at Washington, or the various quartermasters who exercised a controlling authority in that branch of the service, either at the headquarters of an army or at a central dépôt, for that department had no workshops under its direction. The superintendence of these operations was entrusted to special officers, who acted, some as inspectors to verify accounts, and others in the capacity of paymasters. The latter, having to settle all the authorized expenses in the different branches of that department, had to give bonds as a guarantee for the proper disbursement of the large sums of money which they received directly from the government at Washington.

The ordnance and subsistence departments, whose functions we have already sufficiently described, were organized in the same manner as the preceding, the inspection and disbursements being made in the corps itself by officers especially detailed for that service. The principal officer who represented each of these three branches of the service at the War Department attained that position by regular promotion, and could not be deprived of it at the pleasure of the Secretary like a simple *employé*. A portion of the officers of this corps negotiated the contracts and saw to their proper execution, inspected and received the supplies, and took charge of the Federal arsenals. The others were attached to the armies in the field and to their dépôts, forming, from the regiment up, an official bond of communication through which all matters connected with their departments passed before reaching their chief at Washington, under the simple supervision of the commander of each body of troops.

These three branches of the administrative department were alone empowered to conclude heavy contracts.

The surgeons, taken from the doctors already possessed of diplomas, were attached to the regiments, but did not constitute a component part of their staffs; at all the general headquarters there were brigade and division surgeons above them; and, finally, the surgeon-general of the army. Those placed in attendance in hospitals were under their direction, and received their supplies partly from the quartermaster and partly from the commissary of subsistence.

The paymasters were *employés* of the War Department, and not of the Treasury, inasmuch as each administrative department kept separate accounts, and was itself the disbursing officer of the funds required to pay the expenses it had authorized; they had only to settle the pay, the bounties, and a few trifling expenses; consequently none of them remained with the army; mere birds of passage, they made their appearance at certain stated periods, settled the pay-accounts according to the company-rolls, and disappeared immediately after.

We will sum up this sketch by showing, first, what the composition of the headquarters of a general-in-chief, such as that of Scott in Mexico, is, and then the organization and interior administration of the regiment. We will thus be spared the necessity of recurring to these details when we shall have to speak of the volunteer armies which were formed on the same model.

All the members of the headquarters were designated as aides-de-camp, and were distinguished by the addition to their titles of the three letters A. D. C., although their functions differed.

Near the general there was, first of all, the chief of staff, the intermediate agent between the general and his principal officers, but having no particular command himself. Under his immediate direction there were the personal aides to the general, who, apart from the special missions entrusted to them, had no other duties to perform than the name indicated, to accompany him, carry his orders, observe what he could not see for himself, and receive all the communications addressed directly to him.

All that depends upon the chief of staff with us was left to the care of the assistant adjutant-general, and, in a small portion, to the inspector-general of the army.

The administrative *personnel* was represented by the quartermaster-general, the chief officer of ordnance, the chief commissary, and the surgeon-general. These heads of the administrative branches of the service had under their respective commands some officers (or physi-

cians) and non-commissioned officers, but no troops. The teamsters, laborers, and hospital nurses were civilians hired for that purpose, or soldiers temporarily detached from their regiments.

At headquarters the special arms of the service had each a chief surrounded by his own particular staff, such as the chief of artillery, the chief of engineers, and the chief of topographical engineers. Sometimes, with armies in the field, the cavalry were also under a special commander, called the chief of cavalry.

The police of the army was under the supervision of a provost-marshal, while the management of courts-martial and the examination of all legal questions were sometimes delegated to a lawyer styled judge-advocate, who was invested with provisional military rank.

Let us now proceed from the first to the last degree, from the general headquarters to the regimental, or rather the battalion staff; we shall find that their administrative functions were very limited, which increased so much the importance and the duties of the special corps of the service detailed to assist in all that concerns the interior regimen—a service from which such officers are excluded in the organization of the French regiment. In the American regiment there are no regimental accounts, no fund, no council of administration. There are only two *employés* of the administrative department, the ordnance-sergeant, whose duty was not only to attend to the repairing of arms, but also to ascertain their number and condition, to address all requests for arms and ammunition to the officials of the department, who were his immediate superiors, and to deliver them to the regiment. The other was the quartermaster of the regiment, who, acting under the immediate authority of the brigade-quartermaster, delivered to the regiment the personal effects, all made up, which he had requested and received from the central dépôt. The regiment, unless it formed no part of a brigade, had no commissary of subsistence, the commanders of companies keeping direct accounts with the commissary of brigade. If, at any time, the opportunity presented itself for practicing certain economies in the expenses of the regiment, especially as regarded the companies' rations, the officers had absolute control of the matter.

All the records, writings, reports of condition and administrative control, were in the custody of the adjutant of the regiment, whose functions resembled those of our major; he had charge of all the regimental accounts. On one hand, he had to verify the reports furnished by the commanders of companies, and to examine their several books; on the other hand, he had to check and register the operations

of the quartermaster, the ordnance sergeant, and the supplies furnished by the brigade commissary of subsistence for the mess of companies and the hospital.

In an administrative point of view, the regiment had no separate existence; there was no community of interest except in the companies among the men who were fed from the same camp-kettle.

NOTE B, PAGE 82.

If any one wishes to form an idea of the irremediable demoralization that slavery entails, there is no necessity to read romances or pleadings, but only the simple diary kept in Georgia, on the plantation of her husband, by an author who bears a name illustrious in the dramatic annals of England, Miss Kemble. It is the naked truth, such as would strike an observer free from local prejudices; the astonishments and the hopes, even, expressed by the author, are evidences of her good faith. She was struck at first by the contrast between the magnificence of nature and the human wretchedness to be seen there. It was only by degrees, however, that she found out all the evils of which slavery was the source. Being seized with charitable enthusiasm at each sight of the picture, she wished to apply some remedy to it, but each time she stumbled against some new obstacle. It appeared to her that, the power of the master being so great, he might have used it in correcting the abuses of slavery; but on the one hand, the prejudices, the interests, the institutions, which fettered the hands of the masters, and on the other the despondency which has a prostrating effect upon the strongest minds when doomed to a hopeless life of servitude, neutralized all her best intentions. She acknowledged at last that slavery is almost as wretched under a good master as under a bad one. She became convinced, by constantly-recurring examples, of the intelligence of the negro and his aptitude for intellectual improvement, which place him on the same level with ourselves. The moral degradation attributed to him, which was made the miserable pretext for his servitude, was only the natural consequence, as may be seen in every page of the journal, of the condition to which he had been reduced.

A single word placed at the beginning of the book allows us to guess what was the cause which induced the frightful denouement of the pictures, which the author brings abruptly to a close when leaving the plantation for ever. An unholy day arrived when all the slaves were

sold at auction. All the families who had become attached to that estate through their very sufferings, which the authoress has made us acquainted with, were scattered under the hammer of the auctioneer. This simple book bears most conclusive evidence that all that has been said in Europe about the horrors of slavery, and of its influence upon the morals of the whites, was far below the truth; and if we have not dwelt more at length upon this subject, it is because it seemed useless to us to plead in favor of a cause already triumphant.

NOTE C, PAGE 89.

Below is a table, in round numbers, according to the census of 1860, of the population of the principal cities in the slave States. In estimating the forces of the Confederacy, it will be necessary to omit from this list four of the five first-mentioned cities, which were never beyond the Federal authority. They are marked with asterisks:

* Baltimore	212,000 inhabitants.
New Orleans	169,000 “
* St. Louis	152,000 “
* Louisville	70,000 “
* Washington	61,000 “
Charleston	51,000 “
Richmond	38,000 “
Mobile	29,000 “
Memphis	23,000 “
Savannah	22,000 “
Wilmington	21,000 “
Petersburg	18,000 “
Nashville	17,000 “

NOTE D, PAGE 105.

These details, with many others relative to the Confederate army, are taken from a book entitled “Thirteen Months in the Rebel Army,” by W. G. Stevenson, published in 1863. It describes most vividly the situation of the South at the commencement of the war. The author relates, with a degree of simplicity which saves him from all suspicion of exaggeration, his forced enlistment in the Confederate army, the positions he filled, willingly or unwillingly, in the infantry,

the administrative departments, the cavalry, the hospitals, and finally the adventures through which he escaped from those who compelled him to fight against relatives and friends. Notwithstanding the awkward position in which he found himself, and his legitimate aversion for the government whose tyranny he had to undergo, he does not cherish ill feelings against any one, and pays a tribute of respect to the personal qualities of the generals whom he had known. Far from despising the South, he makes known to his fellow-countrymen the resources, the courage, and the energy of their adversaries, in order that they may redouble their efforts to put an end to the war.

NOTE E, PAGE 256.

It would fill an entire library to collect together all that has been written in America on the battle of Bull Run; its slightest incidents have been discussed, commented upon, and presented under the most different phases. It has called forth the most fantastic descriptions on the part of a crowd of eye-witnesses whose judgment and vision had been singularly affected by the excitement of the combat so novel to them. It would be impossible to unravel the truth from among so many contradictory assertions if we had not as guides the official reports of both parties, remarkable for their completeness and the manner in which they agree with each other. This labor has been facilitated for us by the works of two American writers, Mr. Swinton, who has written two accounts of the battle of Bull Run with his wonted sagacity, and Mr. Lossing, the prolific draughtsman and scrupulous narrator.

Finally, the author himself accompanied McDowell a few months after the battle, when the latter visited for the first time since the action the scene of his defeat; and he thus received on the spot, from the mouth of the principal actors, who recognized, with emotions easy to understand, here the route on which they had at first been victorious, there the point where some of their bravest companions had fallen, and farther on a trifling break in the ground, insignificant in appearance, which marked the spot where the rout of their troops had commenced.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

RELATIVE TO THE PRINCIPAL WORKS CONSULTED BY

THE AUTHOR.

Without pretending to give a complete list of the sources from which the author has derived his information in writing the first volume of this history, it is proper to mention the principal publications by which he has been guided in the composition of his work. We will quote, in the first place, "The Rebellion Record," a vast collection of reports, narratives, correspondence, newspaper extracts, prepared at intervals during the war; it requires a certain degree of familiarity with the subject to find out precisely what you are in search of, but it abounds in valuable information. The official documents of both parties are almost invariably distinguished for their general correctness, although frequently too pompous in their style; it would not be safe, however, to rely upon the statements they contain of certain conditions of affairs, except when they bear a confidential character. Unfortunately, these documents are far from being complete. The Navy Department of the Union has published the reports of all its officers *in extenso*; the War Department has only given abstracts of the reports of the Secretary and the commander-in-chief, and only the full reports of the quartermaster-general, which, in a statistical point of view, afford some curious information. A large number of the reports of both parties are to be found in the "Rebellion Record;" there were published besides, in Richmond, in 1864, two volumes of the reports of General Lee and his subordinates, and a few official Confederate documents were reprinted in New York in 1865. Among the numerous documents contained in the Richmond archives, subsequently taken to Washington after the war, there are several of which the author possesses copies, for which he is indebted to the kindness of General Grant. All the depositions received by the "Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War" have been collected into nine volumes which, among interminable repetitions, present some interesting views and much information not to be found elsewhere.

As to the principal works which the author has consulted besides these different collections, he will simply mention their titles, beginning with four publications from which he has borrowed more than from

any other; the first commends itself to our special consideration on account of the conscientious impartiality with which it was written; the others, by the judicious care with which their respective authors made use of the published and unpublished documents they had on hand. These are, "The Pictorial History of the Civil War," by Mr. Lossing; "The American Civil War," three volumes; "Life of General Grant," by his former aide-de-camp, General Badeau, of which only the first volume has appeared; the two books of Mr. Swinton, entitled, respectively, "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," one volume, and "The Twelve Decisive Battles of the War," one volume.

To continue the list of works written from a Union point of view, we will mention, without attempting to classify them, "History of the Rebellion," by Tenney, one volume; "Life of General Grant," by Coppée, one volume; "Life of General Sherman," by Bowman and Irwin, one volume; "Thirteen Months in the Rebel Army," by Stevenson, one volume; "The Volunteer Quartermaster," one volume; "History of the United States Cavalry," by Brackett, one volume; a large number of technical papers in the "American Cyclopædia," a work in four volumes; "Political History of the Rebellion," by McPherson, one volume; "Life of Abraham Lincoln," by Raymond, one volume; "The American Conflict," by Horace Greeley, two volumes.

Among the Confederate publications to which we are indebted we must mention, above all, the works of E. A. Pollard: "The First, Second, and Third Year of the War," three volumes, "The Lost Cause," one volume, and "Lee and his Lieutenants," one volume; the works of J. Esten Cooke: "Life of General Lee," one volume, "Life of Stonewall Jackson," one volume, and "Wearing of the Gray," one volume; and, finally, "The Southern Generals," W. P. Snow, one volume.

The number of works published by Europeans possessing real interest is very limited; it will be enough to mention the remarkable work of M. Vigo Roussillon on "The Military Power of the United States," and the writings of three officers with whom the author had the good fortune to serve in the campaign against Richmond in 1862: "History of the War of Secession," by the Swiss Federal colonel F. Lecomte, two volumes; "History of the American War," by Lieutenant-colonel Fletcher of the British Guards, three volumes; and "Four Years in the Army of the Potomac," by General Régis de Trobriand, two volumes, Paris, 1867. This last work, French in language, in spirit, and in the place of its publication, possesses at the

"Four Years in the Army of the Potomac," by General Régis de Trobriand, two volumes, Paris, 1867. This last work, French in language, in spirit, and in the place of its publication, possesses at the same time, in an historical point of view, all the value of a narrative written by one of the eye-witnesses and actors in the great American drama.

We shall conclude this note with a final reference, which will convey to the reader an idea of the multitude of documents of varied importance and value that have been published on the subject of which we are treating; this is a large quarto volume entitled "Bartlett's Literature of the Rebellion," which appeared in 1866, and is simply a catalogue of all the works relating to the civil war; it contains more than six thousand numbers, and during the last six years the quantity of these works has probably doubled.

In the succeeding pages of our history we shall indicate whatever sources worthy of mention we may have occasion to consult in any subsequent portion of the narrative.

END OF VOLUME I.



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